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ABSTRACT:
This thesis is a study of the domestic influences that led to President
Nixon's decision to seek a new US relationship with the People's Republic
of China. In particular, it concentrates on the role of academics in forcing
a policy debate on China policy and the crucial role that they played in
creating the environment that led to eventual change. The thesis argues
that during the 1960s a climate was created that made it necessary for
Nixon to change policy and that traditional accounts of the subject have
failed to fully appreciate the role of domestic factors in forcing a change of
policy.
This thesis throws light on three areas. Firstly, the development of US
China policy in the post-war years leading up to 1971 and in particular the
domestic influences placed on it. A notable argument of the piece is that
many of the policies later adopted by Nixon were discussed and
promoted during the Presidency of John F. Kennedy and that in the last
year of his life active consideration was given to changing policy.
Secondly, it is a study of Sino-American relations in the 1960s, which
shows the extent to which it was subject to domestic politics. Finally, it is
an exploration of the role of interested academics and the way that they
were able to influence US policy in such a sensitive area and the different
methods that they used to affect and alter policy.
The study has made use of a number of primary archival source
holdings in the United States as well as the transcripts of Congressional
hearings and studies commissioned by the US Government during the
period that informed its China policy. Also, it has made full use of the
secondary sources available on Sino-American relations.
INTRODUCTION: ''THIS SHIFT OF VIEW".
On 24 February 1972 as President Richard Nixon enjoyed the hospitality
of the leaders of the People's Republic of China, the famous Harvard
based China scholar John King Fairbank wrote in the New York Review
of Books that:
A residual ambivalence underlies our post-cold-war view of China.
How come these same Chinese could be such bad guys in the
1950s and such good guys today? This shift of view springs partly
from our own capacity to spring from one to another interpretation
of foreign reality. Our grip on reality in distant places beyond direct
observation is of course weakened by the way we feel. At any
given time the 'truth' about China is in our heads, a notoriously
unsafe repository for so valuable a commodity.1
The nature of this shift in view is the topic of this thesis. The main focus
of the work will be the slow shift in US policy towards China between
1960 and the election of President John F. Kennedy and February 1972.
However, the thesis will also concern itself with the domestic
determinants that brought about this change in policy. Consideration
must and will be given to those individuals and groups who attempted to
influence policy in the sixties and the extent to which their voices were
heard. The conventional view of the famous 'China Opening' carried out
by Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger places the
focus on the years after Nixon's election. However, this dissertation will
try to show the more subtle relationships that existed between
government, academia, and other actors and how they affected the
2change of policy that became so apparent during 1971. The structure of
the dissertation will be to look at Sino- American relations between 1945
and 1972 although the work will focus on the period after 1960. This will
allow a thorough understanding of the basis of the early attitudes of the
US towards the newly created PRe in the 1950s and the manner in which
the hostile policy of that time became established against so much
potential opposition. The thesis will then show how that policy was slowly
undermined and ultimately swept away. In short, it will show how those
bad guys in Beijing became the good guys of 1972. Finally, the thesis will
show how this process took place against a backdrop of major
international events such as the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet split and
the Cultural Revolution.
3CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND: US CHINA POLICY UNTIL 1960.
(i) Background.
Contact between the United States and China during the nineteenth
century was infrequent and associated with the conduct of the European
powers that were in the process of opening up the ancient empire for
trading purposes. The Chinese, with considerable justification, saw this
process as exploitation. America shared the trading interests of the
Europeans as well as their desire to bring Christianity to the "Middle
Kingdom". China was seen as simultaneously a gigantic potential market
for American products as well as a repository of US romanticism and
religious zeal. American traders created commercial bases in the great
port cities of the decaying Chinese empire while American Christian
missionaries tried to bring the dominant western religion to the indifferent
and sometimes hostile mass of ordinary Chinese. These factors would
remain throughout the twentieth century. For example, in 1940 the
Republican Senator from Nebraska, Kenneth Wherry could proclaim that:
"With God's help, we will lift Shanghai up and up, ever up, until it is just
like Kansas City". 1
China became a concern in US foreign policy in the last years of the
nineteenth century as the US began to develop a global role in line with
its growing industrial power. Secretary of State John Hay developed a
policy in 1900 known as the "Open Door". This was based on the belief
that China should be held together politically as a means of creating
social stability and avoiding conflicts amongst the competing European
powers there. This meant that the US was able to maximise its trading
4interests in the area while restraining the ambitions of potential rivals.
The US was also aware of the growing strength of a new regional power
Japan who had adopted many western practices including imperialist
expansion. The open door was predicated on the reality that the US did
not have the means to maintain unilaterally its interests in the region.
Whereas the "Open Door" concept defined the economic attitude of
the US, it was President Theodore Roosevelt who defined its political
approach to the region. This approach would predominate until the
1940s. Roosevelt, a keen believer in power politics, understood that
Japan had vital interests in the region and that the US did not have the
power or will to prevent her from pursuing them. Alternatively, the US
had only peripheral interests, which focussed mainly on the Philippines.
The 1908 Root-Takahira Agreement accepted that Japan should be the
dominant power of the region including the northeast of China and
Manchuria provided it accepted the US dominance of the Philippines. By
that time Japan had seized both Taiwan and Korea and had successfully
defeated Russia at war. Roosevelt saw little alternative but to seek a
surrogate in the region.
As in so much else, Woodrow Wilson adopted a more moralistic tone
in his Asian policy, but beyond verbal condemnation, he did not challenge
the growing Japanese domination of China. At the 1919 Paris Peace
Conference, Chinese aspirations rested on the return of the German zone
of influence around Shantung. The Japanese, who had seized Shantung
from the Germans, also laid claim to it. They demanded it as the price of
their participation in the Peace Conference and Wilson gave it to them to
5the disgust of many Chinese and some Americans including Secretary of
State Robert Lansing.
This policy was continued unchallenged throughout the 1920s and
even into the 1930s as Japan became more openly expansionistic. In
1931, when Japan formally took over Manchuria setting up the Puppet
State of Manchukuo, the US adopted a policy of non-recognition, which in
reality meant accepting Japanese aggression. Only as the Japanese
became allied to the Fascist European powers, Germany and Italy, did
US attitudes change. For the first time, China became a major
consideration in US policy. Assistance was given to the Chinese in their
war effort against the Japanese and the US cemented an alliance with
the Guomindang government of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). In fact,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt envisaged Jiang's China playing a key role as
the major regional power in a post-war world divided up into political
spheres of influence. In short, China would replace Japan as the key US
ally in the region.
The core problem with FOR's strategy was the inability of the
Guomindang to play such a role. The Guomindang were weak, corrupt
and locked in a civil war with the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) led by
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). Little effort was made by them to fight the
Japanese, as Jiang preferred to hold the best troops back for the likely
resumption of the civil war with the communists. The State, War and
Treasury Departments were amongst those who condemned the Chinese
performance. By 1945, FOR had come to accept that Jiang could not
play the regional role set out for him and US policy makers were once
6again forced to look to the defeated Japanese.2
The final players to be considered were the CCP. Up until the 1940s
they did not playa major part in US thinking being regarded amongst
other things as bandits calling themselves communists.3 During the war,
as the US became increasingly exasperated with the failings of the
Nationalists, pressure to develop contacts with the communists emerged.
This culminated with the Venan Mission of 1944 when Foreign Service
Officers went to the Communist stronghold in the north of the country. In
February 1945, these officers sent a memo to the State Department that
bypassed the Pro-Jiang views of FOR's special envoy to China Patrick
Hurley. They argued for a tolerant US view of the Communists based on
their ability and willingness to fight the Japanese. FOR ignored their
pleas and maintained support for Hurley and the existing pro-Jiang policy.
Hurley's bias towards the nationalists hampered any US efforts to
negotiate any peace between the two sides on the ground and in
November 1945 in a dramatic move, Hurley resigned alleging that the
China specialists he had worked with had undermined his preferred policy
by siding with the communists. These allegations would later effectively
destroy the careers of these officers. Amongst those Hurley accused
were John Paton Davies and John Stewart Service who were both in
China at the time and John Carter Vincent who was the Director of the
Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs at the State Department in Washington.4
The defeat of the Japanese merely acted to re-ignite the Chinese Civil
War. FOR's successor in the White House Harry S. Truman, in a move to
stabilise the situation, sent FOR's Chief of Staff George Marshall to China
7to try to broker an agreement between the two warring sides. Marshall
achieved little success and in October 1946 he decided with the
agreement of the Ambassador to China John Leighton Stuart that the
situation was hopeless. It was now clear that the Chinese Civil War
would be fought to the death and it was also highly likely that the
Communists would emerge victorious.
(ii) Truman, Acheson, and the 'Fall' of China.
By this time the US had little remaining confidence in Jiang and his
Nationalist government. It was viewed as corrupt, hopeless and generally
incapable of resisting the more organised communists. In fact, as they
came closer to defeat, Guomindang officials became even more corrupt
in a desperate attempt to protect themselves and provide for their
families. Successive Secretaries of State George Marshall and Dean
Acheson, and the influential head of the Policy Planning Staff George
Frost Kennan, all believed that the Nationalists were not worth defending
and that the Communists, once in power, would be too weak and inward
looking to represent any major threat to US strategic interests. Instead
they preferred to concentrate on the threats posed by the Soviet Union
and economic instability in Western Europe which they felt were far more
real. Truman said of Jiang's government that it "was one of the most
corrupt and inefficient that ever made an attempt to govern a country". 5
From 1947 onwards policy was to be seen to be giving financial aid and
general support to Jiang while ensuring that he took the blame for the
demise of his government.6 The official administration view of the
8collapse of the nationalists in 1949 was the China White Paper released
by the State Department in August of that year. In the letter of transmittal
that was released with the paper Secretary of State Acheson wrote:
The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of
the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of
the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done
within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed
that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has
contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces,
forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A
decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default. 7
Less than two months later on October 1st, Mao declared the formation of
the People's Republic of China and the remnants of the Nationalists fled
to the island of Formosa to the south of China. Acheson anticipated that
the Nationalists would be beaten on Formosa (Taiwan) as well and that
after an initial furore the US would recognise the new Communist
government. In fact, he showed more than a passing interest in the
Formosan Independence movement who were pledged to keeping both
the Communists and Nationalists out.8 The US Government also
anticipated that the People's Republic of China would be an independent
Communist regime rather than a mere satellite of the Soviet Union. As
Philip Sprouse, who in 1949 was Director of the Office of Chinese affairs
at the State Department, later recalled:
the U.S. was engaged (at this time) in what could be described as
a withdrawing and disengaging operation with the prospect that by
9early 1951, with the Communists in possession of Formosa and the
National Government no longer in existence (at least on Chinese
territory), the U.S. Government could seriously consider the
question of recognition.9
This quotation leaves us in little doubt that elements within the
Administration gave serious consideration to developing reasonable
relations with the new government. Even as pressure mounted, the
Administration stuck to its existing position. On 5 January 1950, Truman
told a Press Conference, that the US would not intervene in the Chinese
Civil war, even to save Jiang on Formosa, beyond giving the
Guomindang economic aid. Seven days later, Acheson went even further
in a famous speech to the National Press Club. He outlined where he
believed US interests in Asia lay which were Japan, the Philippines and
the Aleutian Islands and went on to say that Communist China and the
Soviet Union had divergent interests which would eventually lead to a
split between the two.1 0 By the end of 1950, policy and US attitudes
towards the People's Republic of China had changed dramatically.
The Republican opposition had never shared this policy of
disengagement and disillusionment with the Chinese Nationalists.
Instead they looked to the report that General Wedemeyer had made
after a visit to China in the summer of 1947. Wedemeyer, who had
succeeded General Joseph Stilwell as Jiang's Chief of Staff, advocated a
large scale US military and economic aid package for Jiang that would be
dependent on him introducing a package of reforms. Administration
figures were appalled at this report believing that the Nationalists had
10
shown over the previous twenty years that they were incapable of reform.
The Republicans in Congress who saw an issue with which they could
distinguish themselves from the Democrats in an election year took up
the cry for assistance. The Administration who saw no benefit in denying
funds to Jiang agreed $275m in economic aid and another $125m in
military aid that would be paid directly to the Guomindang. Jiang,
believing that the Republicans were likely to win the 1948 Presidential
Election, was happy to rely on the US. When he did flee the mainland for
Formosa, the Republicans began to bitterly condemn the Administration
for failing to protect a US ally against a communist onslaught. The fall of
China, combined with the explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb in
September 1949 and the revelation of Soviet spies in the US, all
combined to weaken fatally the position of the Truman Administration and
led to the excesses of the McCarthy years.11
(iii) The Development of a "China Lobby·.
These Republican attacks on the Truman Administration were fuelled by
the activities of a China Lobby which actively promoted the interests of
the Jiang regime and virulently condemned anybody who was perceived
to be unsympathetic to those interests. Ross Koen, who has written a
major study on the Lobby and their activities, describes:
a well-orchestrated dovetailing of the interests of the China lobby
inner core with the political and social interests of domestic groups
in America ... the basic fear of communism, abroad and at home,
enabled Chiang's agents and their American friends to exploit
II
issues and events to marshall support for Chiang Kai-shek and
attack those critical of his regime.12
Max Ascoli who wrote a two-part report on the lobby for The Reporter
magazine published in April and June 1952 concluded that:
The fall of China invigorated ... a partnership between Chinese and
American factions eagerly involved in the internal politics of each
other's country. The Chinese partners are the agents of a
government that can rule China again only if the United States
destroys Mao's forces in all-out war. The American partners are an
ill-assorted lot - honest men deeply concerned with the plight of the
Chinese people and of Chiang Kai-shek; fanatics possessed by the
nightmare of a Communist conspiracy centering on some of
America's highest leaders; and politicians who will stop at nothing
in their hunt for power.13
The roots of the lobby can be traced back to 1940 when Jiang's notorious
brother-in-law T.V. Soong arrived in Washington to set up a network of
contacts that would maximise Nationalist influence in the United States.
Amongst those who came into contact with Soong was FOR's confidante
Harry Hopkins. As the war ended and the Guomindang were increasingly
under threat from the communists, the activities of the lobby became
more pronounced. Their attacks focussed on the lack of aid being given
to the Nationalists, which they claimed was responsible for their poor
performance and the Wedemeyer Report, which they claimed, was being
suppressed. They also joined the increasing attacks on the Yalta
Agreement where it was claimed that the US had made irresponsible
]2
concessions to the Soviet Union. The 1948 election result, the State
Department White Paper, the conviction of Alger Hiss, the demise of the
Nationalists in China and the reticence of the Administration to back Jiang
all fuelled these attacks. The main thrust of these attacks came from
Congress where Senators such as Owen Brewster of Maine, William
Knowland of California and Congressman William Judd of Minnesota
(who was a former Christian missionary in China) led the attacks on the
Administration. On 9 February 1950, in a speech in Wheeling, West
Virginia, Senator Joseph McCarthy went further when he alleged that
there were 205 known communists in the State Department who were
involved in setting policy. A Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee
chaired by Millard Tydings investigated these claims and McCarthy's
figures, which tended to vary. The subcommittee concluded that they
were "a fraud and a hoax perpetuated on the Senate of the United States
and the American people".14 As a consequence of this, Tydings was
roundly abused and McCarthyite attacks cost him his seat in the midterm
elections of November 1950. The intervention of McCarthy and the
outbreak of the war in Korea seemed to legitimise the more extreme
attacks on the Administration and all of those associated with China
policy. Typical of these attacks was a pamphlet entitled China: Key to the
Orient by Reverend William R. Johnson, which was published in August
1950 and distributed by the American China Policy Association. Using
evidence primarily from the White Paper, Johnson argued that:
There are those who brief presidents, vice-presidents, presidential
representatives, ambassadors and Congressmen relative to the
13
Far East; who are determined that China go Communist. Among
these, as their records and their published writings show are Dean
Acheson, Owen lattimore, Alger Hiss, John Carter Vincent,
Laughlin Currie, John Service, and many others.15
Johnson typified the Lobby's indiscriminate attack on State Department
Officers like Acheson, Service and Carter Vincent; academics like
Lattimore and ex-government employees like Hiss who had virtually no
ties with China policy. By 1950 the main intention of the China lobby and
their supporters was to ensure that the US did not recognise the new
Chinese government and blocked its entry into the United Nations.
Moreover they seemed intent on destroying the careers of the China
specialists who had been critical of Jiang and unwilling to back him
against Mao's communists.16
(iv) 1950: A Key Year.
The activities of the China lobby combined with the actions of the
Chinese Communists pushed the Administration and especially Truman
towards a more hard-line policy. In January 1950, the Chinese
Communists seized US diplomatic buildings and a month later they
signed a far-reaching pact with the Soviet Union. The image of the PRC
as an independent communist nation, along the lines of Tito's Yugoslavia
began to seem less plausible. However, it was the outbreak of the
conflict in Korea and especially the Chinese entry into it in the autumn of
1950 that confirmed the hardening of views. On the night of 25 June
1950, the North Koreans began a concerted attempt to reunify the Korean
14
peninsula by destroying the South Korean government of Syngman
Rhee. Korea, an ancient and homogenous nation for over four thousand
years, had been divided along the Thirty-eighth parallel in 1945 between
Soviet and US backed governments. Truman and Acheson saw the
attack as an attempt by the Soviet Union to use one of its satellites to
alter the balance of the Cold War in East Asia and threaten the key US
ally in the region Japan. Truman's reaction was to militarise the Cold
War. The document NSC (National Security Council) Sixty-eight, which
called for a vast increase in the US military budget was approved as
official policy. Moreover, Truman now decided to protect Jiang on
Formosa by moving the Seventh fleet to the Taiwan Straits that separated
the island from the Chinese mainland. In short this would mean that any
Chinese attack across the Straits would encounter US resistance.
Finally, the US decided to intervene under the auspices of the UN (United
Nations) to save South Korea. The Communists immediately condemned
this provocation and especially the US support for Jiang.17
At first it seemed possible that the North Koreans would defeat the UN
troops as well but a daring landing by the UN at the port of Inchon on the
west coast of Korea in September 1950 altered the balance of the war.
Suddenly, the option of eradicating a communist state presented itself.
The Administration gave the Commander on the ground, General
Douglas MacArthur, orders to invade North Korea provided he did not
encounter either Soviet or Chinese intervention. MacArthur, who needed
little encouragement to go north, started to move his troops with the
intention of reaching the Yalu River that separated China from North
15
Korea. This UN march north brought about a massive Chinese
intervention which became apparent in late November and began a bitter
three-year conflict between the two countries. Traditionally, historians
have argued that the Chinese intervened because they believed that the
US actions threatened their security. However, Chen Jian in a recent
seminal work argues convincingly that Mao saw Korea as an opportunity
to challenge US influence in the region and affirm the new power and
revolutionary spirit of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese attack
shocked the US and in December Truman declared a state of
emergency. US policy to China became implacably hostile with the US
refusing to officially recognise the existence of the PRC and allowing a
Chinese Nationalist delegate to represent China in the United Nations.
Also, the US declared a total economic embargo and in 1951 introduced
restrictions on US allies trading with China. Finally, the Korean War
altered the dynamics of US-Japanese relations. A Peace Treaty was
signed between the two in September 1951 and there can be little doubt
that the war in Korea helped to revitalise the Japanese economy.18
Even though the policy became harsher, the view that China would be
an independent power and have fundamentally different interests than the
Soviet Union remained. The US State Department experts still believed
that an eventual split was likely. The ferociously hostile policy towards
the PRC, it was believed, would push the two communist giants together,
with the eventual result that any tensions between the two that existed
would rise more rapidly to the surface. The public face of this policy was
to claim that the Chinese were little more than tools of Moscow.19 This
16
view was famously put by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs Dean Rusk in a speech before the China Institute on 18 May 1951
in New York. Rusk had been appointed to that position in March 1950
because of his pro-Jiang and anti-CCP credentials. It was felt that the
China Lobby would find it more difficult to criticise him. In the speech,
Rusk, talking to an audience presided over by Life magazine's Henry
Luce, lambasted the PRC:
We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping (Beijing) for what
they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian
government - a slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the
Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not
Chinese. It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of
nations.20
This calculated insult would ensure that Rusk, who would later be
Secretary of State under Kennedy and Johnson, would never be accused
of being soft on Communism especially the Chinese variant. The
reference to Manchukuo, the puppet government set up by the Japanese
in Manchuria, was designed to inflame the Chinese Communists as was
the suggestion that they were little more than a satellite of the Soviet
Union. In reality, even then, Rusk knew that these allegations were
untrue.
The combination of Truman's failure to find a resolution to the war in
Korea and the onslaught of McCarthyite attacks on his administration
took away any electoral hopes that he might have harboured in the
presidential election of 1952. In March, he announced his intention not to
17
stand for re-election. The "fall" of China and its ramifications had
effectively destroyed his Presidency and Sino-American relations had
entered a new and difficult phase characterised by the conflict in Korea
and a violent dislike for one another.
(v) Eisenhower and China.
In January 1953, the famous World War II General Dwight D. Eisenhower
took office. As a Republican, he ended twenty years of Democratic
control of the White House. He was a thoughtful and subtle man who
often hid his intelligence behind a friendly exterior. His appointment as
Secretary of State was John Foster Dulles, a dour man known for his
fierce anticommunist views. Neither had any sympathy for the Chinese
with whom they were locked in war with in Korea. In fact it quickly
became clear that the new Administration was determined publicly at
least to maintain the hostile approach towards the Chinese of their
immediate predecessors. In February 1953, shortly after taking office,
Eisenhower announced the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from the
Taiwan Straits claiming that he would no longer protect the Chinese
mainland from attack by the Nationalists. Moreover to appease the right
wing of the Republican Party, he appointed the ultra hard-liner Walter
Robertson as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
Robertson became the most vocal supporter of Jiang's interests in the
Administration and an impediment to any change in policy.21
Eisenhower and Dulles were also prepared to threaten the Chinese
with the use of nuclear weapons. Shortly after taking office, Eisenhower
18
began to let it be known that he was considering using nuclear weapons
to break the impasse in Korea. These threats had little affect on the
Chinese who knew that public opinion would never allow them to be
carried out. In fact it was Stalin's death in March 1953, rather than
Eisenhower's threats, which created the impetus for a resolution of the
conflict. In 1955, the situation in Indochina and the Offshore Islands crisis
brought forth more threats of nuclear attack. For example, Eisenhower at
a press conference on March 16 declared that atomic bombs were no
different from bullets and should be treated as such. The two Offshore
Islands crises in 1954 and 1958, over two tiny islands Jinmen (Quemoy)
and Mazu (Matsu), just off the coast of the mainland and controlled by the
Nationalists, seemed to sum up for opponents of Eisenhower's China
policy, the dangers that this sort of confrontation posed. The idea that the
US might go to war over two virtually uninhabited little islands with no
strategiC importance was almost too much for many to contemplate. The
hail of criticism was even more intense in 1958 during the second crisis
when the US moved weapons into place to defend the islands. For
example, the Chicago Daily News called the defence of Jinmen Manact of
monumental madness".22
The Administration also developed strategiC alliances with the non-
communist countries of Asia. In particular, in September 1954, SEATO
(South East Asian Treaty Organisation) was formed under US auspices
and in December 1954 the US signed a security pact with the
Nationalists. The terms of the pact meant that the US would defend
Taiwan and the Pescadores in return for which Jiang agreed not to
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launch any attack on the mainland without consulting the US first. It is
not merely accidental that the developmental of this treaty structure
coincided with the beginning of the Chinese shelling of Jinmen on
September 3rd.23
Dulles became the public face of this harsh policy. In the spring of
1954, he attended the Geneva Conference called to try to resolve the
question of Korea amongst others. Dulles made it clear he would not
meet with the Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En-Iai "unless our
automobiles collide" .24 Rumours also abounded that Zhou had
approached Dulles with his outstretched hand who had refused to shake
it. This story became common knowledge to the extent that in February
1972 when Nixon arrived in China he made a big play of publicly shaking
Zhou's hand. Dulles outlined the public face of the China policy in June
1957 when in a speech in San Francisco he stated that:
We can confidently assume that international communism's rule of
strict conformity is, in China as elsewhere, a passing and not a
perpetual phase. We owe it to ourselves, our allies, and the
Chinese people to do all we can to contribute to that passing.25
It was statements like these that seemed to confirm that Eisenhower and
Dulles were unwilling to ever consider any alternatives to the existing
harsh policy. Only in recent years with the opening of the archives has it
been realised that the administration was far subtler in its approach.
Historians such as Gordon Chang, Warren Cohen and Nancy Bernkopf
Tucker have all looked at Eisenhower's China policy and have concluded
that he and Dulles were always more flexible and when pressed were
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prepared to make concessions. Finally, they maintained the view that the
best way to cause a rift in the Sino-Soviet relationship was to isolate the
Chinese.
Even before taking office, Dulles at least, had shown a greater degree
of flexibility towards the new communist government. In his 1950 book
War and Peace, he wrote that: "If the Communist government of China in
fact proves its ability to govern China without serious domestic
resistance, then it, too, should be admitted to the United Nations".26
Once in office, he surrounded himself with advisers who shared his
flexibility, whilst appointing hard-liners like Robertson to the public State
Department positions that dealt with China affairs. This approach insured
Dulles, who had originally been associated with the internationalist wing
of the Republican Party, from attacks from the right. Amongst these more
moderate figures was: Robert Bowie who became Chairman of the Policy
Planning Staff; Livingston Merchant, who despite being Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs had an extensive background in
Chinese affairs having served in Nanjing and U. Alexis Johnson who was
chosen as the negotiator in the Geneva talks with the Chinese in 1955 in
preference to the more hard-line State Department Officers who dealt
with the day-to-day running of China policy. Furthermore, the former US
negotiator in Korea and law partner of Dulles, Arthur Dean was a strong
believer in the idea of two Chinas as he set out in 1955 in an article in
Foreign Affairs.27 The solution that Dulles came up with for China was
the so-called "Two Chinas" approach of supporting and protecting Jiang
on Taiwan as the Republic of China while cautiously developing contacts
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with the mainland government as well. This two China policy could then
be extended to accepting both governments as legitimate representatives
of the Chinese nation. This solution, while totally unacceptable to both
the PRC and Chinese Nationalists, would become the favoured policy of
almost all those who wanted to see the policy of total isolation
abandoned.
Within the development of policy this flexibility towards China was also
apparent. As early as June 1953, serious consideration was given to
adopting a policy of "Two Chinas". When asked about the possibility of a
"Two Chinas" policy at a press conference on 19 January 1955,
Eisenhower replied that it was "one of the possibilities that is constantly
studied".28 Moreover, he had a strong belief that the development of
trading relations with the Communist bloc could facilitate an eventual
thaw. For example, in April 1954, at a NSC meeting he suggested that
trade was the key element in splitting the Soviet Union and the Chinese
away from one another. The Vice-President Richard Nixon promptly
agreed with this.29 In April 1955, after an offer from Zhou En-Iai, the US
accepted the need for talks with Chinese representatives at Geneva. The
Administration ignored criticism from the right wing of the Republican
Party in developing these contacts. Instead both Eisenhower and Dulles
accepted the need for them in light of the Offshore Islands crisis. The
lack of genuine achievement at them would stem from the distance in
attitudes between the two sides mainly on the issue of Taiwan, which the
leaders in Beijing saw as a Chinese province that was being occupied by
the United States. However, these talks at Geneva and Warsaw would
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be the only formal contact between the two nations.3D
The avera" strategy remained one of fermenting a split between the
Chinese and the Soviets by, as Dulles put it in November 1952, "keeping
[Communist China] under pressure which would, in turn, keep the
Communists pressuring Russia for more than Russia would give".31
Both Eisenhower and Dulles disliked the British policy of moderation
towards the Chinese, which the British believed would accelerate any
likely split. A key event that US intelligence reports recorded was a
meeting in Beijing at the height of the Offshore Islands crisis between
Mao and Soviet Premier Khrushchev. At the meeting, Khrushchev urged
the Chinese to moderate their stance towards the United States and
Taiwan, offering them aid to do so. The hostile Chinese stance and the
more conciliatory Soviet behaviour convinced the US Administration that
it was right to see the Chinese as the more extreme power who should be
isolated as we" as showing emerging tensions between the two
communist giants.32
This approach was also necessitated by the lack of a viable
alternative. The other option was some form of contact with the Chinese
Communists with whom officially at least the US was still at war. It was
advised by some within and around the Administration. For example, an
adviser in the State Department Charlton Ogburn, was a firm believer that
the US should overhaul its China policy as a means of splitting the
Chinese away from the Soviets.33 It can be argued that in this climate
such a policy option was politically impossible. Any approach to the
Chinese would have brought down a range of criticism on the heads of
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the Administration, that would have imperilled Eisenhower's re-election in
1956. It would also have led to a diplomatic crisis with Taiwan that would
have had domestic ramifications for the Administration including possibly
rehabilitating the career of Joseph McCarthy. When Arthur Dean did
publicise his views about moderating China policy in early 1954 he was
ferociously attacked by amongst others the Republican Senate Majority
Leader William Knowland. Opinion polls, of the time, showed that the
public supported this anti-Chinese stance. In July 1954, a poll showed
that only seven per cent thought that the PRC should be allowed
representation in the United Nations. Instead, seventy-eight per cent of
Americans opposed such a move and in November 1954 another poll
showed that only five per cent supported the recognition of the PRC
against eighty-two per cent who opposed that.34 It would take a brave or
foolish politician to ignore such polling evidence and Eisenhower was
neither. In short, if the US Administration was tied to a policy of rigidity
towards the PRe that was partly due to public hostility towards the
Chinese Communists. The strategy of making the PRC more and more
reliant on the Soviet Union had one advantage over any other course of
action: it was the only approach acceptable to the American public.
Even within this hostile climate pressure was placed on the
Administration to modify its China policy especially in 1957 after
Eisenhower's re-election. These pressures came mainly from allied
governments who wished to develop trading relations with the Chinese
Communists. In 1957, the US was forced to accept a decision by the
British to open trading relations in non-strategic goods with the PRC and
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in July the Japanese moved to full trading relations in non-strategic goods
with their traditional trading partner.35 The actions of the British and
Japanese began to stir up domestic American politicians and
businessmen. For example, US textile owners began to lean on the
government and Southern Congressmen to support the redirecting of
Japanese textile products to China instead of the United States. The
Senate Majority Leader and presidential aspirant Lyndon Johnson of
Texas was amongst the politicians who called on the Administration to
reconsider its China policy and in January 1957 Henry Ford II called on
the US to consider developing trading relations with the Chinese.36
These statements received widespread coverage and support. Under
this pressure Eisenhower took some slight steps to modify policy and to
ensure that non-strategic trade with the PRC was not hindered. In 1957
he modified the most controversial sections of the Battle Act which paved
the way for the Japanese and British decisions and in July 1958 he
agreed to allow foreign subsidiaries of US companies to trade with the
PRC. This move occurred after the Chinese had made an order to the
Canadian subsidiary of Ford which both the company and the Canadian
government was desperate to fulfil. The Chinese decision to renew their
shelling of the Offshore Islands in August 1958 and the US decision to
respond with a heavy military build-up in the area brought these gestures
to a halt.37
Dwight Eisenhower left office in January 1961 with US policy towards
the People's Republic of China virtually unchanged from the hostile policy
that he had inherited. The PRC was still excluded from the United
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Nations and the US Government publicly continued to recognise Jiang
Jie-shi on Taiwan as the official leader of the Chinese mainland.
Contemporary commentators have lambasted Eisenhower's China policy
as intransigent, unimaginative and even at times dangerous. For
example, Roger Hilsman, who later became Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs under Kennedy and who would deal directly with
China policy condemned Eisenhower's approach as "a policy stance
composed more of myth and rigidity than of realism and f1exibility".38
Academics such as the distinguished political scientist Norman Graebner
have concurred with this perspective.39 Although, it is easy to be critical
of Eisenhower's policy, it is important to take into account certain factors.
Firstly, there was little alternative to a policy of hostility towards the PRC.
A combination of domestic conservatives and the influence of Jiang on
Taiwan and the China Lobby would have made any approaches to Beijing
unsustainable. The political price of an alteration in China policy in the
1950s was simply not worth paying given the hostility of the Chinese
Communists towards the United States. Leonard Kusnitz, who has
studied the affects of public opinion on China policy argues that public
opinion would have prevented any change in policy even if the
Eisenhower Administration had been so disposed.40 A second factor
was the belief that the way to facilitate a Sino-Soviet split was to push the
two nations together. The lack of viable alternatives at this stage
obviously increased the attractiveness of the strategy and indeed the
commitment of both Eisenhower and Dulles towards it. Finally, many of
the critics of Eisenhower's China policy fail to see its subtlety. For
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example, although the Administration did frequently refer to a Communist
monolith, which supposedly emanated from Moscow, the reality was that
they understood the differences of strategic interests that existed
between the Soviet Union and the PRC. Commentators, at the time,
failed to dig below the surface of Administration rhetoric and identify the
real factors that stopped either Eisenhower or Dulles pursuing their
preferred eventual option of "Two Chinas". It can be argued that some of
the criticism of the Administration's policy is unfair and ignores the
restrictions that they operated under. However, the key point that must
be made about contemporary critics like Roger Hilsman and other
members of the Kennedy Administration, who worked on China policy
and condemned their predecessors, was that they started from the
premise that Eisenhower had missed an opportunity to pursue a more
moderate stance that might reap dividends. Over the years from 1961
until 1963 they would get the opportunity to put their alternative ideas
forward.41
That is not to say that there were not some legitimate criticisms of the
Eisenhower Administration in this area. The linking of the containment of
China with the US commitment to Indochina inhibited the attempts of
Eisenhower's successors to change China policy as well as being a factor
in the disastrous US intervention in Vietnam. Also, the aggressive
rhetoric of the Administration made it harder for them or their successors
to begin the slow process of educating the public into accepting a
softening of the American stance towards the Chinese. Another notable
factor, as Gordon Chang has convincingly shown, was that the
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Eisenhower Administration was shot through with a pervading racism that
undoubtedly affected their China policy. This racial bias meant that the
Administration were not dispassionate in their instinctive perceptions of
the Chinese. "Signs of flexibility on China's part could easily be
dismissed as Asian trickery," writes Chang, "On the other hand Chinese
hostility seemed to confirm Asian fanaticism".42 For example, in his
memoirs, Eisenhower described the Chinese as variously "hysterical",
"irrational" and "fanatical" while he wrote of the Soviet leaders that "no
matter what differences in culture and tradition, values or language, the
Russian leaders were human beings and they wanted to remain alive" .43
Eisenhower's need to state this works on the hidden assumption that
there may be others in the world who may not want to remain alive. It is
therefore not surprising given these racial assumptions that the
Administration looked towards the Soviet Union as the more moderate
power with whom one could negotiate. Finally, as in other areas such as
Civil Rights for African-Americans in the United States and the emerging
imbroglio in Vietnam, Dwight Eisenhower left office at just the right
moment to allow his reputation to remain intact. The growing criticism of
his China policy and the more aggressive stance of the Soviet Union
under Khrushchev in the years from 1957 and the Soviet launch of the
Sputnik rocket created a desire for the reconsideration of all areas of US
policy especially concerning the so-called great powers. It would be left
to Eisenhower's young and dynamiC successor John Fitzgerald Kennedy
to grapple with these problems.
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(vi) Conclusion
During the course of the twentieth century, US policy towards China had
gone through a number of changes. Up until the late 1930s, China had
been a minor consideration of US policy makers who believed that the US
did not possess the power or will to exert itself in the East Asian region
beyond the Philippines. Instead, China was a preserve of adventurous
missionaries and traders who travelled to a distant land. The Japanese
invasion of the Chinese mainland and the Japanese alliance with Nazi
Germany and Fascist Italy made China an important theatre in the global
battle against the Axis powers. Jiang became a key US ally during World
War II and Franklin Roosevelt even envisaged China becoming the major
regional power in Asia in place of Japan. The reality of Jiang's weakness
and the eventual collapse of his government on the Chinese mainland
meant that the US was forced to look once again to the Japanese as the
major regional power. Initially, the US had hoped to come to terms with
the new Communist government but Chinese actions and domestic
pressure at first delayed any US acceptance of the new government and
the Korean War ensured that the US became deeply hostile to the PRe.
Eisenhower inherited this policy of total isolation and made only minor
adjustments including the development of pacts such as SEATO and a
reliance on atomic diplomacy. His China policy was regarded as too
conservative and in desperate need of change by many observers. By
the end of his administration new influences were emerging on US policy
towards China that during the 1960s would playa part in laying the
foundation for Nixon's opening to China.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES IN
THE UNITED STATES.
(i) World War II
Just as the Second World War fundamentally altered US policy towards
China, it also led to the development of a fully-fledged academic
discipline in the United States. Before the war there had only been about
fifty academics working in the field of Far Eastern or East Asian studies
and many of those regarded themselves primarily as historians or
linguists rather than area specialists. The war changed all of that. The
war in Asia created a desperate need for government officers with
language skills in Japanese and Chinese to teach others and to work on
the ground in the battle theatre. Moreover, the war linked up government
and academics and their institutions as all worked together in the national
interest of winning the war in the Pacific. The war also created the
opportunity and incentive for the elite universities to establish East Asian
centres that would maintain this new and much in demand specialisation.
This was not only the case with Asian specialists. For example, at the
.end of the war, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) scholars at the
Russian desk left to found Harvard's Russian Research Center. This
linkage also created the relationship between the discipline of area
studies and its influence on foreign policy. These new area studies had
been formed with US foreign policy in mind, especially ensuring that in
the new internationalist era of the post war world, US leaders and
advisers would not lack specialist advice. Anti-Communist military
strategists would dominate the field of Russian studies. Asia specialists
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were not as government orientated as their Russia counterparts with
many of the most prominent of these scholars such as John King
Fairbank and Edwin Reischauer being primarily historians whom events
brought to the rore.l
John King Fairbank was to become the most famous China scholar.
Originating from the mid west, he had spent his early graduate years in
China during the 1930s where he had further developed his love and
fascination for Chinese culture and history, as well as a dislike for the
Guomindang government. During the war, he worked for the government
spending a year each in Chungking and Nanking and working in the OSS
Office in the FE section of the Office of War Information (OWl) under a
fellow academic and rival George Taylor. The two men disagreed
strongly on the merits of Jiang with Taylor being a strong supporter of the
Generalissimo. At the end of the war, he returned to Harvard where in
conjunction with Reischauer he set up a popular degree course in East
Asian civilisation. He also assembled a research group who took a joint
degree in History and Far Eastern languages. In 1955, all of this became
the East Asian Research Center and in 1977, on Fairbank's retirement, it
was renamed the John K. Fairbank Center for East Asia Research.2
James Peck regards Fairbank and Reischauer as the two major figures in
the development of this field: Fairbank as its founder and Reischauer as
its chief populariser.3 Reischauer wrote about his colleague thus:
He (Fairbank) was an indefatigable writer, or rather dictator, of
memoranda and letters, a skilled raiser of funds, and a wily
academic politician, who was deeply entrenched in the Harvard
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community and knowledgeable about the levers of power.4
The two men set about making Harvard the central institution for this new
area attracting funding and top students who became the East Asia
specialists of the next era. The growth of Harvard as the most important
centre for East Asia studies was helped by the decline and crisis that
befell the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR).
Before World War" the main promoter of East Asia studies was the
IPR which had been formed in Honolulu in 1925. It held conferences and
sponsored publications whilst as an organisation maintaining a neutral
political stance. The IPR had a Pacific Council that acted as its main
international co-ordinator and issued the journal Pacific Affairs. There
were also national chapters including an American one that published its
own journal: The Far Eastern Survey. The IPR encouraged free thinking
and an exchange of views between academics of different nationalities: a
highly innovative approach that subsequently got them into trouble. The
most famous academic associated with the organisation was Owen
Lattimore, then based at Johns Hopkins University, who edited Pacific
Affairs for much of the 1930s. Fairbank was a trustee of the American
branch from 1946 until it disbanded and would continue to defend its
work.5 It can be suggested that even without the attentions of Senator
Joseph McCarthy and the China Lobby the IPR would have declined
anyway. As area studies in US universities grew, met governmental
needs, maintained student's interest and attracted funds, establishments
such as Harvard began to supplant the IPR as the main organising body
of publications and conferences in the field. The development of another
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organisation the Far Eastern Association (FEA) was indicative of the way
in which the East Asian studies field was developing in the US.
In 1941, a non-membership group was formed with the sole aim of
publishing the Far Eastern Quarterly. At the end of the war, the
Committee on Far Eastern Studies supported by the American Council of
Learned Societies and chaired by Knight Biggerstaff of Cornell University
looked at ways in which the discipline could expand. One
recommendation was the creation of an explicitly American orientated
organisation that would deal solely with East Asia as opposed to the
existing American Oriental Society (AOS) whose area of interest ranged
primarily over the Middle East, although it also covered all of Asia. This
led, in January 1948, to meetings held by Asia scholars with a view to
forming their own membership-based organisation. Three months later,
on April 2 1948, approximately two hundred members agreed to form the
Far Eastern Association. Distinguished academics Arthur Hummel of the
Library of Congress and Robert Hall of the University of Michigan were
elected President and Vice-President respectively. Nine directors,
including George Taylor now based at the University of Washington, were
appointed with staggered terms. John King Fairbank became the editor
of the monograph series associated with the FEA and his wife Wilma
became its secretary. 6 The nascent organisation at this initial meeting
set out its aims and objectives that included creating "a scholarly,
nonpolitical, and nonprofit professional association of all persons
interested in the study of the Far East"} The FEA would promote study
of East Asia and publications and general research as well as dialogue
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with other interested individuals in Canada and abroad. These aims
reflected the growth of an explicitly US branch of East Asia studies that
would lessen the need for the IPR to be active in the United States.
Furthermore, the non-political nature of the FEA ensured that it rarely
became involved in the battles that existed between members of the
profession as McCarthyism wrenched it apart. Charles Hucker, who has
written a study of the FEA, labels the period between 1949 and 1955 "the
era of consolidation" for the organisation.8 For example, in 1954, it
formally joined the American Council of Learned Societies and
membership continued to grow albeit slowly.9
(ii) The profession and McCarthyism.
It is impossible to understate the extent to which the onset of
McCarthyism and the vendettas and bitterness that it unleashed tore
apart this new academic discipline. As Paul Evans has written:
the IPR hearings unleashed a storm of personal antagonisms far
beyond the confines of normal academic discourse. Scholar
criticized scholar in destructive fashion. Legitimate academic
controversies were aired under conditions that sensationalized
them, polarized the participants, and brought into question the
loyalty, as well as the integrity, of many of those involved. An
intellectual community previously characterized by cohesion,
optimism, and pursuit of a common goal was savagely rent
apart.10
The effect of this civil war within the profession was to warp the discipline
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for a generation and to stifle the views of many of those who would have
criticised the US policy of total isolation of China in its early years.
Moreover, academics learned to modify their views to insure themselves
from attack.
The roots of the split can be found in World War" and the assessment
of the Guomindang government. In fact, most commentators divide the
scholars into two main groups. Ben Lee Martin terms them the "Liberals"
and "Conservatives· .11 The main group was the Liberals associated
primarily with Harvard and including Fairbank and Reischauer. Other
notable academics that can be categorised broadly as belonging to the
Liberal school included Owen Lattimore and Benjamin Schwartz of
Harvard. These academics felt very little sympathy for the plight of the
Guomindang and saw no reason for US intervention to prop up his ailing
administration. They saw Jiang and his immediate circle as being corrupt
and incompetent. They also thought that it was unlikely that the US could
affect the outcome of the civil war. Finally, they believed that any new
Chinese communist government would almost certainly be independent
of Moscow. In short, these academics believed that left to its own
devices the Guomindang Government would collapse and that there was
little that the US could or should do to try to prevent this outcome.12
John King Fairbank's views were typical of this liberal perspective. Even
during the war, he had been deeply critical of the Generalissimo labelling
his government "proto-fascisr and critically translating Jiang's book
China's Destiny and describing it as "a pernicious use of history for
political purposes·.13 In his memoirs, he recalled the development of his
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thinking:
Ever since 1943 I had believed revolution was probably
unavoidable in China. The collapsing urban economy and the KMT
(KuoMinTang) corruption and repression visible in 1945-6
confirmed me in this view. When the Marshall mediation began to
collapse too, it became urgent to warn the American public not to
back CKS (Chiang Kai-Shek) and his right-KMT, who were so
busily digging their own graves and trying to pull us in with them.14
In 1946, he wrote that Jiang's "brand of democracy is not ours, any more
than is Mao Tse-tung's".15 In June 1946, with his wife, he visited the
communists' temporary capital at the time, Kalgan, to assist in the
selection of four communist academics that were to visit the United
States. Whilst there, he maintained friendly relations with the communist
functionaries he encountered, who joked with him that the US should
send its: "Lincolns and Washingtons rather than its Wedemeyers and
Hurleys" to China.16 They also made it clear to him that they would like
to develop cultural relations with the United States.17 Fairbank
remembered this and the development of cultural relations between the
two nations remained a central tenet of his later attempts to influence
government policy. Back in the United States, Fairbank became even
more outspoken in his condemnation of Jiang. In November 1948, in the
Foreign Policy Association Bulletin, he wrote:
The Chinese Communist program may indeed be cynically
ruthless, economically unsound, swayed by Moscow, and feared
by many Chinese. Compared with the overall Kuomintang
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program, it remains preferable from the point of view of the great
majority of poor peasants ... The demoralization of Kuomintang
China is likely to become accelerated. Material aid from the United
States cannot stop this process. Foreign arms and food for the
police will not maintain a Chinese regime once it has clearly lost
the tacit acquiescence of the population - in old parlance, the
Mandate of Heaven. The fact is that Chiang Kai-shek has had
twenty years in which to compete with communism for the support
of the Chinese peasantry, and he has lost.18
Privately, he was even more scathing. In 1949 he wrote that:
I think the Communist regime holds more promise for the Chinese
people than any continuation of the present Nationalist regime
would ... Since the Chinese Communists have doctrines very
similar to those of communists elsewhere, this indicates what an
extremely bad government the recent one finally degenerated into
before its collapse.19
In support of these views, Fairbank wrote dozens of articles and reviews
and maintained correspondence in and with the New York Times,
Washington Post and New York Herald Tribune who all took an editorial
line that shared his scepticism towards the Jiang regime.20 The
consistent theme of these pieces, as well as the failure of the
Guomindang, was the indigenous roots of the CCP and the social
revolution that he believed was taking place in China at the time. Central
to this revolution, as far as he was concerned, was the need for the
modernisation of China from a bureaucratic and conservative state that it
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had historically been, into a more modern and dynamic society. Fairbank
believed that the CCP might be the agents of this modernisation, which
meant that their advent to power was not so disastrous after all.
Furthermore, he believed and emphasised in his writings, that liberal
Americans had no Chinese counterparts. Neither the Guomindang nor
the CCP were liberal in their philosophy or conduct of power and that it
was worthless hoping that Jiang might become more liberal in time.21
He was quick to place all of this in a Chinese setting. Fairbank professed
no sympathy with communism in America regarding himself as a liberal
Democrat. To that end, he actively supported and worked with Arthur
Schlesinger Jr's Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). In fact, he
emphasised his anti-Communism, rationalising that this would protect him
when expressing his more controversial views on China.22
The second and smaller group, who can more accurately be termed
as the "Conservatives", were often associated with the University of
Washington and their main spokesman was George Taylor. These
academics were altogether more hostile to the events unfolding in China
and the Communists. They believed that a failure of US policy had
caused this Communist success. They also argued that the civil war in
China was crucial in the global struggle between capitalism and
communism. In short, Jiang's defeat would affect the contest between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Aside from Taylor, other China
academics that can be characterised as conservatives included David
Nelson Rowe and Richard Walker of Yale, Karl Wittfogel at Washington
and William McGovern and Kenneth Colegrove both based at
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Northwestern University.23 Their view in the early years was not heard in
comparison to the liberal perspective in public, in governmental circles or
even within academia. Up until approximately 1949, most of the
academic commentaries on the Civil War recommended that the US stay
out and leave Jiang to his fate. This enraged the China Lobby who
identified the academic profession as one of its chief targets. This
attention from the Lobby dovetailed with the growing rage of these
conservative academics that felt that the majority of their colleagues were
unfairly maligning Jiang. Furthermore, they began to question the
motives of colleagues whom they saw empathising with the CCP and
condemning Jiang. They were especially suspicious of Owen
Lattimore.24 This dispute within the profession had been held over from
the war where government service had necessitated unity. By 1948 that
unity had broken down as Jiang's position had deteriorated rapidly and
the academics were dispersed to their own institutions.25 Finally, it
should be noted that the views and actions of these groups of academics
shared the views of the political establishment. The liberal perspective
was consistent with the Truman Administration's view of the China
Revolution, as expressed in the White Paper of August 1949, whilst the
conservative perspective converged with the Republican criticisms of the
Ad ministration.
As early as June 1944, the magazine The China Monthly, which acted
as a mouthpiece for pro-Guomindang views, attacked a "group of Harvard
professors" whom it saw as being associated with the CCP.26 Also in
1944, Alfred Kohlberg, a businessman and fierce anti-Communist, began
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to target the IPR of which he was an active member. For example, he
would later claim that "the lies about the Chinese Government and Army
were Communist propaganda; and that the main source for spreading
them in the country was the Institute of Pacific Relationsn.27 Kohlberg's
activities fuelled the China Lobby by providing them with an identifiable
target. He would remain a member of the IPR until 1947 when he failed
in an attempt to get a committee set up to investigate his allegations of
procommunist bias.28 As early as November 1945, Senator Wherry
accused Lattimore during a speech in the Senate of being a
communist.29 This was only the beginning of a sustained onslaught led
by The China Monthly on publications and individuals that were anti-
Jiang. Over the next few years, books critical of the Guomindang
received hostile reviews and a series of books and pamphlets were
published rebutting the views of men like Fairbank and Edgar Snow who
were particularly targeted along with lattimore. Amongst the journals
attacked for their viewpoint were Collier's, The Saturday Evening Post,
Harper's, Atlantic Monthly, The Saturday Review, the Nation, the New
Republic and the review sections of the New York Times and New York
Herald Tribune.30 Senator Owen Brewster later claimed that from about
1945 onwards reviews in the Herald Tribune and Times were openly pro-
Communist.31 To counter this supposed communist bias a new
organisation; the American China Policy Association was set up that was
ardently pro-Jiang.32 When Kohlberg left the IPR he promptly joined this
new organisation. Freda Utley succinctly put the view of the
conservatives and their allies in the China lobby in her 1951 book The
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China Story:
Most newspapers, and nearly all other media of public information,
so far as China was concerned, were firmly in the hands of a
minority of writers, professors, and lecturers representing the pro-
Chinese Communist views of the State Department.33
This quotation neatly emphasises one of the central tenets and questions
of the Lobby/Conservative argument with the prevailing Liberal view.
Given the dominance of the view that the Nationalists were incompetent
and corrupt and that little could or should be done to save them, both
within the US Government and academic communities, then how could
so many people be so wrong? The answer had to lie in their motives.
They would be portrayed as either communists themselves or stooges of
communists. It took the intervention of Joseph McCarthy to bring this line
of attack to the mass of ordinary Americans.34
After his Wheeling speech, McCarthy discovered that he had few
concrete names within the State Department that he could openly accuse
of being communist. The person that he decided to focus on was Owen
Lattimore. On March 30 1950, he named Lattimore on the Senate floor
and subsequently Lattimore became the star witness before the Tydings
Committee set up to investigate McCarthy's allegations.35 The
Committee concluded that: "There is no legal evidence before us
whatever to support this charge and the weight of all other information
indicates that it is not true".36 This did not stop McCarthy and members
of the lobby from repeating the charges and focusing on Lattimore and
the IPR. The accusations against Lattimore and other academics and
41
writers was often not that they were agents of the Soviet Union or the
American Communist Party but that they took a communist line in their
writing and made policy pronouncements that aided the CCP.
Consequently, it was not enough not to be an agent or member of the
American Communist Party. The view of one's loyalty depended on their
writing and particularly their view of Jiang and the Guomindang. After all,
so this view went, any criticism of Jiang and his government, would give
succour to the CCP. Moreover, if your view had helped to shape US
policy or had even dovetailed with it then you shared responsibility in the
CCP success.37 Whereas the Democrat majority in the Senate protected
these writers in 1950, as evidenced from the findings of the Tydings
Committee, after November 1950 and the election of a Republican
majority in the Senate, they were exposed to the full vengeance of the
China Lobby. On February a 1951 the IPR had its files seized. On July
25 1951, the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee under the Chairmanship of Senator Pat McCarran, a
Democrat from Nevada but a hard-line McCarthyite nonetheless, began a
new investigation that focused on the IPR and Lattimore.3a The
McCarran hearings followed the model of the more famous McCarthy
hearings where witnesses were berated and an atmosphere of
accusation and incrimination prevailed. Eight former Communists and
three so-called former Soviet officials were amongst those accusing the
IPR, Lattimore and others of communist leanings. No major figures from
within the Truman Administration were called to testify on the extent of
the supposed influence that men like Lattimore had had on policy. The
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academics who appeared before the Committee to condemn the IPR and
their colleagues were McGovern, Colegrove, Rowe, Taylor and
Wittfogel.39 John Thomas who has written a major study of the IPR
wrote:
In one sense their testimony was a reflection of the deep divisions
among Asian specialists which were finally breaking into the open
after years of surface calm. But the method in which the divisions
were expressed was an indication of the bitterness that had
gradually infected the East Asian scholars since the development
of the Cold War and the establishment of a Communist China.40
Again Lattimore was the star witness. He appeared before the
Committee for thirteen days and was fiercely critical of it and its methods.
For its part, the Committee's members accused him of being
procommunist and having played a major part in influencing the Truman
Administration's decision not to give more support to Jiang.41 Fairbank
was fervent in his support for his colleague's integrity although at times he
questioned his judgement. In August 1951, he issued a statement to the
Committee defending Lattimore and took time out of his academic work to
help with the latter's defence.42
Fairbank himself was attacked by Louis Budenz. Budenz was a
former communist who took a major part in the hearings. He claimed that
Fairbank was a former Communist party officer. David Rowe waded in by
claiming that Fairbank had ·unquestioned sympathy" for the CCP and
Colegrove and Wittfogel were also critical of the most famous member of
the so-called liberal school.43 Colegrove focused on a round table
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discussion of twenty-four academics organised by the State Department
in October 1949 to discuss the CCP victory, which recommended early
recognition of the new government. Colegrove recalled that the group
could be sub-divided into two factions: those who were pro-American,
such as himself and those who were pro-Communist including
Fairbank.44 To clear his name, Fairbank attended a special session of
the Committee on March 12 1952, where a virtuoso performance notable
for its accommodationist attitude, ensured that the Committee cleared
him of all the charges.45 He was not so conciliatory towards Colegrove.
He wrote to an old friend Payson Wild, who was then a Vice-President at
Northwestern University, bringing to his attention Colegrove's association
with the Japanese scholar and known communist Ikuo Oyama.46 Such
was the acrimony to which the profession had descended. Another
academic Harold Isaacs said that conferences at this time resembled the
Protestant-Catholic debates of the sixteenth century.47 The final report
issued by the McCarran Committee on July 2 1952 was deeply critical of
the IPR and Lattimore and was almost indiscriminate in naming
academics who it felt had not been impartial in their treatment of China.
The IPR was condemned as an instrument of Moscow that had been
critical in changing US policy towards China to the benefit of the CCP.
The report claimed that Lattimore was a "consclous, articulate instrument
of the Soviet conspiracy" and that he was "influential in bringing about a
change in United States policy in 1945 favorable to the Chinese
Communists". It also claimed that he had "knowingly and deliberately
used the language of books and articles ... In an attempt to influence the
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American public by means of pro-Communist or pro-Soviet content of
such writings".48 The full Senate as we" as the McCarran Committee
recommended to the Justice Department that lattimore be prosecuted for
perjury. He was later indicted before a grand jury on five counts of
perjury but never tried. Three years later the Department decided to
dismiss the case. lattimore's career was ruined and he left the United
States to take up a post at the University of leeds in Britain.49 For the
Canadian scholar E. Herbert Norman the price was even greater. A
socialist, he "was hounded into committing suicide" according to
Reischauer.50 For Fairbank and others the price was not so heavy. The
offers of book reviews stopped as did the contacts with government.
Academics learnt to avoid writing about the current state of Sino-
American relations. Fairbank, who fervently believed that China scholars
should make the area a major focus of concern, only published seventy-
five pages on the subject between 1952 and 1960.51 Moreoverwriting
was often warped to protect the author. As Fairbank recalled in his
memoirs: "It became second nature to indicate at the beginning of an
article, by some word or phrase that one was safely anticommunist".52
This split between China academics would never heal and would be
exposed again during the 1960s.
The IPR, as a consequence of the McCarran hearings, went into
terminal decline. Between 1925 and 1950 it had a total net income of
$2,536,000 of which 50 per cent came from foundations, 33 per cent from
industrial and corporate contributions, 12 per cent from publications sales
and 5 per cent classed as other sources. In 1951, funds given to the IPR
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totalled $30,000 and a year later the total funds were $15,000.
Thereafter, foundations such as the Foreign Policy Association, Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR), and Ford Foundation that had been so
generous in the past stopped giving any funds to the IPR.53 This switch
partly reflected the growth of East Asian centres at top US universities but
primarily it had to do with the notoriety attached to the IPR. In 1951 the
net income of the IPR was $77,000, by 1956 that had dropped to
$13,000. Its membership declined in the same period from 933 to 341.54
Consequently, the IPR was disbanded in 1961 with Pacific Affairs being
purchased by the University of British Columbia and The Far Eastern
Survey by the University of California in Berkeley.55
The FEA was more fortunate. It was attacked by Kohlberg, who had
attended its organisational meeting in April 1948, and Rowe who claimed
that it was little more than a front for the IPR, and that it was run by an
interlocking directorate of people involved with both organisations. 56
However, its neutrality ensured that the McCarran Committee did not
overtly attack it and it survived the McCarthyite experience virtually
unscathed. More importantly, the FEA remained dominated by the
"Liberal" perspective. For example, no scholar from the University of
Washington was ever elected President of the organisation compared to
both Fairbank and Reischauer from Harvard.57 However as Richard
Kagan writes, Asia scholars were forced to become what he calls
"apolitical-objective", avoiding contentious issues or expressing
controversial opinions. 58 This would later make it harder for these
scholars to question the US action in Vietnam and to work more
46
surreptitiously in attacking the prevailing US China policy.
The next strategy, orchestrated by the Congress, was to attack the
sources of funding of the IPR and the discipline, namely the foundations.
A House Committee under Congressman Reece looked into the activities
of the foundations and reached a number of ominous conclusions. The
Reece Committee did not just criticise the IPR and Asia scholars but also
the whole basis of academic study in the United States and the concept
of internationalism, which they believed was being promoted by the
foundations.
"However well-meaning the advocates of complete internationalism
may be," concluded the Committee, "they often play into the hands
of the Communists. Communists recognize that a breakdown of
nationalism is a prerequisite to the introduction of Communism.59
The report also concluded that:
Alertness on the part of the Rockefeller and Carnegie trustees, and
expenditure of the time necessary to see to the use made of the
public's money by IPR might have saved China from the
Communists and prevented the war in Korea.60
The Committee was critical by name of the Rockefeller Foundation, the
Carnegie Endowment, Ford Foundation, Marshall Field Foundation,
Garland Fund, John Simon Guggenheim Foundation, Heckscher
Foundation, Robert Marshall Foundation, the Rosenwald Fund and the
Phelps Stokes Fund. The Committee Report also attacked what it saw as
the co-ordinating organisations of this funding and internationalism. The
organisations criticised included the American Council of Learned
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Societies, Social Science Research Council, the American Council on
Education as well as the hapless IPR. Finally, the Committee attacked
the elite foreign policy organisations that it believed were supporting this
internationalism. Amongst those attacked were the Council on Foreign
Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the American Friends Service
Committee and even the British Royal Institute of International Affairs.61
The most interesting facet of the report must be this naming of the foreign
policy establishment and its intellectual networks. It can be suggested
that this was not just an attack on China policy but the whole political
establishment that had been responsible for the internationalism pursued
by the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. The report
reflected the right wing nationalistic opposition to US foreign policy, as it
had been constituted since the Second World War. Not surprisingly, this
report was resisted more vigorously with a minority report being published
by members of the Committee condemning its conclusions.62 By
December 1954, and the report's publication, McCarthyism was on the
wane with the Senator himself having been censured by the Senate and
his practices widely discredited. In short, the attacks on the Asia area
studies profession had now reached and passed its peak.
All of this took place within the context of the wider McCarthyite
attacks on government officers and people within the entertainment
industry. Those involved in the making of China policy in the 1940s were
now exposed to the full force of the China Lobby. On December 12 1951,
the State Department Loyalty Review Board expressed "reasonable
doubt" about the loyalty of John Service who was subsequently dismissed
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by the government.63 Although, Service was able to overturn this
decision in the courts eight years later, it ruined his diplomatic career.64
For the China Lobby, this was their first great success as well as firm
evidence that disloyalty existed within the State Department. Next up
was O. Edmund Clubb who was cleared by the Board after the personal
intervention of Dean Acheson but was forced into immediate
retirement.65 In December 1952, the Board concluded that reasonable
doubt also existed as to the loyalty of John Carter Vincent. The new
Secretary of State Dulles cleared him but also forced him into
retirement. 66 The final victim was John Paton Davies who had somehow
managed to survive these repeated loyalty hearings. On May 27 1953, a
new Executive Order No 10450 changed the criteria of the Board's
evaluation to speculating on an individual's reliability and trustworthiness.
In August 1954, Davies failed this new test and the State Department
Loyalty Board recommended his dismissal.67 None of these people had
ever been proven communists, instead they had merely been critical of
Jiang and the Guomindang and in the era of the early 1950s such
criticisms of the Chinese Nationalists called into question one's loyalty.
The removal of these men also affected the conduct of US policy towards
China. Hard-line supporters of Jiang replaced the most knowledgeable
men on the subject and few State Department officers would be willing to
challenge the existing ethos. John King Fairbank concludes that these
events had a far more unhappy result in the longer term. In his memoirs
he writes that:
If anyone of these three (Service, Clubb or Davies) had been
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assistant secretary of State for East Asia in place of officials
without much Asian background at the time President Johnson was
getting us mired in Vietnam, the fate of the American people might
have been far happier.68
It must be said that if that were the case then the fate of the Vietnamese
people would have been happier still. In conclusion, by the mid-1950s,
the most ferocious affects of the China Lobby and McCarthyism had been
spent but it would still be a long while before these China scholars would
begin to speak out on the subject that most vexed them: Sino-American
relations.
(iii) The Eisenhower Years
Although on the surface the discipline suffered as a result of
McCarthyism, underneath the growth continued unabated. Despite the
attack from the Reece Report, the foundations continued to provide more
funds to projects involving the study of East Asia. AT. Steele, who
published his book The American People and China in 1966, researched
the funding given by the various foundations to the academic discipline.
He estimated that between 1952 and Steele's time of writing the
foundations increased their funding to non-western area studies
especially East Asia projects. Specifically, for this period, he estimated
that the Ford Foundation gave seventy million dollars to area studies; the
Rockefeller Foundation five million dollars and the Carnegie Corporation
four million.69 Fairbank in his memoirs estimated that between the mid-
1950s and 1970 the Ford Foundation gave thirty million dollars towards
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China studies with Harvard receiving about five and a half million of that.
A million of that went into establishing four professorships while the rest
went straight into research projects.70 In total, Fairbank estimated that
about forty million dollars was put into China studies between 1958 and
1970.71 This money was used by Harvard and elsewhere to aid
graduate students to conduct research and for academics to engage in
their own research and develop courses and to help students get the
funding necessary to take those courses. Moreover, these grants aided
recruitment to government agencies of area specialists whom it was
hoped might be able to influence government policy. Examples of
individual grants include $420,000 that was given to Columbia University
for research work on the political evolution of modern China. Harvard
received $277,000 for research into the state of the Chinese economy
and aided the East Asia Center to appoint the notable economist who
specialised on the Chinese economy Alexander Eckstein and $910,000
which went to the Social Science Research Council to encourage
research on the Chinese economy.72 All of this helped expand the area
while ensuring that its prestige and influence increased.
Underpinning this was the growth of the departments themselves. By
the late 1950s, John King Fairbank was at the peak of its influence and
the Harvard East Asia Center was famous for its reputation. As well as
his own academic work, he was able to facilitate and encourage research
whilst helping to get his students academic posts and maintaining
approximately a hundred doctoral students of his own. Fairbank's
concentration on his academic work partly reflected his isolation from
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government and his inability to influence US policy towards China at that
time.73 This growth also tended to ensure that the "liberal" perspective
remained dominant as other academics such as A. Doak Barnett came
more to the fore. These academics maintained contact with each other
through obvious informal networks such as friendships and the healthy
interest that academics have in each other's research. This informal
network complemented the more formal network associated with
conferences, journals and publications and helped reinforce the views of
the academics on various matters concerning the profession including
their view on China policy. Fairbank, through natural inquisitiveness as
much as academic necessity, wanted to know what every China expert in
the world was working upon. 74 They also of course were involved in the
developing FEA.
Although the decline of the IPR continued unabated throughout the
1950s, the FEA survived the shocks of the decade and after 1955 began
to grow in line with the discipline as a whole. Charles Hucker wrote that,
by 1955 the Association had survived these difficult times without
incurring any stigma as an organization but that some of its
members survived with scars, antagonisms, or fears and the
Association's leadership on the whole was increasingly dedicated
to keeping the Association unambiguously out of politics.75
This nonpolitical stance had helped it survive the torrents of the early
1950s and in the later parts of the decade made it especially attractive to
foundations and academics. Just as Hucker calls the period between
1948 and 1955 the "era of consolidation" he terms the period between
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1956 and 1968 the "era of growth and expansion". 76 In 1956 the
organisation changed its name to the Association of Asian Studies (MS)
and the title of its journal to the Journal of Asian Studies (JAS). The
organisation also decided to broaden its scope to include South Asia
within its geographical area of interest. 77 Evidence of this expansion
abounds. In 1956 there were 903 members of the MS by 1968 the
figure had risen to 3,752. In the same period non-membership income
rose from $13m to $78m. The circulation of the JAS also increased from
a figure of 1,954 in 1958 to 6,022 in 1968.78 Solid funding from
foundations backed up this expansion. For example, between 1961 and
1971 the Ford Foundation gave the MS $345m and individual MS
projects on South and Southeast Asia received funding from the
Rockefeller Foundation and Asia Society.79 These contributions are
indicative of the benevolent attitude towards this expansion shown by
both the foundations themselves as well as ultimately the US
Government. This expansion was also reflected in the growth of the MS
annual conferences. In 1955 the conference had had twenty-two panels
with about 500 attending whilst by 1968 there were forty-four panels with
1,800 in attendance.80 As well as the annual conferences, regional
groups of the MS were set up in New York, New England, on the Pacific
Coast and one representing the Midwest. These regional groupings were
indicative of the dynamism of the discipline as well as its diversity and the
simmering antagonisms that remained especially between the East Coast
associated with Harvard and the Pacific Coast associated with the
University ofWashington.81 Although the competition remained there
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can be little doubting the extent to which the organisation was dominated
by the "liberal" perspective and the East Coast Ivy League universities.
As Hucker has written "it would seem fair to say that ... its affairs were
dominated by members from major graduate centers, especially those of
the central and northern East Coast area, and most particularly those of
the ivy league".82 This dominance helped men like Fairbank in the
1960s as they tried to influence policy. Another key factor in the
development of East Asia studies was the passage of the National
Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958.83 The Act came into being
partly as a response to the successful Soviet launch of Sputnik the year
before. One of its chief areas of concern was to encourage the
development of linguistic skills amongst young Americans from school
through to university. By 1964 fifty-five language and area centres were
receiving federal support under the terms of the act including eleven that
were concerned solely with the study of East Asia. Two-thirds of the area
centres in existence in 1964 came into being after 1958 and the passage
of the Act. This federal money was vital in their growth. In the same
period enrolment in Chinese language classes quadrupled. The Act was
clearly helping to ensure that young Americans developed these linguistic
skills. The Act, supported by the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie
Corporation, gave funds to schools to develop language training for
children.84 An example, of how the NDEA aided pre-university language
training was its support for the Thayer Academy in the Boston area. The
Academy, in association with Harvard and Yale, introduced the teaching
of Chinese to schoolchildren in and around Boston. Therefore, as a
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consequence of this teaching, by the time they went to university the
students would be more proficient in the Chinese language.85
Furthermore, their initial interest in China and elsewhere would be
encouraged by this training. As well as language training, the NDEA
provided federal government funds for fellowships, other instructional
programmes, the expansion of libraries, summer institutions and
workshops and research projects.86 All of this aided the expansion of
the East Asian field and the AAS who did not receive money directly from
the NDEA.
A final major development was the setting up of the Joint Committee
on Contemporary China (JCCC). The JCCC was set up at a conference
held in June 1959 at Gould House, a property owned by New York
University. Some of the top academics in the field and representatives of
the RAND Corporation, the Department of State and the Ford Foundation
attended the conference. The JCCC would act as a co-ordinator for
research into Communist China. Its organising Committee was made up
of Fairbank, Martin Wilbur of Columbia and Arthur Steiner of University
.,~ C"'I'ho~q,
~ "1 :: Los Angeles (UCLA). Although the group voted for
membership of the AAS this did not come about and instead the new
organisation came to function under the auspices of the Social Science
Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council of Learned
Societies (ACLS).87 A complimentary organisation, the Committee on
Studies of Chinese Civilisation was also set up shortly after and the two
held their first joint meeting in August 1960 with George Taylor as
Chairman. Central to the development of the JCCC was its relationship
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with the US Government.BB As Taylor, who was very involved with its
growth and organisation, wrote in 1961:
It is very important for the Government to know that it can turn to a
responsible group representing the interests of American scholars
for some indication of how they feel ... I think that a process of
political education has gone on in the Committee which I trust is
deep enough to prevent ill-considered political statements being
made by American scholars who are interested in getting into
China.B9
Although it must be remembered that Taylor represented the
"conservative" end of the profession it seems that for him at least the
JCCC was a means of excluding academics who did not share
mainstream views as well as co-ordinating research projects that might
be of interest to the government. The involvement of the State
Department, Ford Foundation and RAND Corporation in the formation of
the JCCC was indicative of the elite nature of the organisation and the
deep-rooted ties that were developing between the discipline and the
government.
By the late 1950s the profession had recovered its vitality. Although,
the bitterness of the McCarthyite attacks remained, the discipline was
now growing rapidly aided by copious funds from foundations and a
renewed relationship with government. John Lindbeck, who wrote a
study of the profession during the 1960s, described the period as "the
developmental decade". 90 As the academics faced the new decade one
area concerned them more than anything, which was the state of Sino-
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American relations. In March 1959, a phlegmatic and concerned
Fairbank in his term as President of the MS, told the organisation during
a speech:
When attacked for having influenced policy Asian specialists
usually deny it with vigor and justice '" (But) If we Asia
specialists have indeed influenced American policy, why is it so
inadequate? If we have no influence, on the other hand, what use
are we?91
In the 1960s, Fairbank and his colleagues would come to address their
problem as the sands began to shift beneath the policy of total isolation of
the Chinese Communists.
(iv) The Early Challenges to the Prevailing Policy.
The scholars felt unable to challenge openly the policy of total isolation.
However, that does not mean that there were no signs of their opposition
to the prevailing mood or that they stopped discussing and reflecting on
the matter in private. Edwin Reischauer made the most public challenge
in his book Wanted: An Asian Policy published in January 1955.
Reischauer had emerged from the McCarthyite era virtually untouched
due to his specialisation in Japan.92 Scholars specialising in Japan were
less likely to be attacked given the lack of controversy over US Japan
policy and the involvement of General Douglas MacArthur who was an
ally of the China Lobby.93 Moreover, Reischauer was a we" known
advocate of a special relationship between Japan and the United States,
which would involve the latter building up the former as the major regional
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power. For Reischauer, and others who shared his views, the Japanese
imperialism of the 1930s and 40s had been an aberration in a country
that was likely to develop into a liberal democracy. Ironically, others who
shared this view were often known conservatives like the former
Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, whilst Reischauer in his own words
was "a lifelong liberal". 94 Nevertheless, these views protected him in the
early 1950s to the extent whereby he could publish a book fiercely critical
of the Asia policles of the Eisenhower Administration and John Foster
Dulles in particular whom he held primarily responsible for them. In the
book, Reischauer argued that the Administration was concentrating too
much energy and resources on military alliances and tactics in place of
any attempt to win the ideological battle for democracy. "SEATO was a
fraud fooling only the American people, because its only reality was the
American commitment to the defense of a curious assortment of weak
Southeast Asian states".95 As a consequence, the US was becoming
allied to a number of unstable and unpopular governments, when
alternatively by emphasising the political desirability of democracy and
the potential economic benefits of capitalism, the US could make a far
greater and more potent appeal. Later, in his memoirs, he wrote that:
My chief argument in the book was that economic support for the
countries of Asia and the championing of our own ideals of self-
determination and national independence were far more important
than alliances or military defense. Nationalism was a much greater
force than communism or socialism or any other set of ideas from
the West. We could rely on it to keep the countries of Asia free of
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control by either Moscow or Peking (Beijing). We were selling
nationalism short, I felt, and also the appeal of democracy. Back of
all these problems, I maintained was our dangerous ignorance of
Asia. We desperately needed to know more about this half of the
world so that we could pursue a wiser course in our relations with
its diverse lands.96
He was concerned about the attitude of the Administration towards those
Asians, who while being anticommunist, nevertheless wanted to remain
independent of US influence and didn't want to be involved in the alliance
structure being set up. He termed this attitude as representing a "Them v
Us" syndrome which he surmised lay at the heart of Dulles' outlook on the
world.97 As Reischauer admits in his memoirs, the book made little
impact at the time and it is unlikely that it had any influence on the
conduct of policy:
Wanted: An Asian Policy, despite favorable reviews, dropped into
the pool of public opinion without raising a ripple. The nation,
under Dulles's unwise leadership, was headed determinedly in the
opposite direction. Of course, I have had the satisfaction of seeing
us slowly change course since then, until three decades later
American policy in Asia is much closer to what I advocated back in
1955. But this is small comfort in the face of the national tragedies
and appalling waste mistaken policies have caused in the
meantime.98
In reality, the book was indicative of the lack of influence of the liberal
school of thought in the mid-1950s. However, many of Reischauer's
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observations were to prove to be accurate and he had the bravery to put
them into print.
Another example, of the "Liberals" continued interest in the state of
Sino-American relations was Fairbank's correspondence with Chester
Bowles over the China section of his book The New Dimensions of
Peace. Bowles had been Governor of Connecticut between 1949 and
1951 and Ambassador to India between 1951 and 53, as well as being a
well known ally and friend of Adlai Stevenson, the liberal standard bearer
in the 1950s and the unsuccessful Democratic candidate for President in
1952 and 56.99 The most controversial views in the book were about the
failings of Jiang and the successes of the new Communist government.
"The Communist regime" wrote Bowles in the book published in 1956, "is
providing the first unified and efficient government in modern Chinese
history".100 Bowles went on to detail CCP successes in the fields of
education, industrialisation, military organisation and governmental
control. This view was certainly different than the view peddled by Dulles
and others that communism in China was merely "a passing and not a
perpetual phaset.l 01 In May 1955, Bowles sent a draft copy of the
chapter from the book to Fairbank for consideration. Fairbank
recommended some changes which Bowles carried out as well as
recommending that he read Wanted: An Asian Policy which shows
Reischauer's "interest in this problem" and that he becomes acquainted
with the ideas of Benjamin Schwartz "who is most conversant locally with
the Peking (Beijing) Line".102 Overall, though Fairbank was positive
about the work indicating his own support and the difficulties faced by
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academics that would like to express similar opinions. "None of us" he
wrote "has a prospect of getting this view into print ourselves, and I am
sure we would like to give full support to your doing so".1 03 A couple of
weeks later, Fairbank again expressed his support to Bowles: "It is in the
main, I think, the story that our public needs to know ... and I appreciate
the opportunity to assist"." 04
In 1956, A. Doak Barnett then head of the Department of Foreign Area
Studies of the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department and later
of Columbia University, led discussions on China policy at a conference
arranged by the American Assembly. The Assembly, which had been
formed by Eisenhower in his time as President of Columbia, brought
together sixty Asia specialists, corporate executives and former
government officers with the purpose of discussing US policy towards the
region. Barnett made a series of far reaching recommendations. They
included the US ending its trade embargo against the mainland. It also
called for negotiation with the PRC with a view of allowing the Chinese
into the United Nations. Barnett also felt that the Nationalists should be
forced to withdraw from the Offshore Islands and Jiang should be
encouraged to abandon his dreams of returning to the mainland and
instead build up the Guomindang as a "stable, local regime ruling Taiwan
and the Pescadores".1 05 Although the wider group didn't accept all of
Barnett's recommendations they did call on the Administration to pursue
negotiations with the PRC.1 06 The conference was another example of
the emergence of Barnett as a key player in the attempts by the liberal
academics to influence government policy.
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After Eisenhower's re-election and as a consequence of the other
pressures emerging on the existing policy, the academics began to regain
some of their confidence in their ability to challenge the ethos of the
Administration. In April 1957, Fairbank published an article entitled
"China: Time for a Policy" in Atlantic magazine and Barnett published a
pamphlet entitled "Should the United States Deal with Red China" for the
Foreign Policy Association.107 These academics also became involved
in the questioning of existing policies that was growing as policy makers
and others with an interest in the workings of government prepared for
Eisenhower's retirement in 1960.
(v) 1958-1960: A Period of Reflection.
The last two years of the 1950s saw major discussions of China policy
taking place and an attempt to analyse what approach Eisenhower's
successor might and should adopt. Moreover, as ambitious politicians
manoeuvred for the Democratic nomination for 1960, they began to
express their differences with the existing policy. The elderly Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Walter George and his
successor in that post J. William Fulbright were both critical of the
intransigence of existing policy as were Presidential hopefuls, John F.
Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Chester Bowles and Adlai Stevenson. The
Democrats increasingly favoured negotiation of some shape or form.l 08
These calls reflected both a change in national mood as well as a shift in
the dynamics of the international environment. The Sputnik launch had
set off a round of soul searching amongst the US political classes as
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Senators like Johnson and Kennedy talked of a "missile gap· developing
between the two superpowers in favour of the USSR.1 09 Moreover, the
first signs of a split between the Soviet Union and the Chinese were
emerging as a consequence of the lukewarm support offered by the
Soviets to the Chinese during the second Offshore Islands crisis of 1958.
To the Administration it confirmed their view that the Soviets were the
more moderate power that should be weaned away from the extremism
of the Chinese. Eisenhower tried to convince Khrushchev of the wisdom
of this view during the latter's visit to the United States in 1959.110
Finally, the discussions on China policy were aided by a slight softening
of the domestic view of the Chinese and a weakening of the strength of
the China Lobby. Christian Herter, who succeeded Dulles in 1959 as
Secretary of State after his death, was more moderate in his attitude to
the Chinese government and during his tenure agreed to validate the
passports of thirty-three journalists who wanted to visit the mainland. He
was helped by the results of the 1958-midterm elections that saw the
defeat and retirement of notable supporters of the China Lobby as well as
a heavy swing to the Democrats. The most notable victim of this swing
was the Senate Minority Leader William Knowland, who gave up his
Senate seat to run unsuccessfully for the Governorship of California.111
A Democrat Clair Engle who quickly came to champion the arguments
for a change in China policy replaced Knowland in the Senate. On May
21 1959, Engle made a Senate speech on the subject stating that: "I am
convinced that our China policy needs a critical reexaminationn•112 He
believed that the US should change policy to place trade with the Chinese
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on the same basis as that with the Soviet Union. In other words, there
should be trade but not in materials that might aid Chinese military
development and deployment. Furthermore, Engle argued that the US
should explicitly tell the Nationalists that they would not support any
military operations by them against the mainland. Finally, he called for
high level negotiations between the two sides.113 The speech was
praised by many including The Economist magazine and fellow Senator
Thomas Dodd of Connecticut who was a well-known supporter of the
China Lobby.114 The next day Chester Bowles wrote to Engle:
Congratulations ... on both the insight and the courage you showed
on the floor yesterday. I think your efforts may well serve to break
the ice and to bring a subject which too many people have been
sweeping under the rug out into the open, where we can see it and
examine it. You have made a great contribution.115
A year later Bowles wrote to him again stating that: "I am sure the record
will be clear that yours was the first voice of any really prominent person
raised in protest against the drift of the last few years".116 On June 4,
Congressman Charles Porter of Oregon who became the most outspoken
advocate of a full reconciliation between the two countries called for a
trade delegation to be sent to the mainland.117 Even so in August the
House passed a resolution that reaffirmed Congressional opposition to
any softening of the US refusal to allow the Chinese into the United
Nations.118
Alongside that outright desire to change policy Jay a desire to analyse
and reflect on it. An example of this was the actions of Senator
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Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, who was the senior Republican member of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On January 28 1959, he told
his colleagues that he had asked the Legislative Reference Service and
the staff attached to the Committee "to undertake an examination of
tensions in Communist China". Wiley believed that the Study would look
at not only domestic tensions but also "the extent of divergence and
cleavage between China, the Soviet Union, and the European
satellites".119 The report was completed in September and was entitled
Tensions in Communist China. It argued that the CCP were unlikely to
be replaced as the rulers of the mainland and that China under them
would become "one of the great powers".120 It believed that US policy
towards China should be flexible. More important was the so-called
Conlon Report. On February 16 1959, a contract was agreed between
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Conlon Associates, a San
Francisco based research firm, for a major study of US policy towards
Asia. The study was one of a series of studies made on aspects of US
foreign policy. Robert Scalapino of Berkeley wrote the section on East
Asia. In it, he reiterated the view that the CCP were now well established
on the mainland, "most indications are that this is the strongest, most
unified government that modern China has ever had, and that the
Communist Party is able to enforce its authority effectively at all
levels".121 Scalapino went on to predict that:
Communist China is very likely to emerge as one of the major
world powers of the late 20th century. The future of China hinges
upon many imponderables, of course, but almost all signs point to
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the rapid increase of state power - economic, military, and political
- under the Communists.122
He felt that China's air and naval power precluded it from being ranked as
an advanced military power. Regarding the relationship with the Soviet
Union, he predicted that increasing strains would emerge between the
two but did not foresee the open split that was to occur. On the subject of
Taiwan, he noted a process of what he called "Taiwanization" whereby
the indigenous majority absorbs the mainland refugees to the point
whereby a new unified national identity is created. This process would
eventually create a logical outcome to the dispute over the island.123
In the concluding section of his report, Scalapino turned to the subject
of Sino-American relations. He was deeply critical of Eisenhower's
policies of containment and isolation. He argued that keeping the
Chinese outside of the UN meant that half of all Asians were not
represented within the organisation and that it helped retain the fiction
that the Guomindang remained the government of China. Scalapino also
felt that to be an effective organisation the UN needed to have universal
membership.124 On the lack of contact with the Chinese, he felt that this
aided the Chinese Government to portray the United States in a poor
light, "this policy will merely supplement the tensions and fears
concerning us that their government is seeking to establish".125
Scalapino was also critical of the concept of using a harsh policy towards
the Chinese as a means of forcing them to rely more heavily on the
Soviet Union thus accelerating a split between the two. He believed that
Soviet aid cost the Soviets little with far greater relative rewards and that
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more contact with the west would create new options for the Chinese and
new tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship:
Greater international involvement for Communist China might
provide new sources of influence, both upon the people and the
regime. Out of a variety of contacts, flow a variety of ideas and
stimuli, and Chinese Communist propaganda to their own people
might have to adjust to this type of competition in a manner not
now necessary. Isolation always serves totalitarianism. At the
government level, moreover, heavier world involvement would
naturally provide the need for more varied and complex decisions,
more careful adjustment to national interests held by foreign states.
It would increase opportunities for policy discussion from and
difference with the Soviet Union; almost certainly the
decisionmaking process of the Sino-Soviet alliance would become
more complicated and be subject to greater strains. That alliance
might even be affected by any increased world attention given
Communist China and its national decisions; outlets for Chinese
nationalism of this type could increase Soviet anxieties.126
Scalapino also made the point that the policy of isolation meant that the
US did not know whether or not the Chinese might be prepared to
negotiate. In conclusion, he argued for a policy of "exploratlon and
negotiation" that would begin with simple contacts leading onto mutual
exchanges involving journalists, businessmen and other commercial
representatives and academics.127 Then, if that went smoothly, the
Administration could send someone prominent to negotiate with the
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Chinese who was not tied directly to the Executive branch. Then, trade
could be moved onto the same basis as that with the Soviet Union and
the People's Republic of China could be recognised and allowed into the
United Nations with Taiwan being eventually recognised as an
independent entity. The report argued that this course of action would
test the Chinese willingness to "coexist" with the US. For the US it would
create a more flexible policy on the US side. Finally it would lay the
foundation for a more unified policy amongst the western nations
including Japan, which by that point had adopted a policy based on
mercantilism towards both the PRC and the Nationalists on Taiwan.128
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee released this report, which
is remarkable for its recommendations that are not that far from the
eventual policies pursued by Richard Nixon, to the public on October 31
1959. Senator Fulbright, now Chairman of the Committee, found the
report "very provocative" but warned against the immediate US
recognition of the PRC.129 The Report was bitterly denounced by the
major US based supporter of Jiangs, the Committee of One Million, which
noted that the Report had not consulted the US public, or US allies in
Asia such as Jiang.130 Despite this, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee was favourable and hoped to use the Report as the basis for
fully fledged Senate hearings on the subject. The State Department
made it clear that it would refuse to co-operate with any hearings of this
nature including refusing to allow Department officers to appear before it
and the Foreign Relations Committee decided, as a consequence of this
hostility, to abandon the exercise.131 The Conlon Report was a
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remarkable document in that it showed the re-emergence of a voice
amongst the China scholars prepared to challenge policy and to work
with sections of that government to influence it. In many ways, it
preordained much of the manoeuvres of the 1960s as well as reflected
the thinking of the "Liberal" academics. Finally, the Report was the first of
other reports at the time of a similar nature such as a Rockefeller
Brothers Fund project published in December 1959 which also
recommended a change in policy. Dean Rusk chaired the project.132
Equally intriguing was a Council on Foreign Relations study by Barnett
published in 1960.
Woodrow Wilson's close friend and confidante Colonel House set up
the CFR (Council on Foreign Relations) at the end of the First World War.
Its aim was to ensure dialogue and discussion amongst the elites of the
United States to ensure that policy would be made with the maximum
amount of information and consensus. As Judith Coburn has written, "the
most important function of CFR is producing a consensus among
scholars, foundation officials, businessmen, and policy-makers on
American foreign policy".133 Not surprisingly, the CFR regularly
considered the state of US relations with the giants of the Communist
world. In late 1954 and early 1955, they prepared a report on US China
policy that concluded that despite its limitations the policy being pursued
by the Eisenhower Administration was better than any other on offer.
We find that despite all the controversy surrounding United States
China Policy we are actually faced with a fairly narrow range of
actions ... Indeed, the present situation, for all its ambiguities, may
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for that reason be prolonged indefinitely as the only workable
solution in the absence of profound changes in China. We might
go farther and say that recognition and UN representation would
not, by themselves, greatly alter things for good or il1.134
Later in the decade they returned to the subject of US relations with the
PRC. In 1958, the Council set up a Study Group on Communist China
and United States Policy in Asia. Their reports and papers formed the
basis of a book Communist China and Asia by Barnett that looked at all
the possible avenues open for the US. The discussion on China policy,
which takes place in the last two chapters of the book fourteen and
fifteen, was remarkably cautious given Barnett's views and the book was
as much an attempt to provoke thought as to try to alter policy.135 The
key point about the study was the actual selection of Barnett as the
Co-ordinator given his views on policy.
In April 1960. Chester Bowles now a Congressman in Connecticut as
well as an adviser to Kennedy published a controversial article in Foreign
Affairs entitled "The China Problem Reconsidered". Foreign Affairs which
is the journal of the Council on Foreign Affairs is where ambitious
politicians and academics attempt to circulate their work and influence
each other's thinking. In the article. Bowles argued for a policy of creating
an independent state on Taiwan that would abandon any plans to retake
the mainland.
The Native Formosans (Taiwanese). the Nationalist Chinese and
the world generally must be convinced that our objective is not to
create a military base for the invasion of the mainland but to
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encourage the orderly growth of a new, independent nation.136
He also believed that this new state should achieve membership of the
United Nations as a separate entity from the Chinese mainland. He went
on to argue that he believed that the Sino-Soviet alliance was unstable
and that the Chinese were not natural allies of their Soviet
neighbours.137 He particularly noted the potential power of Chinese
nationalism.
No outsider can be sure of the present nature or future
development of the Sino-Soviet alliance, but certainly it is an
infinitely complex and delicate arrangement. The assumption that
it is rigid, monolithic and unchangeable is out of date ... Let us
realize that Communist alliances as well as Communist nations are
subject to the eroding effects of economics, nationalism and
history.138
He concluded that: "It seems to me that today we should be striving by all
reasonable means to establish people-to-people contacts with mainland
China- .139 This article set off a storm of protest and even the British
noted it due mainly to Bowles's relationship with the Democratic
contender for the White House. In his memoirs, Promises to Keep,
Bowles stated that he cleared the article with Kennedy and at this point in
time their views on China were not all that different.140
(vi) Conclusions
In the period after 1945, Area Studies such as East Asia, became an
important part of the university curriculum attracting young scholars and
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government and foundation funding. The attentions of the McCarthyite
era warped the actual growth of the subject briefly and individual
academics of a "liberal" persuasion were less likely to talk out on the
issue of Sino-American relations. By the late 1950s, they were beginning
to regain their voice and participate in Foundation studies and other
means to try to influence China policy, which they felt under Eisenhower,
was sterile. They hoped to influence his successor and in the new era
they saw their discipline grow dramatically. Their relationship with
government suffered in the 1950s. It was to be seen how that would
develop in the 1960s. Then, the US commitment and view of Asia
changed dramatically as a consequence of the events in China, the
growth of Japan into a major economic competitor of the United States
and most importantly the US commitment to defend South Vietnam.
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CHAPTER THREE: A NEW BEGINNING; JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(i) Introduction
The task of reassessing China policy fell to John Kennedy, the youngest
man ever elected to the White House and a scion of the East Coast
establishment. Kennedy hailed from a wealthy Boston family and had
attended Harvard before personal heroics in the Pacific Theatre during
World War II. He returned to be elected to the House of Representatives
in 1946 and the Senate six years later. In attaining the Democratic
nomination in 1960 he outmanoeuvred amongst others Lyndon Johnson
who became his Vice-President. He won one of the closest presidential
contests of all time by less than 1 per cent of the vote against his
Republican opponent Richard Nixon. The size of his victory was to playa
part in the cautious approach he took to many issues on coming to office.
His caution also reflected his pragmatic nature which was at odds with
the dynamic image that he sought to promote that reached almost mythic
proportions with his inauguration address on January 20 1961 when he
promised to "bear any burdent.l
In constructing his cabinet, Kennedy displayed that pragmatism by
choosing appointees of ability but without any possibility for controversy.
Kennedy did not want to get into an early conflict with Congress by
selecting well-known liberals for high profile posts. For example, as
Secretary of Defense he chose the dynamic young President of Ford
Motors and Republican Robert McNamara. As Secretary of State,
Kennedy appointed Dean Rusk. A southern Democrat, Rusk had served
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under Truman as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs
and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. During the
Eisenhower years, he was President of the Rockefeller Foundation from
where Kennedy appointed him.2
(ii) 1961: Setting Down a Marker.
Before 1961 both Kennedy and Rusk had been notable supporters of the
traditional policy towards the People's Republic of China of containment
and isolation. Rusk had made his famous speech in May 1951 describing
the CCP government as "a slavic Manchukuo". 3 Kennedy had flirted with
the China Lobby and had been the only Democrat in 1954 not to vote for
the censure motion denouncing Joseph McCarthy.4 On coming to office,
Kennedy was left under little doubt that any change in China policy would
encounter the opposition of, amongst others, Eisenhower and Nixon. It
was not surprising that Kennedy decided to steer clear of any early
changes. In short, he decided to bed himself into office and adapt to
circumstances as they developed. Moreover he had more pressing
demands such as relations with the Soviet Union and what to do about
the new revolutionary government established on Cuba by Fidel Castro.
Finally, public opinion remained adamantly opposed to any alterations.5
Early indications in fact pointed to a hardening of policy by the
Administration. In February, Kennedy rejected a proposal, supported by
both the State and Treasury Departments, that US oil companies be
allowed to bunker ships carrying food from, amongst others, Canada and
Australia, to help ease the famine that was occurring in China at the time.
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Although the request was minor and made on a combination of
humanitarian grounds and the practical fact that the Chinese would
simply buy the oil elsewhere, nevertheless Kennedy decided to go
against these recommendations and refuse it.6 Later that same month,
Rusk weighed in by encouraging an exhibition of Chinese art taken from
the National Palace Museum in Beijing and the National Central Museum
in Nanking. "In the Department's view" wrote Rusk to the President, "this
exhibition would be most useful in helping to identify the Government of
the Republic of China as the custodian of China's great cultural
heritage".7 Rusk went on to recommend that Kennedy and his wife
Jackie along with the Generalissimo and Madame Jiang be appointed
patrons of the exhibition.8
The one change from that early pattern was the consideration given by
the US to extending diplomatic recognition to Outer Mongolia. The
proposal was put forward in a February 4, 1961 discussion paper. The
whole exercise from the beginning was seen mainly in terms of China
policy. Those like Chester Bowles who were favourable towards it saw it
as a first tentative step towards reviewing policy, as did the China Lobby
who saw it as evidence of an ultimate change in the stance towards
Mongolia's southern neighbour. It was the efforts of the Lobby that
ensured that the initiative would fail as Kennedy drew back from even that
minor change.9
This early caution remained tinged by an unwillingness to challenge
Jiang who threatened to use the Nationalists' place on the Security
Council to veto any membership application from Outer Mongolia. In the
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summer of 1961, the Administration began to discuss what to do about
the PRe's application to join the United Nations. It was clear that support
for PRC entry into the UN was growing amongst independent states that
felt that their entry into the organisation merely reflected the reality of their
control over the mainland.10 In a memo written in May, Rusk had
recommended that the Administration take a stance that would allow the
PRC into the United Nations so long as they agreed to abide by the UN
charter.l l Rusk was adamant though that the US should be prepared to
defend Jiang's position. He succinctly expressed his view during bilateral
talks with the British in March 1961 when he stated that: "It is
fundamental to the United States that Formosa retain a seat in the United
Nations. If this is unacceptable to Peiping (Beijing) then they are at
fault".12
During Kennedy's talks with Nikita Khrushchev in Vienna on June 3,
the Soviet Premier made clear that the Chinese would never enter the UN
whilst Jiang remained there.13 At a meeting on July 28th, Kennedy
made clear his absolute opposition to allowing the Chinese Communists
into the organisation and his opinion that the idea of recognising Outer
Mongolia be dropped.14 The China Lobby got wind that the matter was
under consideration and launched a publicity campaign aimed at keeping
the PRC out. Their supporters in Congress ensured that both Houses
passed resolutions condemning any attempts at allowing the PRC in.
The vote on September 1 in the House of Representatives was 395 for
the motion without a single vote against, which is indicative of the national
mood on the matter at the time.15
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Kennedy acted within that national mood when he decided to come
down firmly in keeping the Communists out and he went further by giving
private assurances to Jiang that the US would use its veto against any
Chinese attempts to enter.16 In the autumn session of the United
Nations, held in New York, a vote was passed by sixty-one votes to thirty-
four to make the issue of Chinese entry "an important question" and a
Soviet resolution to seat the Chinese was defeated by forty-eight votes to
thirty-seven with nineteen abstentions.17 The US had ensured that
China was not allowed into the UN in 1961 and that if it was ever to enter
then it would have to acquire two-thirds support within the organisation.
Moreover, Kennedy had pledged that the US would veto any Chinese
entry. He had created a situation whereby the Chinese would not be able
to enter without US support, which seemed extremely unlikely. Kennedy
had made it harder for his successors to change this stance as well as
moving his administration firmly into a position of maintaining
Eisenhower's policy.
If the actions of the administration seemed to confirm a policy of
hostility that showed continuity with the Eisenhower Administration, then
what were the motivations behind it? In May 1961, Kennedy and Rusk
had a long meeting, where according to the latter's memoirs, the
President outlined his views on China policy and the motives:
Not surprisingly, Kennedy ruled out changes in our China policy.
With his razor-thin victory in the November elections ... he felt he
lacked a strong mandate from the American people.
Consequently, he was very cautious about selecting issues on
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which to do battle. And any change in China would have been one
hell of a battle.18
Therefore, clear motivations were the closeness of the election result; the
national mood against changing policy towards China; and the likely
opposition from amongst others Dwight Eisenhower, Congress, the
Republican Party and the China Lobby. Kennedy, whom one can see
from other issues such as civil rights was naturally cautious, was
disinclined from attempting to change policy against such overwhelming
opposition both from the political classes and the general population.
Dean Rusk's account of that May meeting continues:
Also, such contacts as we had with Peking were not promising.
Simply put, the Chinese Communists didn't seem interested in
improving U.S.-Chinese relations. As far as Kennedy was
concerned, then, adopting a more realistic China policy became a
future task, not a present one. Fearing the issue might divide
Congress and the American people, he decided the potential
benefits of a more realistic China policy didn't warrant risking a
severe political confrontation.19
This fascinating quotation cuts to the internal problem that Kennedy
faced. On the one hand he could see the arguments for a reform of
policy towards China, but on the other he recognised the drawbacks,
especially with regard to public opinion but also the attitude of the
Chinese. If Rusk's memory is accurate, and we have no other account of
this meeting, then both the President and himself had accepted the logic
of the argument that the current policy was at the very least not "realistic".
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The realistic policy, according to Rusk, was a policy of Two-Chinas.
However as we have seen the PRC and the Nationalists were not
prepared to accept it. If this policy was to be introduced it would have to
await a better domestic political climate as well as a change in stance
from the Chinese. In conclusion, Kennedy and Rusk were in many ways
prisoners of the national mood and leonard Kusnitz is correct in asserting
that a key determinant on China policy at this time was public opinion.20
The President can be characterised in his early handling of China policy
as a pragmatist aware of its limitations but unprepared to challenge the
existing ethos. It should also be pointed out that Kennedy faced a
number of foreign policy crises in his early days in the White House.
These included the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the stormy Vienna meeting with
Khrushchev, conflicts in laos and dispute with the Soviets over Berlin.
These occupied his attention and made him less likely to make dramatic
changes elsewhere. Finally, Kennedy was aware that the Administration
contained people who would be pushing for a change in policy as well as
others he knew could be trusted when and if the time came to reassess
the existing policy and create the impetus for any change. In the short
term however, Kennedy was determined to keep a lid on the activities of
men like Chester Bowles who was already using his position to argue for
a policy of two-Chinas. Rusk makes this clear at the end of his account
of the May meeting:
I agreed with Kennedy's reasoning and his conclusions, and I told
him so. But as I was leaving the Oval Office, he called, "And
what's more, Mr. Secretary, I don't want to read in the Washington
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Post or the New York Times that the State Department is thinking
about a change in our China policy!" I went back to the
department, and when Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, and
others would drop by to talk about China and especially their hopes
for a two-China policy at the UN, I stonewalled them and played
the role of the "village idiot". I didn't tell them about my talk with the
president because I would have read about that in the Washington
Post or the New York Times. Nor did I initiate any new studies on
China policy; in that leaky Kennedy administration even that would
have gotten to the press.21
This account is a valid and plausible assessment of Rusk's role in the
early China policy. However, his later hostility to any change especially
under Lyndon Johnson, indicates that he was more ideological in his
views than he suggests here and that he was trying to find a way to
explain his earlier position. What wasn't in doubt was his loyalty to
Kennedy and it is likely that he accepted and carried out the instructions
from a man who very much saw himself as Secretary of State as well as
President. Above all, this meeting and Rusk's account of it explain the
factors that underpin Kennedy's early China policy.
Although at the highest levels of the Administration caution was the
watchword, elsewhere a desire to challenge the existing policy was
becoming apparent. The people associated with this stance included the
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Chester Bowles and his young
assistant James Thomson Jr. Also, the Ambassador to the UN Adlai
Stevenson; John Kenneth Galbraith newly appointed as Ambassador to
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India and a university tutor at Harvard to the young Kennedy; and
Reischauer who had become Ambassador to Japan at Bowles's behest.
Connected to this grouping, although more complex and opportunistic
was Averell Harriman the former Governor of New York who in December
1961 became Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. In the
earliest phase of the Administration it was Bowles and Thomson who
would be the main proponents of change.22
Bowles had developed his view of the PRC during his stint as
Ambassador to India in the early 50s when he fell under the beguiling
influence of Nehru. Like Nehru, he came to believe that a basic
incompatibility existed between the strategic interests of the Soviet Union
and the PRC, which would eventually lead to a split between the two.
Consequently, the public belief by Eisenhower and Dulles of a Soviet-
dominated monolith was both wrong headed and likely to lead to major
policy errors. After returning from India, Bowles set up home in Essex,
Connecticut where he wrote two books, Ambassadors Report and The
New Dimensions of Peace. He retained contact with the liberal wing of
the Democratic Party especially Adlai Stevenson and liberal academics
including Fairbank. In these two books he developed his basic liberal
orientated internationalist philosophy. He believed that the US should act
as a beacon aiding third world countries to develop pluralist and modern
political and economic societies. This meant that the US should not be
over-reliant on conservative forces and be willing to accept and promote
reformist movements and even at times revolutionary ones. His hostility
to right wing governments propped up by the US stemmed from the fact
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that he felt that they were not representative of their people and by their
actions damaged the legitimacy not only of themselves but the US.
Moreover, he claimed that the Third World was the key battleground
between the US and the Soviet Union. He suggested that the situation in
Europe had stabilised and that Asia in particular should be the major
focus of American attention. He also stated that the US should come to
accept the views of the non-aligned countries that attempted to retain a
distance from both the major world blocs. He developed this view whilst
in India which took a neutral stance. Finally, he believed that the values
that he saw as essentially American such as liberal democracy, free
market economics tinged with social welfare and a belief in personal
freedom were so personally attractive as to engender support throughout
the world, especially when contrasted with the beliefs of the Soviet
bloc.23 In The New Dimensions of Peace, he wrote that:
I am deeply convinced, that the American Revolution, refreshed
and strengthened and for the first time focused on world affairs,
can become a powerful political, social, and economic force
affecting the lives of every man, woman, and child in the world.24
In a speech to the Cleveland Council of World Affairs on April 18, 1956 he
called on the US to strike:
a balance between ideas and defense; on the one hand, the
bringing together under the banner of a militant new freedom of
those people on the earth - and today they are by far the majority -
who seek the goals we seek, self determination, human dignity,
and expanding opportunities, and, on the other hand the power of a
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massive competent defense to provide a screen behind which
those goals can be vigorously pursued.25
In short Bowles believed in the innate attractiveness of American values;
the importance of the Third World; a dislike for US support for
conservatives in these countries and opposition to the perceived
simplicities of the Eisenhower Administration. These views linked Bowles
to academics like Reischauer and Fairbank in a common liberal
internationalist project and set of beliefs. They also formed a body of
opinion that had a substantial degree of support within the Democratic
Party in the 50s including Adlai Stevenson. However, others in the
Democratic Party such as Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, did not agree
and saw men like Bowles underestimating the Soviet threat and the
importance of Western Europe in the Cold War. These two groupings
would clash repeatedly in the 50s and take their battles into the Kennedy
Administration where Rusk became the major spokesman for the
Acheson/Nitze view. In February 1960, Kennedy asked Bowles to be the
Chairman of the party's Platform Committee and he played a substantial
role in drafting the election platform on which Kennedy stood for election.
Therefore, it was not surprising that Bowles was offered a job within the
Administration although not the position of Secretary of State, which he
had hankered after. He was probably regarded as too outspoken and
liberal and likely to engender opposition from Congress for such a
cautious president. Instead he got the post of Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs which left him in charge of administration.26
With him to the Administration came James Thomson Jr. Thomson
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was the son of missionaries who had been based in China. He shared
their love of China and the Chinese. He had met Bowles whilst at Yale
and a friendship had developed between the two. He worked for him
during the 1956 presidential election and became his assistant when
Bowles became a member of the House of Representatives. He followed
him to the State Department. Thomson had also received a doctorate
from Harvard where his supervisor had been Fairbank and his subject the
activities of Americans in Chinese cities during the 1930s.27 From the
beginning of his time in government his primary interest was China policy.
As he recalled later: "I made it a clear contract with all of these people
who knew my background and interests that I would have an overriding
interest in China and China policy".28 His other area of specialisation
was what he called "the waifs and strays" by which he meant amongst
others Cambodia, Burma and Indonesia.29
On taking office, Bowles quickly decided that China Policy would be
one of his main areas of focus. As early as March 17 1961, in a memo to
Rusk, he outlined his support for the principle of two Chinas in the UN. In
the same memo he expressed the view that Jiang should be forced to
withdraw from the offshore Islands or at the very least the US should
quietly disengage from the commitment to defend them. 3D Bowles also
sent repeated memos to Kennedy where repeatedly emphasised the
importance of the famine in China and how that created an opportunity for
the US to develop links with the PRe and possibly even bring it into the
world system. He also believed that by encouraging the concept of two
independent states of China and Taiwan the US could lay the basis for an
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eventual two nations policy. Finally, he was a strong supporter of the
recognition of Outer Mongolia.31
As well as promoting these policy changes, Bowles used his position
as Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs to appoint people whom he
knew shared his views and rid the Administration of hard-line supporters
of what he termed the "Old Dulles types" and "the Chiang Kai-shek
group".32 For example, Reischauer was appointed Ambassador to
Japan at his behest and J. Graham Parsons the then Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs was transferred to become Ambassador to
Sweden.33
In these attempts, Bowles was hamstrung by Kennedy's cautiousness.
According to his memoirs, he believed that before taking office Kennedy
had become convinced of the need for change in China policy. However,
once elected he became more cautious. The reason for this new
cautiousness, according to Bowles, was the political environment and the
size of his election victory. Bowles writes that
Although I was still convinced ... that the President was anxious to
breathe new life into our China policy, it was apparent that any
significant relaxation in our policy would have to await a resounding
Kennedy re-election victory in 1964.34
Bowles finds it hard to match the Kennedy who approved the publication
of the Foreign Affairs article with the one who now stalled on
implementing the policy changes that he had originally supported. The
answer had to lie in political realities and a natural pragmatism in the man
occupying the White House.
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A far greater problem for Chester Bowles was his growing
unpopularity in the White House and his increasing isolation from the
President himself.35 Within the State Department he quickly fell out with
Rusk. He was regarded as inept at bureaucratic management and liasing
with the rest of the Department. For example, he chaired meetings
poorly and never made any effort to create a network of allies beyond his
immediate staff like Thomson, who although loyal, was inexperienced in
the ways the American government worked at a practical level. His
preference for longer term thinking and planning over immediate solutions
to short term problems earned him scorn both within the State
Department and White House. His long-winded memos with which he
bombarded both the President and the Secretary of State failed to earn
him respect and often were unread. One State Department Officer
described them as a "fog ... proposing long-term solutions ... many
regarded as ridiculous and unrealistic·.36 Bowles also failed to develop
any relationship with the new White House. A puritanical man he did not
fit in with the gaiety of the Kennedy set and his philosophical mode of
thinking was strikingly out of tune with the dynamism that the President
liked to encourage in the men around him. Possibly, as his biographer
Howard Schaffer has argued, there was a generational difference
between the President and his immediate advisers and the old style New
Deal Democrat Bowles.37 He belonged in the liberal era of Stevenson
rather than the subtle combination of caution and dynamism that the new
young president prized. In practical policy terms, Bowles disliked the
emphasis placed by the Kennedy men on military solutions and
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counterinsurgency. As we have seen, it was alien to his liberal
internationalist reformist instincts.38
However, it was his lack of loyalty, which really finished him in the
eyes of Kennedy and his immediate circle.39 Questions had been raised
about his loyalty during the election campaign when he refused to
campaign for Kennedy against his long-time friend Hubert Humphrey in
the Wisconsin primary. It was his opposition to the Bay of Pigs that
sealed his fate. The disastrous US-backed invasion of Cuba by exiled
Cuban military forces in April 1961 embarrassed the Administration and
the new President who had authorised it. At a time when the members of
the Administration were expected to pull together Bowles made it clear
that he had never supported the operation. By doing this, he made a
ferocious enemy in Kennedy's brother Robert who was Attorney General
and set himself up as the fall guy when an angry Kennedy set about
dealing with the defects of a State Department that had not adequately
advised him on the invasion.40 Given that sacking Rusk was out of the
question, as that would call into question the original appointment,
Kennedy turned to the next in command Bowles who was now widely
detested within the White House. As one White House staff member
recalled: "Bowles was a bellyacher and also was trying to better his
position in the (State) Department".41 The latter accusation was untrue.
He opposed the invasion on principle, but these principles and the unwise
desire to express them at a time of great stress destroyed him within the
Administration.
The first attempt to get rid of Bowles occurred in July 1961. Rumours
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began to circulate to the effect that he was likely to be leaving the
Administration due to his incompetence.42 He immediately demanded to
see the President who while regretting the news stories suggested that
he might like to become an Ambassador again. After a meeting on July
17 between the two men it was agreed that he would remain in office and
a public statement would be put out stating this. The statement caused
even more outrage and rumour when it merely stated that Bowles's
resignation was not "currently expectedn•43 Only after the next day when
he threatened to resign was the statement amended and an expression
of support for him given. The President decided to wait quietly for a more
opportune moment. It was in November 1961, in what has been called
the Thanksgiving Massacre, after the American holiday of the name that
occurs at the end of the month, when Kennedy finally brought about the
changes to the State Department that he hoped for. Bowles was
removed and became the Presidenfs Special Representative and Adviser
on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs and an Ambassador at
large. It quickly became clear that this positional change was simply an
attempt to marginalise him. George Ball, who had been Undersecretary
of State for Economic Affairs and was respected in the Administration
took over Bowles's duties and became the chief Undersecretary of State.
Kennedy also packed off the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs Walter McConaughy and replaced him with Averell Harriman who
was more trusted to produce reasoned and politically astute
recommendations on China. Thomson remained his patron's assistant in
a job that he hoped would leave Bowles more scope for long-range
88
studies and policy pronouncements. There can be little doubt that the
personal antipathy towards Bowles both within the State Department and
White House combined with his own limitations helped to stymie the
arguments for any change in 1961 to China policy.44
A final problem that Bowles and Thomson had faced in 1961 was the
adamant opposition of the Far Eastern section of the State Department,
which remained staffed by men wedded to the policy of containment and
isolation. Successively, Walter Robertson, J. Graham Parsons and
Walter McConaughy had acted as a dead hand on those like Bowles and
Thomson who saw China policy as ripe for review.45 Furthermore, these
men sympathised with the Nationalists and Jiang, which naturally
coloured their view of the PRC. An example of their thinking in 1961 was
a memo sent by Parsons to the new Secretary of State. In it, he argued
that:
The Chinese Communists have given no indication whatsoever of
a desire on their part for rapprochement with the United States ...
Peiping has demonstrated its deep-seated hatred for the United
States, as the only major obstacle in its path, and its determination
either to destroy us or as a minimum to confine us to the other side
of the world in isolation.46
The conclusions in the paper were that Chinese hostility and the effects
of any changes of policy on US allies in Asia necessitated sticking rigidly
to the existing policy. In March 1961, Walter McConaughy, who had
been Ambassador to South Korea, replaced Parsons. In December,
Harriman replaced McConaughy. Kennedy had in effect quietly reformed
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. the area of the State Department covering China removing both the
intransigent old guard and the liberal reformist Bowles. However the
currents for changing policy in 1961 continued to swirl, if not in the Far
Eastern Affairs section of the State Department, and were most
convincingly put in a State Department Policy Planning Council study
written by the veteran Foreign Service officer and China specialist
Edward Rice.47
The study, dated 26 October 1961, represented a relatively
comprehensive assessment of the strategic problems facing the
Administration in dealing with the People's Republic of China. It did not
take into consideration the domestic political environment but was
concerned with the longer-term development of policy.48 It started from
the premise that the existing policy had failed:
apparent progress toward achieving both long-range and shorter-
term objectives has been lacking. We have made no perceptible
progress toward a Communist China with which we can live.
Communist China has grown greatly in industrial and military
strength; it has been playing an increasing role on the world scene;
and its continued exclusion from the UN now looks problematical49
The document then went on to assess the likely growth of the PRC in the
years ahead:
Looking ahead, we estimate that Communist China probably will in
the next decade greatly strengthen its position as a major power
center; attain a population of over 850 millions from which it can
maintain the world's largest standing army and military reserve; be
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among the top three producers of coal, steel and electric power;
possess a larger fleet of submarines and more powerful air force;
have a modest stockpile of domestically-produced nuclear
weapons; and be producing short and perhaps medium-range
missiles. We think mainland China will probably continue under
control of a ruthless, determined and unified Communist leadership
which remains hostile to the US, but that the greatest test it will
have to pass will be to increase agricultural production at a faster
rate than population growth. 50
These two statements made it clear that US policy was failing and that
the PRC was growing, thus presenting a greater challenge to the US as
the decade wore on. If the Administration were to avoid addressing what
to do about this new giant in 1961, the study argued, then it would
certainly have to have made some sort of changes by 1971.
Rice outlined three broad options open to the United States. The first
was to continue the current hard-line approach and maybe put some
more pressure on the PRe. He believed that this would lead to some
retardation in PRC development. However, in the longer term that growth
would continue unimpeded. He argued that some elements of the current
policy were effective and appropriate but concluded that "the small
returns to be expected for incurring increased risks and costs make the
hard line approach unattractive".51 The second option was
accommodation with the PRC on something approaching what he
perceived to be their terms. He believed that this approach would set off
a chain of events in East and Southeast Asia which would see much of
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the region fall into communist hands, and even Japan becoming more
"pliable" towards the PRC.52 The answer then, suggested Rice, was
clearly a middle way looking at all policy options in isolation and choosing
those that would best serve US interests. He believed that amongst the
essential goals of such a policy would be to retain allied support, put the
onus on the Chinese for the continued hostile relationship, and adapt to
the reality of the growing strength of the PRC.53 Rice argued for a basic
strategy that:
We should pursue toward mainland China the general policy of
seeking: (a) to hold ajar the door to a more satisfactory relationship
with the US, (b) to mute our shared hostility, (c) to transfer to
Communist China the onus for it, and (d) at the same time to build
more effective barriers to the expansion in Asia of the Sino-Soviet
bloc.54
Among the specific unilateral steps to be taken, argued Rice, were the
lifting of the embargo on the export of food grains and medicines, and
consideration to putting China's trading status on a par with that of the
Soviet Union. Such a move would also make sense in that it would bring
the US into line with international law. This would also lead to sharing
information with the PRC on medical advances and weather
developments including typhoon warnings.55 Moreover, he
recommended that the US attempt to stop the Nationalists from carrying
out attacks on the mainland.56 Rice believed that the policy of non-
recognition and exclusion from the UN should continue. However, he
also called for studies to be made to decide on what terms the US should
92
seek to recognise China, and how and when the US should adapt to the
reality that at some point the PRC would attain UN membership. 57
Finally, he suggested negotiations with the Chinese about disarmament
and their eventual participation in a nuclear test ban treaty.S8
Rice was explicitly critical of Jiang and the Republic of China. He
claimed that they had engaged in "political warfare" against the United
States and that the US could apply pressure on Jiang over this.59 He
also argued that the US should encourage the evacuation of the offshore
Islands and promote "the timely emergence there of government based
on popular consent and minimizing our over-identification with the GRC
(Government of the Republic of China) as it is now constituted and
motivated".60 It is clear that Rice believed that the US should move
beyond the open support and silent toleration of the Jiang regime that
constricted Kennedy's policy, and the US should begin its quiet
disengagement from its long-standing and troublesome ally. Since the
1940s, one of the central tenets of the liberal view was that the US was ill
served in an alliance with Jiang. Therefore, if a new policy and
relationship with the PRC became apparent then Jiang would have to
accept that the US would never back Guomindang hopes of reclaiming
the mainland. This view, however, never extended to allowing the PRC
to seize Taiwan, which was regarded as unacceptable both politically and
strategically.61
The final area of interest in Rice's study were his recommendations
that the non-communist countries of the region should be brought
together in an alliance structure that would aid collective economic
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development and help contain the Chinese. This alliance structure was
something that also greatly concerned Bowles who hoped to encourage
an arc that would lock together Japan, Indonesia and India. More
specifically, for Southeast Asia, it would defend the region against
communist insurgency and sow the seeds of rapid economic growth.
Southeast Asia, which had been a key economic prize since World War"
and essential to Japanese economic revival, would always be related to
US China policy in the eyes of policy thinkers like Bowles, Rice and later
Richard Nixon. A final point must be that this build-up of an anti-PRC
alliance on the southern periphery of the Chinese mainland was in some
ways a direct contradiction of the main recommendation of the study,
which was to improve relations between the US and the PRC.62
A further point should be made about the context of the study. It
represented a convergence of the views expressed by men like A. Doak
Barnett and especially Robert Scalapino in the Conlon Report. This study
represented a merging of academic and government views and it set the
stall for the rest of the Kennedy Administration and later the policies
pursued by Nixon. The specific recommendations made by Barnett,
Scalapino and Rice and the use of an "onion skin" approach of a number .
of small unilateral steps by the US to entice the Chinese into dialogue,
became standard fare. Again, this was the approach pursued by Nixon.
In December 1961, Rice was appointed as Harriman's deputy at Far
Eastern Affairs, partly recommended by Bowles and Thomson because of
his October study. The other two names put forward by Thomson for
consideration for the post in a December memo were Scalapino and
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Barnett, which was indicative of Thomson's desire to promote China
academics that believed in reform of policy.63 Another appointment was
that of Robert Barnett, elder brother of Doak, as Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Economic Affairs. Barnett supported Rice's
recommendations and came to be the key player in the State
Department's consideration of the economic development of the
region.64 Moreover, early in 1962, Harriman split the China section of
the Far Eastern desk into two separate units that would deal
independently with the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. This move gave
the mainland specialists more independence as well as representing a
further weakening of the importance of Jiang in the role of policy making
towards the PRe. It also of course represented another subtle step
towards a policy of two nations.65
In conclusion, by the close of 1961, although Kennedy had remained
cautious and opposed to any overt changes, he had set in motion a
process, which might allow policy to be re-considered and altered later
on. The old hard-line supporters of the Eisenhower policy had been
removed and replaced with a trusted aide: Harriman. Bowles remained
within the State Department but not in a position of great influence. In
short, Kennedy had put the machinery in place to change policy, if need
be, when the time was ripe, although it is clear he did not view that time
as being in 1961. However, four factors were converging that would
begin to push Kennedy away from his cautious approach. These were:
the famine on the mainland; the Sino-Soviet split; the development of a
Chinese nuclear programme and the desire of the Nationalists on Taiwan
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to launch attacks on the mainland, preferably with US backing. It was the
events of October 1962 though which really began to spur him towards
action.
(iii) 1962: A Year of Decisions.
In January 1962, Bowles outlined to his assistants where he wanted to
concentrate his energies in his new post. For Jim Thomson, the
concentration was to be on Mainland China. The task would include a
long range study of China and the implications of its development for all
of the countries of East and Southeast Asia and: Minthe meantime" wrote
Bowles "we should have a special paper on the food situation in China
and our possible response to ir.66 Bowles believed that the food crisis in
China gave the US a unique opportunity to show the world its generosity
of spirit as well as to offer the Chinese a hand of friendship. In a memo to
Kennedy in February, he set out his views on the issue.67 Over the
coming months he was to express the same thoughts repeatedly. He
believed that the famine represented a "semi-permanent condition of
crisis that can be expected to worsen during the decade ahead".68 He
believed that all of the internal options open to the CCP leadership in
dealing with this crisis were "demonstrably inadequate".69 Therefore, the
crisis would force the leadership to alter its foreign policy in some way.
Bowles hypothesised what these changes might be. Bowles believed
that there were few options open to the Chinese government. Firstly, it
could attempt to resettle thousands or even millions of Chinese in the
harsh and underpopulated eastern regions of the Soviet Union. However,
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Bowles believed that this was politically impossible given the Sino-Soviet
split. Another option was a major military invasion of the countries of
Southeast Asia in a desperate move to get hold of the huge rice supplies
in this area. Lastly, the CCP could make a major effort to develop trading
relations with countries outside the communist bloc such as Australia and
Canada, which were likely to sell them the vast amounts of grain needed
to meet their food demands.70 He argued that the US had a clear
interest in pushing the Chinese towards the last of these options. The US
should, he recommended, use the Burmese Prime Minister U Nu as an
intermediary between the US and the mainland on this issue. It could be
made clear to the CCP leadership that the US was prepared to sell the
Chinese grain to alleviate their problems.71 Bowles concluded the memo
with a personal offer to act as a presidential envoy to U Nu and a ringing
endorsement of the opportunity that he believed that the food crisis
presented for American diplomacy:
In conclusion, I must stress my conviction that it would be a serious
mistake for our government not to make some attempt to probe the
impasse with Communist China at this critical moment when
China's needs are so great, when our advantage is so clear, and
particularly when we have so much at stake in Southeast ASia.72
As well as memos to the President, Bowles and Thomson set about
building a coalition of support for the idea both within and outside the
government. Amongst those approached with the idea included:
Harriman; Robert Barnett and George McGhee in the State Department;
and Olsen and Spurlock from the Department of Agriculture. The
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Department of Agriculture warned them that the farmers of the US were
deeply split on the merits of selling grain to China.73 Outside the
government, the main supporters of selling grain to the Chinese on
humanitarian grounds were the Quakers.74 On 26 January, the issue
was discussed at a NSC Standing Group meeting, where it was agreed
that the State Department should be allowed to submit recommendations
on the issue including allowing the sale of medicines. This would allow
the Commerce Department to approve private gifts of food and grain from
the American public to the PRC. Also, it allowed consultations to take
place with other governments including the French, Canadians and
Australians about whether or not the selling or giving of grain to the
mainland might allow the west to exact political leverage in their
diplomatic relations with the PRC.75 After receiving Bowles' memo and
giving it consideration, Kennedy decided to allow Bowles to make an
approach to U Nu whilst in Asia in March. On February 6, the President
met Bowles and they discussed the matter in depth. As the latter recalled
later in an oral history interview:
I said, "Do you want me to say that I am speaking for you, that I am
speaking purely on my own, or something in between"? He said,
"something in between. I would suggest that you say that you had
discussed the subject with me, I am in general agreement with your
ideas, but I am not a party to the specific suggestions and precise
concepts that you may advance".76
It was typical of Bowles' luck in the Kennedy Administration that the day
before he was due to fly from New Delhi to the Burmese capital of
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Rangoon, U Nu was overthrown in an internal coup. A disappointed
Bowles returned to Washington where he recommended that a direct
approach be made to the Chinese through the Warsaw channel.
Kennedy was less interested in this approach since before making any
concrete offer he wanted to be certain that the Chinese would not turn it
down flat and publicise the offer, thus causing a storm in the US domestic
arena.77
The issue rumbled on in the months ahead as it became clear that the
Chinese were unable to feed their population. In April, it rose to the
surface again as a major issue when Averell Harriman entered the fray in
favour of extending an offer to the Chinese of food at the Warsaw talks.
On April 3, Harriman recommended that once it became clear that the
Chinese could not purchase the grain necessary to feed their population
from other sources, then the US should let them know that they would be
prepared to step in. In response to this, three days later, the Deputy
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson wrote a
memo opposing any offers to the Chinese whatsoever. This brought
about a lengthy response from Harriman on April 13 when he outlined the
arguments for making an offer.78 Central to his thinking were the
humanitarian aspects and the belief that a moderation in the US stance
might affect any internal battle that could be taking place within the
Chinese leadership. He hoped an offer of aid would strengthen the hand
of any moderate Chinese leaders. Harriman also placed an offer of food
in a longer-term perspective regarding the development of China policy
as the decade wore on.
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I am not impressed by the argument that we should, "at least for
the time being, not make any overtures of our own". If we are ever
to make these, we can do so more gracefully now then, say, after
the Chinese Communists have exploded a nuclear device -- when
overtures might be interpreted as motivated by apprehension ...
The move we suggest is a small one, but our choice seems to be
between immobility and steps which are few and small. I cannot
believe that a policy of immobility can serve us well in a world
where changes is the rule.79
This statement alone puts Harriman in the liberal camp, although as has
been previously noted he was determined to maintain a good working
relationship with the President that was developing by that point. Unlike
Bowles, for example, he understood the need for caution and the
possibility that a harsher policy might have to be followed if the Chinese
were determined to stick to a rigid position. Moreover, Harriman
understood the growing fears within the Administration about the
developing Chinese nuclear programme and how that was driving policy
makers away from the stance of temporising into taking action. However,
like Bowles, he had identified the food crisis in China as an issue, which
created the opportunity for the United States to seize the initiative. At the
bottom of the April 13 memo, Harriman added in his own handwriting on
Rusk's copy: "Personal for the Secretary. I feel strongly about this and if
need be wish to have a chance to discuss it with you. It's my hunch that it
would be what the President wants".80 Four days later, the two men had
their meeting where Harriman put forward his views. Afterwards, he
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asked for another meeting with the Secretary of State stating that: "I
certainly don't want to see the rigid policies of the past foisted on the
President. I think he is strongly for the less rigid attitude as far as the
grain issue is concerned".81 This pressure succeeded in moving
Kennedy from his instinctive cautiousness. On May 23, at a press
conference, he was asked whether or not the US would give food to
China. He replied merely that the US had not been asked. Bowles had
hoped that the President might use the occasion to make a ringing
declaration of American willingness to sell grain to the Chinese.82 A few
weeks later the Chinese let it be known that they were uninterested in
buying or even receiving grain free from the United States. This move
pulled the rug from underneath Bowles, who continued without success to
argue for US initiatives in this area.83 Others were fiercely critical of
Bowles' views. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research was especially
scathing. For example, on June 27th, A. L. Peaslee reviewing his
arguments wrote that:
While Mr. Bowles assumes there can be no internal solution to
China's food problem, it becomes clear from the inadequacy of his
suggested solutions that an internal solution (or rather resolution) is
the only realistic alternative.84
Roger Hilsman, who was the Director of the Bureau, and who had a keen
interest in China policy concluded from the food episode that individual
efforts could achieve little whilst the Chinese were unwilling to react
positively to even the smallest initiatives. He concluded that it showed
that when China policy was looked at it should be looked at in its
101
entirety.8S However, for others including the President, it was almost
certainly another example of Chinese intransigence showing that it was
almost impossible for the United States to build a better relationship with
them.
The second factor that began to playa major part in US thinking in
1962 was the Sino-Soviet split. The split had its roots in the Chinese Civil
war where Stalin had repeatedly urged Mao's communists to seek a
united front and an alliance with the Guomindang. The Sino-Soviet pact
signed in February 1950 was extremely favourable to the Soviets who
were allowed to maintain their interests in the Middle Kingdom including
their right to mine minerals in the Sinkiang region. By 1954, Khrushchev
had concluded in his memoirs that, "conflict with China is inevitable".86
The denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist
Party by Khrushchev upset the Chinese leaders who did not believe that
dead communist leaders should be criticised. Mao hoped to replicate the
leadership cult, which Stalin had built around himself, and that
Khrushchev was now so critical of. The Chinese leaders were especially
critical of Khrushchev whom they viewed as an upstart. While Stalin had
been alive the Chinese leaders, despite their differences with him, were
prepared to accept his pre-eminence within the world communist
movement because of his revolutionary experiences and the longevity of
his rule. They felt no such respect for Khrushchev and believed that Mao
should now hold that pre-eminent status. The Offshore Islands crisis of
1958 proved to be another pressure point in the rapidly deteriorating
relationship between the two, as the Soviets refused to support Chinese
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attempts to retake the islands. In 1959, the split became apparent as
Moscow encouraged the visiting Defense Minister Peng Dehuai to plot
against Mao. Then in June the Soviets cancelled the 1957 pact between
the two for New Technology and National Defense, which had given the
Chinese access to information about developing a nuclear capability.
This meant Soviet scientists and other advisers began to leave China and
return to Moscow. The Chinese responded by labelling the Soviet
leaders and Khrushchev especially as "Revisionists" and
"Hegemonists".87
A growing ideological split exacerbated these differences. The Soviet
revolution of 1917 had been a more traditional revolution as forecasted by
Marx with urban workers rallying together led by intellectuals such as
Lenin and Trotsky. However, in China, the revolution had originated in
the countryside amongst the peasantry and had subsequently been
carried into the cities. The Chinese saw this model of revolution as being
more relevant to other Third World countries especially in Asia and most
notably in Vietnam. This ideological dispute fuelled the growing battle for
leadership within the communist world. In November 1960, eighty-one
communist parties assembled in Moscow to discuss these ideological
differences. Khrushchev argued for peaceful competition between the
two global blocs, whilst the Chinese favoured a far more aggressive
approach. Khrushchev labelled Mao "an ultra-leftist, an ultra-dogmatist,
and a left revisionist". 88 This fuelled the American view that the Chinese
represented the more virulent strain of communist revolution, and that if
the US was to work with one of the communist giants then that was
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always more likely to be the Soviets.89
Another underlying factor in the dispute between the two were the
Chinese claims to land that the Russians had taken from them as part of
the unequal treaties. The Russians had taken land from the Chinese in
the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and Kiakhta in 1727. In the Treaty of
Aigun in 1858 the Chinese had lost 185,000 miles of territory in the Amur
River valley which became the Russian province of Amursky. Two years
later in the Treaty of Beijing the Russians took 133,000 miles east of the
Ussuri River, which became the Maritime province. Finally, the Treaty of
St Petersburg in 1881 also saw the Chinese cede land to the Russians.
All of these treaties were etched in the minds of the Chinese leaders who
felt that the Soviets had failed to correct historical injustices done to them
by the Tsars. As well as these disputes, throughout the 20th Century, the
two had been quarrelling over the fate of Outer Mongolia, which the
Soviets had made independent from the Chinese in 1921. In March
1963, Beijing published a list of lost territories including part of South
Siberia, the Maritime province and approximately 500,000 square miles of
Russian Central Asia. This dispute would rumble on throughout the
1960s and would explode into violence in 1969.90
Events in 1962 were to widen the split. Khrushchev's handling of the
Cuban Missile Crisis of October enraged the Chinese who saw the
Soviets acting without consulting them, and then having to capitulate to
US demands embarrassing themselves and the communist movement in
general. Chinese public criticism of the Soviet handling of the crisis upset
not only the Soviets at whom it was aimed, but also the Americans who
104
saw more evidence of extremism on the part of Mao and his colleagues.
The subsequent Nuclear Test Ban Treaty agreed between the Soviet
Union and the US also annoyed the Chinese who again were not
consulted. Finally, the Soviets refused to support the Chinese in their
border war with India, which occurred in October.91
The United States Government, despite the original views of men like
Dean Acheson, was slow to come to terms with the implications and
extent of the divergence between the two communist giants. The thinking
in the first year of the Kennedy Administration was that the split was not
irreparable and that both feared the US more than they feared and
disliked one another. It was at a State Department Policy Planning
Council meeting in January 1962 that the Administration really began to
think about the possibilities opened up by the Sino-Soviet split. Thomson
later recalled it thus in a letter to Roger Hilsman:
(A)II the powers of (the) State (Department) appeared to focus for
the first time on the reality of a permanent Sino-Soviet split. The
impact on the minds around the table that morning was dramatic,
and you could hear the ice of 12 years begin to snap and crackle
as an intellectual thaw set in. I kept careful notes on that meeting
and regard it as something of a turning point. One after another
State's operators and planners toyed with the new world of
possibilities that non-monolithic communism might offer to US
policies.92
Although it is questionable whether this meeting can be regarded as a
turning point, given that it took the US another seven years to fully exploit
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the split, it nevertheless meant that the US began to think, once again,
seriously about communist divisions as a major factor in US diplomacy.
Rusk decided as a consequence of the issues raised to have an outside
organisation, which was to be the Council on Foreign Relations, look at
US-China relations as part of a wider exercise of grasping the meaning of
the split. 93 A major report on the matter was prepared for April 1962 by a
group of government officers from both its policy making and intelligence
wings. The group consulted outside experts on the Soviet Union and
China and the contents of the paper were discussed and revised
extensively. However, a wide divergence of opinion remained amongst
those involved. This special study group held two special meetings in
February under the auspices of the CFR and another in March under the
government's auspices involving other senior government officers.94 The
conclusions of this group in a thirty-five page report was that the split was
fundamental, and that it was believed that it would serve the interests of
the US. In fact, the report described it as "the most promising
development that has taken place since the inception of the cold war". 95
The report also concluded that the Soviet Union had the more acceptable
view as far as the United States was concerned and it recommended that
Kennedy seek a meeting with Khrushchev as soon as is practicable.96 A
draft Policy Planning Council paper prepared for the State Department at
about the same time reached the same conclusions:
It is here estimated that, short of a direct military threat to one or
the other of the communists strongholds or a sudden wave of new
communist successes, no improvement in the situation is likely to
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take place in either the near or long term. Differences rather than
diminishing will fester and grow. The polarization process already
so definitely underway will continue. The odds would seem to
favor continuation on to the point of no return, on until the "single
world camp of socialism" will cease in fact to be ... This estimate
derives in part from the fact that the dispute involves a large
number of elements that by their very nature do not seem
reconcilable. It derives even more from the fact that neither the
Soviet leadership nor the Chinese leadership can make necessary
modifications in its position without surrendering its control over
matters affecting the basic national interests of the state for which it
is responsible.97
The paper, like its later version, regarded all this as beneficial to the US.
"In general a process would be begun that would make it increasingly
possible for the United States and others to deal with Russia as Russia
and China as China". 98 This suggestion has all the hallmark of a
Realpolitik viewpoint of the two powers putting strategic and national
interests before ideological factors. This view was held by Nixon and
Kissinger but was at odds with documents like NSC 68, which had
emphasised the revolutionary aspects of world communism. Kennedy
had an instinctive dislike of communism and both the Communist
superpowers. It was not until the apparition of world destruction opened
up by the Cuban Missile crisis that he came to appreciate fully that the
superpowers shared common aims such as national survival. The
rhetoric of his inaugural address could not be carried out in direct conflict
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with the Soviet Union. Kennedy's response to the split once again
seemed to be governed by caution. There were no major initiatives
towards either the Soviets or the Chinese before October. Kennedy
shared his advisers' preference for the Soviets and his belief that they
represented the more moderate power.
The third factor in 1962 that affected US policy was the growing fear of
the inevitable moment when the Chinese would acquire a nuclear
capability. During the summer of 1962, the President began to worry
seriously about such a development, fearing its impact on the balance of
power, and the possibility that the Chinese might use these weapons to
threaten international equilibrium in pursuit of their revolutionary aims.99
As the date of a successful Chinese test drew nearer, (it took place in the
autumn of 1964), the Administration began to concern itself more
extensively over what action to take. In 1962, it was enough that the fear
was felt, as well as the clear lack, from an American perspective, of a
solution on what to do about this major new force in the world. What
seemed certain, however, was that it began to push Kennedy away from
his temporising regarding China policy. The Chinese and the issue of a
coherent new policy would only be able to wait so long, otherwise the
changing world situation and the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons
would force the US into an unwise position or drastic action. In short,
Kennedy now began to appreciate that the policy he had followed for his
first eighteen months in office would not be viable in his hoped-for second
term and may have to be abandoned earlier. William Bundy, in a chapter
on China in the draft book that is deposited in the Lyndon Johnson
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Library, captured the problem neatly when he wrote of the eventual test
that:
there could be no question that the Chinese test signalled an
important and basic change in the power status of mainland China .
in the post-war world ... China had not only acquired a new form of
military capacity which, however small, would grow over time. It
had shown the capacity to achieve this without more than initial
Soviet help, and it had signalled its independence of "world
opinion" as expressed in the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Since all of
this had been anticipated, its immediate impact on American official
thinking was not sharp or great. But in the gradual sense, over the
many years it had been in process, the event of nuclear testing
was a crucial part of the overall evaluation of China as a terribly
important and formidable element in East Asia and in the world
balance of power.l 00
Although the impact on US thinking was greater, even in the short term
than Bundy acknowledges, he is right to emphasise the gradual affect it
had on US policy. In effect, it was another factor in pushing an alteration
in the structure of international relations between the US and the
communist superpowers. Kennedy's initial reaction to a Chinese nuclear
breakthrough was to try to prevent it happening. This would lead in 1963
to the US reaching out to the Soviets for a joint arrangement, possibly
even a joint military operation, against the Chinese to prevent them
acquiring a nuclear capability.l 01
The final factor that needs mentioning was the decision by Kennedy to
109
allow the Nationalists to launch commando raids against the Chinese
mainland in 1962. Jiang had for a number of years been pushing for US
support in his hopes to attack the mainland and try to recapture it,
possibly forcing the United States to intervene to aid him. The
Eisenhower Administration had been sceptical about his ideas and had
tried to stymie his ambitlons.l 02 In July 1961 a "US intragovernmental
committee" which was a special group involving the President agreed US
support and provision for six 20 man teams to be airdropped into South
China. The Nationalists had originally requested 200-300 men teams
with a greater degree of US involvement especially air support. Kennedy,
•. 1.,,'
not surprisingly given infamous Guomindang incompetence, was
unwilling to go along with this. Once the preparations were complete the
Nationalists refused to carry out the operations arguing that 20 man
teams were insufficient to be of any use. Everett Drumright, the pro-Jiang
ambassador to the Republic of China, suggested further debate between
Washington and Jiang on this matter. On March 31st 1962, a discussion
about the proposals took place amongst policy makers. Rusk was highly
sceptical but Kennedy, Hilsman and Harriman wanted to "temporise"
rather than directly refuse the requests. The conclusion of the meeting
was to support a larger airdrop but as surreptitiously as possible. This
'-.decision was relayed in an unsigned memo, although the memo was
clearly authorised by the President, to Ray Cline who was the Chief of the
CIA station in Taipei. It stated that:
You are ... authorized to maintain close liaison with GOe
(Government of China) on planning and preparation for larger scale
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clandestine operations on a contingent basis involving up to a
maximum of 200 men in a single airdrop, but it is essential that all
responsibility for the preparation and execution of such operations
rest with the GOC. The United States will, concurrently with such
planning, prepare two C-123 aircraft in the United States and train
the Chinese crews in this country ... It must be understood that we
are preparing the capability for this operation - but have made no
decision at this time to proceed with it.103
This development would ultimately come to nothing. In June 1962, the
Chinese began to mass their troops along the coast in a defensive
formation as a warning both to the Guomindang and the United States.
The appointment of Alan Kirk, an amphibious war expert, as Ambassador
to Taiwan combined with the increased nationalist military activity had
clearly played a part in heightening Chinese concerns.104 Equally
important, as far as the Administration was concerned, was the absolute
failure of the teams that were launched against the mainland. They were
all quickly captured by the mainland authorities. This convinced the US
Government even more that Jiang had no chance of retaking the
island.105 From then on Kennedy ensured that he gave no US support
to attacks on the mainland. By September 1963 the Chinese Nationalists
had begun to emphasise that they were prepared to wait before taking
the mainland - in other words they were coming to accept their inability to
affect developments in, and control of, China.106 It is surprising, given
Kennedy's cautious approach, that he was prepared to support Jiang's
ambitions to such an extent. The most logical conclusion was that he
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anticipated the failure of the mission and didn't feel it would ultimately
affect the already poor relationship with the PRC. However, refusal to
support Jiang might set off a string of attacks from the China Lobby within
the domestic US arena. It seems inconceivable that Kennedy genuinely
believed that the attacks could succeed.
US fears about the Chinese Communists hardened as a consequence
of the events of October 1962. Although the Chinese had no involvement
in the Cuban Missile Crisis their subsequent attacks on the Soviet Union
over its capitulation hardened US Governmental feeling towards them.
Furthermore, when Kennedy began to rethink his policy towards the
Communist bloc it was primarily the Soviet Union that he hoped to build a
better relationship with. There was to be no instantaneous change in
policy towards the Chinese. The other major event of October 1962 was
the Chinese attack on India. This came about as a culmination of a long-
running border dispute between the two. On October 24 the Chinese
began a military assault which would continue until November 18, when
Chinese forces were only 30 miles from the plain of Assam whose oil
fields and tea plantations were vital to India's trade with the outside
world.107 The attack especially affected the liberals within the
Administration including Chester Bowles. Whereas up to then Bowles
had been a supporter of a relaxation in Sino-American relations, he
became a hard-line opponent of any change seeing the Chinese as
extremists. The Ambassador to India, Galbraith, also changed his view of
Sino-American relations. In short, their sympathies for Indian democracy
and Nehru outweighed any attachment to the Chinese. or even a change
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of policy. An armed attack, however limited, turned Bowles and others
against the Chinese for the rest of the 60s.1 08 Obviously for others
within the Administration, including the President, the attack represented
yet another example of the aggressive militant world-view and behaviour
of the PRC. For Roger Hilsman, as he later recalled, the attack sent
another message to him. He believed that China had shown that it was
able to seize the initiative in Asia and exercise its power virtually
unimpeded. In reality, he felt this more than anything showed why policy
needed to be overhauled.1 09 This changeover between Bowles and
Hilsman was emphasised by the fact that Bowles was about to leave the
Administration. In 1963 he went back for a second stint as Ambassador
to his beloved India, and Hilsman was appointed Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs replacing Harriman who was promoted to
Undersecretary of State.11 0
(iv) Conclusion.
By the end of 1962 the original policy adopted by John Kennedy of
temporising had clearly come to the end of its usefulness. In the first two
years of the Administration the domestic opposition to any change
combined with the hostility of the PRC pushed pragmatists like Kennedy
away from giving serious consideration to the ideas being floated by men
like Chester Bowles and Jim Thomson. That being said, underneath the
surface, the desire to reform policy was carried into the Administration
primarily by liberal policy makers who hoped to shake off what they saw
as the sterile policles of their predecessors Eisenhower and Foster
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Dulles. Although they won few battles in 1961 and 62 they continued to
pursue their agenda and influence the minds of policy makers. They also
held views, which dovetailed neatly with the academics in institutions like
Harvard who had tried to influence policy before the 1960 election. In
Thomson they had a friend and ally who had studied at Harvard,
understood, sympathised and shared their viewpoints and was able to
promote their ideas within the government. Thomson did this in a way
that met their intellectual predilections but also was explicable to the
politicians of the time like Bowles. This convergence between politicians
and academics would continue. Another point was that the policy agenda
in terms of political steps was introduced in the first two years of the
Kennedy era. After that all policy debates would focus on the US taking a
series of small unilateral steps to entice the PRe into dialogue. In fact, in
1969 that was the course that Nixon followed.
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CHAPTER FOUR: 1963: A TURNING POINT.
(i) Introduction.
The first two years of Kennedy's presidency saw little change of policy
towards the People's Republic of China. Faced with what he viewed as a
hostile and intransigent opponent and with an American public, which
would countenance no change, Kennedy preferred to temporise and
await a change in circumstances before deciding what long-term policy to
adopt towards the PRC. By the beginning of 1963, he had begun to
change his viewpoint. The nearing Chinese acquisition of nuclear
weapons and the emotional affects of the Cuban Missile crisis had
convinced him that policy had to be reformulated to take account of the
changing situation. Elsewhere within the State Department the voices
calling for a change in policy were becoming more noticeable. The
departure of Chester Bowles, rather than weakening their case,
strengthened it as new voices emerged who had the ear of the President
in a way that Bowles had never had. The two key figures in this process
were Averell Harriman and Roger Hilsman. During the course of 1963
they set in train a motion of events that looked like the prelude to a
possible change in China policy. This chapter argues that in 1963 a twin
track approach emerged. On the one hand this meant moves towards a
more openly hostile policy including making overtures to the Soviet Union
regarding an anti-Chinese alliance that might even include joint military
action against Chinese nuclear facilities. On the other, new moves with
tacit approval from the White House were begun that gave the President
the option of changing to a more moderate stance. Finally, worth noting
115
is the fact that as the pressures for change mounted with a critical speech
by Hilsman in December 1963, Thomson used his connection with the
academic community to garner their support and make them aware of the
proposed alterations being promoted.
(ii) W. Averell Harriman.
Central to the development of the twin track China policy that developed
in the last year of Kennedy's life and presidency was W. Averell
Harriman.I The grandson of the railroad magnate E. H. Harriman, he
had a long and impressive record in the Democratic Party and
international diplomacy. He had been Ambassador to the Soviet Union
and in the 1950s served a term as Governor of New York. He had
managed to develop close relations with both FOR and Truman; and
quickly in the 1960s, despite the potential rivalry, with the Kennedy family.
Later it would be Harriman who smoothed Robert Kennedy's entry into
New York politics where he was elected Senator in 1964.2 Harriman had
long viewed the communist powers as normal states to be dealt with by
the traditional routes of diplomacy rather than as revolutionary states
intent on global expansion that was implicit in much of the thinking of men
like Kennan and Foster Dulles. As early as the 1920s, he had been
developing trading links with the Soviet Union.3 He had a similar
flexibility towards the Chinese as well as a keen understanding of
Kennedy's attitude towards them. In 1959, he had applied for a visa to
visit the mainland but the Chinese Embassy in Moscow had let it be
known that he would not be welcome.4 He had also hoped to be
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Secretary of State in the Kennedy White House but had to accept lesser
positions although he worked himself into a position of influence partly
due to his good working relationship with Robert Kennedy.5
From very early on in the administration he had been attracted to
China policy. In the early summer of 1961, whilst in Geneva, he had
wanted to develop contacts with the Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi
and had sought and obtained clearance from the President to make an
approach.6 The clearance was given, but by that time the Chinese
minister had left the city. When in late 1961, he took on the position of
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; he became the key
player on policy for the region. To these ends he built up a little circle of
advisers who shared many of his views. These included Hilsman,
Michael Forrestal (a member of the NSC Staff from 1962 onwards), Paul
Kattenburg, who was the Vietnam desk officer, and Thomson.7 From
that position he developed a reputation for flexible thinking and
unswerving loyalty which earned the respect of the President. He
became the one member of the Administration involved with both tracks
of the new potential China policy.
That is not to overstate the degree of influence that Harriman
possessed over the President. For example, he was excluded from the
crisis talks over the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the Vienna Summit,
evidence that JFK did not want his influence over Soviet policy.8
Moreover, both Rusk and Ball within the State Department distrusted him.
His biographer Abramson claims that they were unwilling to have
weekends away from Washington simultaneously in case Harriman was
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able to gain too much influence.9 It would be fair to say that the best that
can be said for him was that he carved out a niche, which included a key
role in China policy.10
In March 1963, he was promoted to Undersecretary of State replacing
George McGhee who became Ambassador to Germany. He was left in
charge of Far East policy. His replacement as Assistant Secretary of
State for Far Eastern Affairs was Roger Hilsman and according to the
latter Harriman made it clear to him from the beginning that his main area
of concern was to be China policy.
(iii) The Military Option.
There can be little doubt that John Kennedy viewed the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by the Chinese Communists with horror. On January
10, 1963, in a meeting with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) John McCone, NSC (National Security Council) Adviser, McGeorge
Bundy made the President's position clear:
Bundy then brought up the question of the estimate of Chinese
Communist nuclear capability, with its current status, and what was
the present estimate of when the ChiComs would explode a
device. He stated that the President felt that this was probably the
most serious problem facing the world today and intimated that we
might consider a policy of indicating now that further effort by the
,
Chinese Communists in the nuclear field would be unacceptable to
us and that we should prepare to take some form of action unless
they agreed to desist from further efforts in this field. Bundy said
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that he felt the President was of a mind that nuclear weapons in the
hands of the Chinese Communists would so upset the world
political scene it would be intolerable to the United States and to
the West.11
McCone's notes of the meeting recorded that: Kitappeared to me that
Cuba and the Communist China nuclear threat are two issues foremost in
the minds of the highest authority and therefore should be treated
accordingly by CIA".12 McCone was honest during the meeting in
admitting that up to that point the CIA had been unable to gather
sufficient information to make any kind of detailed assessment of the
extent of the Chinese nuclear development.13
On January 16, Bundy told Harriman that the President wanted a
thorough assessment of China's long range military capability with special
reference to her nuclear strength and a list of possible US responses to
the threat posed. Harriman agreed to set up an interdepartmental
working group to look into the matter.14
Six days later, the subject came up again at a meeting of the NSC
where Kennedy made clear his feelings on Chinese nuclear
development.15 He also floated the idea of working with the Soviets to
prevent it. A day later, Harriman took up the same theme in a letter to the
President.
To my mind, the most important matter in the interest of our
security which you touched upon was the question of attempting to
prevent Red China from obtaining nuclear capability, and the
possibility of working with the Soviets to this end ... (I)n a
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conversation with one Russian representative, I asked what was
the use of our coming to an agreement on a test ban without Red
China. He replied that if the United States and the Soviet Union
agreed, world opinion would prevent China from acting
independently. The earnest manner in which he spoke gave me
the impression that what the Kremlin had in mind was that with
such an agreement, together we could compel China to stop
nuclear development, threatening to take out the facilities if
necessary. In any event, I was glad to learn that you put this
subject so high on your priority list.16
At this juncture two points need to be made. Firstly, it is clear that
Kennedy and Harriman viewed the Chinese as the more extreme of the
two communist powers. Whereas the Soviets could be negotiated with,
the Chinese had to be prevented at all costs from developing a nuclear
capability. In short, they believed that the Soviet State had a degree of
rational thinking where nuclear weapons were concerned which the
Chinese did not appear to possess. Whether these feelings had any
racial component can only be speculated upon. It has to be said though
that this is a remarkable view given that only three months earlier the US
and the Soviets had gone head to head over the Soviets attempt to place
weapons in Cuba. The other point is that triangular international
diplomacy was beginning to emerge in US policy makers' minds
regarding the two communist super powers. Kennedy and Harriman both
wanted to play on the Sino-Soviet split to ally with the Soviets against the
more extreme (as they saw it) Chinese. These early attempts at
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triangular diplomacy showed that even in 1963 US politicians were now
adapting to the split and the range of opportunities that it presented them.
By 1969, and the inauguration of Richard Nixon, the international
environment was both more complex and the problems facing the US
more pressing. In short, for Kennedy and Harriman caution was a
sensible approach whereas for Nixon the bold strokes associated with the
opening to China were in many ways necessities. There appears to be
no evidence at this point of members of the Administration arguing for the
US to ally with the Chinese against the Soviets.
The subject of an anti-Chinese alliance between the Soviet Union and
the United States came up during the Tripartite negotiations between the
two superpowers and the United Kingdom held in Moscow between July
15 and 25, 1963. The subject for discussion, which led eventually to a
deal on the last day of the talks, was the banning of nuclear tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Harriman represented the
United States at the talks. On the first day of the talks Kennedy ensured
Harriman understood that he wanted the issue of the Chinese discussed.
In a message to his representative, the President wrote: "You should try
to elicit Khrushchev's view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese
nuclear development and his willingness either to take Soviet action or to
accept US action in this dlrection' .17 The matter was discussed on that
day in a meeting between Khrushchev, Harriman and the British
representative Lord Hailsham and again several times during the talks.
The outcome of the talks was inconclusive, as Khrushchev was
unprepared to make such a commitment at that time.18 A memo written
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by John J. de Martino of the State Department Executive Secretariat to
the Executive Secretary Benjamin Read in October 1964 recounted the
talks as follows:
A search of our records of the Test Ban Treaty negotiations in
Moscow fails to reveal any Harriman proposal for a joint US-USSR
effort to slow down Red China's nuclear development. On the
other hand the question of Chinese nuclear capacities came up in
various Harriman/Khrushchev conversations. Harriman probed
USSR knowledge of Chinese capacities and its attitude toward
them. He expressed our concern regarding this matter and said he
hoped that the problem would be solved by eventual Chinese
adherence to the Treaty or by disarmament. Khrushchev was
obviously unwilling to talk at much length on the question and he
tried to give the impression of not being greatly concerned.
One of the reasons that the Chinese issue was raised with
Khrushchev was Harriman's theory that Khrushchev's interest in a test
ban treaty flowed from his desire to isolate Red China in the international
communist movement. Aside from this Harriman was also under
instructions to express the Presidenfs great concern over Chinese
development of nuclear weapons.19
This tells us that the US and especially Averell Harriman were moving
towards triangular diplomacy. Nevertheless, the US remained cautious
and on the evidence of the Test Ban treaty with good reason given that
Khrushchev was unprepared to commit himself to such a potentially risky
adventure. Ironically, his successor Leonid Brezhnev would be more
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prepared to seek US support in the Soviet conflict with the Chinese.
Kennedy also convened a NSC meeting on July 31,1963 to consider
the threat posed by the Chinese. His concerns were questioned by the
CIA, which argued in a report that the acquisition of nuclear weapons was
unlikely to change the foreign policy of the PRC. The CIA argued that the
Chinese adopted a cautious approach towards world affairs, which stood
in marked contrast to the provocative language that often emanated from
the Chinese leaders and media in Beijing. The meeting broke up without
reaching any firm decisions.20 Thereafter, the fear of Chinese nuclear
development seems to have concerned the President less as he began to
lay his preparations for his re-election campaign. The more hostile track
of the new China policy was set aside for the meantime. In reality, it
would never be implemented as events moved the US to a different
assessment of the PRC.
At about the same time as the Test Ban Treaty was being signed
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Chinese were
making clear their view on the Treaty and the nuclear arms race. On
August 7, John Cabot, the US Ambassador to Poland and representative
in the US-PRC ambassadorial talks reported that he had had a long
meeting with his Chinese counterpart Wang Ping-nan (the Chinese
Ambassador to Poland). Cabot reported that Wang spoke "at times
more emotionally than he has for some time".21 According to Cabot's
report, Wang made Chinese feelings known on the Treaty,
he (Wang) must point out August 5 tripartite test ban treaty goes
against aspirations people of world because it can be used by
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nuclear powers consolidate their nuclear monopoly. It legalizes
continued manufacture, transportation, underground testing and
use of weapons by US while binding hands of peace-loving
countries, denying them adequate means protecting selves against
nuclear threat. Treaty thereby actually increases hazard of nuclear
war and is menacing world peace. Asked how a few nuclear
powers could take into own hands serious issues affecting human
destiny. How can desire of people of whole world be ignored and a
few nuclear powers be permitted monopolize everything. Without
participation China no major questions in international affairs can
be settled in our times. Said President Kennedy had gone out of
his way to resume tone and airs of world overlord presuming
describe nonnuclear powers as stable or unstable, responsible or
irresponsible. That was outright imperialistic attitude. Even
Kennedy cannot deny that far from prejudicing nuclear strength of
USG (United States Government), treaty makes possible carrying
on of nuclear race. If US sincere in wanting take first step, should
first remove nuclear threat it now possesses by dismantling all
overseas bases and reaching an accord establishing nuclear-free
zones.22
This quotation, allowing for some overblown rhetoric, neatly puts forward
the Chinese viewpoint, which has cogency. The Chinese were
developing a nuclear capacity partly to ensure that no power could attack
them with impunity: a situation no national government could find
tolerable. Moreover, Wang is surely right in saying that no major
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international problems of the time could be solved without Chinese
participation. Arguably, the US policy of non-recognition was therefore
not only a failure in its own terms but warped US reaction and flexibility
on other issues such as the nuclear arms race. Finally, Wang was right
to say that the Test Ban Treaty solidified the US and Soviet right to
maintain their own nuclear stockpile whilst forbidding other countries from
developing theirs. Therefore, it is not really surprising that the Chinese
found the treaty wholly unacceptable.
The Chinese were however quick to emphasise their peaceful
intentions. They were not seeking a nuclear capability to threaten the
world or to aid regional expansion. After the Cabot-Wang meeting, the
Chinaman struck up an informal conversation with his American
counterpart:
He said he had just come from China where his people were
working hard in constructing their country. They had much to do
and would never attempt to break out of their own borders into
other areas. Said I should not believe newspaper accounts in the
US which claimed China was a peril in the Far East.23
This conversation and the manner in which the Chinese leadership used
their eventual development of a nuclear capability show that they
understood that it was a deterrent against attack rather than a
conventional weapon of war. In November 1963, a matter of days before
Kennedy's death, an interdepartmental PG (Planning Group) met to
discuss the consequences of the Chinese acquisition of nuclear
weapons. A report of the meeting concluded that: "The consensus was
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that the Chinese would remain basically cautious in the overt use of force
even after they acquired a few nucs; first use by them would be highly
unlikely - instead they would see their nucs as a deterrent to escalation
by us".24 The paper arising from this meeting was never sent to the
President because as Bromley Smith (Executive Secretary of the NSC)
explained in a note to Bundy: "This event is so far down the road I doubt
JFK should be given this this year".25 In short the US was becoming
more accustomed to China's nuclear development and was beginning to
accept that the Chinese too would see it as a deterrent. Also, the lack of
interest by the Soviet Union in any joint alliance to prevent Chinese
nuclear development closed off this option. All of this made it easier for
the President of the day to reach out to the mainland, just as the mere
fact that it possessed the nuclear capacity made it more necessary.
Moreover, the Chinese nuclear capability gave them a greater status as a
world power, in their own eyes, but also in the eyes of the outside world.
Again, all of this was clear to Nixon in 1969 but uncertain in 1963.
(iv) Roger Hilsman and the Peace Track.
In April 1963, Harriman took up his post as Undersecretary of State.
Roger Hilsman replaced him as Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs. A graduate of West Point, with a doctorate from Yale,
Hilsman had the right combination of brain and brawn that Kennedy liked
in the people around him. During the Second World War he had been a
member of Merill's marauders in Burma, where he had developed the
reputation as a military expert especially in counter-insurgency, a
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fascination he shared with the President.26 Hilsman, using this
expertise, had a tendency to question military decisions and lecture
officers in the military and Pentagon. Kennedy liked this form of
questioning but others such as Lyndon Johnson, Dean Rusk, General
Maxwell Taylor and Robert McNamara did not and became enemies.27
Their dislike was kept in check so long as Hilsman had a friend in the
White House. For example, Kennedy stepped in to ensure that Hilsman
stayed in the Administration after Yale had offered him an academic
post.28 James Thomson in a later interview makes the point that
Hilsrnan's only close friend and mentor within the Administration was the
President and that after his assassination Hilsman's "days were
numbered".29
On taking office, Harriman made it clear that Hilsman's priority must be
sorting out China policy and that he was to reflect on what policy should
be during a second Kennedy Administration. Hilsman believed from his
conversations with Harriman and the President that Kennedy wanted a
form of detente with the Chinese as part of a general improvement in
international relations. 3D Kennedy prioritised improved relations with the
Soviets, but believed that if circumstances were right, then the US should
try to improve relations with the Chinese as well. Hilsman's job, as he
saw it, was to flesh out these ideas and to apply the principles that
Kennedy had begun to take towards his policy towards the Soviet Union
to his policy with the Chinese. These principles were 'Firmness,
Flexibility and Dispassion".31 Hilsman verified this in To Move a Nation,
his account of his time within the Administration, writing of these three
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principles: "In all three aspects, the policy was basically what President
Kennedy had followed so successfully in dealing with the Soviet
Union".32 The other factor that motivated Hilsman was the Sino-Soviet
split. 33 In short, he understood that the nature of international politiCS
was evolving and that the US could take advantage of the change in
climate.
The first major task that Hilsman undertook in order to begin to alter
the parameters of how China policy was dealt with in the State
Department was to reorganise the desks or compartments where policy
towards the Asian region was dealt with. He especially intended to
separate policy towards the Chinese Mainland from policy towards the
Republic of China. He decided to create an Office of Asian Communist
Affairs, which would be the motor for consideration of policy towards the
PRC and its communist neighbours North Korea and North Vietnam. He
also decided that he wanted somebody who shared his flexibility and was
experienced in US policy towards the region. He turned to Marshall
Green, who at the time was based in Hong Kong, but had recently been
turned down for the post of Ambassador to Thailand. In July 1963,
Hilsman wrote to him to express his regrets about Green's
disappointment but also to offer him a job back in Washington:
I have a proposition to make to you to which I hope you will give
careful consideration. As you have no doubt suspected, many of
us in the Kennedy Administration would like to lay at least the
groundwork of a rational China policy. This is something that is
high on my own agenda, high on Governor Harriman's agenda,
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and, I know, high on the President's agenda. We will be making
the first tentative moves in this direction in the next few weeks.
Beyond that, no one has any very clear notions of what we will do
next -- only the ambition and, I might say, determination. I would
like you to be in on the policy-making of this fundamental and (I
need not tell you) most far reaching series of steps. Although I
have not raised it in a formal fashion, I have reason to believe that
the seventh floor would look with favor on a request from me to
establish a third Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
with special responsibilities in developing and carrying out a new
look at our China policy. I have not asked for this position to be
formally established yet, simply because I want to know my man
before I establish the position. If you are interested ... I would like
to move ahead looking toward your early reassignment to
Washington to take on these very heavy and serious
responsibilities. I would appreciate your reaction as soon as
possible.34
An excited Marshall Green responded almost immediately after receiving
the letter sending a personal telegram to express his interest in the post:
I have long been interested in a relook at our China policy and I
consider it a stimulating challenge and opportunity to be in on the
ground floor of the project you describe. If the position is created
and if I am assigned to it, you may be sure that I will do my
utmost.35
In August, letters were exchanged between the two of them to the affect
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that Green would take up his new assignment in mid-September. Green
returned to Washington then.36 Hilsman next turned to establishing the
office. In an undated Memo, which was almost certainly written by
Hilsman, the rationale for the new Office was set out:
Current trends underline the need for taking a new look at the
problem of Communist China in a changing world: the deepening
of the Sino-Soviet rift, the growing triangulation of the Cold War,
the new diffusion of power and authority in the communist world,
progress in arms control counter-balanced by evidence that a
truculent China may soon enter the club, and signs that Peiping
(Beijing) baffled by the great leap backward and the enormity of
China's long-term economic problems is casting about for new
solutions which could involve dangers and/or opportunities for us ...
In this situation there is a need to lay the foundation for a longer-
range China policy, for a better coverage of North Korea, North
Vietnam and Outer Mongolia, for closer attention to the world-wide
implications for US policy of the Sino-Soviet split and for new focus
on Subcontinent affairs as they affect China.37
The Memo went on to explain why it was important to separate China
policy from the departmental desks that dealt with Taiwan, Japan and
South Korea. It argued that the two officers in the department had to deal
with the operational problems of relations with allies, including Japan,
which was the key, US ally in the region. Hilsman proposed that a total of
six officers be placed in the Office, the most important being Green.
Three would work on China policy, another on Sino-Soviet relations, and
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another on South and Southeast Asia and a final officer would
concentrate on North Vietnam and North Korea. The new office structure
(Hilsman also created a second new Office of Regional Affairs whose
brief included SEATO and general economic development) was approved
on November 14 and came into affect thirteen days later.38
Hilsman then put forward his programme of alternative policies, which
were generally the same ideas that Bowles and others had previously
espoused. These were an exchange of newsmen, diplomatic recognition
by the US of Mongolia, re-examining US trade restrictions with China and
most boldly bringing the PRC into the disarmament talks in Geneva. He
saw little chance of a positive Chinese response to this programme but
felt it would put the onus on them as the cause of the poor relationship
between the two countries as well as possibly having an impact on the
internal politics of the PRC. These ideas were put in a memo that due to
Kennedy's assassination would have to go to his successor Lyndon
Baines Johnson, but it was decided to wait until after a major speech
before putting the ideas forward to the new President. 39
(v) The December 1963 Speech: Preparation.
Unlike the Truman Administration and to a lesser extent the Eisenhower
Administration, Kennedy and his aides placed less emphasis on formal
policy documentation.40 He preferred confidential discussions with key
advisers. This meant that policy was often less structured than for
example the Truman/Acheson approach, which were formalised in
documents like NSC 68. It meant that those trying to influence policy
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tended to use vehicles other than memos. It also meant that it is harder
to trace what the policy was and how it developed over time. One way as
William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under
Lyndon Johnson recalled "was to make major speeches even more
important than in the past as a vehicle for codifying what was being done
and thought".41 Bundy believed that the speech given by Hilsman at the
Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on December 13, 1963 fell into
that category.42
Hilsman had been looking since the summer of 1963 to make a
speech outlining the new direction that policy towards the mainland might
take. The first opportunity to give a speech of this nature took place in
August when he was asked to substitute for Rusk at the 16th Annual
Meeting of the National Legislative Conference in Honolulu, Hawaii. He
was offered the speech that Rusk was to give but decided that he would
prefer to give a speech on US policy towards China. The Far Eastern
Section of the State Department produced a draft for a speech, which
restated what policy had been since 1950. Hilsman and Thomson
reviewed the speech in mid-August and decided that it was unacceptable I
as it stood.43 As Thomson noted in a Memo on the genesis and reaction
to the speech that he wrote for the record in May, 1964,
it was largely a one-sided chronicle of U.S. relations with
Communist China from 1949 to the present; it placed the onus for
our bad relations entirely on the Chinese Communists. In effect, as
Hilsman said, it forced him to identify himself with all the actions of
previous administrations on China policy.44
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The two of them decided that it was impossible to make the numerous
changes to this draft to make it acceptable as a speech that Hilsman
might want to give. Instead, he reverted to the original speech that Rusk
had intended to make.45
The next opportunity came when the Commonwealth Club in San
Francisco invited Hilsman to come and make a speech on December
13th. This time both he and Thomson were ready to ensure that the text
would suit their purpose.46 Hilsman has always suggested that the
specific nature of the speech was cleared with Kennedy and that it would
represent an elaboration of Kennedy's comments at his last ever press
conference on November 14.47 Responding to a question about trade
with the PRC, Kennedy had replied:
We are not planning on trade with Red China in view of the policy
that Red China pursues. If the Red Chinese indicate a desire to
live at peace with the United States, with other countries
,
surrounding it, then quite obviously the United States would
reappraise its policies. We are not wedded to a policy of hostility to
Red China.48
This statement set out a basic willingness to come to terms with the PRe.
Hilsman has always claimed that the December speech was aimed at
laying the basis for US policy towards the PRC for a second Kennedy
Administration. This was based on the assumption, which seemed logical
at the time, that JFK was likely to win a second term and have five more
years in the White House, the last four unencumbered by electoral
considerations. Hilsman was also certain that the President wanted the
133
seeds of this change put in place before the election.49 Thomson has
always been more sceptical about these claims: "Roger (Hilsman) thinks
that he had a go-ahead from John Kennedy, I've never been able to ferret
out precisely how specific that go-ahead was and when Kennedy gave
it".50 Historians have tended to share Thomson's scepticism, but a
logical explanation is that Kennedy was happy to give the green light,
knowing that he could disassociate himself from it if necessary and that
he could gauge the reaction to the proposals that Hilsman put forward. 51
By late 1963, Kennedy knew that the Soviet Union would be uninterested
in any joint anti-Chinese\alliance and that the CIA was emphasising the
cautious nature of the PRe's foreign policy. Furthermore, Kennedy was
now in a far stronger position domestically, likely to win re-election
comfortably and was perceived as a tough anticommunist, which would
give him the space to manoeuvre in relations with the Communist
superpowers. There seems to have been no reason to suggest that
Kennedy would not give Hilsman, whom he undoubtedly trusted, the
green light knowing that Hilsman would not be too controversial and
would carry out his intentions. Finally, Kennedy always knew he could
back out of any commitment if necessary.
At the end of November the State Department produced its draft for
the San Francisco speech. The result was another hard-line document,
which outlined traditional US policy. Thomson reviewed it on December 1
and rejected it.52 He then recommended to Hilsman, that given that
there was a new man in the White House who was still finding his feet, it
might be better to abandon the speech. Hilsman rejected this advice and
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decided to press on. This decision and the rejection of the original draft
prompted two new drafts by Robert Barnett (brother of Doak and Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs) and Lindsey Grant who was the
Acting Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs. Thomson
reviewed these new drafts and decided that the latter "could be readily
adapted" to suit Hilsman's requirements.53 Over the next few days
Thomson worked on the speech to adapt it to the specific requirements of
the occasion. On December 7, Thomson took the latest draft to a
meeting with Grant, Barnett, Marshall Green and Allen Whiting, who was
the Director of the Office of Research for Far Eastern Affairs and noted
China academic. 54 At that meeting the final draft was worked out and
Thomson took it to Hilsman who was satisfied. 55
The next stage was getting it cleared by the White House, Harriman
and especially by Dean Rusk. On Monday December 9, copies were
sent to Michael Forrestal at the White House, William Sullivan who was
the special assistant to Harriman and the Bureau of Public Affairs.
Forrestal approved it telling Thomson that he was disappointed that they
had not gone even further, Sullivan approved it saying that he saw no
problem with it although he had been unable to get hold of his boss. 56
On the evening of December 11, Hilsman requested time with the
Secretary of State to apprise him of the speech. He had already shown it
to Undersecretary of State George Ball who had raised no objections.57
Hilsman recalls in his book To Move a Nation his encounter with Rusk
over the speech:
(I described) what was in the speech, I warned him that the China
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Lobby would probably raise a fuss, along with the Chinese
Nationalists and probably some Congressmen. We discussed the
implications of an intelligence report that the French were about to
recognize Communist China. Finally, I asked if he wanted to go
over the speech himself. He saw no need for it - and that was
that.58
Thomson backs this story up noting that Rusk's only concern was the
timing, given that the French were establishing relations with the PRC
(which they formally did in January 1964) and that this speech might be
interpreted as a US blessing for that move.59 Assuming that Hilsman
accurately informed him of its contents Rusk clearly found the text
acceptable. Thomson has always claimed that Rusk was hoodwinked
into clearing a text, which advocated a policy he did not agree with.BO
However. Rusk was politically shrewd enough to know how sensitive
China policy was. A more likely explanation was that, given the speech
already had presidential clearance, it met the basic requirements of the
Administration. William Bundy's view is that the speech was only different
in tone from Rusk's viewpoint and therefore the Secretary of State would
have found the ideas contained within it acceptable.B1 The text was
released to the press on December 12 and delivered in San Francisco
the following day.
(vi) The Text of the Speech.
The speech itself was carefully crafted and aimed at appearing hard-line
enough not to cause upset in the domestic arena too much whilst
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simultaneously clearly representing a shift in policy terms. The basic
policy position was summed up in the most famous section of the speech:
We believe ... that policies of strength and firmness, accompanied
by a constant readiness to negotiate - policies long and effectively
pursued with the Soviet Union - will best promote the changes
which must take place on the China mainland.62
In short, Hilsman was stating that the US was preparing to move away
from a policy of total isolation to one of containment as pursued towards
the USSR. The other key change in terms of immediate policy attitude
towards the PRC was an acceptance that the CCP were now firmly
entrenched in power.63 This clearly repudiated Dulles' view that the PRC
was "a passing phase". The US no~ accepted that if it was to come to
terms with the rulers of the Mainland, then that meant coming to terms
with the Communists. These changes grew out of the policy debates that
had been taking place within the Kennedy Administration since 1961.
They found substance in the most conciliatory section of the speech:
We do not know what changes may occur in the attitudes of future
Chinese leaders, but if I may paraphrase a classic canon of our
past, we pursue today towards Communist China a policy of the
Open Door: We are determined to keep the door open to the
possibility of change, and not to slam it shut against any
development which might advance our national good, serve the
free world, and benefit the people of China.64
This statement showed that the US would be prepared to build bridges
with the CCP leadership if they were prepared to change their stance.
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The other most interesting aspect of the speech is its acceptance of
the liberal interpretation of recent Chinese history. Firstly, Hilsman
acknowledged that the US and the West in general had failed to
understand the collapse of the Confucianist state and the degree to which
the Chinese felt humiliated by Western intervention in their country:
We had little understanding of the ferment and weakness created
by the collapse of the Confucian state. And we were little aware of
the depth and fervor of Chinese nationalism in reaction to a sense
of repeated humiliation at the hands of the West.65
For that reason, Hilsman went on to state; the US was unprepared for the
rise of the CCP. This view, although simplified, is not far from Fairbank's
assessment that Americans failed to understand how humiliated the
Chinese were at Western interference. Hilsman avoided directly the
issue of the indigenous nature of the CCP but clearly hints that the US
must now come to terms with it. However much the US may continue to
dislike it: "It is time to take stock - dispassionately - of the greatest and
most difficult problem we face in our efforts to assist in the development
of a peaceful Far East".66
A final aspect of the speech worth noting is the belief of the need for a
regional approach and the inclusion of the PRC in that approach. If the
US wanted a peaceful Far East and recognised that the communists were
firmly established on the Chinese Mainland and that the US shared some
responsibility for the unhappy relationship, then it admitted the PRC must
playa part in any regional structure that may emerge in the longer term.
This is most succinctly put in another important passage of the speech:
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Of course, the paradox of nation building is that the ultimate
guarantee of its success lies in the capacity of national leaders to
transcend parochial nationalism and to understand the
interdependence of all peoples. How to bring peaceful regional
cooperation out of conflicting national revolutions - that is the key
question. In the Far East that question has a special significance.
For the evolution of each Asian state is taking place today under
the long shadows cast by China - by the China of history that was
for so long the matrix of east Asian civilization, and by the mainland
China of today, the torchbearer of a rigid totalitarian ideology that
threatens all its neighbors.67
In short, Hilsman emphasised the cultural importance of China. This view
stemmed directly from Fairbank and his emphasis that Chinese culture
must be understood as a means of coming to terms with it. Moreover, no
regional policy for the area could survive without Chinese co-operation.
This speech, which in many ways was still hard-line, was the most
concrete evidence of the returning influence of the liberal academics,
such as Fairbank and their disciples, most notably James Thomson. It is
not therefore so surprising that Thomson gives the speech and his input
into it such prominence amongst his papers, which are to be found at the
Kennedy Library in Boston. Of course, this speech failed to note some of
the tensions created by this Sino-centric view of East Asian history. Any
historian of the area would have noted the lengthy animosity that existed
between the Chinese and Vietnamese, which even a shared communist
ideology had not extinguished.
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(vii) The Reaction to the Speech.
The distribution of the speech was handled by Thomson, who in his
choice of recipients, showed a bias to senators and academics that he
knew were likely to approve of its contents. To those who were less likely
to approve, the emphasis was that policy had not changed. To his friends
in the academic profession, Thomson clearly was pushing at an open
door and appealing to their already firmly held viewpoints. The evidence
of this can most clearly be established by their reactions.
Thomson distributed the speech to twelve Senators who were
regarded as most likely to sympathise with its contents and were known
for liberal views and an interest in foreign policy. The speech was also
sent to one hundred and seventy members of the MS (with a note from
Thomson enclosed in each case) and to those who usually received
general information from the State Department. 68 Thomson's careful
targeting of sympathetic academics reaped a favourable response that
built on the positive response in the nation's press. Of twenty-one US
newspaper editorials, fifteen praised the speech; three attacked it for
being soft on communism and another three, including the Washington
Post, criticised it for not going far enough.69
The reaction of the academic community was the most positive of all.
Reischauer in Tokyo wrote to Thomson praising it as "excellent".70
Thomson replied pointing out that he was only one of a number of
authors but explaining the rationale behind its delivery:
the speech involves at best a change in posture, not policy; but that
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in itself is significant. Now that we have talked dispassionately
about China without having the roof fall in, we will have the
courage to talk a great deal more about China. 71
A. Doak Barnett wrote to Thomson saying that: "I am delighted that some
of the ideas that have been current within (the) State (Department) for
some years have been publicly articulated".72 Kenneth Scott Latourette
of Yale described the speech "as a miracle" whilst Karl Pringsheim of the
University of Chicago called it "sane, sound and reasonable". 73 John
Kenneth Galbraith, whom although not a China academic nevertheless
was linked to the liberal academic community, described it as a "great
speech"_74 In total the State Department received fifty letters praising the
speech, mainly from academics working on East Asia and China, and
only eight criticising it.75 From this reaction alone one can surmise that
these views enjoyed the support of a substantial section of the academics
working on the region. Thomson also sent a copy to Bowles in New Delhi
writing that "it is the first effort since the days of Parsons to articulate the
policies that we have been pursuing on a pragmatic basis since early
1961",76 Thomson also emphasised to his former boss that it did not
mean that the US was "going soft" on the PRC: "We are merely being
rational, firm, and patient - as befits a great power!"77
Amongst the Senators who received the speech, the most outspoken
in its favour was George McGovern of South Dakota, himself an
academic historian, who had come into contact with many of the ideas
contained within it whilst in the Administration. McGovern talked of:
my growing belief that we cannot continue on the rather sterile
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course which we are now following with reference to mainland
China. I hope that Mr Hilsman's statement ... is an indication of
growing consideration of possible alternatives to our present China
policy.78
This type of comment from a Senator would have been unheard of even
in 1961 and is evidence that the shift towards a new policy had begun
and that Hilsman and Thomson had correctly judged the national mood in
making public that policy was under review. Also notable was the muted
reaction of the Committee of One Million. They released an elaborate
statement which condemned it but not in the extravagant terms that they
had been used to dealing with those daring enough to advocate relaxing
policy with the PRC in the past. 79
(viii) The December Speech: Conclusions.
Given the time and effort that men like Hilsman and Thomson put into the
speech and their obvious satisfaction with the outcome, what was the
overall affect of it and where should it be placed in the overall
development of policy towards the PRe? Moreover, what does it tell us
about Kennedy's policy towards the mainland Chinese Government?
Seymour Topping writing in the New York Times, in February 1964
stated: 'While Mr. Hilsman's speech did not represent a change in United
States policy, it was widely interpreted as an effort to prepare the ground
for the adoption of a more flexible attitude".80 Topping neatly identifies
the two features and purposes of the speech: to clarify the existing
position of the US Government; and to ensure that publicly it is noted that
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the US is now prepared to change its policy and to respond to any
initiatives from the Chinese.81 Moreover, it was part of a process,
pushed by Hilsman and Thomson, to get China policy placed on the
agenda and to set off a wider debate, already taking place within the
academic community, about how China policy should develop. It can be
argued that this speech represented a turning point whereby mainstream
politicians and government officers could support, if they wanted to,
altering policy towards the PRC without fear of being subject to vilification
from the China Lobby. From now on that debate and the pressure for
change would grow stronger and even academics that had remained
silent in years previous began to find their voice. Finally, it suggested
that Kennedy probably approved the stance taken by Hilsman knowing
that such a debate would strengthen his room for manoeuvre and that he
could disown it if necessary. In conclusion, the speech represented the
first signs that the hard work by men like Hilsman and Thomson was
beginning to payoff. It also signalled that the national mood was
beginning to alter to the extent that they were now able to express their
opinions more openly. Certainly, they must have felt optimistic as 1963
drew to a close, that the policy debate was moving in their favour and that
Lyndon Johnson might be prepared to carry out the promises that
Hilsman felt he had received from Kennedy.
Hilsman waited a couple of weeks and then in conjunction with a
couple of close associates of the new President, Walter Jenkins and Tom
Hughes, set about finding out what Lyndon Johnson thought of the
speech. According to Jenkins the response was: "On the whole, very
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good".82 Nevertheless, Hilsman backed out of making any more moves
on China policy, possibly fearing the likely reaction, and in March he was
sacked. His rationalisation later was,
my feelings would be that you don't want any grand initiatives in
foreign policy in the period when the new President has got to get
his hands on the reins. The time to do that would have been after
the 1964 election.83
A couple of years later in the summer of 1966, he got a call from the
White House saying that Johnson had taken up his ideas but by that time
the domestic and international circumstances had altered dramatically.84
(ix) Conclusions.
The first issue that must be assessed is the precise nature of Kennedy's
policy towards the People's Republic of China. Clearly, it was governed
mainly by a combination of caution and pragmatism. Central to that was
the belief that the Chinese were unwilling to accept any overtures from
his Administration and that domestically the criticism that a likely change
of stance might generate was not worth the risk. This understandable
caution ensured that Kennedy gave very little thought to any early
substantial change in US policy. All of this was underpinned by
Kennedy's instinctive anti-communism and his belief (shared by his aides)
that China was the more extreme of the two communist superpowers.
Within that context, it is therefore not surprising that Kennedy did not
entertain the suggestions propagated by men like Chester Bowles. By
1963 faced with the onset of Chinese nuclear development, the growing
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Sino-Soviet split, and his improving domestic position, helped by his
popular stand over Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, Kennedy was given
more room to manoeuvre and more need to do so. His reaction to
Chinese nuclear development was horror to such an extent that he
allowed Harriman to approach Khrushchev with a view to some form of
tacit agreement between the two on the subject. It was a combination of
Khrushchev's disinterest in such an arrangement, and CIA and other
Administration assessments that the Chinese were likely to remain
cautious even with nuclear weapons, that made him back away from that
position. It was then that a second track emerged which involved
Harriman and to a greater extent Roger Hilsman. Hilsman was given the
green light to reassess policy and to lay the groundwork for possible
policy alterations in a second Kennedy term. To that end, he set up a
new Office of Communist Affairs; put a set of innovative proposals
forward and in December 1963, despite his patron's death, made a
keynote speech on the subject. Hilsman was influenced by the Sino-
Soviet split and hoped to move China policy towards a more
dispassionate and flexible viewpoint that he felt was being followed by
Kennedy towards the Soviet Union. To Hilsman the split gave the US the
chance to build a new relationship with both superpowers based on
Realpolitik not rigid ideology. Kennedy's death has robbed the historian
of a definitive answer as to how far he would have followed that stance
had he remained alive and won re-election. His instinctive caution would
certainly have acted to limit his flexibility. Moreover, just as with Johnson,
Vietnam would have played an ever-greater role in his thoughts and
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would have impinged on his attitude towards the Communist Chinese.
However, Kennedy had shown considerable flexibility and was willing to
give men like Hilsman leeway in pursuit of their ideas. Ultimately, the jury
is out on whether or not Kennedy might have conducted a different policy
than his successor, but he certainly showed more flexibility and was
willing to engage with these ideas in a way that Johnson would not until
they were forced on him in 1966.
The key issue would however be the Republic of ChinalTaiwan. In
October 1963, Zhou En-Iai was interviewed by Reuters and amongst the
questions was one concerning Sino-American relations. Zhou responded
that the failure to reach agreement between the two turned on one issue:
"Would the United States agree in principle to withdraw its armed forces
from the Taiwan Strait and remove its armed threats"?85 From the
Chinese perspective Taiwan remained the key issue and only when the
US was prepared to start to be flexible on that, as Nixon was, would the
possibility of an improvement in Sino-American relations be likely. If
Kennedy had been prepared to make concessions in that arena he might
have stood a chance of changing the hostile relationship between the
two. The likelihood is that he would not have, given the domestic
circumstances, and because in 1963 even Hilsman and Thomson were
not openly advocating a change in attitude, to an extent acceptable to the
PRC, towards Jiang's regime on the island. The conclusion based on
probabilities is that Kennedy might have been more flexible but that the
circumstances would still have not been right for the major shift that Nixon
brought about.
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A second area concerning Kennedy's approach that must be
considered is the influence of academics on policy, especially the liberal
ones identified in the second chapter. Here the difference with
Eisenhower is marked. Whereas the academics were almost totally
excluded in the fifties, under Kennedy they began to regain influence
within governmental circles. A key ally of theirs, Chester Bowles was
appointed Undersecretary of State and he appointed James Thomson as
his Special Assistant. Reischauer became Ambassador to Japan and
during the next three years even Fairbank was invited to Washington to
confer with governmental officers (something which would have been
unheard of under Eisenhower).86 Bowles was also able to begin to
remove hard-liners like Parsons and replace them with officers more
amenable to a more flexible view of the PRe. In 1963, Roger Hilsman
another academic, became a key player on China policy. The crucial
individual at the centre of all of this was Thomson. He retained contact
with these academics whilst simultaneously working to promote a new
policy within the Administration. The nearest his ideas, and those of his
friends and allies in the academic community, came to being put into
practice was the December 1963 speech, which was generally
applauded. Thomson would look back feeling that a basis for change had
been achieved but little more.87 However, it can be argued that a
decisive shift in attitude took place and that the academics that worked
within the Administration were vital in achieving that.
The final question must be: how can the Kennedy period be placed in
the overall consideration of the precise nature of the domestic roots of
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Nixon's opening to China? This thesis would argue that the Kennedy
period represented a vital shift away from the Truman/Eisenhower policy
of total isolation and that it represented the beginning of an evolving
consensus, which by 1969 would give Nixon the freedom to manoeuvre.
By the end of 1963, the constraints on the Administration were still too
great and the academics that promoted change still too cautious. Within
a couple of years that caution would have largely evaporated.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE REAL QUESTION
(i) Introduction.
The death of John Kennedy deprived those within the Administration who
had wanted to reform China policy of their patron. They now faced a new
President who had had no involvement with the subtleties and loose ends
that had characterised the later parts of the Kennedy outlook.l The
bridgehead that had been built by December 1963 therefore would have
to be reconstructed in terms acceptable to a new man. As things turned
out, in the short term at least, those who wanted to reform policy faced an
uphill struggle of an otherwise occupied President and a deeply hostile
. Secretary of State. However, by 1964 the view that China policy should
be reformed was beginning to emerge within the public arena. In the
period between 1960 and 1963, men like Thomson had enjoyed
significant support for their ideas within the Administration, but had feared
the public reaction to what they were proposing. In 1964, their influence
within government diminished, but they began to see signs of public
support for changing China policy. Throughout 1964 and 1965 they
continued to promote reform within government, but although they were
stifled internally, publicly, support was beginning to grow. The growing
consensus that had enveloped the academic community by 1960 and the
China experts in the State Department by 1963 was beginning to find
expression in the public domain in 1964.2 This chapter charts the period
between Kennedy's assassination and 1966 when it can be argued that
the public clamour led by China intellectuals reached the point whereby
the Johnson Administration felt it could not ignore it any longer.
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(ii) Lyndon Johnson.
On November 22, 1963, as a result of the assassination of John F.
Kennedy, the presidency passed to Lyndon Baines Johnson. A
formidable political operator from the Pedernales in Central Texas,
Johnson had been a successful Senate Majority Leader before becoming
Vice-President. A man not accustomed to being second to others, he
had detested being Vice-President and had had a difficult relationship
with amongst others Robert Kennedy. Johnson had a very different
character and style to his predecessor. Earthy and blunt, he felt uneasy
and distrusted the academics and socialites with whom Kennedy had
surrounded himself. Moreover, his background had been in domestic
policy rather than foreign affairs. The sureness of touch and confidence
with which he handled issues such as his famous "War on Poverty" and
civil rights in the South deserted him when dealing with foreign policy.
This was not helped by his attachment to certain fixed ideas about
foreign affairs. These included a lesson from the Munich Agreement of
1938 that all foreign leaders engaged in armed aggression should be
faced down otherwise they would continue to threaten others until they
directly challenged US interests. This reading of Munich had been
prevalent since World War" but its most disastrous application was in
Vietnam during the 1960s. Johnson's refusal to countenance the
argument that Vietnam might be a civil conflict partially explained the
disastrous US commitment and its failure to cut its losses even when it
was clear that the US would be unable to achieve its objectives.
Although this reading of the Munich Agreement was common amongst
US policy elites, it is important to note that Johnson was particularly
intransigent when faced with the obvious differences between the
challenge offered by Hitler in the 1930s and Ho Chi Minh in the 60s.
Although the US involvement in Vietnam grew out of a generation of US
policy thinking, nevertheless it had Johnson's stamp on it: it was his war.3
Another fixed concept that the President held was the belief that
American values of hard work and the importance of economic
development could be universally transferred to other parts of the world
no matter what the circumstances. He believed that all peoples of all
nations shared common aims. Again, he would discover that the world
was a far more complex place. Ironically, this transfer of aims would
account for his development of a benign view of the Chinese wanting
peaceful economic development. 4
A final factor that influenced Johnson's thinking was his reading of the
CCP take-over of China in 1949. He believed that the affect of the so-
called fall of China in 1949 on the American domestic scene was so
profound and traumatic that it had made it impossible for President
Truman to properly lead the nation. The lesson for him was that defeat in
Vietnam would destroy his cherished domestic programmes and warp
other foreign policy areas or initiatives that he might wish to undertake. In
short, very quickly all foreign policy became subservient to Vietnam
policy. That led to a situation whereby all other foreign policy issues
became secondary to the war and its successful prosecution.5 It became
almost impossible to shake the Johnson Administration out of this
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assumption.
Johnson also came to rely more heavily on his key advisers whom he
had inherited from his predecessor. These included Dean Rusk as
Secretary of State; Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense;
McGeorge Bundy as National Security Adviser and, his successor from
1966, economist Walt Rostow. In spite of his hostility towards
intellectuals, whom he associated with Harvard and the Kennedy family,
Johnson relied heavily on certain academics inherited from his
predecessor throughout his Administration.6
This heady brew of a president lacking in foreign policy knowledge;
with fixed ideological concepts; reliant on relatively few advisers and
mistrusting academics and State Department Officers laid the basis for
the disaster that befell the Administration in Vietnam. It also explained
the protracted debates and delays in reflection on China policy.
(iii) China Policy
The steps taken to reform China policy in the last few months of the
Kennedy Administration, leading to the Hilsman speech of December
1963, came to an end in March 1964. First, Roger Hilsman was sacked
from his post as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.7
Hilsman had made numerous enemies and as soon as Rusk felt
comfortable in his improved relationship with the new President, he
moved against the Kennedy confidant. Hilsman's replacement was
William Bundy, brother of National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy,
and a hard-line anticommunist. Second, Harriman was removed from a"
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influence on China and Vietnam policy and given special responsibility for
African affairs.8 In short, Rusk with Johnson's blessing had, in one
swoop, removed the influence of the group that had surrounded
Harriman: the group that had wanted to moderate and alter policy
towards the PRC. Johnson mistrusted Harriman being especially wary of
his relationship with Robert Kennedy.9
As a consequence during 1964, policy towards the PRC hardened.
William Bundy in his memoirs stored in the Johnson library states that
"there was no conscious change in policy or assessment concerning
China" after he took office.l 0 However, he admits that there was: "No
question, however, that the Administration judgement of China did tend to
harden somewhat".11 In September, Bundy put his views on China
policy forward, which served as a corrective to the views, expressed by
his predecessor nine months beforehand:
So long as Peiping, as well as Hanoi and Pyongyang, continues on
their present course, I see no basic change in United States Policy
toward mainland China. It is inconceivable to me that, at a time
when Communist China is stridently proclaiming a militant
revolutionary thesis and bearing out its threats with actions that
undermine the security of nations both in Asia and Africa and even
in the Americas, we should relax our guard. It remains that first
requirement of our policy to help maintain adequate free-world
military strength in order to deter aggression or, where aggression
or threats to the peace occur, to be able to cope with such threats
effectively.12
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The extreme language of this speech, which taken to its logical
conclusion might even include war with the Chinese, reflected a return to
the hard-line stance of the Eisenhower years. There were some
accentuating factors that might have accounted for this shift. The US
Presidential election was a matter of weeks away. The Republican
candidate Barry Goldwater was adopting a hard-line anticommunist line.
This would not be the time for a Democratic Administration and
Presidential candidate to appear to be going soft on the Communist
Chinese. Moreover, the August 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident, where the
North Vietnamese were alleged to have fired at US vessels heightened
the anticommunist mood in the US.13 Finally, the Chinese were about to
explode a nuclear device. The US would not want to appear to be caving
in any form of nuclear blackmail or appearing weak at such a moment.
Nevertheless, Bundy's rhetoric represented a significant shift.
The Administration, in its consideration of the new nuclear threat
returned to the hard-line perspective associated with Kennedy in the early
part of 1963. On September 15, 1964 Johnson met with Rusk,
McNamara, McCone and McGeorge Bundy to discuss the forthcoming
Chinese nuclear tests. The mood was one of extreme hostility towards
this and once again discussions turned to the possibility of a pact with the
Soviet Union that might include an attack on the PRC. It was agreed that
Rusk would meet with the Soviet Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin to
feel out Soviet intentions.14
Related to these moves directly with the PRC was the Administration's
growing involvement in Vietnam, where it was defending the Government
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of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) against the guerilla activities
of the Vietcong, who were supported by the Communist north. Kennedy
had always separated Vietnam policy from China and Soviet policy. He
saw a global ideological competition taking place in the Third World
between the two superpowers of which Vietnam was an example.
Kennedy relied on counter-insurgency experts who believed that the war
in Vietnam, which was primarily civil in nature, could be one with US
advisers training and supporting the ARVN (South Vietnamese Army) and
the US supplying weaponry to the South.1S By 1964, the situation had
worsened considerably with the South in turmoil and clearly losing the
battle to the Vietcong. In August 1964, after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, a
resolution was passed by both Houses of Congress giving Johnson
powers to pursue, what was in effect war, in Vietnam. The Johnson
Administration believed that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were
being backed by the Chinese and that any defeat for the South might
encourage any expansionist aims that Mao and the Communists in
Beijing might have.16 Moreover, Johnson was haunted by the fate of
Truman and Acheson in the late 1940s. The fall of China had set off the
McCarthyite storm, which had decimated Truman's Administration.
Johnson believed that the fall of South Vietnam would precipitate another
similar storm. These fears helped harden his view of policy towards the
PRC and in the short term made him unwilling to countenance any
reflection on policy. Ironically, Johnson's fears of Chinese intervention to
protect her southern neighbour placed limitations on the US bombing
campaign against North Vietnam, which Johnson launched in March
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1965.17
This specific fear of Chinese influence in Vietnam was part of a
general fear that the US had of a general increase and extension of
Chinese power and prestige. The explosion of the nuclear device, the
growth of the Chinese economy and its recovery from the famine of 1961-
2, and the Sino-Soviet split, all concerned policy makers in
Washington.18 Ideologically, the US feared that the Chinese might
emerge as a key influence on Afro-Asian countries on the basis of colour.
In short, China was a major world power that was non-white yet had
successfully competed with the West and had entered the nuclear club on
its ,own terms and against the wishes of both the United States and the
Soviet Union. William Bundy recalls that the US feared Chinese
intervention and influence in North Korea, Southeast Asia especially
Indonesia and as a result of the Sino-Pakistani alliance even in South
ASia.19 In short, when added to the war in Vietnam, the US believed that
the Chinese were now intent on establishing themselves as the dominant
power in the region. Bundy condemned this extension of influence as "an
active and opportunistic policy, which by the fall of 1964 had achieved
quite a lot and gave promises of achieving a great deal more".20 It is not
surprising given this, that the US began to see the Chinese in 1964 as its
major rival in Asia instead of the Soviet Union.
The final factor was Dean Rusk. Rusk became a far more powerful
figure in the Johnson Administration than he had been under Kennedy.21
Lyndon Johnson respected and liked his fellow southerner. Rusk was
vehemently opposed to changing policy towards the PRC. He believed
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that the Chinese were not interested in the series of small steps that men
like Thomson and Hilsman were proposing. In fact as he later argued
many of these ideas had been put to the Chinese at the Warsaw talks
and had been rejected by them.22 In 1970 he argued his case succinctly
in an Oral History interview recorded for the Johnson Library:
We, in our talks in Warsaw, took various steps to try to improve
relations with Peking. We repeated the effort made by the
Eisenhower Administration to bring about an exchange of
newspapermen. We proposed the exchange of scientists,
scholars, of professional men - - doctors. We proposed the
exchange of weather information. We proposed the exchange of
basic plant materials in the basic food crops such as rice and
wheat, things of that sort, but we got nowhere with it because
Peking always came back with the answer that there was nothing
to discuss until we are ready to surrender Taiwan ... They insist
that Taiwan, sometimes known as Formosa, is a part of China --
their China. They don't recognize that China split in a civil war and
that the Republic of China on Taiwan has an existence of its
own.23
All of this is accurate. It also explains Rusk's hard-line position. He knew
that the Chinese would never accept these proposed compromises
without a shift by the US on its protection for Jiang. He was never
prepared to accept that shift. Ironically, the liberals like Thomson had
always felt uncomfortable with supporting Jiang, but tended to support the
concept of two Chinas, whilst hoping a more palatable administration
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might emerge on Taiwan.
Rusk had a particularly harsh view of Chinese rhetoric, which he
reciprocated in his own statements. This included comparing Mao to
Adolf Hitler and Lin Biao's famous doctrine of ULongLive the People's
War" to Mein Kampf.24 Lin Biao's statement is interesting in that whilst it
called for communist insurrection and the seizing of the cities by the
countryside, it ruled out Chinese assistance in accomplishing it.25 A
more subtle reading by Rusk might have altered his perspective.
Rusk by both his actions and viewpoints prevented a more substantial
review of policy towards the People's Republic of China. Thomson
recalls a conversation with McGeorge Bundy when the latter said of
Johnson and China:
Frankly, this President will never move on such a sensitive issue as
China, unless advised emphatically to do so by the constitutionally
designated chief advisor in foreign affairs, the Secretary of State,
and frankly, this Secretary of State will never advise him so to do,
and that's the way it is.26
It could be argued that Rusk was more receptive to alternative views
on China policy but accepted the decisions of his two Presidents;
Kennedy and Johnson. For example, the historian Warren Cohen has
argues this in a biography of the Secretary of State. Cohen does accept
that his view hardened in the mid-1960s but believes that he was always
more moderate than historians do and colleagues have portrayed him.27
This perspective ignores Rusk's opposition to those advocating a
moderate course and the fact that he never went beyond the cold war
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mindset of the 1940s. Clearly, failing to go beyond that mindset was a
common failing in the Johnson Administration, which ultimately
manifested in the disasters unleashed on Vietnam. However, on China
policy and especially Taiwan other Cold War warriors like Nixon were
prepared to alter their thinking. This was never the case with Dean Rusk.
That is not to deny the legitimacy of Rusk's viewpoint on Taiwan. Jiang's
regime had been an ally of the US by this point for over thirty years and
the links between the two were extensive.
Another defence of Rusk was that he was typical of the thinking of the
era. But he never opened himself to the more reasonable arguments put
forward by men like Harriman and Hilsman and the influence of those
ideas withered after the death of Kennedy who was more flexible in his
thinking. That is not to underplay Johnson's role. The President listened
to few people in 1964 and 1965 on China policy and Rusk merely
reinforced opinions he already held. Again, this process was repeated on
Vietnam. Ultimately, Johnson who was a formidable politician held the
reins of power and must be held accountable for their shortcomings.
Leonard Kusnitz is more persuasive when he argues that Rusk acted as
a brake on all discussions on China policy. For example, he notes that
Johnson came round to supporting "two Chinas" in 1966 yet Rusk
prevented him from putting those ideas into practice.28
In conclusion, at the upper echelons of the Johnson Administration a
number of factors converged to destroy the liberals' attempts to change
policy within the government. Firstly, the influence of Dean Rusk. This
included sacking Hilsman and removing Harriman from a position of
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influence. Second, Vietnam, which diverted the Administration, as well as
making it even more apprehensive about reforming China policy. Third,
the Chinese acquisition of a nuclear capability which in the short term
alarmed the United States and finally, the presence in the White House of
a man who was hesitant when dealing with foreign affairs preferring to
concentrate on domestic reforms.
(iv) The Continuing shift within Government.
Although, reform of policy was halted in the early months of 1964, that did
not alter the perspective of men like James Thomson and others who
continued to use their positions deep within the government to argue for
change. Their influence had certainly diminished. But that did not stop
them from continuing to try and in December 1965 they claimed another
minor victory when the US agreed to relax some of its travel restrictions
on Americans wishing to visit the Chinese mainland.
In July 1964, after the departure of Hilsman, Thomson was transferred
to the NSC where he worked for McGeorge Bundy. Before moving
across from the State Department, Thomson had been alarmed by
Bundy's influence on President Kennedy believing that he represented a
conservative influence on a potentially liberal leader. 29 However, once
there Thomson developed an attachment to his new departmental boss
and began to write an incessant flow of memos where he outlined his
ideas on China policy. 30 These ideas were essentially the same policy
alterations that he had been recommending since 1961. An example of
these memos was one sent on October 28, 1964 to Bundy outlining what
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he believed policy should be towards the PRC during the next four years
of Johnson's presidency.31 Thomson was convinced that the Chinese
would enter the UN and participate in nuclear negotiations between the
superpowers. To adapt to these predictions (erroneous as it turned out)
he recommended that the US should, de facto, recognise the PRC,
remove travel restrictions and increase trade with the PRC and support
two Chinas in the United Nations.32 Thomson concluded that
we should move toward moving treating the Chinese much as we
treat the Russians: an appropriately tough response wherever or
whenever they seriously cause us harm; but otherwise, a groping
toward coexistence on the basis of self-interest. 33
Thomson continued throughout 1964 and 1965 to put forward
suggestions for possible small policy steps that the US could take to open
a relationship with the PRC. For example, in November 1965, he had
lunch with William Bundy where he once again advocated a policy of "two
Chinas" for the United Nations and in the same month tried to get the US,
at the Warsaw talks, to invite Chinese newsmen to tour the United
States.34 His viewpoint retained substantial support amongst serving
officers within the State Department and NSC. These included Lindsey
Grant, Marshall Green, Robert Komer and to a lesser extent Averell
Harriman. For example, in November 1964, Robert Komer outlined in a
memo to McGeorge Bundy his view on the future of China policy:
Most people agree that, after 15 years of sustaining a rigid policy
against Peking (and rather successfully at that), the erosion of our
position is forcing us to take a different tack ... We want to retreat
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gracefully from an increasingly isolated position toward a stance
which puts the onus for continued friction more on Peiping and less
on us. In effect, we want to make our ChiCom policy more like that
toward the USSR - - tough where they push us but flexible where
there's something to be gained, if only in terms of willingness to talk
... So the real question is no longer whether to disengage from the
more rigid aspects of our China policy but how and when.35
Komer went on to argue that Johnson's massive election victory had
given his room for manoeuvre and the Chinese acquisition of a nuclear
capability necessitated that the US seek dialogue with the PRC.36
In November 1964, Marshall Green made his continuing support for
reform clear. In a memo to Harriman he gave details of a speech that
Hilsman was intending to give in San Francisco. Hilsman was going to
argue for Chinese participation in nuclear disarmament talks in Geneva,
lifting restrictions on travel to the mainland, review of trade policy towards
the PRC and US recognition of Outer Mongolia. Green, writing about
these proposals, concluded that: "I personally agree with at least three of
the above policy lines which, you will recall, we considered very actively
last fall".37
However, Lindsey Grant provided the most interesting angle of all.
Grant who was the Officer in charge of Communist China in the Asian
Communist Affairs Department shared many of the views of the others
but had concluded that a policy of "two Chinas" was wrong for the reason
that neither Beijing or Taipei would find it acceptable. Moreover, Grant
was specific in identifying a positive policy towards the Chinese as
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helping to fracture the Communist bloc still further. In a memo dated
March 18, 1965, Grant outlined his perspective. He believed that the
conflict in Vietnam and the dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia
prevented any immediate moves towards changing policy.38 However, in
the medium term Grant felt that changes to policy such as removing
restrictions on travel to China and recognising Mongolia "are
demonstrably justifiable in the pursuit of a positive policy". 39 On travel,
Grant wrote that: "I believe that a general removal of travel restrictions
would do more good than harm, even in the present context".40 He was
more specific about the need to allow the PRC into the United Nations
believing that their entry was inevitable. US efforts, argued Grant, should
focus on protecting the Republic of China against PRC efforts to expel it
from the organisation: "Even in defeat, one would win considerably more
sympathy fighting for the representational rights of a "small nation" than in
fighting against the representation of a large one".41 He went on to
argue that:
The effort to exclude the ChiComs is at cross purposes with our
purpose to promote the flow of ideas into Communist China. The
old arguments are decreasingly valid. Keeping them out no longer
effectively isolates them; and they are hardly likely to do much
harm to a peace-keeping machinery which is increasingly
circumscribed by other factors, anyway.42
Grant went onto to challenge the whole concept of "Two Chinas".
Although he did not favour recognition of the PRC or support for their
claims to Taiwan he did feel that the US should benefit from a change of
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approach to the whole issue.
I would have us recognize more explicitly that there are competing
claimants to power in China ... We have stated the presumption
that treaties with the GRC are not applicable to the mainland, and
have long ago recognized the juridical entity of Communist China
... It is a small step to say that we recognize them de facto ... We
should carefully avoid any indication that the United States
Government supports or favours the division of China. (I think of
nothing better calculated permanently to sour our relations with
both claimants.) It is this feature which separates this line from
"two Chinas", and leads me to promote the phrase: "contending
,
claimants" (emphasis in original).43
This new emphasis on contending claimants represented another small
step towards the position taken by Richard Nixon in February 1972 when
he emphasised that Taiwan was an internal matter and that there was
only one China.44 Grant was clearly taking a different stance to that of
Dean Rusk, who saw the disagreement over the status of Taiwan as a
fundamental block to any alteration in US attitudes towards the PRC.
Grant had come to understand that the US would have to find a way of
watering down its commitment to Taiwan as an individual state whilst
retaining formal support for Jiang and opposition to any Chinese military
take-over of the island. This position represented a firmer desire on the
part of US policy makers to disentangle themselves from Jiang. They
were of course aided by the decline in influence of the China Lobby. As
the China Lobby became less feared, academics and US policy makers
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began to challenge openly US support for Jiang.45
By 1965, it was becoming clear that the ideas put forward by Roger
Hilsman and supported in the lower reaches of the US Government had
little chance of gaining currency from the President or Secretary of State.
In fact they tended to generate little formal response. The men
associated with these policies began to leave the Administration. In July
1965, Marshall Green took up the post as US Ambassador to Indonesia.
In a Memo to Chester Cooper and Thomson, Green made his
disappointment clear: "A personal disappointment in leaving FE after
almost two years has been our inability over that period of time to
strengthen and modernize our China policy. ,,46 More dramatic was the
view reached by Lindsey Grant before his departure from the State
Department in 1966. Grant did not formally state his views but State
Department aide Dave Osborn wrote a valedictory memorandum.47
Grant was reported as arguing that the US should only be prepared to
protect Taiwan from "unprovoked attack from outside" (emphasis in
original).48 The memo went on to state that the US should issue a
declaration stating that at the moment there were two governments of
China. However, the declaration should go on to say that Taiwan is part
of China and the US hoped for a peaceful solution to the conflict based
upon the will of the majority of Chinese. This declaration would then state
that it hoped that both Chinas "will have cultural, diplomatic and economic
relations with all other countries and participate in the international
community".49 The final clause of this proposed US declaration would
state that the US:
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Calls on all other governments to declare in similar terms their
support for the integrity of China; for the ultimate peaceful
resolution, in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese people, of
the differences between the two Chinese governments; and for the
removal, pending such peaceful resolution, of artificial barriers to
the conduct of diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations
between the nation of China and the other nations of the world. 50
Given US policy towards the PRC since 1949, this statement showed the
extent to which the debate was now moving in favour of men like
Thomson. By 1966, the consensus on China policy had begun to move
to such an extent that a US State Department official could advocate the
virtual ending of US support for Jiang. Whereas the Eisenhower era had
seen the US support Jiang and the Guomindang and its claims on the
Mainland, the officers of this era were taking a minimalistic view based on
solely defending him from an unprovoked attack. Moreover, anybody
arguing for an internal solution to the dispute between Beijing and Taipei
knew that this would mean the Chinese Communists claiming Taiwan.
Jiang had neither the support on the mainland nor the power to challenge
any alternative to a communist take-over. In short, US policy makers who
in 1963 had been prepared to advocate a series of small steps were now
prepared to question the one issue which prevented a Sino-American
detente: Taiwan. The impetus for this change did not come from the
President or a Secretary of State who was deeply hostile to any lessening
of the American commitment to the Jiang regime. It came from the public
debate that was now swirling around the issue and from the set of
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assumptions that US Government officials had inculcated from their study
of the China issue, especially their study under academics who held the
liberal view that Jiang had never been an acceptable ally. After all, if one
accepted the liberal perspective and knew that the CCP were unprepared
to alter its relations with the US without movement on the issue of
Taiwan, then there was little reason to want to maintain the status quo on
that basis. Put bluntly, as the liberal view of China began to regain
strength then the US commitment to Jiang was always likely to be
challenged. That such a debate was taking place within the State
Department was evidence of how the consensus was moving towards a
detente with the PRe and how Taiwan was no longer the stumbling block
it had hitherto been. That shift was evidence of the subtle interconnection
that existed between US governmental policy consideration and the
public arena including academics writing about individual areas of policy
and business, political and other leaders and opinion formers trying to
influence and alter policy. The reason for the boldness of men like
Thomson, Green and Grant could not be located higher up in the
echelons of the government because Johnson and Rusk were notably
more intransigent then Kennedy. The reasons were located elsewhere.
(v) Travel Policy
The one alteration in China policy was a relaxation of some of the
restrictions that had prevented US citizens travelling to the mainland.
Relaxing the travel restrictions had been discussed in the winter of 1965
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at one of the famous "Tuesday Luncheons", where Johnson would meet
with his most trusted aides and thrash out foreign policy issues.51 On
that occasion, Johnson had decided against changing policy. The issue
was again discussed at a NSC meeting in June.52 However, it was the
intervention of Dr Paul Dudley White that spurred the Administration into
taking action. White, a world famous heart specialist, counted amongst
his patients Dwight Eisenhower. The President of the Chinese Academy
of Medicine had invited him in July 1962 for a visit that had been
scheduled for the spring of 1963, and although the US State Department
had approved his visa, the Chinese had withdrawn the offer. 53 In the
summer of 1965, he wrote to Johnson offering his services to try to
unlock the stalemate between the US and the PRC.54 At this point, the
US only allowed three categories of Americans to travel to the Chinese
mainland: authorized news correspondents; families of the four
Americans held prison in China and what was termed "special cases" (the
status under which Dr White had been approved). In August, McGeorge
Bundy put a suggestion to Johnson that it might be a good idea for the
Administration to change the policy in response to an appeal from White,
whom it was believed the Republicans would find it harder to attack. 55
Bundy believed that three more categories should be introduced to cover
people with expertise in medicine, education and general welfare.56 The
State Department Far East officers also supported the proposed change
although they added that: "We doubt very strongly that the Chinese will
admit any Americans in the new categories. Nevertheless, we think it is
an excellent step towards improving our public posture".57 In early
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September, Johnson approved the move but what Thomson described as
a "holding operation" by Rusk "and a few others" held back an
announcement until December 31,1965.58 When the step was
announced it was made clear that it had been done at the express
suggestion of White so as "to drape it in the cloak of respectability for
Republican consumption". 59 In March 1966, the Administration
announced a further relaxation in travel restrictions and by November
1966 a governmental interagency working group set up to look into China
policy was recommending the removal of a" of the remaining
restrictions.60
These changes were another example of the slight affect that
internally men like Thomson could have. Moreover, it also showed that
outside pressure could be used to make the Johnson Administration
make alterations to its China policy. Finally, it showed that Johnson could
be convinced of the need for change if he felt that it would not engender a
public outcry and might make communication between the two nations
possible.
(vi) The Interagency China Country Committee.
The other area in which the Johnson Administration moved in 1965 was
in the setting up of a long-range study into China policy headed by
Joseph Yager who worked in the Policy Planning Council of the State
Department.61 Yager, who had served as a Deputy Chief of Mission at
the US Embassy in Taipei, was regarded by Thomson as "we" informed"
but "conservative" in his views.62 Yager saw the study as an opportunity
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to push for the setting up of a major interagency China Country
Committee made up of officers from the Departments of State and
Defense, who could continually look at major areas of policy and possible
conflict with China.63
(vii) Conclusions.
On December 31, 1965 the State Department announced the first
relaxation of travel restrictions to the PRC. Dealing only with medical
experts, it seemed a minor change and was generally welcomed. For
James Thomson, it was another tiny step that he had been pushing for
since he had first entered the US Government in 1961. However, he was
exhausted from his efforts and had begun to develop serious doubts
about US policy in Vietnam.64 Nevertheless, he remained hopeful that in
1966 a breakthrough might be achieved.65 The period between
December 1963 and December 1965 had seen the cause of these
reformers stifled. Johnson, in the short term, had stepped away from the
subtleties of the Kennedy approach and had relied more heavily on the
intransigent Rusk and had believed that the conflict in Vietnam prevented
any major consideration of China policy.
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CHAPTER SIX: The Context.
(i) Introduction
Foreign policy is not conducted hermetically, free of outside influences. A
range of concepts and perceptions affect the decision process and those
involved in policy making as well as the relationships between the
individuals themselves. This was true of all US foreign policy including
that towards the People's Republic of China. In this chapter, those
influences will be identified and their importance assessed. From that
analysis an understanding of the decision making in the later Johnson
years and of the more radical policies pursued by his successor, Richard
Nixon, can be put forward. Those influences will be divided into five
broad categories: US academics, whose attitudes have already been
considered; other domestic opinion including business and general public
opinion; US policy towards the Soviet Union; the war in Vietnam and
finally the People's Republic of China itself. That is not to say that there
were not other influences but they were tangential in the early 1960s and
remained secondary even when Nixon took office.
(ii) Academics
The Kennedy administration brought about a change of thinking on China
policy. This change affected the academic community especially the
more liberal members of that community such as Fairbank and
Reischauer. Kennedy appointed a number of Harvard academics to his
administration such as Arthur Schlesinger Jr and McGeorge Bundy who
got jobs within the White House.! From the Asia scholars, Thomson was
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appointed to the State Department and most significantly of all Edwin
Reischauer became Ambassador to Japan. The gulf that had existed
between the Harvard scholars working on Asia and the government in the
Eisenhower period was bridged by his successor. Moreover, during the
Kennedy period their views on policy were sought, as was their support
for the initiatives men like Roger Hilsman and Thomson were trying to
enact.2 In short, the relationship between the Kennedy Administration
and these academics was fruitful. They supported the election of John F.
Kennedy and the general thrust of the policies he was trying to pursue.
Later they would support his brother Robert Kennedy in his presidential
bid in 1968.3
The 1960s also saw a period of rapid growth in the Asia studies field.
For example, in 1956 there had been 903 members of the Association of
Asian Studies (MS). By 1968 that figure had risen to 3,752.4 Similar
rises took place in the numbers attending the MS annual conferences
and those subscribing to the MS journal the Journa/ of Asian Studies.5
Furthermore, regional subsections of the MS were set up in New York,
New England, in the Midwest and on the Pacific Coast. The
development of these subsections reflected both the expansion of the
academic discipline as well as the tensions that remained within it.6
Those tensions continued to surface at regular intervals. For example,
in 1960 it exploded in a bitter dispute in the pages of the China Quarter/y,
a newly formed British journal, which quickly came to be dominated by
American academics.7 Benjamin Schwartz accused another China
academic Karl Wittfogel of being "obsessed with the view that Fairbank,
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Schwartz and Brandt (an indivisible entity) have committed an "error" (not
an accidental error!) which has led to incalculably evil results in our
struggle with world communism".8 In the mid and late 1960s, when the
liberal academics began to sway governmental opinion, the conservative
and pro-Jiang members of the profession like David Rowe repeatedly
attacked the integrity of men like Fairbank and Barnett.9 However, in the
early 1960s the new dynamics of the relationship between government
and the China community was only slowly becoming apparent.
Fairbank's biographer Peter Evans is closest to the mark when he writes
that by the 1960s the conservative grouping around George Taylor and
David Rowe "were very much in the minority in the academic community
but continued to carry, considerable weight in Washington and in public
opinion".10
The next question that needs to be considered is how academic views
of China developed in the 1960s and how these affected the profession
and its relationship with the US government. Initially it is difficult to
quantify that influence. However looking at the role of one academic
Allen Whiting and both his academic and governmental work can be
instructive both as an indicator of the way that academics were
influencing policy debates and how their academic study often had policy
implications. Also, Whiting is a very good example of a policy academic
who works in government as well as interacting with governmental
agencies. He was not only an academic but worked within the Kennedy
and Johnson Administrations serving as director of the State
Department's Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East between
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1962 and 1966.11 Later, in 1969, Whiting acted as an adviser to Nixon
and Kissinger about the Sino-Soviet split where he challenged the
accepted wisdom that China was the more aggressive power.12 That is
not to claim that Whiting was the most important academic influence on
China policy but his career is instructive and he is clearly extremely
important.
Undoubtedly, Whiting's China Crosses the Ya/u: The Decision to enter
the Korean War, which was published in 1960 represented a landmark
assessment of the Chinese leadership in Beijing and challenged the
assumptions made about them by many conservative commentators.13
For China Crosses the Ya/u, Whiting had used his extensive contacts and
diplomatic background to gain access to restricted US governmental
documents. Moreover, he made extensive use of Chinese public
sources.14 In the book, Whiting challenged the accepted interpretation of
why China had decided to enter the Korean War in the summer and
autumn of 1950. The traditional viewpoint that had been widespread in
the 1950s was that the Chinese entry had been part of a global
communist plot emanating from Moscow, which had seen Korea as part
of the ideological struggle between the communist and capitalist worlds.
For example, this was the view expounded by David Rees in his book
Korea: The Limited War.15 This interpretation obviously fitted in with the
views of the hard-line anti-Communists such as the China Lobby who
were happy to see the CCP portrayed as Soviet pawns. Furthermore,
this perspective supported the notion that the communists were
expansionist and therefore represented a threat to the security of the
174
region as well as a challenge to the United States.
Whiting's book challenged that thinking as well as putting forward a far
more convincing explanation as to the reason the Chinese had entered
the war on the peninsula. Whiting's thesis was so convincing that it would
remain virtually unchallenged in historiography on the war until the
1990s.16 Whiting argued that the Chinese had entered the war not
because of ideology or Soviet urging but because they had felt
threatened by MacArthur's attempt to unify the peninsula under an
anticommunist government.17 According to Whiting the Chinese had had
little or no involvement in the decision to invade the South by the North
based government of Kim II-sung.18 China, argued Whiting, had felt
threatened by US actions to such an extent that they had no alternative
but to intervene to protect their own borders. Whiting pointed out that the
Chinese had issued a number of warnings that they would not accept UN
soldiers marching to the Yalu River, which borders Korea and China.19
In short, Whiting argued that the Chinese had acted not because of
ideology but because the UN/US had threatened essential Chinese
interests by attacking the Northern part of Korea just as the Japanese
had done half a century earlier.
Academically, Whiting offered a wide-ranging alternative perspective
of the reason for the Chinese involvement in the Korean War. His thesis
that the Chinese reacted to a strategic threat has become the basis of all
academic thinking on the subject. Bruce Cumings in his seminal two-
volume work The Origins of the Korean War refined it by emphasising the
historical ties that existed between China and Korea but accepted that
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strategic factors were paramount in the final analysis.20 In the 1990s,
Chen Jian in China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-
American Confrontation emphasised Mao's ideological ideas and his
belief that Chinese revolutionary fervour could be crucial in a conflict with
the imperialist nations represented by the United Nations in Korea.21
Chen Jian also showed that the Chinese were thinking about a possible
intervention much earlier in the war than Whiting allowed for.22
Whiting's thesis also had profound political implications in the
atmosphere of the early 1960s and the relationship between China
academics and the US government. First, was the factor of Whiting's
credentials. Steeped in governmental and intelligence contacts, it was
impossible for conservative academics like Rowe and Wittfogel to attack
him convincingly. Moreover, the range of sources that he was able to call
upon gave the book added validity and protection from ideological attack.
Related to that was the fact that Whiting was not a liberal academic in the
mould of Fairbank, Barnett or Reischauer. Whiting was a realist in the
sense that he down played the importance of ideology, instead
emphasising strategic interests.23 Ultimately, to attack Whiting's premise
would mean challenging the importance of the northern part of Korea to
the Chinese.
Secondly, Whiting's thesis challenged the whole premise of US policy
towards the People's Republic of China which publicly at least
emphasised the ideological stridency of the Beijing regime as well as its
supposed subservience to Moscow. Whiting argued that China had
entered the war to protect their interests and because of Realpolitik not
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because of ideology. China's conduct in the war had not been that of an
extremist nation but had acted rationally under threat from an ideological
enemy invading its neighbour. Whiting made the point in the introduction
to the book that one of the key areas he wanted to address was the
question of communication between the US and the PRC in a potential
conflict situation.24 By implication, therefore, the current Chinese
government could be dealt with because they were not subservient to
Moscow and could think and act in their own interests. Perhaps they
shared certain strategic concerns, which were understood by the west.
Whiting's work was crucial in undermining the intellectual basis of the US
foreign policy towards the PRC, which had been followed since the onset
of the Korean War.
Finally, Whiting's book was vital because of the powerful lesson it
gave political leaders in the 1960s which was that the Chinese were
prepared to go to war with the United Nations including the United States
to protect its strategic interests. Whiting's thesis emphasised that the
Truman Administration had made a terrible error of judgement in allowing
MacArthur to go up to the Yalu. In blunt terms the ultimate conclusion
was that the US had provoked the Chinese intervention. In the 1960s, as
the US was becoming bogged down in another civil war in Asia, the same
factors would come into play. To policy makers in the Johnson
Administration, of whom Whiting was a minor player, it would be vital not
to provoke another Chinese intervention.25 That implied limiting the
scope of military operations in Vietnam and forbidding any invasion of the
North. Whiting's thesis suggested communication with and possibly even
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acceptance of the PRC. One of the factors that had contributed to the
Chinese intervention in Korea had been the American refusal to treat
Chinese warnings sufficiently seriously. The best way to avoid a repeat
of that would be direct communication between the US and the PRC.
In conclusion, Allen Whiting's book played a tangential but vital role in
altering the terms of the debate about how the United States should deal
with the People's Republic of China. It modified the accepted
establishment viewpoint of the Chinese showing them acting within
strategic boundaries that were understood and followed by all of the other
major nations of the world. Critics of Whiting, especially Chen Jian, have
argued that Whiting's thesis still portrayed the Chinese as reacting to
American initiatives and he emphasises the ideological precepts which
Mao Zedong was working from which he argues convincingly was also
vital in explaining Chinese actions.26 However, a careful reading of
China Crosses the Yalu shows that Whiting was aware of that thinking
using Mao's writings to identify it. In addition, US academics had no
access to Chinese archival sources.27 In fact the more one goes through
the archives and governmental papers the more one comes to
understand the intellectual and physical void that existed between the US
and the Chinese in this period at least, evidenced most clearly by the
different attitudes towards Taiwan.
Allen Whiting was also a key player in the formal research relationship
that existed between the government and China academics in his position
as Chairman of the Foreign Area Research Coordination Group (FAR)
China subcommittee on External Research Priorities. FAR had been set
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up by the US Government to co-ordinate government and academic
research interests and it was quickly agreed at the first meeting in April
1964 that China was a priority. The meeting approved the creation of "a
subcommittee of government China specialists representing the
government foreign area research community".28 The new
subcommittee was made up of a range of people from different
government departments. Fenton Babcock represented the Central
Intelligence Agency. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
was represented by Robert Barendsen. Charles Hutchinson of the US Air
Force represented the armed forces. The numbers were made up of
Thomas Lough and Colonel Kent Parrot of the US Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency; Kenneth Roberts Jr of the Office of the Secretary
of Defense dealing with international security affairs and Joseph Sullivan
of the US Information Agency.29
Amongst the tasks assigned the new subcommittee by FAR was to
"prepare a tentative list of government research needs on Communist
China".30 The Subcommittee held its first meeting in May 1964 where it
was agreed to draw up a list of external research topics which would
reflect the needs and interests of all the FAR Co-ordination Group
agencies engaged in research in China.31 Whiting had told the April
meeting that the government should be prepared to sponsor academic
research on China to the benefit of government. As he told the meeting:
What I am suggesting is that external research focus on
researchable areas of inquiry and avoid those areas where our
governmental strengths are most evident ... I would like to suggest
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that government-sponsored research avoid contracts for those
areas that we do best. 32
Whiting had had personal experience of engaging in research sponsored
by US government agencies. China Crosses the Yalu had been written
as part of a research programme undertaken by the RAND Corporation
for the US Air Force.33 He did not believe that such sponsored research
was anything but appropriate and indeed the Subcommittee wanted to
avoid any suggestion that they were trying to affect the research topics
being undertaken by academics in the China field. As the minutes of the
July 1964 subcommittee meeting stated, the list of topics:
will represent long-term research needs as seen by government,
but which are not likely to be undertaken by government. The
private researcher would be free either to take up some of these
topics or to reject them and go his own way. The list will be a
broad guideline and not a document which could be construed as
dictation either to the private community or to government
agencies.34
Preparing the list of topics was an exhausting process that was not
completed until April 1965. As the subcommittee reported:
In a pioneer effort to determine external research needs on an
interagency basis, this survey entailed much more than a poll or
compilation of suggestions. A list of suggested topics was but the
first step in a continuing series of individual contacts,
Subcommittee discussions, refining and redrafting. Past research
experiences, the existing literature, on-going and planned research
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within government, the known resources of the private research
community, and advances in research methodology had a" to be
taken into account. 35
Nevertheless, the subcommittee was satisfied that they had been
exhaustive and thorough in their approach: "The statement which
emerged is thus a unique document in that for the first time government
research specialists have acted in concert to reach agreement on
research needs of vital concern to a" of government".36
The Subcommittee identified four main areas that they hoped
researchers would investigate: a detailed study of ethnic groups within
China especially in the border areas; an evaluation of educational and
scientific materials published in China; a compilation of handbooks on the
foreign relations and economic policies of the CCP government and an
analysis of the development of science and technology in the PRC.37 As
we" as these four main areas the Subcommittee identified fifteen other
areas that it was hoped academic researchers might explore.38 In
conclusion the Subcommittee made it clear in their report that they hoped
to see a general increase in the amount of research conducted into the
People's Republic of China.39
Relations between governments and academics has a long and
detailed history but when it comes down to identifying specific areas of
research then it often brings into question the motives of both groups. On
this occasion, it is clear that the US Government required an
improvement of its understanding of events on the China mainland and
the actions and opinions of the communist government that ruled there.
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As Hilsman had made clear in December 1963 the CCP was probably
established there over the longer term. The Subcommittee was clear that
this was not an attempt to dictate to the academic profession or to pervert
their integrity or their choices for academic enquiry. Researchers were at
liberty whether or not they wished to engage in research of interest to
government. It would have been hypocritical of academics like Fairbank
to express their frustration at their lack of influence on the US
Government and then when an opportunity arose to influence it to spurn it
as an unwarranted infringement on academic freedom. In reality the US
Government through the FAR China Subcommittee approached this
subject in an ethical fashion. In fact critics of the relationship have tended
not to focus on the governmental end of the relationship. All accept that
governments need specialist information on nations, which they deal with,
that is not obtainable internally within the formal administrative structure.
It is the activities of the academics and in particular the role of the
Joint Committee on Contemporary China (JCCC) that has come under
scrutiny from amongst others the Committee of Concerned Asian
Scholars (CCAS) and has been subject to criticism. In March 1968, at
the annual conference of the AAS in Philadelphia, a fringe meeting was
convened by the Vietnam Caucus to discuss the affects of the war on the
Asia studies field.40 The Caucus had been barred from holding the
meeting under the AAS name due to the organisation's deep-rooted
antipathy to taking any form of political stance.41 The University of
Pennsylvania in separate facilities arranged the meeting so that no
connection could be made between this meeting and the annual
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conference.42 Nevertheless, it was clear that of the approximately six
hundred whom attended the meeting almost a" were MS members. Out
of the meeting grew a new academic organisation the CCAS organised
primarily by postgraduate students from Harvard. Within ten months the
new organisation could boast four hundred members and six hundred
were subscribing to its journal, the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
(BCAS).43 As we" as a hostile approach to the Vietnam War and to US
policy towards Asia since World War ", members of the CCAS attacked
the Asia studies scholars for complicity in the formation of US policy
towards the region.44 They also criticised the role of the JCCC and a
fierce debate raged in the BCAS about its role. The scholars were able to
produce evidence that those involved in the JCCC had attempted to
influence the relationship between academics and government and
/
possibly to exclude academics who were not in tune polltically with the
pervading ethos of the organisation.45
The Joint Committee on Contemporary China grew out of a meeting in
June 1959 at Gould House between academics, State Department
officials and representatives from the Ford Foundation and RAND
Corporation.46 The CCAS was especially critical of a report compiled by
the JCCC entitled "Scholarly Communication with Mainland China" which
was an assessment of seven individuals who had recently visited China
and included speculation about their political sympathies. This report,
according to the CCAS, had been compiled without the knowledge of
those who were being written about. The results were made available to
several governmental organisations. To the CCAS, this represented an
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attempt to pervert the relationship between the academic discipline and
the US government.47
Equally disturbing was the attitude of George Taylor who was the first
Chairman of the JCCC. In a letter dated July 5, 1961, Taylor wrote that:
"It is very important for the Government to know that it can tum to a
responsible group representing the interests of American scholars for
some indication of how they feel" .48 He went on to state that: "I think that
a process of political education has gone on in the Committee which I
trust is deep enough to prevent ill-considered political statements being
made by American scholars who are interested in getting into China".49
Along with Taylor's known sympathies with the conservative impulse in
the China academic discourse, these comments suggest possible
censorship and may even have led to attempts to exclude academics
whose political perspective was not palatable to the JCCC.
The criticisms of the JCCC were not helped by that organisation's
refusal to release information about its activities. For example, it refused
to reveal the contents of the 1960 report. In 1970 after John King
Fairbank intervened with a request for them to open its files, it still
resolutely refused to do so on the grounds that they contained sensitive
material. Instead George Taylor wrote an official history of the
organisation.SO In a letter to the BCAS, Ezra Vogel, an academic deeply
involved with the JCCC, defended its integrity by saying that it had
refused to release its files on the grounds that they contained confidential
evaluations of researchers. Vogel went on to state that the range of
authors that the JCCC sponsored showed that it was more open than the
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CCAS was suggesting. Finally, he stated that the JCCC had only ever
held one meeting with the FAR (Foreign Area Research) of the State
Department. 51
To assess the validity of the criticisms made by the CCAS it is best to
reflect on each in turn. In the summer-autumn 1971 edition of the BCAS,
four charges were laid against the JCCC, which can be condensed, into
three areas.52 Firstly, that the leading figures within the JCCC had "long
been orientated to concerns of governmental policy rather than academic
development".53 It is difficult to say how accurate this allegation is. For
example, did the academics involved in the JCCC see a clash between
the two? And if so did they consciously or subconsciously hinder
academic development in the wider interests of the US government or
their perception of what that interest was? Given the relationship
between the government and the JCCC it is most likely that academics
like Taylor did not see a clash. However, it is disturbing that the JCCC
was not prepared to release its files, which allowed speculation to arise.
Secondly, the CCAS accused the JCCC of having close relations with
government agencies "whose interests were primarily and profoundly
political".54 This undoubtedly was true but it would be anticipated that
scholars of contemporary China would lend their expertise to
governmental agencies. Problems would only arise if such association
started to curtail the freedom of the academic's fields of enquiries or of
the discipline as a whole. To protect the discipline from developing
unsatisfactory liaisons with government required a culture of openness
and academic discourse, which of course had not been present in the
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China discipline in the 1950s because of the excesses of the McCarthy
era.
The final allegation made was that the JCCC did not act in a spirit of
openness and accountability and there seems to be little doubt that this
was accurate. The compilation of reports on academics and other
individuals without their knowledge or allowing them access to their files
is at best suspect and at worst corrupting. The background to the JCCC
was one of reacting against McCarthyism and the sensitive nature of
Sino-American relations. Nevertheless, there should be certain principles
of academic freedom and accountability which should be adhered to and
it would appear that the JCCC did not meet them. That being said, at
time the criticisms put forward by the CCAS appear excessive. It would
be unnatural for government and academia not to co-operate in areas
where their interests converge and for government to encourage, even
with financial inducements, academic enquiry in specific areas. Where
potential dangers emerge is when such relationships affect academic
freedom or when academics or government officials exclude opinions
with which they do not agree. There is a thin line between the two and it
seems likely that the JCCC crossed that line. Ultimately the truth can
only be verified with access to their files. Although the accusations of the
CCAS are largely substantiated, this should not detract from the obvious
improvement that took place between these China scholars and the US
Government. It should be emphasised that this was a positive
development for these academics, the government, and the general state
of Sino-American relations.
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In conclusion, it is clear that relations between academics working on
China and the US government improved in the early 1960s. This was
due primarily to the change in administration and by the work of men like
Chester Bowles and James Thomson. The beginning of a change in
public opinion assisted them and allowed China policy to become a
subject of debate. This was undoubtedly helped by Roger Hilsman's
December 1963 speech. By 1966, men like A. Doak Barnett and John
King Fairbank were confident enough to parade their opposition to China
policy before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations chaired by
Lyndon Johnson's fierce critic William Fulbright.
(iii) Public Opinion.
It has already been shown that public opinion was a powerful influence
on US policy towards Communist China. For example, it was a crucial
factor in ensuring that Kennedy was resistant to changing policy during
his time in the White House. It was the single factor that ensured that the
more liberal China academics remained silent. Any change in public
opinion would obviously have repercussions for the policy itself and would
reinforce the position of those seeking to change policy. Therefore,
identifying the public mood in the early sixties is crucial not only to
understand how US policy towards China developed; but also to assess
the policy followed by Johnson and even to speculate on the policy
Kennedy might have adopted had he lived.55
Much light can be thrown on the nuances of contemporary public
opinion by analysing a study of US public opinion towards China that was
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published in 1966. Written by A.T. Steele, a journalist who had been
based in China between 1931 and 1949, the study was part of the
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) series "The United States and China
in World Affairs" that had been set up in 1962 under sponsorship from the
Ford Foundation. The series, under the direction of academic Robert
Blum, aimed to "encourage more active and better informed public
consideration of one of the most important areas of U.S. foreign
policy".56 The CFR rightly identified the influence of public opinion on
this sensitive area and Steele set about a long process of interviewing
two hundred prominent American politicians, business executives,
Congressmen, Government Officials, Trade Union leaders, Newspaper
editors, Doctors, Lawyers and academics. 57 The findings formed the
basis of the book. It should be noted that Steele's study was carried out
amongst the Americans with the greatest understanding of the issues
surrounding China policy, and although indicative of public opinion, was
not necessarily reflective of it especially in the amount of knowledge
about the subject.
Steele, who clearly believed that policy should be changed,
discovered that a consensus existed amongst these groups for a review
of policy:
It seems apparent from our findings that the American public is
becoming increasingly favorable to a re-examination of our China
policy but that the legislative and executive branches of the
government are lagging somewhat in their response to the public
mood.58
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As a result of his interviews, Steele identified two basic positions:
'fundamentalist" which meant supporting the existing policy and
"accornmodatlonlst' which meant coming to terms with the existence of
the People's Republic of China.59 He quickly pinpointed the problem that
Kennedy faced. Many leading Americans accepted the rationale for a
change, but believed that because of the Chinese attitude, it was not
worthwhile causing domestic outrage by trying to unilaterally change
policy.60
Steele identified some other interesting trends. Firstly, he noted a
clear geographical divergence between views on Sino-American relations
between the West Coast, especially San Francisco, and the rest of the
United States.61 Amongst the West Coast organisations that supported
change were the San Francisco Chronicle, the World Trade Association
of the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, the International
Longshoremen's Union, the California Federation of Young Democrats
and the Committee for a Review of our China Policy which was based in
Oregon.62 The reason for this was that the West Coast, and especially
San Francisco, had a long history of dealings with China. The local
business community contained many members with experience from
before 1949 of trading with the mainland that did not see the communist
government, as a permanent obstacle to re-establishing those ties.63
One businessman interviewed by Steele who had actually lived in China
but at the time of the interview was a prominent trader based on the West
Coast puts this view best:
We are being naive about China ... We are beating our heads
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against a wall. In this matter the West Coast is more realistic than
the rest of the country. We don't see why we should sit next to
Canada and watch them sell wheat to Communist China, while we
do nothing. We are handcuffed. We can do nothing until we
educate the United States government. There are plenty of people
around who know the situation and could be of help. But they are
Old China Hands. The thinking in Washington is that businessmen
of this type cannot be helpful because they have ulterior
motives.64
Steele also discovered more support for changing policy towards the
PRC in the major cities on the East Coast and put that down to a more
cosmopolitan outlook and the fact that in places like New York, a greater
emphasis on international trade existed.65
Secondly, he found academics the most flexible in their views.
Politicians were more pliable in private whilst publicly retaining their hard-
line support for the existing policy.66 He found politicians who were
Democrats notably more tractable on the issue than their Republican
counterparts.67 In fact, Steele regarded the emergence of a commitment
to influence policy on behalf of the academic community "the most
significant indicator of the shifting emphasis in public opinion". 68
Regarding pressure groups, he noted the effectiveness of organisations
like the Committee of One Million who continued to organise letter writing
campaigns to prominent politicians warning them of the possible electoral
implications of any public commitment to recognising the People's
Republic of China.69 For example, Senator Thomas Kuchel of California
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estimated that ten per cent of the sixty thousand letters he received in an
average week could be termed as fright mail aimed at influencing his
political views.70 Steele spent less time on overall US public opinion
preferring to look at the views of those who he perceived as opinion
formers.71 Although he did make use of the results of a Survey
Research Center (SRC) study carried out on general public opinion on
US policy towards China.72 From that, he suggested that public opinion
was not opposed to a review of policy. He also identified a general lack
of knowledge. In the conclusion to his report, he set out his findings
powerfully in the context of his own views:
One of the reasonable assumptions to be drawn from this survey is
that American public opinion would, on the whole, welcome a
public appraisal, in Congress and among the people, of our China
policy. We cannot afford to treat any aspect of that policy as
sacrosanct for public discussion. All alternatives need to be
exhaustively examined ... True, complicated foreign policy
questions are not usually resolved by public debate. But debate
does, on occasion, produce fresh thinking and new perspectives,
both of which should be helpful to our policy-makers in the search
for feasible alternatives in what seems, at present, to be a
hopeless impasse.73
The most powerful assessment of general public opinion of the man
and woman on the street in the United States was carried out by the
Survey Research Center (SRC) based at the University of Michigan in
1964. Again the report was prepared for the Council on Foreign
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Relations.74 The conclusions were that the US public had very little
understanding or interest in US policy towards the region but that their
opinions were clearly more flexible than US leaders gave them credit
for.75 For example, more than one in four interviewed were unaware that
China had a communist government, whilst about a third of Americans
questioned did not know that a second government existed in Taiwan
which laid claim to the Chinese mainland.76 Regarding policy, the survey
showed that ordinary Americans cared little for the fate of the Nationalist
Chinese; opposed any attack on the Chinese mainland and would
support presidential initiatives aimed at easing relations between the US
and the PRC.77 The one bright spot for the hard-line supporters of Jiang
was that the US public still opposed allowing the PRC into the United
Nations as the Chinese representative.78 However by 1966, an
extensive survey carried out by Lou Harris showed that the majority of
those interviewed favoured a series of unilateral US steps to ease
tension. These included the US diplomatic recognition of the PRC;
admission of the PRC into the UN; the negotiation of an atomic test-ban
treaty with the Chinese and allowing Americans who wanted to go the
opportunity of visiting the country.79 As Lou Harris stated in summing up
his findings: "The American people generally believe every effort should
be made to begin a dialogue between this country and Red China to avert
war".80 All of this indicated that the public mood was now in favour of
opening up relations with China giving academics and political leaders
room for manoeuvre.
The trend towards greater contact with China was aided by the decline
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in influence of the China Lobby that had done so much to stifle debate
and to protect Jiang's position within the United States.81 By the mid
1960s most of their main supporters like Senator William Knowland,
Walter Robertson and Patrick Hurley had either died, retired or had been
discredited. Anyone associated with the excesses of McCarthyism was
liable to be shunned by younger politicians who linked support for Jiang
with support for McCarthy. After McCarthy had been discredited in 1954,
politicians felt able to discard his extreme views whilst still remaining
firmly anticommunist. The public had also lost interest in the cause of the
nationalist Chinese and welcomed debate on China policy. As a
government official told the Washington Post the Committee of One
Million was now "a term rather than a reality". 82
In conclusion, general public opinion began to move away from
supporting the hard-line policy of total isolation towards one that
acknowledged the existence of the PRC and its right to be included within
the United Nations. However, the general public remained uninterested
and ignorant of the nuances of this policy and still looked to the White
House for leadership on this matter.
(iv) The Business Community.
Evidence of the precise attitude of the US business community towards
Sino-American relations has been relatively unexplored. Steele, in his
seminal book, argued that there was some support amongst business for
a reappraisal of relations and also that it was concentrated on the West
Coast especially around San Francisco. Evidence from other sources
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seems to support this view. It also shows that support was growing
amongst the business community for initiatives towards the PRC,
reflecting the growing breakdown of barriers towards US reconciliation
with the Chinese. This support naturally focused on arguments for a
relaxation of restrictions on US trade with the PRC. For the business
community political aspects were secondary, though amongst those who
supported a relaxation of trading restrictions, the argument was put
forward that this could be a useful first step to a better Sino-American
relationship. A final point needs to be made. Some crude Marxist
"
analysis of business-government relations in capitalist countries portrays
the government as pawns of big business. These assessments ignore
the complexity of the relationship and the essentially heterogeneous
nature of business in any large capitalist economy. It is clear that
substantial sections of the business community remained resolutely
opposed to reviewing or changing US policy towards the Chinese
mainland.
The most concrete example of business support for a change in
approach came in a report produced by a Committee of the World Trade
Association 0NTA), (an autonomous body linked to the San Francisco
Chamber of Commerce), on the possibilities of trade with mainland
China. The report produced by the Committee concluded that the current
US policy of "double isolation" was "untenable". 83 The report went on to
state that: "Changes within mainland China, within the Communist world,
and within our own free world are occurring with ever-increasing speed
and far-reaching import". 84 The changes referred to included a clear
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improvement in trade between the PRC and the outside world, brought on
partly because of the Sino-Soviet split and the longer term effects of the
Chinese famine that had caused such death and destruction in the early
1960s. The report considered especially the improvement in trading
relations between the PRC and the countries of Western Europe and
suggested that similar trade between the US and the PRC could be
"profitable".85 The report was categorical in its conclusions: "Until we
ourselves are in direct dialogue with our major protagonist, we shall find
ourselves on a dark and deserted stage from which there is no exif.86
The Committee endorsed the report unanimously. Next it went to the
WTA which endorsed its findings by a hundred and seventy votes to
thirty.87 However, the directors of the San Francisco Area Chamber of
Commerce refused to endorse it on two occasions showing that they
were not prepared to support such controversial conclusions.88 The
contents of the report were circulated amongst members of Congress
showing that some elements of the business community did support a
change in policy.89
This trend towards challenging the existing tenets of policy continued
in April 1965 at a US Chamber of Commerce conference in Washington
attended by approximately a thousand delegates. The conference
agreed a resolution calling on the government to explore ways "to more
effectively open channels of communication with the people of China".90
Finally, the business community became more vocal in the mid and late
1960s in calling for a new US policy towards the Mainland. This
suggested that the traditional policy of isolation never had unanimous
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support and that once the climate changed then it became open to strong
criticism.91
The business community, like the public, academics and government
officials, allowed voices to be heard calling for review and change. For
businessmen it was imperative the US took advantage in the increase in
Chinese trade with the non-communist world. US businessmen,
particularly those on the West Coast, were determined that this outside
trade would not bypass the US. Again, business leaders looked towards
the Presidency for leadership but a clear impetus had been established
which meant that the climate of the 1950s had changed in a way that was
conducive to review. Like public opinion in general the business
community was divided but becoming increasingly flexible on the issue of
Sino-American relations.
(v) US Policy Towards the Soviet Union.
So far three domestic influences on policy have been considered.
However, there were other factors that need to be taken into account.
The first of these is the US relationship with the Soviet Union. Clearly
policy towards the People's Republic of China would be affected by
attitudes towards its giant neighbour and ideological soul mate.
Kennedy had come to office accusing Eisenhower of allowing the
USSR to gain a lead in the arms race and to secure political advantages,
particularly in the developing nations such as Vietnam. Kennedy was
determined to redress this imbalance.92 He quickly discovered that any
missile gap between the superpowers was weighted in favour of the
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US.93 Moreover, he found himself locked in major confrontations with
the Soviets firstly on Berlin and then more dangerously over Cuba.94 In
October 1962, the President to his horror found that the Soviets had been
placing missiles on Cuba, a mere ninety miles from the coast of Florida.
A fierce head to head took place, which led to the Soviets withdrawing the
missiles at Kennedy's insistence after he had stated that the US would
regard any attack from Cuba, as an attack by the Soviets on the US.95
Ironically, the Cuban missile crisis led to an improvement in relations
between the two powers, which led to the Test Ban Treaty of August
1963. Both had realised the limitations of a hostile confrontation. The
lesson was learned that nuclear confrontation was unacceptable to both
sides and this would form the basis for an understanding.96 Biographers
have emphasised the centrality of the crisis to Kennedy and his
determination to pursue a more cautious policy towards the Soviets.97
To his advisers and indeed the public at large, Kennedy's handling of
the missile crisis was portrayed as a great triumph for his diplomacy and
crisis management. In particular, Roger Hilsman used this interpretation
of Soviet policy as a model for how policy towards the PRC should
develop.98 On the one hand, policy could be tough when US strategic
interests were being challenged whilst on the other the US could be
flexible when it was in its interests to improve relations with the Chinese.
This parallel would be made repeatedly by Hilsman and others to justify
their attempts to alter policy towards the PRe.99 It could be argued that
the principal influence of the Soviet Union on US China policy was that it
provided a model to follow.
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A secondary factor was the importance of the Sino-Soviet split. By the
mid-1960s it was clear that the split was fundamental and might even
lead to a military showdown between the two communist giants. To the
United States this split clearly presented an opportunity to pursue US
interests against both of them and to extract advantages from both. The
US government was aware of this from a very early point in the
proceedings but it would not become a central plank of policy until Nixon
was in office and Henry Kissinger was his National Security Adviser.
Under Kennedy and initially under Johnson, the predominant view was
that the Chinese were the more aggressive and unreasonable and that a
factor in the Sino-Soviet split was a Soviet desire to peacefully coexist
with the western world. This simplistic reading of the split dominated US
official thinking from about 1962 until 1966, which cited examples such as
Lin Biao's famous statement of 1965, which emphasised Chinese support
for wars of national liberation like the one being fought in Vietnam.
However, less commented upon was the fact that Lin Biao went onto
state that Chinese involvement would not go beyond moral support. In
1963, the US through Averell Harriman had made some tentative
approaches to the Soviets regarding the Chinese nuclear capability.
Khrushchev had shown little interest in any co-operation with the US in
such a sensitive area and for that reason amongst others the US decided
to let the matter drop. By 1965, as in so much else, policy towards both
China and the USSR was deeply influenced by the US commitment to
protecting its client government in South Vietnam. Vietnam was the key
factor that prevented Johnson and his advisers fully taking advantage of
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the Sino-Soviet split.
In short, US relations with the Soviet Union affected China policy in
two key areas. First, to provide a model policy for the US to follow
towards China; and second, the Sino-Soviet split created a new range of
opportunities for the US to pursue once it was ready to do so.
(vi) Vietnam.
Immediately on taking office Kennedy had emphasised the importance of
wars of national liberation in developing areas in Africa and Asia. The
civil war in Vietnam was a classic case of such a war. To those around
Kennedy it represented a test case of whether the US was able to defend
client governments against communist insurgents backed by the Chinese
and Soviets.1 00 In reality, the situation in Vietnam was altogether more
complicated than Kennedy's advisors supposed. For a start, the US ally
in the South had very little credibility or support amongst the general
population. Alternatively, the communists were Vietnamese whose
appeal to their compatriots was primarily nationalistic.1 01 This imbalance
meant that the US was faced with a stark choice by the early 1960s,
which was either to deepen their commitment to the country or to accept
a communist take-over of Vietnam. The latter option was always the
more unpalatable due to a range of factors such as public opinion and
general cold war doctrlnes.l 02 Therefore, Kennedy chose to send
increasing numbers of military advisers to Vietnam. In March 1965
Johnson began the mass carpet bombing of the North; and later in 1965
large quantities of US troops began to enter Vietnam in order to defend
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the South.103 By the end of 1965 an undeclared state of war existed
between the US and North Vietnamese and their allies in the South - the
Vietcong.
Events in Vietnam would influence China policy in a number of ways.
Firstly, US leaders including both Kennedy and Johnson viewed China as
the key international supporter of the North Vietnamese. The war was
seen as a test case to measure Chinese support for communist
movements on its borders and the extent of its influence in Southeast
Asia.104 As Lyndon Johnson would state in a seminal speech in April
1965 at Johns Hopkins University: "Over this war - and all Asia - is
another reality in the deepening shadow of Communist China. The
contest in Vietnam is part of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes".105
Related to this "wider pattern" was the "domino theory" which asserted
that if Vietnam was to fall to the communists then an irresistible
momentum would be created leading to other countries around Vietnam
like Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia being similarly affected.106
Thus the conflict in Vietnam took on far greater importance in
international eyes than its scale merited. Initially, it also deterred
members of the Johnson Administration from reviewing and reforming
China policy.
China also effected the military strategy adopted by the US. The fear
of provoking a Chinese intervention, coupled with a desire not to provoke
domestic American opposition, meant that Johnson and his advisers
waged a war by stealth often doing the minimum to maintain the position
of the South Vietnamese.1 07 The full-scale assault that might have been
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able to alter the military balance of the war was never attempted partly
because of the fear of Chinese reaction. The lesson of Korea, most ably
enunciated by Allen Whiting, was that the Chinese would intervene
militarily when its strategic interests were threatened. It was this factor
that would later lead some historians and other conservative
commentators to say that the war in Vietnam was a failure from US
perspectives because Johnson never allowed the military to prosecute
the war to its full potential.10~ Ultimately, the importance of China in the
Vietnam imbroglio created a greater need for communication and
negotiation between the US and the PRC. This was a key factor in
Nixon's decision to seek a dialogue.
The final manner in which Vietnam influenced US China policy was
the debilitating affect that the war began to have on the Johnson
Administration by 1966. The effects intensified during 1967 and
eventually destroyed the Johnson presidency.109 It became clear that
the US was failing to achieve its minimum objectives for Vietnam and the
war increasingly sapped morale and public support. The war began to
dominate the Administration and to take up an increasing portion of the
time of the President.11 0 Other areas of foreign policy such as China
were downgraded; reviews were postponed until the war took a turn for
the better; and policy changes were unrewarded because of the ill affects
of the war. Alternatively, countries like China and North Vietnam would
be less interested in negotiating with what by 1968 was palpably a lame-
duck president. Domestic observers were often horrified at the damage
that the war was doing both in policy and political terms.111 In
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conclusion, it can be argued that Vietnam prevented Johnson giving more
serious consideration to changing foreign policy in 1966 when the public
mood had shifted.
(vii) The People's Republic of China.
In the normal state of diplomatic relations the concerns, actions and
viewpoints of the country with which the host nation is dealing with should
be of paramount concern. However, Sino-American relations did not
come into the category of normal diplomatic relations. Between 1955 and
1967 the only contact between the two nations was the one hundred and
thirty ambassadorial meetings that took place in Geneva and Warsaw.
These meetings were ultimately unproductive.112 On the American side,
as has been argued, political leaders were unprepared to take the lead in
making the moves that might advance the relationship between the two
nations. The Chinese had their own reasons for not wanting to alter their
hostile attitude towards the USA. In particular, they resented the US
commitment to Taiwan and the historic role of the US as the paragon of
Western imperialism. It is for these reasons that events in China and the
viewpoints of the Communist leaders were always peripheral to the US
policy makers of the time. This included both those who advocated a
policy of total isolation and those who argued for a form of containment.
China policy had been subjected to violent domestic debate and the lack
of contact between the two nations meant that each power's attitudes
towards the other developed in a vacuum. For historians, examining US
China policy in the 1960s, it is difficult to uncover the nuances of US
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policy because much of the political intelligence provided by
organisations like the CIA remains classified. Furthermore, a large
proportion of the specific information that policy makers acted upon is
unavailable. For example, the information that convinced Johnson and
his advisers that China considered nuclear weapons as defensive and
thus were unlikely to use them is not now available. However, comments
and actions by contemporaries indicate that it did exist and it is referred
to.113 It is clear from the sources however that policy makers were
vague about events in China and often generalised. The Chinese
historian He Di is closest to the mark when he concludes that Sino-
American relations in the Twentieth Century are characterised by
misunderstanding and a lack of knowledge about one another.114
Nevertheless, developments within China itself did affect the
perceptions of US policy makers even if they did not fully understand
them. It is worth trying to assess what Chinese policy was towards the
United States during the late 1950s and the 1960s to measure the
accuracy with which the policy makers approached events and trends.
Between 1949, when Mao and his colleagues in the Chinese Communist
Party took full control of the country, and 1959 the new Chinese
government could boast a range of achievements. The CCP
consolidated its control over the vast interior of China and launched a
programme of economic development that had some creditable
results.115 In foreign affairs, China had established itself as a leading
member of the communist bloc. It had achieved the basic aim in Korea of
defending its border and had ensured that a government sympathetic to
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Beijing would control North Korea. At the Geneva Conference (1954) and
Bandung Conference (1955), China had played a leading role and by the
late 1950s China was taking the first steps towards becoming a nuclear
power.116 However, in other areas tensions were emerging. The
relationship with the Soviet Union was deteriorating, splits were emerging
within the leadership of the CCP, and economic problems were also
escalating.117 To the watching world, including the Americans, there
was nothing that might distinguish the CCP from other leading
Communist governments and certainly nothing to support Eisenhower's
policy of total isolation of the Chinese compared to their working
relationship with the Soviet Union. It is hard not to agree with historian
Edwin Moise when he writes that: "Up to 1957, China's position in both
domestic and international affairs seemed to fall within the normal limits
of communist behaviour".118
In February 1958, the National People's Congress of the People's
Republic of China launched the Great Leap Forward of the Chinese
economy. This involved attempts at huge increases in production of steel
and coal that often involved the setting up of small steel furnaces all over
the country. Ordinary Chinese were organised into communes, which
were given individual targets of production.119 The results of the Great
Leap Forward were disastrous, with approximately seventeen million
peasants dying of starvation.120 Much of the steel produced was unfit
for industrial use and peasants were diverted ~romfarm duties for what
was ultimately a wasteful exercise.121 These disasters combined with
bad harvests, and the withdrawal of Soviet aid led to an abandonment of
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the initiative. In September 1959 at the Lushan Conference the policies
behind the Leap were quietly abandoned and by late 1960 the Great
Leap Forward had been completely set aside.122
The Great leap Forward brought to the surface the simmering
differences within the CCP leadership and the dissatisfaction with Mao's
leadership. In December 1958, Mao was forced out as State Chairman.
By 1960, a group of moderates who coalesced around the leadership of
the Chief of State Liu Shaoqi, CCP Secretary General Deng Xiaoping,
and to a lesser extent Premier Zhou En-Iai, emerged to assume control of
the party and state apparatus. These moderates began to have an effect
on both the domestic and foreign policies of the PRe.
In January 1962, a new policy of "Three Privates and one Guarantee"
was introduced. The peasants were given permission to cultivate
individual plots of land, operate private handicraft enterprises and were
allowed to sell the products on the free market and to keep the profits.
The guarantee was that they had to fulfil an agricultural production quota
set by the govemment.123 In foreign policy, the moderates launched a
policy of "Three Reconciliations and One Reduction". The reconciliations
were to be with imperialists, reactionaries and revisionists and the
reduction was to be in Chinese aid to foreign national liberation
movements.124 The aim of this policy was clearly to improve relations
with both the western world and the Soviet Union. This policy clearly
suggested to the West and to the US that it was possible to improve Sino-
American relations. The moderates never however deviated from Mao's
insistence on the importance of Taiwan and that would remain the
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fundamental block to any reconciliation between the People's Republic of
China and the United States. The policy achieved its greatest
breakthrough when France, under General De Gaulle, recognised the
PRC.125
It is remarkable, given the extent of these changes, how little they
filtered through into American thinking. Detailed discussions of the
differences within the leadership never took place. Both those who
believed in total isolation and those who advocated an improvement in
Sino-American relations based on containment were unmoved by events
on the mainland.126 Chester Bowles argued that the starvation in China
presented an opportunity for America to improve its relationship with the
Mainland but his efforts were to go unrecognised.127 Also, James
Thomson and others in their writing began to acknowledge that a more
moderate leadership might emerge in China after the death of Mao.128 It
is probable that they meant Liu Shaoqi, but he was never specifically
named. Chinese moderate policies helped to bolster their position but
they never used events in China to change policy radically, partly
because of the issue of Taiwan.
Within China itself, Mao watched these events with horror. He
regarded the policies pursued by Liu as likely to bring about the onset of
a capitalist economy and reconciliation with the Soviet Union. He also
believed that these policies would lead to an end to the revolutionary
feeling, which he considered essential to the survival of communism
within China. He also resented being sidelined.129 To reverse these
trends, Mao began to build a base of support in order to attack Liu and
206
his allies. In September 1962, he set up a Socialist Education Movement,
which emphasised the ongoing class struggle and he instructed officials
and intellectuals to go to the countryside to learn skills from the
peasantry.130 By 1965, Mao was ready to begin the process that led to
the Cultural Revolution. This process involved the removal of Liu, who
had once been Mao's chosen successor, and an onset of revolutionary
fervour.131
(viii) China's Policy Towards the United States.
Despite the intense ideological differences between the US and the
PRC, the Chinese Communists adopted a pragmatic approach to
relations with the US Government.132 Although ideologically closer to
the Soviet Union, Mao did not trust Stalin and hoped to balance the
relationship with the Soviets with a reasonable association with
Washington. Mao's first attempt at this was during World War II when
clear approaches were made to the Americans. In mid-1942 Zhou En-Iai
held talks with the second secretary of the US embassy in China, John
Paton Davies.133 In July 1944 this dialogue led to the US sending an
observer mission to the Communist base in Yenan.134 In 1945,
according to Barbara Tuchman, the communists were even prepared to
accept a coalition government in China as a means of garnering
American aid.135 Ultimately, these plans came to nothing and the
Nationalists and Communists were thrown back into civil war.
When the CCP succeeded in taking over China, they considered the
USA, as Jiang's main backer to represent the greatest external threat to
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the Chinese Revolution and their new government. Mao argued that
although US propaganda was aimed primarily at the Soviet Union, its
military might would be used to repress national revolutionary movements
elsewhere.136 The fear of US military engagement would undoubtedly
be a factor in Mao's reaction to events in Korea in 1950 and influence his
decision to intervene. It also played a part in the decision of the CCP to
"lean to one side- and forge an alliance with the Soviet Union. Mao
feared that the US might intervene in the Chinese Civil War and believed
that its support for Taiwan represented an attempt to undermine the
sovereignty of the new government and support a defeated rival. In the
longer term, Mao believed that the Americans would try to undermine
Chinese development. This fear was one of the major factors in
explaining early Chinese Communist foreign policy.137
Other factors in that early foreign policy included a desire to re-
establish China as a regional or world power. Mao and the Communists
shared the national humiliation that the Chinese had suffered as part of
the unequal treaties and the inability of previous Chinese governments to
defend its national interests. Mao was determined to redress that
imbalance and that again was a factor in China's intervention in
Korea.138 Mao believed that China represented a unique example of a
non-European example of a proletarian revolution that could inspire the
peoples of the world especially peasant societies elsewhere in ASia.139
A final factor was of course the ideological affinity with the Soviet Union
and the fact that the Soviets were the one power prepared to establish
good relations with the PRC.140
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In the mid-1950s the Chinese Communist leadership tried again to
improve relations with the USA. This was despite the attempts by the
Eisenhower Administration to encircle China by setting up SEATO (South
East Asian Treaty Organization) and having US military bases in South
Korea, Japan, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Burma and Thailand.141 In
particular, the Chinese leadership was enraged by the US defence treaty
signed with the Republic of China in December 1954, which they saw as
a direct attempt to undermine the sovereignty of the PRC.142
Nevertheless, at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, attended by
twenty-nine African and Asian countries, Zhou was quick to affirm the
Chinese desire to deal with the Americans. On April 23, the PRC
released a statement saying that:
The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The
Chinese people do not want a war with the United States of
America. The Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter
into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss the
question of relaxing tension in the Far East and especially the
question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area.143
It is worth pointing out that this statement is very similar to the one sent to
Richard Nixon a generation later.144 It was this positive approach that
led to the commencement of the ambassadorial talks that continued into
the 1960s. A number of historians have suggested that between 1955
and 1957 the Communist leadership genuinely hoped for an improvement
in Sino-American relations and that included them being prepared to
renounce the use of force as a means to retrieving Taiwan, a concession
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they later made to Nixon.145 The fault that there was no improvement at
this time lay primarily with the Americans.
It was at the Bandung Conference that the Chinese Communists laid
out their five principles of peaceful coexistence. They were a mutual
respect for each other's territory and sovereignty. A mutual agreement
not to engage in aggression against one another. Agreement not to
interfere in each other's internal affairs. An acceptance of the need for
equality in relationships based on mutual benefit and a commitment to
general peaceful coexistence.146 These five principles formed the basis
of Chinese foreign policy in the years after 1955 and helped reassure
countries on China's periphery like India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma,
Laos and Cambodia that China did not seek to dominate them or
undermine their non-communist governments. These principles, which
were extremely vague and harder to define when dealing with specific
situations nevertheless, defined a Chinese desire to improve relations
with the outside world including the United States.147
However, by 1957 the Chinese Communist leaders were becoming
disillusioned with the talks with the US. They believed that the US
wanted to institute a policy of -Two Chinas" based on the policies that the
Americans had adopted towards Germany, Korea and Vietnam.148 The
Chinese historian He Di has argued that the Chinese leaders launched
the shelling of the offshore islands from Taiwan, Quemoy and Matsu, as a
means of sabotaging what they believed was a two Chinas policy on the
part of the United States.149 The shelling would signal to the outside
world China's continuing determination to reunite Taiwan with the
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mainland. Furthermore, after the crisis, Mao decided that the islands
were better left in Jiang's possession because it prevented a clear
geographical division being created between Taiwan and the
mainland.150 Mao was also reported to prefer Jiang remaining ruler on
Taiwan to a potentially more liberal leader who might follow the US
agenda of creating two Chinas.151 On October 6, 1958, Mao set out his
position in a radio address entitled "Message to Our Taiwan Compatriots:
There is but one China in the world, there are not two Chinas. On
this point, we concur with each other. Americans are using their
techniques to try to force upon us a two China policy. All the
Chinese people, including you and our overseas Chinese
compatriots, will absolutely not let this materialize.152
This assessment of US intentions was of course accurate and was
certainly the solution to the Taiwan impasse supported by men like
Chester Bowles.153 The lesson from this was that the policy was fine on
the drawing boards in Washington but suffered form the fact that neither
China nor Taiwan was prepared to accept it. Before the goal of an
improved Sino-American relationship could be reached this approach
would have to be changed.
The Offshore Islands crisis of 1958 also led to a Chinese appraisal of
policy towards the United States. Before the crisis Mao had believed
since the 1940s that the USA was determined to destroy the PRC
through a three pronged attack on it via Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.
Mao had seen the war in Korea as part of that wider strategy. However,
Mao now decided that the US was essentially defensive not wanting a
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wider war but merely trying to isolate China.154 In the autumn of 1958,
Mao took this new assessment to a CCP Central Committee Politburo
meeting convened to discuss the state of Sino-American relations and the
failure of the talks between the two countries. A new policy was decided
upon based on concentrating on one issue: Taiwan.155 In future, in all
talks with the United States, the issue of Taiwan would be central to any
potential improvement in relations between the two. This accorded to
Mao's desire to reunite the country as we" as Chinese desire to establish
itself as a great power. This policy would remain constant throughout the
1960s.
The retirement of Eisenhower led to Chinese hopes that his successor
might be more moderate but Mao, Zhou and other leaders quickly came
to the view that Kennedy was another hard-liner who was potentially even
more hostile than his predecessor.156 The rhetoric and intervention in
Vietnam concluded the Chinese, was evidence of Kennedy's inability to
seek compromise or break out of the stalemate of the 1950s.
The growing conflict in Vietnam clearly contributed to this assessment.
Gabriel Kolko in his seminal book on the war in Vietnam identifies a
number of divisions within the Chinese leadership about foreign affairs
including Indochina.157 He argues that a" the leaders feared a complete
North Vietnamese victory. which they saw as potentially extending Soviet
influence in the region.158 Both at the Geneva Conference in 1954 and
in their contribution to the 1962 Laos Treaty the Chinese were prepared
to act independently of the North Vietnamese. Even in the early 1960s
the Chinese continued to advocate a negotiated settlement that would
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keep both the US and the Soviet Union from becoming too powerful in the
region.159 In fact it was only after the creation of a US military command
MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) in February 1962 that
the Chinese became more aggressive in support of the North. Even then
the Chinese was careful in the manner in which support was offered to
the North.160 Privately, the Chinese sent tens of thousands of personnel
to help the North but publicly they continued to call for the Vietnamese
Communists to win the war by themselves.161 The US, fearing an
escalation of the war, also chose to keep the extent of the Chinese
support for the North Vietnamese quiet.162
Nevertheless, Taiwan rather than Vietnam remained the key obstacle
to an improvement in Sino-American relations. A People's Daily
Observer article of March 29, 1966 concluded that:
So long as the U.S. Government does not change its hostile policy
toward China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan
and the Taiwan straits the normalization of Sino-American relations
is entirely out of the question and so is the solution of such a
concrete question as the exchange of visits between personnel of
the two countries.163
In private, the Chinese leaders were equally adamant about the
importance of Taiwan. The author Han Su Yin, who was later to write a
biography of Zhou En-Iai, remembered meeting him in 1966 just before
she was leaving for a conference in the United States at the University of
Chicago on Sino-American relations. Zhou told Han:
Please tell the Americans that we have never been against a
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United States presence in the Pacific. That is a fact that we have
to live with. But Taiwan is part of China, it cannot become an
occupied protectorate under the United States. Nor can there be
two Chinas. Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and we are in total
agreement on this point.164
This commitment to Taiwan was not just based on geo-politics.
According to Edgar Snow in his Life article of July 1971, Mao saw
integrating Taiwan into the mainland as his "last national goal of
unification" .165 It was clear to all neutral observers that until compromise
could be reached on this issue an improvement in Sino-American
relations was impossible.
In conclusion, Chinese policy towards the United States was based
primarily on one issue, Taiwan. Until the US was prepared to engage
with the Chinese view that the island was part of China then there was
very little opportunity for the initiatives and overall policy being advocated
by men like Thomson being realised. Moreover, until that time it was
impossible to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split or the Chinese
hesitancy in supporting the North Vietnamese. Dean Rusk understood
the importance of Taiwan but did not believe that an improvement in
Sino-American relations was worth the sacrifice that might have to be
made in that area.166
A related problem for these more liberal thinkers was the Chinese
hostility towards the concept of two Chinas. The CCP leaders in Beijing
viewed that policy with horror and if an improvement in Sino-American
relations was to be affected than abandoning the concept of two Chinas
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would be required. By 1966 as these academics prepared to publicly
challenge the Johnson Administration over China policy, the issue of the
US commitment to Taiwan would be one of the issues that would come
more and more into focus.
(ix) Conclusions.
In this chapter a range of influences on US China policy have been
identified as has the shift that was taking place in all of them. This shift
was clearly helping to create a climate conducive for reassessment and
change in Sino-American relations. Public opinion, the business
community and the more liberal academics were moving steadily in
support of a more flexible policy. In foreign policy terms the improvement
in Soviet-US relations and the Sino-Soviet split helped to create
opportunities for the US to improve relations with the PRe and to use that
improvement as leverage in world politics. All of these changes required
presidential leadership and up until 1966 it was clear that Kennedy and
especially Lyndon Johnson were not prepared to provide that leadership.
The war in Vietnam debilitated policy making within the Administration.
However the potential clash between the two created an even greater
need for improved relations. Finally, the Chinese themselves were ready
to improve relations with the US but only on the basis of an agreement
being reached about the status of Taiwan. The overall trend was towards
a change in policy. At the very least it shows that the climate that greeted
Nixon on this issue when he took office in 1969 was very different to the
one that greeted Kennedy in 1961 or Hilsman as he made his speech in
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1963. By 1966, it can be argued that the situation both in the US and
outside was ready for the US to change policy.
A final area needs to be looked at which is the relative weight that
should be given to the influence of these factors on policy. International
relations theorists have often looked for determining factors on policy
making. However, the conclusion of this chapter is that a range of factors
converged to help undermine the existing US policy. Moreover, each
trend towards changing policy helped reinforce other factors. For
example, liberal academics were more prepared to state publicly their
deslre for a change in policy because of the more tolerant public mood
and they in turn by their pronouncements would influence public opinion.
Also, the more co-operative stance of the Chinese leadership helped
increase trade with the western world which in turn influenced American
businessmen who began to call for a change in policy. In short, all of
these factors were cogs on a wheel pushing the US towards a change in
policy towards the PRC.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE COMING OF AGE: 1966-1968.
(i) Introduction.
In the years leading up to 1966, academics, government officials and
others who advocated a change in US China policy had been cautious in
the way that they expressed their views. The strength of the China Lobby
and the lack of opportunities for change had, if not silenced them,
impeded the extent to which they were prepared to speak out. By 1966
those barriers had been removed. It was clear that public opinion had
shifted and a change had begun to take place amongst the opinion
formers who had previously been unprepared to speak out. During 1965
and 1966, academics and others joined organisations committed to
changing US China policy; appeared at a series of Congressional
hearings into US policy and advocated change. Eventually with
businessmen and other interested groups they created the National
Committee on US-China Relations, which although formally neutral, acted
as an umbrella for all those who wanted reform. This onslaught began to
force the Johnson Administration to shift its ground. During 1966, leading
members of the Administration made conciliatory speeches outlining their
desire to seek a new relationship with the PRC. It is also clear that policy
did shift towards an official stance of "Two Chinas". Furthermore, many
of the academics that had long argued for change were brought into
government as part of advisory panels on Asia policy that were created to
attempt to take into account their views. By 1968, this shift had ensured
that it was not a matter of if policy would be changed but when and
whether or not it would be acceptable to the PRe.
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(ii) The Academics and the Congressional Hearings.
The second half of 1965 and the opening months of 1966 clearly
represented a turning point in the attitude of the foreign policy elite
towards discussing China policy. Whereas fear of the China Lobby had
stymied more controversial views, the change in public opinion and the
growing conflict in Vietnam removed the barriers to open discussion and
dissent from the traditional policy of total isolation. In 1965, a new
organisation: Americans for Reappraisal of American Far Eastern Policy,
involving amongst others John King Fairbank, was set up.l Moreover,
the Council on Foreign Relations, the League of Women Voters, the
Foreign Policy Association and the American Association of University
Women all undertook information campaigns on China and US policy
towards the PRC.2 The largest of these studies was by the Council on
Foreign Relations who spent $ 1.1 million on the production of an eight
volume study of "The US and China in World Affairs".3 The most
important and controversial volume of the series was Steele's book: "The
American People and China", which showed that public opinion was
ready for a shift in policy whenever a president might be ready to address
it.4 In fact the majority of the authors in the study advocated a shift in
China policy and the purpose of the study was to try to kick-start a debate
on what the CFR members saw as a sterile and failing policy position.5
The 1966 CFR handbook on China policy noted:
a gradual but highly significant modification of American attitudes
on the whole China question. Not only was every aspect of China
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policy being discussed in the United States with a freedom that
would have been unthinkable a few years earlier. Even the
substance of China policy appeared to be undergoing subtle
modifications as Washington, without relaxing its opposition to
Chinese expansion, sought cautiously ... (to encourage) new forms
of Sino-American contact. 6
If this was the case then the CFR itself contributed to that new climate.
It was in that new climate that both Houses of Congress in the early
months of 1966 held hearings on China policy. The House of
Representatives conducted its hearings before the Subcommittee on the
Far East and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Clement Zablocki, a Democrat from Wisconsin, chaired these}
However, it was the Senate hearings in March 1966, before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, which was to attract the publicity and
star witnesses. The Committee was chaired by Senator J.William
Fulbright, a Democrat from Arkansas, who was rapidly becoming a thorn
in the side of the Johnson Administration due to his growing criticism of
the Vietnam conflict.S Fulbright in a book published the same year
entitled The Arrogance of Power expressed the view that the time had
come for policy to be changed and a process of dialogue with the leaders
in Beijing established.9 The hearings were publicised and the early
speakers a" reflected the liberal view of US-China relations and the view
held by men such as James Thomson Jr within the Administration.
The first speaker was A. Doak Barnett then the Acting Director of the
East Asian Institute at Columbia University who had previously held posts
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within the State Department and the CFR.1 0 Barnett called on the US to
adopt a policy of containment but not isolation, a policy that would
aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and
pressures emanating from Peking (Beijing), but at the same time
would aim at maximum contacts with and maximum involvement of
the Chinese Communists in the international community.11
He put forward three proposals that he hoped might improve the situation:
a formal acknowledgement of the regime in Beijing; an encouragement of
contacts including trade in non-strategic items; and for the US to support
the concept of "two Chinas" in the United Nations.12 After Barnett's initial
statement the Senators on the Committee were given the opportunity to
question the witness. Amongst the issues that came up was the question
of to what extent US policy towards the PRe could affect the internal
development of the mainland and in particular the succession to Mao.
Barnett chose his words very carefully:
It would be reasonable to expect, I think, that the outcome of the
competition between leaders and policies that is likely to occur, and
the resulting balance between what one might call radicals and
moderates will be definitely influenced by the perceptions that the
new leaders have of the international environment as it affects
China. While it may not be possible for outsiders to exert very
much influence on the outcome, our hope, certainly, should be that
the balance will in time shift in favor of technical bureaucrats
promoting relatively moderate policies.13
This prescient reply was followed by questions on the Sino-Soviet split
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which Barnett emphasised was ·very real, very bitter, and very deep".14
Before the end of the questions Senators Stuart Symington of Missouri
and Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania had both publicly stated their support
for Barnett's position.15
The next witness was John King Fairbank whom Fulbright introduced
as the "man considered by many experts in the field to be the dean of
China historians".16 Fairbank, appearing exactly fourteen years to the
day that he had appeared before the McCarran Committee, argued for a
policy of "Containment and Competition".17 Historically, he argued Mao
could be identified as emerging from within a tradition of Chinese leaders
going back to the emperors of previous centuries.18 He stressed that the
PRC rulers should be seen primarily as Chinese nationalists determined
to overturn perceived injustices of the previous century, and communists
secondly.19 He then went on to outline his perspective on how to deal
with China emerging as a superpower. The answer lay in bringing it fully
into the world system and making it a bloc of a stable international order.
This is precisely what Richard Nixon set out to do a couple of years later.
Fairbank told the hearings:
In the end - my whole point this morning has been that in the end if
you want the Chinese Communists to stop trying to stir up the
underdeveloped world as their main claim to fame, your real
alternative is to get them into international contact. The most
obvious place is the UN. So I think that it has a great psychological
curative value for them in the long run because I think they are
prestige conscious ... And consequently you have to work toward a
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complex and combined policy in which you are not giving into
Peking. You are doing something constructive, you are not letting
go of your alliances, you are not selling out the other countries that
feel threatened by China. You have to hold up both sides. In other
words, build the international order with Peking's participation. At
the same time that you have a certain amount of Containment of
Peking's expansionism if it occurs in these other places on this
subversive revolutionary model.20
Another witness, Alexander Eckstein, a Professor of Economics at the
University of Michigan, and a rising star amongst scholars of China who
was already considered the foremost US expert on the Chinese
economy, touched on the same aspects of developing relations with
China:
My convictions on this relate to the view that the United States, as
a matter of national interest, is committed to the evolution of a
stable international system ... The Chinese Communists, on the
other hand, have a vested interest in political and economic
disturbance, such as that which prevails in some African countries,
because this provides a much more fertile ground for subversion.
Now, to the extent that our relations with China at the present
time and in the recent past and our policy of isolating China
contribute to world tensions - and I think they do contribute to world
tensions - they tend to aggravate instability in the world
international system.21
In short, US interests in the opinion of both Fairbank and Eckstein were
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being impeded by the refusal of the US to try to integrate the PRC into
the world system. This strategic approach if successful would also give
the opportunity for the US to extract itself from Vietnam as China was
weaned away from supporting revolutionary movements in Southeast
Asia. On Vietnam, Fairbank and Barnett before him both stressed their
support for the war.22
Eckstein also convincingly put the case for a change in trading
relations between the two countries. In his testimony, he argued that the
trade embargo didn't work and served no purpose other than to try to
isolate the Chinese.23 He went onto identify two specific problems with
the policy. Firstly, that it separated the US from many of its allies that
now had full trading relations with the PRC and secondly that it denied
US business its share of the China trade, "however modest".24 Put in
such stark terms it was hard to defend the policy of total isolation.
Another fascinating subject that came up was the issue of the
interaction of views amongst the academics. Senator Clifford Case of
New Jersey noted the similarity between the views expressed by Barnett
and Fairbank, given that the latter had a reputation of being more of a
"dove". He questioned the latter on this and Fairbank's reply is worth
reprinting in full:
It proves that we have met each other for many years in
conversation and learned from each other. We form a group in the
country, a professional group. A country has to be guided by
realism and not merely by a consensus of the so-called
professional people in a certain line, and it is extremely important
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that we question everything that we have to offer.25
These comments clearly show the extent to which these academics were
talking, interacting and co-ordinating their attempts to alter policy. To
prove the point made by Fairbank over the next few days: John Lindbeck
(of Harvard who had also served in the State Department and as a
consultant to the RAND Corporation); Benjamin Schwartz; Morton
Halperin (later to serve in the NSC under Henry Kissinger); Donald
Zagoria (of Columbia) and Robert Scalapino appeared before the
Committee to support the views put forward by Barnett, Fairbank and
Eckstein. All were keen to stress the unanimity amongst scholars on US
China policy and the changes that they believed were necessary.26
Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island realised the trend that was
developing and begun to wonder what influence these views were having
on the State Department officers who had studied at some point in their
careers at the East Asian Institute at Harvard. Although he raised the
subject with Fairbank he tackled it more thoroughly during his allotted
questions to John Lindbeck.27
Senator Pell: Since the present generation of China specialists in
the Department of State in general go through your institute, would
you be willing to hazard an opinion as to their personal thoughts
regarding our general line of policy toward China? Do they reflect
your views or the administration's views?
Dr Lindbeck: Well, first you are under the misapprehension that
they have gone through the East Asian Research Center; most of
those who have come to Harvard from the State Department and
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other government agencies I think have gone to the Center for
International Affairs. We have had a number of associates of our
Center among the Foreign Service officers who were at Harvard.
would say that among the very few who have been closely
associated with us, there have been differences of opinion.28
This answer is disingenuous to say the least. Given the views held by
Thomson and those associated with him in government it is clear that at
the very least their views are almost identical and at most that the
process of interaction outlined by Fairbank amongst academics extended
to government officials. The views publicly expressed by Barnett and
others was the very same as the views that men like Hilsman and
Thomson had promoted in the autumn of 1963. Whereas in 1963, public
opinion urged caution on those advocating change by 1966 times had
changed to such an extent that academics that supported this approach
could argue publicly for their preferred policy options.
As the hearings continued, support for the views expressed by Barnett
and Fairbank grew. On March 21, the New York Times published a
statement by a hundred and ninety eight academics advocating change
along the lines outlined at the hearings.29 Senator Bourke Hickenlooper
of Iowa, a long-time supporter of the China Lobby, decided to intervene to
try to redress the imbalance against the existing policy. He arranged for
Walter Judd, and Professors George Taylor and David Rowe to address
the hearings.30 Fulbright noted this development stating that: "The
Senator from Iowa thought the witnesses up to now hadn't given a
balanced point of view". 31 These witnesses appeared before the
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Committee on March 28. In stark contrast to the McCarran hearings this
time it was conservatives like Taylor and Judd who were given a hard
time. Fulbright wrought the concession from Taylor and Judd that
whereas the US had 600,000 troops stationed abroad the PRC had
none.32 Rowe took a far more aggressive stance claiming that
academics like Barnett and Fairbank were representative "of a lunatic
fringe of cowards, pacifists, appeasers, and just plain, simple
Communists and pro-Communists". 33 The Committee was extremely
hostile towards Rowe and was able to get him to state publicly that he
supported the use of non-toxic gases and napalm in times of war.34 In
fact, it was clear that Rowe's conduct, much like Joseph McCarthy's a
generation earlier, helped discredit the views which he was putting
across. The combination of the reasonable viewpoint being put by the
majority of speakers compared with the extremist language used by
Rowe helped solidify the belief that the advocates of change were the
moderates and those supporting the existing policy were the extremists.
Two final issues are worth addressing. The first is the matter of the
extent to which the US was encircling the PRC. Fulbright raised the fact
that it was the US who had troops active in the countries bordering the
PRC rather than the Chinese Communists. Brigadier Samuel B. Griffith
told the House Subcommittee on February 25, 1966:
I think if we can put ourselves in Peking and look around as the
members of the politburo do, we might see the picture they see.
They see American power in Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, the
Philippines, Taiwan and growing in South Vietnam. They see us
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as an ally of India ... I honestly believe we have to understand, or
attempt to understand, that Peking has reason for apprehension. 35
These sentiments were echoed in June 1966 by State Department Officer
Chester Cooper in an address he gave to a CFR conference on China:
The Chinese Communist regime may be exaggerating for popular
consumption its view of the American military threat. But American
planes are bombing within a few miles of Southwest China's
borders and the Seventh Fleet is close enough and powerful
enough to blow up major Chinese cities over night. Soviet missiles
in Cuba produced a major crisis in the United States: Can we
expect the Chinese to accept with equanimity American missiles
ninety miles of their shores? We know we won't unleash our
awesome power against them except in the event of the greatest
provocation. But do they know it? ... Against this backdrop we can
hardly expect quick or generous dividends from our newly-
expressed willingness to let a few doctors or students travel to
China.36
These radical statements show the extent to which the US was beginning
to debate the whole concept of its responsibility for the hostile state of
Sino-American relations. Also the issue of whether or not the US
needed to begin to withdraw some of its military presence in Asia or at
the very least communicate its position towards the PRC. This debate
was given greater impetus by events in Vietnam. Not only were
observers calling on the US to start to make small gestures to the PRC it
was now also looking at how the US could genuinely reflect on how its
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commitment in the region itself contributed to the poor state of Sino-
American relations. Moreover, given the views of men like Fairbank and
Eckstein of the need to incorporate the PRe into the world system then
that need would eventually take precedence over US commitments to
some of its allies in the region. That is not to say that these observers
were prepared to accept Chinese or Communist take-overs of countries
on its periphery but for the first time they were prepared to state publicly
that alliances with these countries were not worth sacrificing a better
relationship with the PRC itself.
This leads onto the second issue, which was Taiwan. As we have
seen the key issue as far as the Chinese leaders in Beijing were
concerned was the island occupied by Jiang and his supporters. Publicly,
Barnett, Fairbank and others argued for policies that, if adopted, would
lend impetus in the drift towards "Two Chinas" across the Taiwan
Strait. 37 However, this policy was unsustainable given both Chinese
Communist and Nationalist hostility to the concept of separating Taiwan
from the mainland. Both claimed to be the legitimate rulers of all China
including Taiwan. This hostility rendered useless other proposals put
forward by these academics and other observers for a series of
incremental measures by the US to improve Sino-American relations. As
far as the Chinese Communists were concerned until the US moved on
Taiwan it was impossible for Sino-American relations to improve.
During the hearings these academics tended to avoid discussing the
issue of Taiwan probably due to the sensitivity of the subject. However,
the new emphasis that they placed on Sino-American relations and the
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importance of incorporating the PRC into the world system combined with
the continuing importance of Taiwan to the Chinese created the climate
for the US to begin to withdraw its commitment to the island. If this was
the one issue that prevented a rapprochement between the two then it
was unlikely given the other views expressed by these academics that
they would advocate abandoning the changes they wanted because of
disagreements over Taiwan and its status and long-term future.
Furthermore, these liberal academics had never had much faith in Jiang
anyway and his involvement with the China Lobby hardly made it likely
that they would rally to protect him. In short, the Chinese Nationalists
were beginning to become an impediment to a process of reconciliation
that these academics believed necessary for US interests. The
academics were still too cautious to address this issue directly during the
hearings but the shift of opinion was unmistakable.
These hearings clearly set in motion a shift in Sino-American relations.
The majority of observers were now prepared to challenge the existing
policy shift without fear of attack from the China Lobby. Moreover.
pressure was now being brought to bear on the Administration to change
policy in a way inconceivable a few years before when Kennedy had
been in the White House. James Thomson best describes this shift in
evidence that he gave before the same Committee in June 1972. In
I
1966, Thomson was still in government whereas by 1972 he had returned
to Harvard where he was a Lecturer in History. He recalled the affect of
the hearings thus:
these hearings in 1966 had a profound impact within the
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Government, as they apparently did through television, upon the
nation as a whole. The interagency community of China worriers
and China watchers in the executive branch, long frustrated in their
efforts to unfreeze China policy, was very much emboldened by the
testimony of the academics, by the responsiveness of the
Senators, by the favorable reaction of the press, and by
subsequent indication of public flexibility as revealed in opinion
polls.38
He also believed that the hearings led to the adoption, by the Johnson
Administration, of Barnett's dictum "Containment without isolation" and
helped the Administration move to end restrictions on travel by American
citizens to the mainland.39 Finally, Thomson believed the hearings
helped lay the foundation for the changes in policy introduced later by
Nixon:
At the very least, then a new rhetorical foundation was laid for a
revised China policy, a foundation which the Nixon administration
has considerably enlarged, strengthened, and began to put to good
use.40
All round therefore the Senate hearings of March 1966 was another
decisive turning point in the evolving consensus calling for a new Sino-
American relationship.
Those who supported the existing policy fought back. As well as
David Rowe, Congressman John Ashbrook identified Fairbank and
Barnett as members of a Red China Lobby.41 Also, within Taiwan
attacks on the views of Fairbank and others intensified. Dozens of
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vitriolic articles were published with exotic titles such as "Why only Half-
Baked China Watchers?" and "John K. Fairbank: Twister of Chinese
History" .42 These attacks however failed to find a wider US audience.
The spell woven a generation earlier was not going to be repeated in the
new climate of the late 1960s due mainly to the decline of the China lobby
and its influence. The conservative impulse and viewpoint was in the
minority and was incapable of holding back the evolving consensus of the
time. Their weakness and inability to prevent the changes being
advocated contributed to the shift in policy itself.
(iii) Shifts within the US Government: 1966-1968.
In response to the China hearings, Johnson asked Thomson to write a
memo on China policy setting out the views being put by the academics
at the hearings.43 Presidential aide Jack Valenti also got Thomson to
outline in writing his proposed alternative China policy. In his response
dated March 1, 1966 Thomson argued for a three pronged approach.
The prongs were military containment of China and a policy of
strengthening the nations on the borders of China. Finally, Thomson
argued the US should try to create a more constructive engagement with
the PRC with a view to helping to "erode the Chinese totalitarian state, to
influence Chinese behavior, and to combat Chinese ignorance and fear of
the outside world".44 He then went on to say that:
The first two of these aspects have received much attention since
the Korean war. They underlie our network of military alliances
and our aid program; they are reflected in the Vietnam war today.
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But the third aspect has been largely neglected.45
Thomson put this down to a combination of three factors: the domestic
political environment; the existence of Taiwan as a separate claimant of
power on the Chinese mainland; and the actions of the CCP
leadership.46 He then stated that these domestic impediments had now
been removed and the initial Chinese reaction was secondary to the need
for the US to be trying to break the impasse that existed.47 He then
made a list of recommendations, which included the usual agenda of
trade in non-strategic items, encouraging visitors to and from China and
including the PRC in negotiations about nuclear disarmament.48 He
concluded "the pursuit of a third strategy of flexibility commends itself as
a low-risk imaginative policy worthy of a strong and confident power in its
dealings with the China problemn•49 Having made these initial
recommendations Thomson recorded the views being expressed on
Capitol Hill by Barnett, Fairbank and the others and sent them to the
President. According to Thomson, Johnson was "rather surprised - and
pleased that they're not all against him on Vietnam. They're talking about
China as a rather separate issue, and they are sort of making good sense
about it".50
Johnson also decided to set up an advisory panel system involving the
academics in a bid to create a closer relationship between them and the
Administration. According to a memo written by Valenti: "This was to be
a task force which would set out objectives and guidelines on our policy
toward China and Russia -- so that Presidential decisions in this arena
are tied to specific goals·.51 Over the coming months this new task force
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was set up and academics such as John King Fairbank that had been
ostracised for their criticisms of Jiang were now listened to again. This
was indicative of the decisive shift that was taking place.
The first evidence of this new attempt at communication was the Panel
on China, the United Nations and United States Policy convened by the
Administration on July 6,1966.52 Amongst those involved were Barnett,
Zagoria, and Lucien Pye of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), Kenneth Young and George Taylor as well as traditional
government advisers such as Arthur Dean and Robert Roosa, who
chaired the Panel meeting.53
However, the most tangible proof of these efforts was the creation in
December 1966 of a China Advisory Panel (CAP) that would report to a
Panel of Advisors for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs within
the State Department.54 This new body included Fairbank, Barnett,
Eckstein, Pye, Scalapino and Taylor. Other members of the CAP
included two former US Ambassadors Philip Sprouse and Jules
Holmes.55 The CAP would hold discussions with government officials
and then filtrate what they had gathered through to the larger Panel,
which included other interested parties including Walter Judd.56
CAP held five meetings with government officials, each of which lasted
two working days. They took place in February 1967, June 1967,
October 1967, April 1968 and November 1968.57 As well as these
formal meetings a pattern of regular communication was established
between Alfred Jenkins, the NSC China expert, and the academics
involved in the Panel meetings.58 The first meeting in February
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discussed possible policy options but the meeting was dominated by a
detailed consideration of the effects of the Cultural Revolution.59 The
academics argued that the turmoil on the mainland shouldn't impede the
process of reviewing China policy and making any necessary
alterations.60 To other participants and Alfred Jenkins the government
official who wrote a record of the Panel meeting for government files, the
events in China necessitated the government to postpone any intended
policy initiatives until it became clearer as to what the future direction of
the PRC was likely to be.61 As subsequent events were to show the
academics assessment was to prove the more accurate based on their
belief that it was the US who should be reforming its policy to adapt to the
reality of the PRC. The chaos being generated within China made it less
likely that it was about to embark on any aggressive foreign policies and
historically the Chinese had looked inwards rather than to imperial
expansion.
The second Panel meeting held on June 5 and 6th, went into far
greater detail as to what the academics wanted.62 Firstly, the academics
"reiterated its consensus that the Cultural Revolution in China should not
be considered a barrier to policy initiatives on our part at this time-.63
They then went onto emphasise their support for the Johnson
Administration's conduct of the war in Vietnam but again did not see that
as a barrier to attempts to improving Sino-American relations. According
to the official record of the meeting:
There was a general consensus that our policy toward Communist
China should consist of a firm stand in Vietnam, but also a more
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liberal stance concerning economic relationships. Fairbank feared
that if the U.S. stance on trade and other relationships is
unyielding, this would in time encourage the revival of Sino-Soviet
ties.64
The Panel also considered in full the issue of Taiwan and stated: "There
was general agreement that the long-range future for Taiwan is likely to
be one of separate existence from the mainland and that the U.S should
favor self-determination for the Taiwanese".65
Certain points can be made about the attitude and the
recommendations put forward by the academics. Firstly, the policy
options they were proposing were entirely consistent with those
Thomson, Hilsman and others had been arguing for under President
Kennedy and that the academics themselves had put forward at the
Senate hearings. Secondly, their support for the war in Vietnam and their
seeming inability to relate it in any way to Sino-American relations
suggests that they did not fully adopt a regional approach. Of course,
members of the Panel may have compromised and suppressed their
doubts about the war in the hope of influencing the government in what to
them was the more important arena of Sino-American relations. Their
support for the war also suggests that the criticism aimed at them by the
Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS) which was that they
were implicated in the decision process that led to the war does have
some legitimacy. As late as 1967, the cream of US academics who
specialised in Asia studies and China were still supporting the war in
Vietnam. Paul Evans, Fairbank's biographer, suggests that he was
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tormented by events in Vietnam throughout 1966 and 1967 but only came
out fully against the war in 1968.66 By that time it was clear that the
Johnson Administration had failed to put down the Vietcong: that the US
was not prepared to pay the price of winning the war; and that public
support was draining away. A final point was on the issue of Taiwan,
these academics remained tied to the idea of "two Chinas" even though
all indications coming out of the PRC showed that this policy would never
be acceptable to the leadership in Beijing.
Ultimately, the Panel meetings failed to affect significantly Johnson's
China policy as events in Vietnam and China itself overtook the advice
being given. Later Fairbank would argue that the meetings served no
useful purpose and it was clear that amongst these academics a cynicism
towards Johnson had developed based on his personal style and inability
to shift policy.67 This failure shows that Vietnam had begun by 1967 to
hamper any genuine attempts by the Johnson Administration to change
policy. Also it shows the limitations of the influence of these academics.
Their role was merely to push the flow along rather than dramatically
effect the shaping of policy in the short term. They needed a President in
the White House who shared their perception about China policy and was
willing to pursue their agenda. That was clearly not the case with Lyndon
Johnson.
In addition to this new Panel a high-level attempt was made by the
Administration in 1966 to encourage Edwin Reischauer, who planned to
stand down as Ambassador to Japan to return to academic life at
Harvard, to take on a new role as an ambassador-at-Iarge with special
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responsibility for China.68 Reischauer, who was well known as an
advocate for the approach supported by Thomson and others, received
the support in the early months of 1966 of both Bill Moyers and
McGeorge Bundy. Bundy described Reischauer as "a great
reinforcement and protection in which both our long-range thinking about
China and our immediate Vietnamese dangers make this kind of person
very important to us".69 Reischauer was aware and appreciative of these
efforts but had become disillusioned with the Johnson Administration on
issues such as China and Vietnam and felt little rapport with either the
President or Dean Rusk.70 He preferred to return to Harvard where he
felt he could speak out more freely rather than take a job that he
described as "merely an exercise in futility".71 Reischauer had a
meeting with Johnson on July 22, 1966 to discuss China policy where
according to Reischauer "he (Johnson) conducted a monologue most of
the time"_72 Johnson did try to keep Reischauer within the Administration
but the academic was unimpressed and felt that the President was trying
to look like he wanted him to stay rather than a genuine desire to take his
policy ideas into account. 73
Reischauer's scepticism fails to take into account the genuine shift that
did take place in 1966 where both Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and
later Johnson himself made speeches outlining their desire to seek a new
relationship with the PRC. On June 8, 1966 at West Point Humphrey told
his audience that "we seek and will continue to seek to build bridges, to
keep open the doors of communication, to the Communist states of Asia,
and in particular Communist China·.74 On July 12, Johnson went even
237
further in a speech given at White Sulphur Springs on Asia policy. The
President called for "cooperation and not hostility" with mainland China.75
He also called for "the free flow of ideas and people and goods" which
seems to be clearly a reference to non-strategic trade and passports for
those wanting to travel to and from China.76 Finally, the President stated
his belief that peace could only come to the region "through full
participation by all nations in the international community under law",
which can be interpreted as the first sign that the US was preparing to
relax its opposition to the PRe entering the United Nations.77 These
sentiments from a President would have been unheard of even twelve
months ago but they reflected the palpable shift in opinion that had
developed in 1966.
Historians have identified 1966 as a key turning point in Johnson's
policy towards the PRC. Leonard Kusnitz argues, on the basis of
interviews that he carried out in 1966 that Johnson came around to
believing in a policy of "two Chinas" but that the opposition of Dean Rusk
prevented him from taking those ideas further.78 Gordon Chang sees a
clear shift in US government attitudes towards the PRC. Johnson
stopped publicly claiming that the Chinese were responsible for starting
the war in Vietnam and calling the Chinese capital Peiping.79 From the
Chinese side, Chang asserts that at some point in the spring of 1966 they
informed the US that China would not enter the war so long as the US
didn't attack China itself or bomb north of the Red River dykes.BO
A final intriguing aspect of this policy shift was an attempt by Johnson
to try to communicate with the PRC through Romania; an attempt
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repeated by Nixon in 1969.81 Johnson told Romanian President Maurer
to tell the Chinese leadership that the US hoped that the PRC could play
a peaceful role in Asian development. 82 Arriving in Bucharest on June
23, 1966 Zhou had declared that: "Romania has successfully fought
pressure from outside and she has been striving to find useful norms for
cooperation between friendly countries". 83 This statement seemed to
suggest that the Chinese were prepared to treat the Romanians as a go-
between in relations it might want with the outside world. Although the
Chinese were still insisting that US commitment to Taiwan made any
reconciliation impossible. However, in a People's Daily article of March
31, it was US military presence around the island that most upset the
Chinese:
So long as US Govt does not change its hostile policy toward
China and refuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and the
Taiwan strait, the normalization of Sino-American relations is
entirely out of the question and so is solution of such a concrete
question as exchange of visits between personnel of the two
countries.84
This wording and the emphasis on the US military presence would
provide the solution to the Taiwan issue for Richard Nixon but remained
unacceptable in 1966 to the Johnson Administration.8S
Another factor contributing to the shift was the attitude of the Defense
Department, military chiefs and the CIA. In 1966, the Defense
Department began to advocate a policy of "two Chinas" as offering a
more constructive approach that would aid US strategic interests.86 In
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September 1966, Jenkins recorded a discussion with Morton Halperin
now employed by the Defense Department who told him that a memo
advocating "two Chinas" had been approved within the Department
without any opposition. Halperin wrote that:
McNamara commissioned his staff to find some way of getting
DOD (Department of Defense) into Chirep (China and the United
Nations) policy deliberations. The reasoning was that our present
stand damages our relations with friends, and that particularly in
the case of Japan such damage has defense implications.87
Military chiefs stationed in the region echoed this view. For example, in
March, the US Chiefs of Mission throughout East Asia called on the
Administration to "mitigate the impression of inflexibility and rigidity in our
approach to China".88 In particular they called for the lifting of the trade
embargo on non-strategic items and greater cultural contacts between
the two.89
CIA reports bolstered this shift. In June 1966, a CIA report entitled
"Economic Benefits to Communist China of a Removal of US Trade
Controls" argued that the selling of US machinery would make little
practical difference to the operation of the Chinese economy.90 A CIA
cable dated September 19, 1966 poured scorn on the idea that the PRC
might at this time want war with the United States over Vietnam or
anyone else:
It seems quite inconsistent that Mao Tse-tung would be thinking of
taking his country into a war with the United States at the same
time that he is carrying out an internal struggle against his own
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party and attempting to force the country into new and greater
production.91
That being said the cable did suggest that the US should remain sensitive
to Chinese troop movements towards the area bordering North
Vietnam.92 All of this reinforced the argument for a change in China
policy.
Within the lower levels of the US Government the most important
development was the interagency study carried out under the direction of
Joseph Yager.93 Set up in the autumn of 1965 by August 1966 it had
prepared a series of recommendations including the creation of a
permanent Interagency Committee to provide a forum for discussions
between the relevant departments on China policy.94 These included the
Departments of State and Defense. The study's initial report made some
small policy suggestions on trade and visitors to China which although
supporting the ideas suggested by Thomson and others was noticeably
more cautious.95 Thomson, in one of his last memos before his return to
Harvard was critical of that caution:
To the casual observer, it may seem that the mountain has labored
and brought forth a mouse. Yet, I anticipate resistance at the top
of the Department even to these minimal steps.96
This quote indicates Thomson's growing despair as well as the continuing
resistance that he perceived Dean Rusk provided against any potential
changes to policy.97 It was at the third meeting of the new Interagency
China Country Committee that overall policy was discussed in depth.
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Yager's study formed the backdrop of the talks.98 The first two meetings
had concerned themselves solely with organisational matters.99 The
"tentatively approved" recommendations were policy directions rather
than specific steps but they were based on greater flexibility that reflected
a desire to seek "eventual reconciliation between nations that now call
themselves enemies".1 00 The central recommendation of the Committee
was that a balance needed to be found between supporting allies in Asia
and on the other hand placing limitations on the degree to which the US
was prepared to intervene in the region.1 01 In November 1966, the
China Working Group recommended the removal of the last of the
remaining travel restrictions.102 Yager's study, which has yet to be
released in its entirety, will clearly shed light on the views of members of
the Johnson Administration on China policy. However, its concrete
proposals suggest a tentative commitment to changing policy that may
either have reflected a cautious stance or a messy compromise between
two opposing factions.
Even after all the shifts of 1966 practical policy towards the PRC
actually changed very little. In April 1967, the Administration stated that it
might allow pharmaceuticals to be shipped to the PRC and in May 1968
Chinese journalists were invited to cover the upcoming US Presidential
elections.103
Observers like James Thomson and historians like Leonard Kusnitz
have emphasised the dual affects of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and
the war in Vietnam.1 04 The combination of the two stymied any genuine
chances of Johnson changing policy. The issue of trade continued to be
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discussed within the Administration and according to Thomson, Johnson,
at the time planning to stand for re-election, hoped to have a summit with
the Chinese Communist leadership during the election year.1 05 This
was not to be the case and ultimately the careful groundwork laid by
Hilsman and Thomson under Kennedy was never to find fruition under his
successor.
Nevertheless, the shift had taken place and it was clear that whoever
succeeded Johnson would have a unique opportunity to adopt a policy of
his choice unimpeded by the domestic restraints that had been so critical
in the thinking of John Kennedy. The Wall Street Journal aptly caught the
new mood in an article on November 14, 1967, which Alfred Jenkins
picked up on and sent to Walt Rostow as part of a Memo entitled "After
Mao". Of US policy the article stated:
The present attempt to isolate mainland China, after all, makes no
sense as a permanent policy. Eventually logic will compel the U.S.
to offer diplomatic relations, a measure of trade and other steps
advocated by those who want better relations with China. The
relevant argument is over when and how.l 06
It then went onto argue that Mao's successors were likely to want to
concentrate on internal economic development rather than foreign
revolution. The article suggested that, "it would be in the U.S. interest to
encourage such a regime" and that once such a shift in the PRC became
clear then the US should start to change its policy along the lines
suggested by the academics." 07 Jenkins declared that the article was
identical to his thinking.1 08 By 1967 the question was really one of
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"when rather than ir and it can be argued that the activities of the
academics like Fairbank and their allies in government like Thomson was
crucial in creating that climate. It was ironic that just as they were about
to see the real fruits of their lobbying in this area they decided to withdraw
from public life.
This failure to change policy even after the decline of the China Lobby
and the shift in public opinion were crucial factors in the decision by
Edwin Reischauer and James Thomson to leave the government in the
summer of 1966.109 Back at Harvard, Reischauer wrote Beyond
Vietnam, which was an update of his views on Asia policy.11 0 He left the
Administration utterly disillusioned especially over the failure to reform
China policy.111 In one of his last cables as Ambassador to Japan, he
set out his views in language that could leave nobody under any illusion
about the extent of his disenchantment:
Nothing stands more firmly in the way of a Chinese readiness to
seek a rapprochement with the world than their resentment of what
they regard to be the callous pretence on the part of the world's
greatest power that China does not exist or that, if it does exist, it is
so depraved or so unstable or so inconsequential that it should be
barred from world society .112
On Taiwan he wrote that, "we should not allow the peculiarities of one
small country to continue to determine the position of the world's greatest
power year after year" .113 This memo which over-emphasised the
feelings of the Chinese clearly showed the frustration felt by liberals like
Reischauer.
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Thomson was more circumspect about his reasons for leaving
government. He felt in need of developing an alternative career in
academia and he had developed a good working relationship with
McGeorge Bundy and when Bundy left the Administration.114 However,
he was deeply disillusioned by events and his inability to affect the
conduct of policy:
The moments of euphoria - when one broke through the travel ban
after four and a half years of trying; when one got the President
finally to say some gracious words toward Peking; when one heard
the President give a conciliatory speech about the future of the
Mekong and North Vietnam - such moments of euphoria were very
few and far between, and they could not balance out the deepening
sense of horror over escalation and killing with no end in sight,
movement down a track which seemed a suicide track.115
This reply given in an oral history interview he gave for the Kennedy
Library prompted a question about why he didn't speak out against the
war sooner.116 Thomson's reply throws light on the whole relationship
between the US government and the policy academics who at times work
for it and at other times in conjunction with it:
One has a sense of constraints - respect for one's colleagues who
are left in, a sort of loyalty to the good guys inside, as well as to the
presidency, and I'm sure also some sense of fear. You want to be
invited back. You don't want to break the code. You therefore
want to be careful.117
Thomson comprehensively broke the code in May 1967 when he
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published a comic parody of a National Security Council meeting under
Walt Rostow in the magazine Atlantic.118 Rostow communicated to
Thomson, via academic Richard Neustadt, that as a result of the article
Thomson would never work in government again.119 A month later
Thomson went even further when he wrote a letter to the New York
Times outlining his opposition to the war in Vietnam.120 For both
Reischauer and Thomson there seemed little reason to remain inside an
Administration that they felt no longer represented the values and
aspirations that had brought them into government in 1961. It is clear
that their early hopes of having a decisive impact on policy had given way
to despair about their lack of influence and the failings of the strategy that
was being pursued.
(iv) The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.
The final element in the shift in domestic pressures on US China policy
was the formation of the National Committee on US-China Relations.
Conceived in the autumn of 1965, it came into official being in June
1966.121 The Committee's proposed research programme included
organising a series of conferences; launching a public discussion
programme and setting up working parties to look into issues such as
China and the United Nations; China's economic relations with the
outside world and the Sino-Soviet split.122 It was formed with the
express purpose of facilitating a debate on China policy. As it declared in
its statement of purpose:
The National Committee on United States China Relations believes
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that we urgently need a public discussion of our current China
policy: the basic issues, present problems, and possible
alternatives. Such a discussion is essential in terms of our national
interest and the peace and security of the world.123
The Committee stated that it would take no policy position, "but are
hopeful that out of a national dialogue on the subject there will emerge a
consensus as to whether any modifications in our existing policies are
desirable" .124
In its initial press release the Committee set out its prospective
programme thus:
the purpose of the Committee will be able to serve as a national
resource center to provide the means through which the current
public discussion on U.S. China policy can be maintained at the
highest level of sophistication ... A market survey to determine the
scope of trade possibilities with China is also planned.125
Its programme showed the wide ranging remit that the organisation
intended to have and the likely affects that this would have on
government policy. Other activities that the Committee were intended to
be involved in was formal exchanges between the US and the PRC;
polling studies on attitudes in the US towards China and various elements
of US policy towards the PRC and the publication of a regular
newsletter.126
This wide-ranging remit was also evidenced in the membership of the
Committee. Its organising group included from academia A. Doak
Barnett and Robert Scalapino who became one of its co-chairmen.127
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The world of business was represented by amongst others: Allan Sproul
who was a director of Wells Fargo Bank, Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical
Corporation of San Francisco; Daniel Koshland who was Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the Levi Strauss Company based in San
Francisco and Jack Gomperts who was the former Chairman of the World
Trade Association of San Francisco who had been involved in the
controversial report that had been circulated the year before.128 Finally,
the organizing Committee included other interested parties such as Carl
Stover who was the Executive Director of the National Institute of Public
Affairs; Anna Lord Strauss, who was the former President of the League
of Women Voters of the US, and Cecil Thomas who was the Associate
Peace Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee.129 Its
overall membership also included representatives from academia,
business and policy centres that acted as vehicles for advice to
government.130 For example other academics involved included
Fairbank and Eckstein and in total included seven who had appeared
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1966.131
The Committee received an almost immediate endorsement from
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and Senator Edward Kennedy and by
1967 according to Paul Evans: "having secured substantial foundation
funding, it operated as the country's largest information clearing house
and as an active forum for promoting public discussion" ,132
In analysis, it needs to be emphasised that despite its protestations of
neutrality the National Committee was biased towards changing policy.
Its membership was made up of almost exclusively those who advocated
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the sorts of changes outlined at the Senate hearings by men like Barnett
and Fairbank. In fact, it showed a formal joining together of all those who
advocated change from academia, business and other interested
organisations. It is worth noting that the business involvement was
mainly from the West Coast proving Steele's thesis that the West Coast
and San Francisco was the fulcrum of support for change.133
Furthermore, even if the organisation were genuinely neutral in its
approach to US policy then its activities would ultimately undermine a
policy of total isolation. After all promoting cultural exchanges, studies
into policy alternatives and public discussion programmes would erode
the basis of support - a declining support as has been argued - from the
existing policy. The membership of the Committee who regarded the
policy of total isolation as fundamentally flawed believed that the more the
policy was discussed the more it would come into disrepute. A final point
is that the formation of the National Committee was the most systematic
evidence of the decline of the "China Lobby". The funding and support
available to the new Committee dwarfed that for the Committee of a
Million.
The existence of the National Committee affected the debate on China
policy within government, bolstering the position of those who wanted
change. This influence was apparent when the Committee sponsored a
meeting between President Johnson and a group of China experts.134
The experts were Reischauer, Scalapino, Eckstein, Lucien Pye, Barnett
and George Taylor.135 With the exception of Taylor all were known
advocates of a change in policy. Also present, representing the
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Committee, were Cart Stover and Cecil Thomas (who was its Executive
Director). With Johnson were Walt Rostow and Alfred Jenkins.136 The
experts outlined potential policy options and lobbied hard for the
appointment of a policy adviser with a specific remit for China policy.137
Johnson accepted that policy had failed but blamed the Chinese who
were "interested in discussing nothing except Taiwan".138 Eckstein
emphasised the change that the National Committee represented:
He (Eckstein) said that he detected a changing mood in the
country; in the business community, in labor circles, in civic groups
and in churches. He said the Committee represented by this group
constituted an answer to the rigidities represented in the
Committee of One Million. The time has come to engage in more
open discussions.139
Johnson concluded the meeting by thanking the Group for their input and
asking them to send a memo to him outlining their policy
recommendations and making a recommendation as to who could be
appointed as an expert on the PRC.140
In response to the Johnson meeting with the National Committee on
U.S.-China Relations two replies came back from the academics
involved. On February 12, all but Taylor supported a series of small
steps including greater communication with the PRC. Their memo
recommended that the US repudiates Jiang's claims to the mainland and
allows the PRe to enter the UN under the same terms as other
countries.141 The memo suggested taking these steps incrementally to
maximise their affect on Beijing and show the PRe leadership that the US
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was not engaged in a mere propaganda exercise.142 The memo
supported the creation of a position of ambassador-at-Iarge but declined
to name an individual for the role.143 Two days later George Taylor
wrote a dissenting memo distancing himself from the position being taken
by the others and stating that: "Reconciliation is the wrong word for the
ultimate objectives of the United States".144
Johnson asked his National Security Adviser Walt Rostowand
Secretary of State Dean Rusk to write papers on China policy for him.145
Assessing the scholar's recommendations, Rostow commented that: "The
speciftc steps proposed ... are not new, having been under intensive
study at one time or another within the government" .146 Moreover, these
recommendations are "regarded by most of the China specialists within
government as having merit, provided appropriate timing in their
application is followed".147 The conclusion of the piece commented that
the suggestions were constructive but that they could not be implemented
at the time because of the attitude of the regime in Beijing and the
uncertainties caused by the Cultural Revolution.148 The one positive
aspect of Rostows recommendations was that the President, if possible,
should emphasise America's desire for eventual reconciliation.149 There
was no mention within the memo of Taiwan and its importance to the
Chinese.
Of even greater interest was a memo from Dean Rusk, who seems to
have been given leave by the President to say what he believed .150
Rusk recommended some very limited changes on travel and the sale of
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food to the Chinese but beyond that opposed any changes:
For immediate purposes, I believe we can take only very limited
steps, since our firm posture in Asia generally remains crucial and
any significant "concessions" to Communist China would be
seriously misunderstood in key quarters, not to mention the
Congress.151
This statement suggests that Rusk remained highly sceptical about the
volatility of public opinion and was not prepared to believe that the
majority was open to possible changes in policy. For somebody who had
served as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in the
Truman Administration this was an understandable caution but
nevertheless it showed an inability to adapt to the new public mood of
1968. He also showed inflexibility towards the Chinese believing that
they would only respond to a "firm posture".
Rusk then went on to assert that as a consequence of the conflict with
the Soviet Union, the PRC might seek to improve its relations with the
US. In his opinion, the US should be prepared to welcome this
development and make it clear that it was open to a new China policy.
However, he proposed no significant steps on the part of the US that
could facilitate such a change.152
The final area of note is Rusk's attitude towards the issue of Taiwan.
Rusk was categorical as to what he saw as the outcome of the struggle
between the PRC and ROC:
(We deal with) Peking and Taipei as if they were separate states.
This is a direction toward which our policies have been taking us
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for 15 years and it is probably in our interest to work gradually
toward at least a tacit acknowledgement of this reality by both.153
Rusk did not believe that an improvement in Sino-American relations
could take place until the leadership in Beijing accepted the idea of
separate states.154 This statement clearly shows that Rusk believed in
"Two Chinas" and that the protection of Taiwan was central to his
opposition to changing China policy. For Rusk, Taiwan was an issue
from which the US could not be seen to compromise. From what we
know about the Chinese position this was the single issue from which
they were not prepared to retreat. Rusk either failed to grasp or refused
to accept the legitimacy of the Chinese belief that Taiwan was an issue of
national sovereignty not an issue to be negotiated.
From this certain points can be made about Rusk's position. James
Thomson has emphasised that Rusk was the single factor that prevented
China policy being changed during the Kennedy and Johnson
Administration.155 In fact, he described Rusk as an "absolute zealot" on
China policy.156 However, this memo showed that he was more flexible
although he remained convinced that domestic public opinion would not
accept a change in policy towards the PRC and that until the Chinese
changed their stance on Taiwan the US should not alter its policy.
Warren Cohen's view that Rusk was always more flexible but that he took
his lead from two hard-line Presidents is patently false. As has been
discussed Kennedy was more adaptable than Rusk on this issue and in
1968 Johnson was toying with changing policy, as a result of the
domestic shift. Yet Rusk still only recommended the most minor steps.
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Rusk, was not a zealot on China policy but he was less flexible than
those around him and acted as a drag on efforts to change policy. He
was not the single factor that prevented policy being changed under
Kennedy and Johnson but he was a major factor. A more flexible
Secretary of State may have led to a more thorough change in policy
after 1964. One can only ponder what would have happened had for
example Averell Harriman or Clark Clifford been Secretary of State
between 1964 and 1968. That is not to downplay other factors that
impeded the currents trying to change policy such as the Cultural
revolution, the war in Vietnam and the continuing uncertainty surrounding
public opinion.
Another factor that put China policy on the agenda of the President in
February 1968 was an incident on or around February 10, when an
American HA-IF was shot down by a MIG near Hainan.157 Johnson
ordered a study of violations of Chinese airspace and this must have
increased his concern about his inability to communicate directly with the
leadership in Beijing.158 Ultimately little changed in February 1968. The
war in Vietnam, including the Tet Offensive, preoccupied the President
and events in China itself gave little ground for hope that the leaders in
Beijing might change their stance. The academics that had met with the
President sensed this sterility and Reischauer for one was dismissive of
the meeting:
We sat together around the Cabinet table in the White House, and I
could see that he was trying to win understanding from the
academic community. Nothing came of this meeting except an
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embarrassing incident in which Johnson mistook his own White
House adviser on East Asian affairs (Alfred Jenkins) for a member
of the visiting group. It showed how disgracefully little the poor
man was consulted.159
This was a little harsh. Johnson did review policy in February 1968 but
the advice he received showed how his key advisers remained wedded to
the view that the arguments for the existing policy outweighed the
arguments for the approach recommended by Reischauer and others.
(v) Conclusions.
The period between 1966 and 1968 in the wider context of the evolving
consensus was the key moment when the balance of forces that argued
for change in US policy became the majority view. The Senate hearings
and the formation and activities of the National Committee on US-China
Relations reflected a change in public opinion and mood that had begun
in the early 1960s. This mood was also reflected in parts of the US
Government. The Defense Department began to seek to change existing
policy and within the NSC and State Department continued arguments
were put forward for a more progressive approach. However, at the
higher levels of the US government, beyond a change in tone and a
desire to seek reconciliation with the PRC evidenced in speeches given
by Johnson and Humphrey, policy remained firmly wedded to total
isolation. When questioned, officials blamed that on the Beijing
leadership that refused to accept the concept of Taiwan as a separate
state. Other factors like the war in Vietnam and the Cultural Revolution
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reinforced this caution, as did continuing fear about a domestic backlash
against any changes. Ultimately though the Johnson Administration was
gripped with a sterile approach and an unwillingness to change. By 1968,
it was not hostile to the views of men like Reischauer, Fairbank and
Barnett. It was simply unwilling to make the moves they advocated.
Perhaps, this was understandable caution in an election year or just
exhaustion from the trials and tribulations that it had endured. When
Johnson announced on March 31, 1968 that he would not seek re-
election it became clear that the issues raised by the Senate hearings
and National Committee would be dealt with by a new man.160
The academics sensed that the next president might make the
required changes and given their liberal instincts they rallied firstly to the
banner of Robert Kennedy and then after his assassination in June 1968,
to the campaign of vice-president Hubert Humphrey.161 Instead the
1968 Presidential Election would be won by Richard Nixon, a man with a
chequered history on China policy, and one with an abiding fascination
with foreign policy as well as a deep rooted dislike of policy academics.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE GRAND OPENING
(i) Introduction.
The final period that will be looked at is the actual opening to China itself.
Amongst the issues that need to be considered is the role of Richard
Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. To what extent
were their policies and outlook towards the People's Republic of China
affected by the domestic factors and individuals that we have looked at?
To do that requires not only a study of Nixon's policy of rapprochement
with Beijing but the continuing evolving consensus that was developing
towards China policy.
(ii) Richard Nixon.
Richard Nixon first entered politics in 1946 when he was elected as a
Congressman for his home state of California. He quickly earned a
reputation as a conservative who attacked Democrats for their supposed
softness towards Communism. In 1950 he became Senator for California
on the same platform.1 Despite this conservative background however,
he was always careful to maintain a distance between himself and the
formalised China Lobby. Although his 1950 campaign fund included
contributions from the Lobby, Nixon was never a mere mouthpiece for
their views in the way that his senate colleague from California William
Knowland was perceived to be.2 Moreover, Nixon was careful not to
attack the liberal internationalist wing of the Republican Party.
Consequently, although seen as coming from the conservative wing of
the party, he was able to maintain good relations with the liberal wing that
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dominated the party on the East Coast. This careful balancing act was,
perhaps, crucial to Nixon's selection as Eisenhower's vice-presidential
candidate in 1952.3
Once in office, in 1953, Nixon went on a tour of the Far East, visiting
nineteen countries including Japan, South Korea and South Vietnam.4
Publicly, he returned blaming the People's Republic of China for all the
problems that the US and its allies were experiencing in Asia. "If China
had not gone Communist," he declared, "we would not have had a war in
Korea ... there would now be no war in Indochina, and there would be no
war in Malaya".5 Privately, his conclusions were very different. In a
report to Eisenhower on his visit and his views on Asia policy, Nixon
condemned the influence of McCarthy on the State Department and the
discrediting of Foreign Service workers and professionals: "No one wants
to make a career in a discredited service".6 In particular, he attacked the
role of Scott McLeod who at the time was administrator of the State
Department's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs and was charged
with identifying potential security risks in the service. McLeod had been
appointed at the behest of McCarthy} Nixon condemned the move: "he
(McLeod) is a stooge of McCarthy working in the State Department; he
knows nothing, about the foreign service and he has never visited a
single diplomatic post outside the United States". 8
Privately, Nixon was also subtler in his views on the People's Republic
of China. For example, on August 4, 1954, the National Security Council
discussed a document NSC 5429.9 During the discussions, General
XI J.~...Jo.J
Matthew :-:~.: ~ .. then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed
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the view that the US should not be trying to destroy the CCP as that
would only create a void for the Soviet Union to move into. Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles agreed with this perspective although
Eisenhower did not. Nixon then expressed his opinion. He felt that the
US should adopt a policy of what he termed as "tough coexistence"
towards the PRC and "an area of action in between war and
appeasemenf.10 This should be done "on the basis that in the long run
Soviet Russia and
Communist China can and must split apart".11 Ultimately, Eisenhower
got his way and the NSC adopted a policy statement that committed the
US to "reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of,
but without deliberately provoking war".12 This meeting, and Nixon's
contribution to it shows that as early as 1953 he was dissatisfied with the
policy of total isolation. It also showed that Nixon was subtler than
contemporary observers might have expected and his public hostility
towards the PRC was not the same view he held in private.
The same year, according to journalist Henry Brandon, Nixon went
even further when in a meeting with a number of correspondents, he
spoke of gradually ending the isolation of the PRC by progressively
reopening trade relations and cultural exchanges between the two
nations.13 Once again, this is evidence of Nixon's flexibility that he kept
hidden from public view.
In April 1960 as he prepared to run for the Presidency, Nixon is
rumoured to have attempted to obtain a visa to travel to the PRC.14
According to George Dixon, a newspaper columnist close to him, Nixon
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saw electoral advantages in a visit to the mainland even then. "If he can
achieve a "breakthrough" into the forbidden country that holds one-fourth
of the earth's people" wrote Dixon "his "image" will be so gigantic he'll
overshadow any stay-at-home Democratic opponenf.15 Eisenhower
mocked the suggestion at the time and British embassy reports labelled
Dixon a "buffoon" and "not intended to be taken seriously".16
Nevertheless, later writers like Seymour Hersh are convinced of the
accuracy of the report.17 They point out that Nixon's 1959 visit to
Moscow and the subsequent positive publicity showed him the potential
benefits of visits to communist countries. It is certainly true that on a
number of occasions later Nixon would talk of a general personal desire
to visit the PRC.18 Furthermore, during the 1960 election he promised to
tour communist countries if elected.19
However, as the Election Day neared Nixon reverted to his more
traditional hostile view of the Communist Chinese. During one of the
famous televised debates with Kennedy he enunciated his public position
on the PRC: 'They don't want just Quemoy and Matsu. They don't want
just Formosa. They want the world".20
After the election where Nixon went down to one of the narrowest
defeats in presidential history, he met with Kennedy and amongst the
issues they discussed was China policy. 21 Kennedy told him that
although he opposed recognising China he had heard some good
arguments for adopting a strategy of "Two Chinas" over the issue of who
should sit in the United Nations.22 Nixon left the new president in no
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doubt that he would oppose any attempts to move towards
accommodating the Chinese leadership in Beijing.23
Once out of office, Nixon busied himself with working as a lawyer
dealing with international trade law.24 Nixon used this work as a means
to travelling around the world and meeting as many world leaders as
possible. Also, he used this period to develop his ideas on foreign policy
and to indulge himself in his love of international affairs.25 Unlike Lyndon
Johnson, who was primarily interested in domestic policy, he imbibed
foreign policy and the workings of the world system.
In 1963, in Europe, Nixon met French President Charles De Gaulle
and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer who both argued that the
US should change its policy towards the PRC.26 Also that year he
visited Japan where he met with the Ambassador Edwin Reischauer who
was a known advocate of change. At this time, he would regularly travel
to Japan as part of his work for Pepsi-Cola, who were one of his clients
and whose chairman Donald Kendall was a close friend.27 Reischauer
recalled their meetings thus:
I had always looked on Nixon with abhorrence, but in the flesh he
was much larger, better looking, and more pleasantly spoken than
one would gather from television. In calls later made on me at my
office, he would speak forcefully of the desirability of recognising
Peking, sounding for all the world like John Fairbank. I had felt that
the American public had been ready for this for some years, and
when as President he finally did do it, I was in no way surprised.28
In 1965, he tried again without success to get a visa to visit the PRC.
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This time it was part of his legal work when one of his clients, John
Shaheen, wanted him to go with the Premier of the Canadian Province of
Newfoundland, Mike Pearson. The State Department vetoed the
suggestion.29 Nixon did all of this whilst publicly declaring that the war in
Vietnam was a "confrontation - not fundamentally between Vietnam and
the Vietcong or between the United States and the Vietcong - but
between the United States and Communist China". 30
By 1967, Nixon had decided to seek the Presidency for a second time.
He decided that the time was right to announce publicly his belief in the
need for a change of policy. In April, whilst in India as part of another tour
of Asia he met with the Ambassador Chester Bowles. Bowles reported
the meeting to Secretary of State Dean Rusk remarking particularly on his
attitude towards the PRC:
On several occasions he almost suggested that good relations with
China were more important than good relations with the Soviet
Union. I disagreed with him strongly on this point, pointing out that
the door to Moscow was ajar while the door to Peking was locked
and bolted. I suspect he picked these ideas up in Hong Kong.31
However, it is his article in Foreign Affairs, the elite journal of the Council
on Foreign Relations, where Nixon forcefully set out his views on China
policy. In the article entitled "Asia After Vietnam" he left no ambiguity in
the need for a change in China policy:
Any American policy toward Asia ... must come urgently to grips
with the reality of China ... Taking the long view, we simply cannot
afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to
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nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors.
There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially
most able people to live in angry isolation. But we could go
disastrously wrong if, in pursuing this long-range goal, we failed in
the short range to read the lessons of history.
The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to
the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce
change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it must
change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its
own national interest requires a turning away from foreign
adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own
domestic problems.32
It is clear that central to his thinking was the need for communication with
the PRC and the need to develop a constructive policy that incorporated
the Chinese Communists within a world system, whereby they become
less of a threat to the United States and its allies and satellites. This view
not only accepted the perspective of men like Fairbank but also
emphasised the need for change in terms of global stability, which was a
key concern of Nixon and was evidenced by his pursuit of foreign policy
once in the White House.
During the election year itself, Nixon repeatedly stressed his desire to
seek a better relationship with the PRC. After his nomination by the
Republican Party as its candidate he stated that: "We must not forget
China. We must always seek opportunities to talk with her, as with the
USSR ... We must not only watch for changes. We must seek to make
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changes".33 After his victory in November, he told his transition team
that one of his ambitions as President would be to recognise the PRC.34
As President-elect his most important act was to appoint Henry
Kissinger as his National Security Adviser. Kissinger was a Harvard
based academic who had worked as a consultant to the Governor of New
York Nelson Rockefeller, who was the leading figure of the liberal wing in
the Republican Party.35 Once in office, Nixon would quickly sideline the
role of the State Department and rely on his own instincts and knowledge
as well as the advice of Kissinger.
,
Unlike Nixon, Kissinger came to office with very little focus on China
policy. In his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy he had included
a chapter on "Sino-Soviet Strategic Thought", but it was very much a
standard expression of the view that the Chinese were the more extreme
of the two super-powers.36 In 1958, he met with Adenauer who told him
that he believed that a break between the two Communist superpowers
was almost inevitable. Kissinger admitted later that at the time he did not
believe the West German Chancellor.37 The Cultural Revolution and the
Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons also horrified him. Initially once
the Sino-Soviet split became apparent Kissinger sympathised far more
with the Soviets.38 Nevertheless, by 1968 he had come to see the
possibilities of the US developing good relations with both the USSR and
China. In a speech drafted for Rockefeller and given by him in July,
Kissinger wrote:
We will have to learn to deal imaginatively with several competing
centers of communist power ... I would begin a dialogue with
264
Communist China. In a subtle triangle of relations between
Washington, Peking and Moscow, we improve the possibilities of
accommodations with each as we increase our options toward
both.39
Despite this, his knowledge and interests were always focused more on
Europe and general international relations theory. Although, Kissinger
knew many of the academics like Reischauer, with special interests in
East Asia, he never belonged or involved himself overtly in their
discussions.40
Concluding therefore, Nixon came to office with a substantial
knowledge and interest in international policy particularly towards Asia.
Moreover, Nixon maintained a dual perspective on policy towards the
PRC. Publicly, he continued to portray himself as a Cold War warrior and
only in 1967, as the public mood was changing, did he begin to soften his
stance. However, privately he was always more flexible and believed in a
policy of containment. Nixon was quite happy to ride the storm of anti-
PRC thinking whilst not agreeing with its nostrums and at the same time
take advantage of any change in the domestic environment. In short, he
was primarily an opportunistic politician who saw the Communist powers
as akin to other nations in one's ability to develop agreements and
understanding with them based on mutual interest. This marked him out
from many of his most recent predecessors who emphasised the
revolutionary nature of the Communist states. This opportunism,
cynicism as well as belief in negotiation would become apparent once
Nixon was in the White House.
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(iii) 1969: A Year of Opportunity.
Once in the White House, Nixon quickly turned his attention to China
policy. As he later noted in a State Department Bulletin published in
March 1972: "I entered office convinced that a new policy toward the
People's Republic of China was an essential component of a new
American foreign policyn.41 In January 1969 he told Lt General Vernon
Walters that he was determined to seek an opening to China. To that
effect on February 1, he sent an unsigned Memorandum to Kissinger
stating that: "I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude
that this administration is exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the
Chinese ... This, of course, should be done privately and should under no
circumstances get into public print from this directionn.42
This quotation summed up Nixon's obsession with secrecy. On taking
office, he organised the foreign policy making structure to enhance the
role of the National Security Council and sideline the State Department.
To do this Nixon created a system whereby Kissinger, who became a key
player, would write Memos on various policy areas outlining a range of
options. These were known as NSSMs (National Security Study
Memoranda) and reflected the President's belief that the State
Department had failed to provide Lyndon Johnson with all the options
open to him on issues such as the war in Vietnam. Once Nixon had read
the Memo and had made his decisions they would be reproduced in what
was known as a NSDM (National Security Decision Memoranda). For
both men, this system had the added advantage that it made sure the
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decision making process was more secret, was kept out of the public eye
and was less open to scrutiny. It was in this climate, for example, that the
secret bombing of Cambodia was begun.43
On February 5, 1969, Nixon began to request NSSMs on China.
NSSM 14 dealt with China policy in general.44 The key option proposed
was the idea of "Two Chinas", which according to journalist Tad Szulc in
his monumental study of Nixon's foreign policy The Illusion of Peace, was
couched in general terms of preserving relations with Taiwan whilst
simultaneously developing relations with the PRC.45 On March 28, the
President and his National Security Adviser requested a second NSSM
dealing specifically with trade with Communist China.46 On May 15, the
NSC Senior Review Group met to discuss trade with Communist China
and it was agreed to begin to relax the embargo.47 It was also agreed
that this relaxation would take place in a series of incremental steps in
much the same way that men like Thomson and Barnett had been
arguing for over a number of years.48 The steps were agreed with the
assistance of Elliot Richardson who was Undersecretary of State.49 The
first steps were announced on July 21, and included ending the travel ban
to the mainland and allowed all subsequent tourists to buy up to one
hundred dollars worth of goods and bring them back to the United
States.50
As well as these early formal steps, Nixon began to signal to the
Chinese through a number of intermediaries that he was seeking to
change policy. In March 1969, the subject was raised in a meeting
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between the President and the French President, Charles De Gaulle.
Nixon asked the French to relay a message to the Chinese via the new
French Ambassador to Beijing, Etienne Manac'h, that he wanted a
dialogue with the CCP leadership and that he was determined to
withdraw US troops from Vietnam.51 This message was relayed to the
Chinese leadership in May.52
In August, whilst on a world tour, Nixon let it be known to the Pakistani
President Yahya Khan and Romanian President Ceaucescu that he
wanted to improve relations with the PRC.53 He knew that both nations
had cordial relations with the leadership in Beijing. In Bucharest at a
formal dinner at the toast, he outlined his viewpoint very clearly using
almost identical words to that used by Zhou En-Iai three years earlier as
regards the Romanians:
Your country pursues a policy of communication and contact with
all nations. You have actively sought the reduction of international
tensions. My country shares those objectives ... As I told you today
in our meetings, we seek, normal relations with all countries
regardless of their domestic systems. We stand ready to
reciprocate the efforts of any country that seeks normal relations
with us. We are flexible about the methods by which peace is to be
sought and built. We seek value neither in the exchange of
polemic nor in false euphoria. We seek the substance of detente,
not its mere atmosphere. 54
Therefore by August 1969, Nixon had let it be known through three
separate intermediaries that he sought to improve relations with the PRC.
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Ultimately, Pakistan became the key purveyor of messages between the
two, but the President or his National Security Adviser did not know this
at this point.
The main issue that kept a rapprochement with the People's Republic
of China in the mind of the President was the growing conflict between
the Soviet Union and China that in 1969 broke out into armed conflict. 55
During the year it became increasingly clear that the Soviet Union was
planning air attacks on Chinese nuclear facilities. Moreover, in March
1969 a series of minor conflicts broke out on the Sino-Soviet border in the
disputed areas such as on an island in the Ussuri River between the
Northeast Chinese province of Heilungkiang in Manchuria and the
maritime province in the Soviet Far East.56 The battles on the island that
the Soviets called Damansky and the Chinese called Chenpao resulted in
heavy casualties. In May, the Soviets moved aircraft from Eastern
Europe to Outer Mongolia where they were within striking distance of the
Chinese nuclear facilities at Lanchow and the number of Soviet infantry
divisions on the border was increased. 57 All of this was taking place
whilst Soviet nuclear missiles were being installed near to the Manchurian
border and aimed at the Chinese. 58 These Soviet moves culminated
with approaches to the US about what its likely response to a Soviet
attack on China would be. These contacts initially involved Soviet military
attaches in Tokyo and Canberra but after little initial success on August
18, a Soviet embassy official raised the subject with a State Department
specialist on Soviet affairs. 59
Nixon and Kissinger were both aware of the growing conflict and the
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possibility of some form of war between the two erstwhile allies. For
example, the EC-121 US spy aircraft shot down by the North Koreans in
April was on a mission to monitor troop movements by both powers on
the Sino-Soviet border.60 As the situation escalated on August 14, a
NSC meeting was held to discuss the split. It was at this meeting that
Nixon expressed his view that he believed the Soviet Union to be the
more aggressive of the two powers.61 This was in marked contrast to
the thinking of the Democratic Administrations that had preceded Nixon
and the thinking of individuals such as Kennedy, Rusk and even
Kissinger. After the August 18 approach, Kissinger convened an
emergency meeting of WSAG (Washington Special Actions Group; which
had been created by Nixon to deal with emergency situations). The
meeting that took place at San Clemente involved members of the NSC
and Allen Whiting, the author of China Crosses the Yalu. Whiting
stressed the defensive nature of the Chinese leadership and also
emphasised that the Soviets were the more aggressive power. Whiting
also stated that he believed that the Soviets might launch a premeditated
strike on the Chinese nuclear facilities at any time.62 The Kale brothers
in their book on Kissinger have noted the influence of Whiting on
Kissinger's thinking. Kissinger began to view the Chinese as a traditional
nation state rather than a revolutionary one and concluded that it was
vital to create a link between Washington and Beijing. According to the
Kalbs:
To Whiting, this represented an historic opportunity. America,
appreciating China's dilemma, could reach across the Pacific in
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friendship for the first time in twenty years; and China, reeling from
the Cultural Revolution and alarmed by the Soviet border build-up,
might very well welcome the gesture. A chance for a radical
realignment of Pacific powers snapped into focus - for Kissinger,
for the very first time.63
Of a more immediate nature, Kissinger ordered a NSSM on the Sino-
Soviet split. NSSM 63 that was prepared by November emphasised the
opportunities for the US presented by the split. Furthermore, at Nixon's
behest, the US began to make it clear that wherever possible that the US
would not side with the Soviets in the conflict or support military action
against the Chinese. For example, on September 5, Elliot Richardson at
a meeting of the American Political Science Association used his speech
to state that the US did not support the Soviet position.64 Finally, Nixon
and Kissinger agreed that it was imperative that a direct approach be
made to the Chinese.65
On September 9, Walter Stoessel Jr, the US Ambassador to Poland,
was instructed by Nixon and Kissinger to seek a meeting with the
Chinese diplomatic representation.66 Stoessel was unable to make
contact until December when he had to chase down a flight of stairs after
the Chinese Charge d'Affaires Lei Yang with a message requesting
talks.67 The approach led to two meetings between Stoessel and Lei
Yang held on January 20, and February 20, 1970. At these meetings
three main issues were discussed: Taiwan, Vietnam and the possibility of
a US emissary visiting Beijing.68 It was at the second meeting that
Stoessel outlined what was Nixon's official position on the US military
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presence on Taiwan: "It is my Government's intention to reduce those
military facilities which we now have on Taiwan as tensions in the area
diminish".69 In other words, a link was created between a settlement of
the war in Vietnam and the US military presence on Taiwan. It built on
the concepts announced in the Nixon Doctrine of August 1969 that
emphasised that the US expected its allies to provide its own defence.70
Moreover, the first indication was made to the Chinese that the Nixon
Administration was more flexible on the issue of Taiwan than its
predecessors.
This new US position was bolstered by other US actions. On October
10, 1969, Kissinger told the Pakistani Air Marshal Sher Ali Khan that the
US was going to remove two permanently stationed US destroyers from
the Taiwan Straits. When Kissinger made a report to the President about
this move, Nixon wrote at the bottom of the report: "K(issinger) - also
open trade possibilities·_71 In November, the US, in an agreement with
the Japanese Government, returned Okinawa to Japanese
sovereignty.72 On December 19, the US announced another package of
measures that would improve trading relations between the US and PRC
including lifting the ceiling on the value of Chinese goods that Americans
could bring into the United States.73 It was about this time according to
Kissinger's memoirs that the Chinese signalled their willingness for
negotiation and their preference for the use of Pakistan over Romania as
an intermediary.74
These early talks would be cut off by the Chinese in May 1970 in
protest at the US invasion of Cambodia but by then it was clear that a
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process of dialogue had been established and contact was able to be re-
established later in 1970.75
(iv) 1969: External Factors.
The attempts by the Nixon Administration to seek a new relationship with
the People's Republic of China were affected by other foreign policy
considerations.
The first of these was the Sino-Soviet split and the affect that began to
have on the attitude of the Chinese leadership in Beijing. In 1966, China
launched its Cultural Revolution. Chinese society was turned upside
down as Mao Zedong encouraged his shock troops known as the Red
Guards to break up society and attack the CCP itself.76 As well as the
enormous human costs, the Revolution led to a breakdown in China's
foreign relations as even former allies were appalled at the actions of the
Chinese.77 By 1968, it seemed that the Soviets were moving towards as
attack on China. In August, they launched an assault on Czechoslovakia
to break up the regime of Alexander Dubcek who sought to build a
different type of communist society.78 The invasion grew out of the
Brezhnev Doctrine enunciated by the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in
May 1968. The Doctrine declared that the Soviets had the right to
intervene, militarily if necessary, in the affairs of other communist
states.79 Not surprisingly, the Chinese quickly understood that this
Doctrine had potentially serious consequences for themselves. Evidence
emerging from Chinese archival documents demonstrates that the
leadership in Beijing were deeply affected by the invasion and feared that
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the Soviets were becoming more aggressive and expansionist. 80
To meet this growing threat, the Chinese leadership began to think of
improving relations with the US. As pro-Communist Chinese writer
Arnold Xiangze Jiang has written:
Soviet hegemon ism became the most dangerous threat to China's
security and to world peace. To resist this hostile expansionism, it
was necessary to enlist all available forces, including the United
States.81
In November 1968, after Nixon's election and aware of his more
moderate stance, the Chinese quickly agreed to reopen their
ambassadorial talks with the US. later the Chinese cancelled these
meetings but they were indicative of a new desire to seek an
improvement in relations with China's former archenemy.82 Moreover, in
January 1969, Mao Zedong instructed the People's Daily to publish
Nixon's inaugural address where he announced that the US would seek
to improve relations with all countries.83 Most spectacular of all, Marshal
Chen Vi, a former foreign minister, wrote a report for Mao setting out the
rationale for an improvement in Sino-American relations and suggesting
that the Chinese should encourage a high-level emissary to visit Beijing
on behalf of the new Administration. 84 Furthermore, Chen Yi
recommended that the Chinese should soften their stance on Taiwan
stating that it could be an issue for discussion rather than a precondition
to any substantive talks.85 This was the approach adopted by the
Chinese in the talks held in early 1970. There can be little doubt that the
increasing tension between the Soviet Union and the PRC increased the
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desire of the Chinese leadership to seek to improve relations with the
United States.
The bloody and seemingly intractable conflict in Vietnam also
undoubtedly influenced policy towards the People's Republic of China
and elsewhere by the Administration. Nixon knew when taking office that
his key task was to try to end the US involvement. He took office still
hoping to maintain South Vietnam as a non-communist state separate
from the North. He saw this as essential to maintaining US credibility in
other arenas as well as pleasing his conservative constituency at
home.86 During the election campaign, Nixon claimed that he had a
secret plan to end the war whilst avoiding explaining what it was.87 Once
in office he developed a multi-pronged strategy that he hoped would
simultaneously meet the key US objective of protecting South Vietnam
whilst allowing the US to withdraw its troops which he saw as the crux of
the problem.88
This strategy had five elements. First, a threat and escalation strategy
to try to convince the North Vietnamese that the US was prepared to risk
war to meet its objectives. Part of this element was the bombing of
Cambodia and specific threats made to the North Vietnamese. Second,
was an attempt to use improved relations with the Soviets and Chinese
as a means of exerting pressure on the North Vietnamese to make
concessions. Third, was a programme of reducing the number of US
troops in Vietnam so that by 1972 and the presidential election there
would be no US ground troops involved. To cover the loss occasioned by
this process the Administration termed ·Vietnamization" the US increased
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its concentration on the use of air power against North Vietnam. The
fourth element was altering the situation on the ground in South Vietnam.
This included forcing the South Vietnamese leader Thieu to begin to
introduce land reform as well as initiating the Phoenix Program which was
an attempt to destroy the Vietcong in the South by a programme of
assassination. The final element was to ensure that the US public
supported its policies. This included the ending of conscripts going to
Vietnam from the US and a far more aggressive stance towards
opponents of the war. With this wide ranging strategy Nixon hoped to
maintain South Vietnam as a US ally as well as ensuring that his re-
election chances in 1972 were not harmed by the war.89
Elements of this strategy directly affected Nixon's policy towards
China. The reduction of US troops in Asia would help improve relations
with the Chinese and the possibility that the Chinese might use their
influence on the North Vietnamese or at least not oppose the US
attacking the North Vietnamese increased Nixon's desire to seek a better
relationship with the PRe. In short, Nixon saw the Chinese as helping to
provide a solution to the Vietnam war in a way alien to his predecessors
who had seen the CCP as part of the problem that had led to the need for
a US intervention. On the domestic front, the change in rhetoric about
the Communist Chinese would act as a cover to convince the American
public that the US could withdraw troops from Indochina without any
major consequences for the overall pursuit its strategic interests.
A new policy towards the PRC helped Nixon and Kissinger adopt a
new approach to its allies in Western Europe and especially Japan. By
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1969, it was becoming clear that Japan was emerging as an economic
competitor to the United States at the same time that the strains of the
war in Vietnam and other American Cold War commitments were
beginning to have an adverse affect on the US economy. In particular,
inflationary pressures were growing and the dollar, which anchored the
Bretton Woods global economic system, was coming under increasing
pressure. These new pressures, in the view of Nixon and his advisers,
required the Japanese and the Western Europeans to take on greater
responsibility in ensuring the stability of the international capitalist
system.90 Regarding Japan, Nixon also had domestic political
considerations to take into account. During 1968, as part of his so-called
"Southern Strategy", (Nixon's attempt to win the conservative south for
the Republican Party), he had promised the cotton producers in South
Carolina and elsewhere that he would do something about the cheap
Japanese textile products flooding the American market.91 When the
Japanese Government made it clear that it was unwilling or unable to
force its cotton companies to stop targeting the US market, Nixon
became extremely angry.92 Later, when he developed the opening to
China, the Japanese were kept firmly in the dark and in August 1971, he
announced the so-called "Nixon Shocks" where he ended the automatic
convertibility of gold into dollars and a change in the exchange rate value
of the dollar. Again these announcements took place without the
Japanese being informed.93
The strains that began to develop in the relationship between the US
and its cold war allies convinced Nixon and Kissinger that the world was
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becoming multi-polar instead of bi-polar between the US and the Soviet
Union. These opinions found legitimacy in a speech given by Nixon in
Kansas on July 6,1971 just as Kissinger was arriving in Beijing.94 Once
again, this development reinforced the President's belief in the
possibilities presented by an opening to China. In short, international
factors now converged to reinforce Nixon's inclinations and the evolving
domestic consensus that made an opening almost inevitable.
(v) 1969: The Evolving Consensus.
As we" as these external factors, the domestic environment in 1969 was
conducive to the moves that Nixon was making. By early 1969, the
National Committee on US-China Relations was in full swing and on
March 20 and 21 they held a National Convocation in New York to
discuss the state of Sino-American relations.95 Amongst those who
attended were Senators Edward Kennedy and Jacob Javits, Reischauer,
Barnett, Whiting, Fairbank, Halperin, Chester Cooper, James Thomson
and Alexander Eckstein.96 The event was partly funded by the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Ford Foundation.97 In total about two
thousand attended the event.98 The Chairman of the Convocation Edwin
Reischauer and the new Chairman of the Committee A. Doak Barnett had
hoped to get the new Secretary of State to attend the event. They
believed that it would provide an opportunity for the new Administration to
make an early indication of its approach towards policy towards Asia.
Despite a formal approach in January by the Committee, Nixon and
Kissinger declined to send a government speaker.99 The vast majority of
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speakers supported the view that a moderate opening to China should
take place.l 00 In fact, that view was now so prevalent that a concerned
Fairbank and Thomson sent a letter to Barnett requesting a greater
diversity of oplnlons.l 01 Fairbank had reached the view that the
academic China watchers had become "too homogenized".1 02 Barnett
refused on the grounds that he asserted left wing academics in particular
had nothing constructive to add.1 03 The most important features of the
convocation were the speeches by the two senators, especially that of
Edward Kennedy, who was seen by many as the most likely Democratic
candidate for the Presidency in 1972.104
Javits, a Senator from New York, who was a close ally of Nelson
Rockefeller and a specialist in international monetary policy, addressed
the damage done by the McCarthy years to the academic profession:
The Nixon Administration has a great opportunity to bury the
lingering pall of McCarthyism that continues subtly to inhibit
thought and debate in this country concerning China. The United
States paid a heavy price during the McCarthy period in the
destruction of many of our most perceptive China experts. It was
not only a period of grave damage to our national stock of
intellectual resources and experience, which has seriously affected
the clarity and accuracy of our perception of events in Asia.1 05
Javits also predicted that the Sino-Soviet split would give the US the
opportunity to gain leverage with both nations and to help find a solution
to the imbroglio in Vietnam.1 06
However, it was Edward Kennedy's wide-ranging speech that
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signalled the final shift of opinion over China policy. Kennedy began by
addressing the issue of Chinese isolation from the world community and
the US policy that helped maintain it. "However valid that policy may
have seemed for the cold war of the 1950s, it is demonstrably false in the
1960s, and must not be carried into the 1970s·.1 07 He then went onto
argue that the PRC must be brought into the world community as a
matter of urgency.108 He then considered the original decisions that
led to the hostile relationship between the two. He was careful to blame
the climate of the times but it was clear that he was criticising the
decisions nevertheless. For example, he was critical of the decision by
President Truman to place the 7th fleet in the Taiwan Straits. 109 More
intriguing was his reflections on the war in Korea:
With hindsight, most experts agree that China's action in Korea
was an essentially defensive response, launched to prevent the
establishment of a hostile government on its border. At the time,
however, the issue was far less clear.l l 0
This statement clearly illustrates the importance of Allen Whiting's book
China Crosses the Yalu and how it had now begun to affect the debate
over China policy. Later in the speech, Kennedy returned to the issue of
Chinese actions describing them as "extremely cautious" and portraying
actions such as the war with India in 1962 as a ·carefully limited
engagement" .111 Kennedy then compared this caution to the military
containment of the PRe by the US and emphasised the effect of this
policy on the Chinese.112 Kennedy's views indicated that major
figures within the US now accepted that the US Administration's of the
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1950s and 1960s bore some responsibility for the poor relationship with
the PRe. In 1963, it would have been unheard of to suggest that the US
was answerable for Chinese hostility towards it. In 1966, there were hints
of such a view but by 1969 it was being expressing by serious politicians
with presidential aspirations. This shift was partly due to the debilitating
affects of the war in Vietnam but also reflected the evolving consensus
that took place on US China policy during the 1960s that reached its
apogee in 1969.
Kennedy next considered other more orthodox tenets of US thinking
on China. He mocked the idea of Jiang and the Nationalists being
considered the government of the Chinese mainland as "palpably absurd
... It is as though the island of Cuba were to claim sovereignty over the
entire continent of North America" .113 He also categorically rejected any
suggestion that the CCP were in any danger of losing power or Jiang of
returning to power on the mainland.114 He then addressed the
argument that the Chinese government was repressive condemning any
repression but pointing out that the US recognised other governments
that were repressive including the Chinese Nationalists.115 More
specifically, he argued that the US failed to understand the reasons for
the Chinese Revolution:
We have ignored the historical conditions that evoked it and the
social and economic gains it produced. We have ignored the fact
that the Nationalists also engaged in repressive measures and
deprivations of freedom, not only during their tenure on the
mainland but also on Taiwan.116
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This viewpoint that the Chinese Revolution might have brought benefits to
the mainland was rare within America, even amongst intellectual opinion,
and only even then readily expressed by elements of the New Left that
peopled organisations such as the CCAS (Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholars).117 He concluded his general analysis by emphasising
that the Sino-Soviet split created an opportunity for both the United States
and the People's Republic of China to seek a better relationship with each
other.118 He stated that he believed a more tempered US position would
bolster the influence of the moderate elements within the Chinese
leadership.119
He then set out his alternative policies towards the PRC. These
included accepting the existence of the PRC and opening a US consular
office, a relaxation of trade and travel restrictions; a resumption of the
Warsaw talks and an invitation to discuss arms control.120 However,
Kennedy's most innovative thinking was on the issue of Taiwan. He
stated that he believed that the US should retain diplomatic relations with
the Nationalists and guarantee them from a military attack.121 Having
said that, he then went on to argue that the issue of Taiwan was up for
negotiation given that "our own government regards the status of the
island as undefined, even though we maintain diplomatic relations with
the Nationalists" .122 Kennedy's preferred solution was a negotiated
settlement between the CCP and the Nationalists facilitated by the United
States:
To help elicit Peking's interest in negotiations, we should withdraw
our token American military presence from Taiwan. This
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demilitarization of Taiwan could take place at no cost to our treaty
commitments or security of the island. Yet it would help to make
clear to Peking our desire for the Communists, the Nationalists,
and the Taiwanese to reach a negotiated solution on the status of
the island.123
On the issue of the United Nations, Kennedy called for the PRC to be
allowed to enter both the Security Council and General Assembly but also
foresaw some form of continued representation for the government on
Taiwan although even that he suggested could be open to
negotiation.124
Concluding his speech, Kennedy laid out his own commitment to a
drastic change of policy:
We will have to be patient, Peking's initial reaction to serious
initiatives on our part will probably be a blunt refusal. But, by laying
the groundwork now for an improved relationship in the 1970s and
beyond, we will be offering the present and future leaders in Peking
a clear and attractive alternative to the existing impasse in our
relations.125
This speech, like Hilsman's in December 1963, represented a decisive
turning point in US policy towards the People's Republic of China. The
fear of speaking out on this issue had now evaporated and it is
fascinating to watch the development of views during the course of the
1960s. By 1969, the one issue that even three years earlier men like
Thomson and Barnett had been unprepared to address - Taiwan - was
now firmly on the agenda. For example, later in the Convocation as a
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discussion took place amongst the participants about the future direction
of policy. John Kennedy's former Speechwriter Theodore Sorenson,
posed the following question to the arch conservative William Rusher,
who was one of the few participants prepared to support the existing
policy: "In his closing remark he stated that the United States should not
embrace the tottering regime of an ageing megalomaniac. Did he have in
mind Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Tse-tung?"126
Another characteristic about Kennedy's speech is that it debunks the
myth that only a conservative figure like Richard Nixon could open
dialogue and change policy towards the People's Republic of China.127
By 1969, major political figures throughout the political spectrum were
prepared to call for and support change in the policy. In tact, it can be
argued that whoever had been elected to the White House in 1968 would
have taced almost irresistible pressures to change policy. These
pressures included the international dynamics outlined earlier as well as a
growing domestic consensus that was now firmly in the majority. Nixon's
ability lay in identifying this groundswell and making use of it for his own
purposes.
A third aspect is that all of this shows that domestic determinants were
crucial in giving Nixon the ability to make the changes that he sought.
The President knew that with Edward Kennedy calling for a wide ranging
change in policy he was unlikely to be outflanked or attacked by his most
dangerous political opponents when he did announce a change in policy.
A final point concerns the importance of individual speeches in the
development of policy towards China. The development of the language
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used in the speeches reflects the tortuous road taken by the US in the
post-war era in policy towards the People's Republic of China. The
evolving consensus can be traced through the words of Dulles in 1957,
Hilsman in 1963 through to Kennedy in 1969. It can be argued that
Kennedy's speech, as much as Richard Nixon's election to the
Presidency indicated that by 1969 the policy of total isolation of the
People's Republic of China was doomed.
Reaction to the speech was almost universally positive. James
Thomson immediately endorsed his proposals and praised Kennedy's
"inventiveness" .128 The Far Eastern Economic Review was amongst the
press that endorsed the Senator's ideas.129 Of the participants at the
Convocation only George Taylor condemned what he had said calling the
speech "highly irresponsible and uninformed" .130
From that point on the majority of China academics were quite open in
their support for wide ranging changes in policy. The inhibition of early
years had now dissipated. For example, in the summer of 1971 the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee held further hearings on US policy
towards the PRC.131 The views expressed by the witnesses, many of
whom had testified in the earlier hearings, was noticeably more radical
that those expressed in March 1966. Allen Whiting described by
Fulbright as "our chief Chinawatcher" called for the PRe to be the sole
representative of China in the United Nations.132 James Thomson went
further and argued the case for throwing the Nationalists or allowing them
to be thrown out.133 He went on in his testimony to state that a policy of
"Two Chinas" was unworkable due to the fact that neither side accepted
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it. The priority regarding the UN was seating the PRC and "that will
probably require Taiwan's ouster".134 Thomson then went on to attack
the policy of containment in the sixties:
I am dismissing containment as of no consequence. Not only as of
no consequence, but as ill-advised, counterproductive, pushing
Chinese into a sense of threat, a sense of fear ... pushing all
parties away from the vital learning processes. And here I would
really stress emphatically that we have a lot to learn from the
Chinese, as they do from us. There are some extraordinary
experiments taking place there, on terms of how a society is
organized, as well as breakthroughs in science, technology and the
like.135
These statements show the extent to which the ground had shifted and is
indicative of the influence of the thinking of the New Left on elements of
the policy establishment. The gut anti-communism of an earlier
generation was being replaced with an interest in the operation of
communist societies. Moreover, these views illustrate the debilitating
affect the war in Vietnam had on many Americans, calling into question
their belief in the motives of US foreign policy in the post-war era.
The China academics also retained some contact with the government
during the years of the Nixon Administration despite his reputation as a
conservative. After Kissinger's appointment he had a discussion with A.
Doak Barnett at the Council on Foreign Relations and asked for the
names of five specialists who could advise the new President on the
issues surrounding US policy towards East Asia.136 Kissinger also
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suggested that Barnett in conjunction with others prepare a five or six
page memorandum on what they considered the most pressing issues
facing the new Administration in their relations with East Asia.137
Barnett wrote back recommending himself, Reischauer, Eckstein,
Chalmers Johnson (who was the Director of the Center for Chinese'
Studies at the University of California at Berkeley) and George Packard
(who had worked in the Japanese Embassy under Reischauer but was
now working as the Washington Correspondent of the Philadelphia
Bulletin).138 Barnett promised to produce the suggested Memo but in
the meantime sent Kissinger a copy of a briefing paper that he and a
number of other academics had prepared for Hubert Humphrey.139
The paper was written by amongst others Fairbank, Reischauer and
Pye as well as Barnett. It included the usual policy recommendations on
China policy such as relaxing trade and travel restrictions, involving the
PRC in arms control negotiations and moving towards a policy of "Two
Chinas" in the United Nations.140 A more interesting development was
that the academics recommended sending a high level diplomatic
emissary to Beijing to negotiate with the Chinese leadership.141 Another
fascinating aspect of the paper was its emphasis on the economic
development of Southeast Asia. It argued that if China was brought into
the international political community then it could be expected to playa
peaceful regional role.142 By the late 1960s, it was becoming clear that
Japan was beginning to recover economically and was starting to playa
role in promoting economic development in the countries of Southeast
Asia. This was the role that men like Dean Acheson had foreseen for
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them a generation earlier and was welcomed by the United States.143
On the war in Vietnam, the academics recommended "a negotiated
political settlement of that conflicf .144
Henry Kissinger set up a meeting between a group of five specialists
and the President for April 24, 1969.145 The five specialists chosen were
Barnett, Reischauer, Pye, Henry Rosovsky, (an economist based at
Harvard whose specialism was China) and George Taylor, who Kissinger
described in the memo of introduction to Nixon as: "Generally regarded
as a responsible exponent of modern conservatism in U.S. China
policy".146 In the letters of introduction to the academics, all of whom
were addressed by their first names except Taylor who was addressed as
Professor Taylor, Kissinger noted that: "I hope that we will get into far-
reaching discussions of Vietnam and Japan as well as of China
policy".147 After the meeting, Barnett wrote to the President to express
his appreciation:
As I said during the course of our discussion, I believe not only that
the problem of working towards a new relationship with China is of
the greatest importance in any long run view of our national policy
problems, but that your administration has an unusual opportunity
to take new initiatives, particularly now in the trade field, moving in
that direction, which I believe would obtain wide American and
international support and might begin to lay the groundwork for
actual changes in U.S.-China relations in the future.148
At the very least, this meeting shows that Nixon was aware of the
academic thinking on China policy and the initiatives that they argued
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were necessary to move it forward. Therefore, it is not unsurprising that
many were eventually introduced.
After the April meeting there was little direct contact between the
Administration and these academics. In August 1969, Whiting was
involved in discussions about the Sino-Soviet split but from that date
onwards Nixon and Kissinger decided to cut out all external influences on
their China policy. This was partly because they considered that for the
new policy to work it should be secret but also, both hoped to maximise
the personal credit that they believed would be available to those who
were seen as being responsible for the opening to China.149 In August
1971, a Republican Congressman from California John Rousselot wrote
asking the Administration whether or not the China opening had been
influenced by academics like Fairbank, Thomson, Reischauer and
Barnett. Clark MacGregor, who was the Presidential Counsel for
Congressional Relations replied saying that: "I think your question can be
answered unequivocally in the negative".150 This as we have seen was
wholly untrue. It is not to deny Nixon's and Kissinger's contribution to
note that they were building on a domestic environment that others had
built and that the China opening would have taken place in the early
1970s whoever had succeeded Lyndon Johnson in the White House.
(vi) The Grand Opening.
By 1970, Nixon was beginning to believe that he needed an opening to
China to sustain his re-election bid. His poll ratings were falling; the
midterm election results were poor and the war in Vietnam was not
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coming to a speedy end as he had hoped. Furthermore, an opening to
China would put pressure on the Soviets to improve relations with the US
and might isolate the North Vietnamese from their neighbours and one of
their key allies.151
In June 1970, Lt General Waiters was ordered to approach a Chinese
official in Paris with a view to opening a direct channel of communication
between Beijing and Washington. Walters tried twice but without
success.152 Later in October, with the US leading the celebrations of the
United Nations twenty-fifth anniversary, Nixon sent messages to the
Chinese via the Pakistanis and Romanians. On October 25, he asked
Yahya Khan to relay to the leadership in Beijing the Administration's
continued commitment to an improvement in Sino-American relations.153
It was at this meeting, according to a member of Khan's Cabinet, that
Nixon made it clear that Taiwan was expendable.154 A day later Nixon
repeated the message to the Romanians.155 It was clear that as Nixon's
desire for an opening increased any remaining commitment he might
have for the Nationalists evaporated. He also seemed to revel in the
subterfuge and subtlety of the messages being transmitted.
A few weeks later Khan flew to Beijing where the message was
relayed.156 The Chinese leadership was now happy to take the initiative
aware, of the shift that had taken place by the US over Taiwan. On
October 1, 1970, veteran American writer Edgar Snow was invited to join
Mao in the celebration's of China's national day.157 On November 5,
Snow met with Zhou who informed him that he wanted the US to begin to
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withdraw its troops from Taiwan.158
On December 18, Snow held a long meeting with Mao. Mao informed
him that he believed Nixon would visit China some time in 1972 and that
amongst the issues to be discussed would be Taiwan. Mao also
suggested to Snow that other American politicians might be invited to
China as wel1.159 These comments were clearly aimed at accelerating
the thaw in relations and showed an understanding by Mao of Nixon's
domestic political considerations.
The Chinese responded directly via the Pakistanis to the messages
from the President. On December 8, a message came from Zhou: Min
order to discuss the subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called
Taiwan, a special envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in
Peking".160 Eight days later, after discussions with the President,
Kissinger sent a reply again via Pakistan agreeing to come to Beijing but
saying that:
the meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan
question but would encompass other steps designed to improve
relations and reduce tensions. With respect to US military
presence on Taiwan, however, the policy of the United States
Government is to reduce its military presence in the region of East
Asia and the Pacific as tensions in this region diminish.161
The Chinese further took the initiative when on April 6, 1971 they invited
the US national table tennis team to tour the PRC.162 In response on
April 14, Nixon announced a package of measures aimed at easing trade
and travel restrictions.163 For the first time the US treated China and the
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Soviets equally in trading terms. On April27, another message arrived
from the Chinese inviting an American emissary to Beijing.164 A day
later it was agreed that Henry Kissinger would be the emissary.16S
Kissinger flew in total secrecy from Pakistan into the PRC on July 8,
1971.166 There he held a series of meetings with Zhou. On the issue of
Taiwan, Zhou made it clear that the sovereignty of the island was a
matter for the Chinese themselves to sort out. It was not an international
matter but a territorial one.167 On the subject of the United Nations a
secret agreement was reached. The US would publicly defend the
position of the Nationalists whilst supporting the entry of the PRC: in
effect, a policy of "Two chinas". Privately, the US would stand aside and
allow the Nationalists to be thrown out.168 Regarding Vietnam, the
Chinese told Kissinger that they wanted a total US military withdrawal
from Indochina but did not make it a precondition to Nixon's visit.169
Other subjects that were discussed included the Soviet Union, Nixon's
multi-polar world vision, and the future US role in ASia.170 Nixon was
formally invited to visit China and it was agreed that all future discussions
between the two parties would take place directly without
intermediaries.171 An exhausted but exhilarated Kissinger left Beijing on
July 11 and returned to the US two days later where he flew directly to
San Clemente to brief the President.172 On July 15, Nixon in a televised
address to the nation announced the opening and his intention to visit
China.173
Kissinger flew to China for a second visit in October where the
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wording of the Shanghai Communique was worked out. The two sides
agreed that on each issue they would put forward their individual views
rather than try to come up with some agreed wording.174 This visit took
place just as the issue of who would represent China in the United
Nations came to a boil. In a tense vote on October 26, the UN agreed to
seat the PRC and expel the Nationalists.175 By the end of 1971 all of the
outlines of the Nixon visit was in place.
On February 17, 1972 Nixon flew from Washington to Beijing for a
summit that formally brought to an end the years of isolation between the
US and the Chinese. Most of the subsequent events were televised live
on American television as Nixon maximised the circumstances to push
his image as a statesman and ensure his re-election.176 Nixon met Mao
who told him that: "I like rightists" and images of the President and his
wife visiting the Great Wall of China were shown around the world .177
As well as the publicity, a number of agreements were reached
between the two on issues such as trade, science and the exchange of
technology.178 The US agreed, within the Shanghai Communique, to
accept the five principles that the Chinese liked to include in their
agreements with all countries.179 The rest of the Communique was
sorted out with relative ease.180 The key bone of contention was exactly
what would be said about Taiwan. As Nixon recalled in his memoirs:
We knew that if the Chinese made a strongly belligerent claim to
Taiwan in the communique, I would come under murderous
crossfire from any or all of the various pro-Taiwan, anti-Nixon, and
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anti-PRC and interest groups at home.181
The Chinese contented themselves with an unequivocal statement on the
island stating that "the People's Republic of China is the sole legal
government of China" meaning that they viewed themselves as the
rightful rulers of Taiwan.182 The American section on the Communique
that covered Taiwan was masterful in its ambiguity but showed that the
US was now more flexible on the issue:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of
the Taiwan strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan
is but part of China. The United States does not challenge that
position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the
Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in
mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US
forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it
will progressively reduce its forces as the tension in the area
diminishes.183
This statement sufficed to keep the Chinese happy whilst not appearing
to cave in on an issue that Nixon considered sensitive to many of his
strongest supporters. Secretary of State William Rogers was said to be
unhappy with the wording and Nixon's archconservative speechwriter
Patrick Buchanan threatened to resign but beyond that, most people
accepted without question the new position.184
On February 27, Nixon toasted the Chinese leadership saying: "This
was the week that changed the world" and two days later Nixon and his
entourage returned to Washington to a triumphant welcome.185 The visit
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had been a public relations triumph and Nixon was able to use it as the
basis for launching his re-election campaign that culminated in November
with him winning one of the largest victories in American presidential
history. Moreover on Vietnam and the USSR the visit to Beijing gave the
Administration greater leverage to exact concessions which led ultimately
to the SALT agreement and to an ending of the Vietnam war in January
1973 that in the short term guaranteed the independence of South
Vietnam.186 It also played to Nixon's idea of himself as a great
statesman making a unique contribution to history. For the Chinese, they
managed to weaken dramatically the relationship between the
Nationalists and its main patron. Also, they reduced the US presence in
Asia whilst removing any American threat to the PRC itself.187
(vii) Conclusions.
Historians and other commentators have generally praised the opening to
China and the role-played in it by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.
Walter Isaacson in his biography of Kissinger has written that:
the creation of a strategic tie to communist China was probably the
most significant and prudent American foreign policy initiative since
the launching of the Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO.188
Nixon, not too surprisingly, is also fulsome in his praise for the initiative
and his role in it:
The biggest success, historically, and Clare Luce is my witness on
this, was China. Clare said, "You know, in history books a hundred
years from now, a thousand years from now, there will be one line
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on your administration - "He went to China".189
This view is rose tinted and ignores the magnitude and significance of the
Watergate scandal. Nevertheless, the importance of the opening to
China can and should not be downplayed. It ended a policy of total
isolation towards the PRC that was clearly no longer serving American
interests. It gave shape to the ideas of triangular diplomacy that both
Nixon and Kissinger and indeed many other American academics and
politicians believed in. It incorporated the PRC into an American led
world system and marginalised the influence of the Soviet Union in the
region. Finally, it led to the development of trading relations between the
two erstwhile enemies.190
The Chinese also benefited from their new relationship with the US.
The alliance further isolated the Chinese Nationalist regime on Taiwan
from the international community. It greatly reduced the possibility of a
Soviet attack. There was also a reduction in the amount of US troops
stationed in the region.191 For example, at the height of the Vietnam
War the US had had ten thousand troops stationed on Taiwan. By 1977,
when Nixon's successor Gerald Ford left office, that figure had been
reduced to a thousand.192 In light of all of this it is therefore not
surprising that both sides saw the mutual benefits of reconciliation.
Nevertheless, the visit of Richard Nixon to the People's Republic of
China in February 1972 represented not only the culmination of the
policies that he had adopted since taking office in January 1969 but also
represented the culmination of a long process of changing domestic
circumstances around China policy.
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That is not to denigrate Nixon's personal contribution. Unlike his
predecessor he believed that policy should be changed and that changing
it was a priority. Moreover, he saw the Chinese representing part of the
solution to the war in Vietnam rather than part of the problem. Nixon was
patient in his pursuit of an opening to China and put his formidable
knowledge of international affairs to good use to try to build a new world
system. He believed this would serve the interests of the United States
in the more complex world of the late 1960s and early 1970s. That being
said many of these policies were devoid of moral factors. The Nixon
Administration's record on issues like the fall of Allende in Chile, the "tilt"
towards Pakistan in 1971 during the India-Pakistan war and the bombing
campaigns in Indochina are all stains on the overall record of the
Administration.193
The key factor to note is that Nixon merely carried out a policy change
towards the PRC that by 1969 had overwhelming support from the
political elite and general support from the US public who were now ready
to accept the existence of the CCP. The opening included risks from
domestic political opponents but not the risks that one might at first
glance foresee. The opening to China was not the achievement of Nixon
alone, even less so that of Henry Kissinger. It also belonged to the
substantial group of academics and government officials who throughout
the 1960s had challenged the prevailing ethos and had set an agenda
that by 1969 swept away a policy that was clearly not based on reality.
The shifts in international affairs played a significant role. The growing
Sino-Soviet split; the need for the US to extricate itself from the costly war
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in Indochina and the growing independence of former US allies in
Western Europe and Japan all necessitated a change of approach from
the US. Most importantly of all the Chinese themselves were more ready
than any time since 1945 to come to terms with the United States
primarily due to the threat emanating from the Soviet Union. Any new
approach from any President in the early 1970s, it could be suggested,
would have included coming to terms with the PRC as an independent
entity with a legitimate worldview.
Finally, it is worth noting again the continued evolving consensus that
continued to grow over China policy in 1969. Men like Thomson,
Reischauer, Fairbank and Barnett continued to push for change. They
did have connections with the Nixon Administration and undoubtedly
influenced it. Also their public stance continued to create an environment
in which Nixon's new policy would be welcomed. It is also worth
mentioning the role of Edward Kennedy who in March 1969 made a wide-
ranging speech on China policy that indicated that the policies of the
1960s had no credibility left in the Democratic Party. If Nixon had not
sought an opening to China then it is probable that the Democratic
candidate for the White House in 1972 would have used his timidity on
China policy against him.
In short, the grand opening to China had many authors of which Nixon
was only one.
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CONCLUSION:
The purpose of this thesis has been to identify the process that
allowed policy towards the People's Republic of China to be changed so
dramatically. China policy was chosen because of the controversy that
overshadowed it and the major shift that was required to move between
the policy of total isolation pursued in the fifties, and to a lesser extent in
the sixties, and the rapprochement adopted under the Nixon
Administration. Many of the pressures outlined contributed to US policy
towards other countries in this period and before and after. But in few
areas and periods does the controversy exist that shadowed US China
policy between 1949 and 1972.
To understand the influences on policy requires an understanding of
what the policy actually was and how it adapted under time and what
forces and influences forced it to change. This thesis has argued that, in
practice, the policy was always more fluid than traditional viewpoints have
allowed for. Truman and Acheson did not expect to isolate totally the
new CCP regime for a generation. Eisenhower and Dulles occasionally
gave consideration to adopting a more conciliatory stance. Of more
significance, Kennedy was far more flexible in his approach towards
China and in 1963, before his death, began to create a climate within the
government that might allow him to change policy should the
circumstances permit it. Kennedy's successor Lyndon Johnson was less
flexible and by 1966 when he too began to consider changing China
policy his administration had become bogged down in Vietnam. It was
therefore left to Richard Nixon to bring to fruition the changes that by
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1969 were being widely advocated.
Among the starkest influences on policy that we have identified is
public opinion and academics. The single factor that made John F.
Kennedy decide not to pursue any dramatic changes towards China
policy was his understanding of the hostility of the general public to the
PRC. However, during the course of the 1960s that hostility began to
wane as the war in Vietnam sapped the morale of the United States and
the old nostrums of the China Lobby had less and less credibility.
Leonard Kusnitz in his book Public Opinion and Foreign Policy concludes
that public opinion was the single most important factor that influenced
China policy.l This thesis accepts his point but it argues that public
opinion is one factor that interacts with other elements that produce the
final policy. That is not to downplay it but other factors help push policy
and public opinion as we have seen. The speeches given by men like
Hilsman in 1963 and Edward Kennedy in 1969 do not just test the public
mood but also influence it.
It is therefore vital to identify these other factors. Much has been
made in this thesis of the role of academics. The majority of academics
working on China did not believe in or accept the policy of total isolation.
Instead they hoped to bring about a gradual change and reconciliation
between the country of their birth and the one of their studies. In the
1950s they were cowed into silence by the McCarthyite purges.
However, in the 1960s they were able to use their influence to affect
policy. This was done in a number of ways. Firstly, by the interaction
between US universities and the government. It has been traditional for
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academics and their students to work in the US government in
departments like State and Defense. They bring with them their
knowledge and expertise and their political background. Thus James
Thomson was a postgraduate student at Harvard, where he studied
under Edwin Reischauer and John King Fairbank. This thesis shows the
fundamental influence that Thomson had on the China policy of the early
1960s especially the Hilsman speech of December 1963. Also,
Reischauer spent over five years between 1961 and 1966 as US
Ambassador to Japan. In return, many government officers have studied
at places like Harvard where they encounter the views of the academics
based there. Finally, of course, both groups (and as we have seen they
are not autonomous) attend conferences, advise and consult one another
and keep in regular contact.
Academics also influence the public policy debate by their work. Allen
Whiting, in the 1960s both government official and academic published a
major work on the Korean War, China Crosses the Ya/u. It emphasised
and seemed to prove that the government in Beijing was one that was
cautious and had entered the Korean War because it felt threatened by
the US marching up towards the Yalu.2 The implicit assumption in
Whiting's work was that the same government could be worked with in
the sixties. It is also worth noting the effect of the public pronouncements
of the China academics, who in March 1966, went before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to lambast the China policy pursued by
Lyndon Johnson. It is certainly not accidental that the Administration then
began to reflect on policy. Academics like Fairbank did not merely reflect
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and respond to public opinion but they helped shape it thus proving the
complex process at work here.
A third factor worth noting and expounding upon is the role of ideas.
Paul Evans captures the role of the academic in expounding ideas and its
affect on policy very well in his biography of Fairbank when he writes that:
The extent of his (Fairbank's) influence on policy and public
thinking is difficult to estimate, but it has probably been no less
than that of any other academic of his generation. More important
perhaps are the lessons his career offers on, first, the most
effective role for scholars in policy discussion and, second, the
tension between political realism in international affairs and the
area specialist's penchant for cultural differences.3
These academics, especially Fairbank, had a deep-rooted belief in the
benevolence of the US and its capacity to do good in the world. They
believed that communication between the US and the countries of the
world, especially China, could lessen tension. It is not accidental that
after the opening to China, these academics through their work on the
National Committee on US-China Relations concentrated their
considerable energies on helping to foster cultural exchanges between
the Chinese mainland and the United States.4 The Liberal
Internationalists John Fairbank, Edwin Reischauer, James Thomson and
Chester Bowles believed in the power of communication, dialogue and
interaction that would lessen the hostility in international relations. If that
could be achieved in Sino-American relations, where the two nations had
been violently hostile to one another and had two very different political
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systems, than surely it could be achieved anywhere. James Thomson,
writing later, talks about this interaction and its significance thus:
a process that has brought more Americans and Asians in touch
with each other and with each other's cultures in this decade (the
1960s) than ever before. The transformations recorded in these
data, particularly the data of economic and cultural ties, may well
be of far greater long-term significance to the region and the
relationship than the more visible political and military
confrontations.5
Related to this was the question of knowledge. The more that could be
known about other societies and the more that they might know about the
US would benefit both and lessen the risk of confrontation. To men like
Fairbank, who believed this, a policy of total isolation was anathema no
matter what the political justifications for it might be. A further element is
the significance of economic and trading ties. Traditional liberal thinking
has emphasised those countries that trade with one another were less
likely to go to war. Richard Nixon, who was a more cynical figure than
men like Fairbank, clearly believed in the value of trade as cement to lock
into place the new geopolitical world order that he wanted to construct. 6
In short, certain liberal ideas influenced the thinking of men as diverse as
Chester Bowles, John King Fairbank and Richard Nixon and affected
their policy towards the People's Republic of China. At the end of the
day, a policy of total isolation jarred with these ideals and ultimately was
to be opposed and when possible reformed.
The fourth factor to be considered is the role of individual politicians.
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The approach of specific figures that have been discussed did affect the
conduct and development of policy towards the People's Republic of
China. John Kennedy's cautious flexibility allowed policy to be reflected
upon whilst his wariness of public opinion ensured that he never took the
risk of running ahead of the public mood. Lyndon Johnson's lack of
knowledge of foreign affairs and the debilitating affect of Vietnam
impeded any genuine hopes that he had of improving Sino-American
relations. Furthermore, the role of Dean Rusk was to hinder any changes
in policy those men like Thomson hoped to introduce. Rusk's
intransigence was understandable given his experience as Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Harry Truman but his
refusal to consider any change in the US support for Jiang ensured that
there would be no change on policy towards the PRC whilst he was
Secretary of State. Finally, Nixon's cynical opportunism, secretiveness,
and flexibility on China policy not only helped policy to be changed but
also affected the manner in which it was changed.
A final element is the role of Non-Governmental Organisations.7 On
one side the China Lobby and groups like The Committee of One Million
helped shape and sustain the policy of total isolation for a generation.
However, on the other side were the funds provided by organisations like
the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Council on
Foreign Relations. They provided the ballast for the growth of China
studies as an academic discipline and helped move spokesmen like A.
Doak Barnett and John Fairbank to the forefront of their discipline where
they were able to influence public opinion.
304
In conclusion what emerges is a heady brew of influences that push
and affect the development of policy. Some reinforce others and interact
with international developments to shape policy. However, it is the main
argument of this thesis that the major determinant in the change of policy
was the views and activities of a group of China academics that in the
1960s both within and outside government successfully challenged and
discredited the policy of total isolation. This thesis also believes that on
balance the contribution made by these academics was a positive one
that redressed the damage done to the academic profession and the
development of policy and freedom of expression by the McCarthyite
purges. Historiography has tended to focus on the roles of individual
politlclans, usually Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, at the expense of
explaining the consensus that made their policies accepted and
necessary. It is hoped that this thesis has begun to correct that
imbalance. It is also hoped that this thesis can contribute to any
academic understanding of the domestic influences on any area of US
foreign policy and how that policy can be subjected to pressures over an
extended period of time.
There are other factors that need to be considered. Most significantly
would be the role of the People's Republic of China itself. In the list of
influences the policies of the PRC was left out as a major factor. The
argument of this thesis is that in the minds of the Americans making and
influencing policy throughout this time, the Chinese were at best
secondary factors and at worst passive recipients of US policy initiatives.
Examples of this abound. The key factor that influenced Roger Hilsman
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does not concern China, but the Soviet Union. A longer-term example of
this is the length of time it takes American leaders to consider the
importance of Taiwan to the Chinese. From about 1950 all Chinese
statements on Sino-American relations start from the premise that Taiwan
is the key bone of contention and that any policy of "Two Chinas",
allowing Taiwan to develop as an independent state separate from the
mainland, is utterly unacceptable to the PRC. Yet, as late as 1966, the
specialists both within and outside of government publicly see "Two
Chinas" as the solution to the China problem. It is Nixon's greatest
achievement that he sets this policy aside.
World events clearly do affect US diplomacy. For example, US policy
towards Nazi Germany was greatly affected by the actions of Hitler and
his regime. Moreover, the US approach was affected by the Chinese
Revolution of 1949. But the fundamental point remains. US policy
towards the People's Republic of China between 1949 and 1972 was
determined primarily by domestic factors. Those factors shaped the
original US actions and they provided the circumstances that led to the
dramatic changes carried out by the Nixon Administration.
It is vital to fit US policy towards China into its overall Asia strategy.
The US had always had a regional surrogate in Asia to pursue its
interests that it felt it could not do itself. Before, World War" that
surrogate was Japan and after 1945 when it became clear that the
Chinese Nationalists could not playa regional role, the Japanese once
again emerged as America's key ally in the region. In the 1970s, the
strains caused by the US involvement in Vietnam and the emergence of
306
Japan as an economic competitor forced the US to attempt to reintegrate
China back into the overall world system. The opening, under these
terms, was a success as the US was able to withdraw many of its troops
from the region without any affect on its overall stability. China went in a
few short years from being the fulcrum of revolution in Asia to being one
of the blocks of the international system. On those terms, an opening to
China in the late 1960s was also essential. Nixon understood this better
than most and was able to bring about a convergence between these
geopolitical considerations and the liberal ideals of men like Chester
Bowles and John Fairbank.
The reconciliation between the US and the PRC reflected the power of
both nations. Ultimately, the potential and real power of both nations
brought them together. China's size, population and political and
economic potential necessitated that the US seek a relationship with it.
Once the CCP had established itself on the mainland and was clearly
beginning to realise that potential then it was only a matter of time that
the US would need to develop some sort of relationship with it.
Alternatively, the power of the United States required the leaders in
Beijing to accept its strategic interests in the region. As the years after
1972 have shown, this they were prepared to do with the obvious
exception of Taiwan which the Chinese saw as a matter of sovereignty.
This concept of power should not only be measured in raw political power
but also cultural power. There can be little doubt that scholars were
attracted to China by its size, its classical civilisation and its potential
economic and political strength as well as traditional curiosity.
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Concluding, it is right to emphasise the importance of the China
opening in post-war US diplomatic history. However, the opening was
not only the preserve of politicians like Richard Nixon but also grew out of
the cultural beliefs of men like John King Fairbank and was put into force
by their overt political activities and academic pursuits. These activities
and pursuits converged with strategic factors, public opinion and the
decisions of individual politicians to make the grand opening possible.
INTRODUCTION: FOOTNOTE.
1. Paul Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of
Modem China, (Oxford, 1985), p. 311.
308
309
CHAPTER ONE: FOOTNOTES:
1. The best introductory texts on Sino-American relations and the
historical background are Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to
China: An Interpretive History of Sino-American Relations, (New York,
1980) and John King Fairbank, The United States and China,
(Cambridge, Mass, 1973). Wherry cited in Anthony Hartley,
"American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era", The Adelphi Papers, No
110, 1974/5, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 12n.
2. For a good introduction to FOR's China policy see Waiter la Feber,
The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad
since 1750, (NewYork,1989), pp.403&415.
3. Cohen, America's Response to China, pp. 164-5.
4. The Yenan Mission is covered well in E.J. Kahn Jr, The China Hands:
America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them, (New York,
1975), Chap 5.
5. Truman cited in La Feber, The American Age, p. 477.
6. Cohen, America's Response to China, pp. 192-5; la Feber, The
American Age, p. 477, Fairbank, The United States and China, pp.
256-8.
7. Acheson cited in Stanley D Bachrack, The Committee of One Million,
(New York, 1976), p. 41.
8. Cohen, America's Response to China, pp. 201-2 & 206-7; la Feber,
The American Age, p. 478, Thomas G. Paterson & Dennis Merrill
(eds), Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol//: Since
1914, (lexington, Mass, 1995), pp. 359-60.
310
9. Sprouse cited in Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign
Policy: America's China Policy: 1949-1979, (London, 1984), pp. 34-5.
1O.lbid, pp. 23-6; la Feber, The American Age, pp. 485-6, Cohen,
America's Response to China, p 205.
11. Cohen, America's Response to China, pp. 194-7.
12. Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, (New York,
1974). p. 55. Koen is easily the best and most readable account of
the existence and activities of the China Lobby
13.Ascoli cited in Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p 28.
14. The Tydings Report is cited in Robert Newman, Owen Lattimore and
the "Loss" of China, (Oxford, 1992), p. 300.
15. Rev William Johnson is cited in Koen, The China Lobby in American
Politics, p. 170.
16.lbidp.171.
17.The best short book on the Korean War is Callum MacDonald, Korea:
The War Before Vietnam, (london, 1986). Chapter 2 deals explicitly
with the decisions made by the Truman Administration in June 1950
after the North Korean attack.
18.Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War. The Making of the Sino-
American Confrontation, (New York, 1994) provides a good
assessment of the interpretations of the Chinese entry into the Korean
war as well as providing a new interpretation of its own. Allen Whiting
most famously puts the traditional view, China Crosses the Ya/u: the
Decisions to Enter the Korean War, (New York, 1960). See
MacDonald, Korea, Chaps 3 & 4 for an account of the Chinese entry
311
into the war and the US reaction to it.
19. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, pp. 56 & 63.
20. Rusk cited in Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of
Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, (New York,
1967), p. 295; Warren Cohen, Dean Rusk, (Totowa, New Jersey,
1980) p. 63.
21.Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and
the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 United States, China, and the Soviet
Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford, California, 1990) has the best
assessment of Eisenhower's China policy. Richard Melanson & David
Mayers (Eds), Re-evaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in
the 1950s, (Chicago, 1987) also covers China policy containing two
essays on Eisenhower's China policy by Norman Graebner and David
Mayers. Graebner is critical of the Administration's approach whilst
Mayers is more sympathetic. For details of Walter Robertson's
appointment see Melanson & Mayers (eds), Graebner p. 69 & Warren
I. Cohen & Akira Iriye (eds), The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-60,
(New York, 1990), Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, p. 36.
22. For details about the Offshore Islands crisis and the US threat to use
nuclear weapons against the Chinese see Melanson & Mayers (eds),
Re-evaluating Eisenhower, Graebner pp. 75 & 78-80 The Chicago
Daily News is cited on p. 80; la Feber, The American Age, p. 516,
MacDonald, Korea, p. 190.
23. Melanson & Mayers (Eds), Re-evaluating Eisenhower, Graebner p 72
& Mayers p 103.
312
24. Dulles cited in Melanson & Mayers (Eds), Re-evaluating Eisenhower,
Mayers p. 97.
25. Dulles cited in Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 295. Chang, Friends
and Enemies, p 161 reports that even as Dulles was making the
speech he knew from CIA reports that the CCP was well established
on the Chinese Mainland and therefore could not be described as a
passing phase. Cohen, America's Response to China, pp. 227-8 also
comments on the speech.
26. Dulles cited in Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p 210.
27.Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 103-4; Cohen and Iriye (Eds), The
Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960, Tucker pp. 36 s 39-40.
Eisenhower cited in Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 146. For details
of Eisenhower and Dulles interest in "Two Chinas" see also Cohen,
America's Response to China, pp. 225 & 229.
28.Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 107-8.
29. Melanson & Mayers (Eds), Re-evaluating Eisenhower, Graebner pp.
76-7 & Mayers pp. 111-3; Cohen, America's Response to China, p.
227; Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists:
The United States Experience, 1953-1967, (New York, 1968), remains
the most complete account of these talks.
30. Eisenhower cited in Melanson & Mayers (eds), Re-evaluating
Eisenhower, Mayers, pp. 92-3,
31.lbid, pp 95 & 104-5.
32. For details of Ogburn's views see ibid pp. 91-2; Cohen & Iriye (Eds),
The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, Tucker pp. 38-9.
313
33. Melanson & Mayers (eds), Re-evaluating Eisenhower, Mayers P 98
writes that as a consequence of public opinion and reaction to Arthur
Dean's views: "Dulles went to Geneva unencumbered by any illusions
about the political price to be paid for even a brief conference with
(Z)hou En-lain. For details of opinion polls see Kusnitz, Public Opinion
and Foreign Policy, pp. 68-71. Akira Iriye & Warren Cohen (Eds), The
United States and Japan in the Postwar World, (1989), Cohen, pp. 44
& 48, Cohen, America's Response to China, pp. 43-4 & 50; Bachrack,
The Committee of One Million, p. 136.
34.lriye & Cohen (eds), The United States and Japan in the Postwar
World, Cohen, pp. 43 & 49, Cohen, America's Response to China, pp.
48-9, Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, pp. 132 & 134 &
Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 164.
35.Cohen & Iriye (Eds), The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960, Qing
Semei, p. 135.
36. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 301.
37.Melanson & Mayers (Eds), Re-evaluating Eisenhower, Graebner, p.
85.
38. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 83.
39. Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 164-5 & 169.
40. For general details of the racism of the administration see Chang,
Friends and Enemies, pp. 170-3. Chang cited on p. 172.
41.Eisenhower cited in Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 173.
314
CHAPTER TWO: FOOTNOTES:
1. Judith Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government: The
Chrysanthemum on the Sword", in Edward Friedman & Mark Selden
(eds), America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American
Relations (New York, 1971), pp. 74 & 78; James Peck, "The Roots of
Rhetoric: The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers" in
Friedman & Selden, America's Asia, p. 68; Paul Evans, John Fairbank
and the American Understanding of Modem China (Oxford, 1985), p.
61.
2. Edwin Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America (New York,
1986), pp. 113-4; Evans, John Fairbank and the American
Understanding of Modern China, pp. 94-5.
3. Peck in Friedman & Selden, "The Roots of Rhetoric", America's Asia,
p.60.
4. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, pp. 114-5.
5. John King Fairbank, The United States and China (Cambridge, Mass,
1973), pp. 317 & 318n; John N. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific
Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics (Seattle & London,
1974), p. 3; Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics
(New York, 1974), p. 133.
6. Charles O. Hucker, "The Association of Asian Studies: An Interpretive
History", Association of Asian Studies, Occasional Papers No 1
(Seattle & London, 1973), pp. 3, 9-10,12,15; Evans, John Fairbank
and the American Understanding of Modem China, p. 64; Reischauer,
My Life Between Japan
315
and America, pp. 116-7; Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations,
pp.128-9.
7. Hucker, The Association of Asian Studies, p. 13.
8. Ibid, p. 17.
9. Ibid, p. 18.
10. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, p. 152.
11. Ben Lee Martin, Interpretations of United States Policy toward the
Chinese Communists, 1944-1968: Survey and Analysis, Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University, 1968). Martin is cited
in Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 52; Koen, The China
Lobby in American Politics, p. 116; John King Fairbank, Chinabound:
A Fifty Year Memoir {New York, 1982), pp. 36-7; Far Eastern
Economic Review, 22/5/69, Vol LXIV, No 21.
12. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, pp. 116-7.
13. Fairbank cited in Evans, John Fairbank and the American
Understanding of Modem China, pp. 86-7.
14.Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 316.
15.lbid, p. 320.
16. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 99-100. Fairbank cited on p. 100.
17.lbid, p. 100.
18. Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 320.
19. Fairbank cited in Evans, John Fairbank and the American
Understanding of Modem China, p. 118.
316
20.lbid, p. 124.
21.lbid, p. 101; Fairbank, Chinabound, pp. 315 & 317-8.
22.Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 317; Evans, John Fairbank and the
American Understanding of Modem China, p. 129.
23. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, pp. 52-3; Fairbank,
Chinabound, p. 367.
24. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, pp. 52-3; Koen, The China
Lobby in American Politics, pp. 116-7.
25. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 54.
26. The China Monthly is cited in Koen, The China Lobby in American
Politics, p. 118.
27. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, pp. 36-44; Koen, The
China Lobby in American Politics, pp. 122 & 135. Kohlberg is cited in
Koen, p. 135.
28. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, pp. 136-7.
29.lbid, p. 122.
30.lbid, pp. 118-20.
31. Senator Brewster is cited in Koen, The China Lobby in American
Politics, p. 121.
32.lbid, p. 122; Stanley 8achrack, The Committee of One Million (New
York, 1976), p. 31.
33.FredaUtley, The China Story (Chicago, 1951),p.139. Utleyisalso
cited in Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 120.
34. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 117.
35.lbid, p. 124.
317
36. The Tydings Committee report is cited in Koen, The China Lobby in
American Politics, p. 126.
37.lbid, p. 125.
38.lbid, p. 126; Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 77.
39. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 139; Thomas, The
Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 87.
40. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 87.
41. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, pp. 126-7.
42. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 150 & 154.
43. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 85; Rowe cited in Evans,
John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem China, p.
147. See also Evans, pp. 136 & 142.
44. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
China, pp. 128 & 152-3.
45.lbid, pp. 143-5; John Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 345.
46. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 152-3.
47.lsaac cited in Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding
of Modern China, p. 159.
48. The report of the McCarran Committee is cited in Koen, The China
Lobby in American Politics, p. 129. See also Koen, pp. 129-30 & 141-
4; Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 144 and 144n.
49. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, p. 129; Fairbank, The
United States and China, p. 318.
318
50.Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, p. 126.
51. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, p. 184; Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, pp. 130-1;
Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, pp. 120-7.
52. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, p. 158.
53. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, pp. 134 & 154.
54. Ibid, p. 154.
55.Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, p. 118.
56.Hucker, The Association of Asian Studies, p. 61 & 65.
57. Ibid, pp. 50-2.
58.Richard Kagan writes in the foreword to Koen, The China Lobby in
American Politics, p. XIV.
59. Ibid, pp. 155-9; Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, pp. 112-3;
The Reece Report is cited in Koen, p. 158.
60.The Reece Report is cited in Koen, The China Lobby in American
Politics, p. 158.
61.lbid, p. 158.
62.lbid, p. 159.
63.lbid, pp. 176-181; The findings are cited on p. 181.
64. Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 349.
65. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, pp. 182-3; Gordon
Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the
Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford, California, 1990), p. 23.
66. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, pp. 184-9.
319
67.lbid, pp. 189-92.
68. Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 350.
69.Archibald.T. Steele, The American People and China: A Volume in the
Series "The United States and China in World Affairs·, (New York,
Toronto & London, 1966), p. 189.
70. Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 360.
71.lbid, p. 371.
72. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, p. 116; Steele, The
American People and China, p. 190.
73. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 2 & 180-3.
74. Fairbank, Chinabound, pp. 376-7.
75. Hucker, The Association of Asian Studies, p. 19.
76.lbid, pp. 16 & 25.
77.lbid, p. 25.
78.lbid, p. 28.
79.lbid, pp. 27 & 37.
80.lbid, pp. 28-9.
81.lbid, p. 29.
82.lbid, pp. 51-2.
83. Steele, The American People and China, pp. 190-1.
84.lbid, pp. 190-2.
85.lbid, p. 192.
86. Hucker, The Association of Asian Studies, pp. 43-4.
87. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
320
China, pp. 211-3 & 218; Bulletin of Concerned Asian Studies
(Henceforth BCAS), Vol 5, No 1, pp. 74-5.
88. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 211-3.
89. Taylor is cited in BCAS, Vol 5, No 2, p. 63. Letter by Taylor dated July
5, 1961.
90. Lindbeck is cited in Evans, John Fairbank and the American
Understanding of Modem China, p. 216.
91.Fairbank is cited in ibid, p. 186.
92. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, p. 129.
93.lbid, pp. 126-7.
94.lbid, p. 327.
95.lbid, p. 129.
96.lbid, p. 130.
97.lbid, p. 129.
98.lbid, p. 130.
99. There is an excellent biography of Chester Bowles; Howard Schaffer,
Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War (Cambridge, Mass &
London, 1993).
100. Chester Bowles, The New Dimensions of Peace (London, 1956),
p.121.
101. Dulles is cited in Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of
Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York,
1967), p. 295. Bowles assessment of the early years of the CCP
government can be found in Chester Bowles, The New Dimensions of
321
Peace, pp. 121-4.
102. Yale University Library (Henceforth YUl), Chester Bowles
Collection, Box 132, Folder:- John King Fairbank, 1954-1958, letter
Fairbank to Bowles, May 10, 1955.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid, letter Fairbank to Bowles, May 24, 1955, pp. 1-2.
105. Barnett cited in Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 164. Further
details of the conference are to be found on the same page.
106. Ibid, p. 164.
107. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 136.
108. Warren Cohen in Akira Iriye & Warren Cohen, The United States
and Japan in the Postwar World (1989), p. 49; Chang, Friends and
Enemies, p. 163.
109. Waiter la Feber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy
at Home and Abroad since 1750 (New York & london, 1989), pp.
541-2.
110. Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 182-94;Warren Cohen, Dean
Rusk (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980), p. 164.
111. Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's
China Policy: 1949-1979 (Westport, Connecticut & London, 1984), p.
81; Cohen, Dean Rusk, p. 164.
112. Engle cited in Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 152.
113. Ibid, p. 152 & Steele, The American People and China, p. 211.
114. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 152; Steele, The
American People and China, p. 212.
322
115. YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 207, Folder 0084, Misc Engel-
Engelman, Letter Bowles to Clair Engle, May 22 1959.
116. Ibid, Letter Bowles to Engle, April 28, 1960.
117. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 152.
118. Ibid, p.152.
119. Wiley cited in Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 152.
120. Report cited in Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 154.
121. United States Government, United States Foreign Policy: Asia:
Studies Prepared at the Request of the Committee on Foreign
Re/ations, U.S. Senate By Conlon Associates Ltd, No.5 (November
1st, 1959, US Government Printing Office, 1959), Section on East
Asia by Robert Scalapino, p. 126.
122. Ibid, p. 131.
123. Ibid, pp. 131, 133-5 & 143.
124. Ibid, pp. 147-8.
125. Ibid, p. 146.
126. Ibid, p. 150.
127. Ibid, p. 152.
128. Ibid, pp. 150-1.
129. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, pp. 154-5.
130. Ibid, pp. 156-7.
131. Steele, The American People and China, p. 213.
132. 132. James Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy,
1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", The China Quarterly, April-
June 1972, p. 221.
323
133. The best general book on the Council on Foreign Relations is
Robert Schulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs (New York,
1984); Coburn in Friedman & Selden (eds), America's Asia, p. 87.
134. Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 389, Folder - Council
on Foreign Relations, Soviet-American Relations, pp. 19-20.
135. Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 175-82; A. Doak Barnett,
Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy, published
under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York,
1960), pp. 381-3 & 474-5.
136. Chester Bowles, "The "China Problem" Reconsidered", Foreign
Affairs, Vol 38 No 3, pp. 476-485.
137. Ibid, pp. 481 & 484-5.
138. Ibid, p. 485.
139. Ibid, p. 485.
140. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-
1969 (New York & London, 1971), p. 391; British comments on the
article can be found in PRO F0371 148589; Other correspondence on
the article can be found in John F. Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers,
Box 14, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, The China Problem
Reconsidered by Chester Bowles in Foreign Affairs 4/60; this
correspondence includes hostile comments from the State
Department.
324
CHAPTER THREE: FOOTNOTES:
1. Amongst the best biographies of John F. Kennedy and his Presidency
are James Giglio, The Presidency of John F. Kennedy, (New York,
1991) and Herbert S. Parmet, JFK: The Presidency of John F.
Kennedy, (New York, 1983).
2. The best biography of Dean Rusk is Warren Cohen, Dean Rusk,
(Totowa, New Jersey, 1980).
3. Rusk is cited in Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of
Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, (New York,
1967), p. 295.
4. Thomas C. Reeves, A Question of Character: The Book That Finally
Exploded the Kennedy Myth, (London, 1991), pp. 120-4.
5. Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Sino-American Reconciliation,
(Baltimore and London, 1978), p. vii; Stanley D. Bachrack, The
Committee of One Million, (New York, 1976), p. 181.
6. John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library (JFKL), Papers of President
Kennedy, NSF Files, Countries, China, Box 21-3, Memo to the
President, From Frederick Dutton to Kennedy, February 1st, 1961;
JFKL, NSF Meetings & Memos, Box 320: February 31961, National
Security Action Memo No.3. McGeorge Bundy and Dean Rusk.
Subject: Bunkering of Free World Ships under Communist Chinese
Charter.
7. JFKL, Presidential Papers, NSF Files, CO Box 21-3, Memo for the
President From Dean Rusk, February 17th, 1961, Subject: Exhibition
of Chinese Art Treasures in the United States.
325
8. JFKL, Presidential Papers, NSF Files, CO Box 21-3, Memo From
Ralph Dungan to JFK, March 7, 1961. This memo shows that the
ROC was delighted by this offer realising its propaganda value.
9. JFKL, NSF Files, CO, China, Box 21-3, Folder: China [General],
1/20/61-2/19/61, Discussion Paper, February4, 1961; Bachrack, The
Committee of One Million, p. 202 assesses the role of Chester Bowles
in all of this.
10. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Northeast Asia: Vol
XXII, 1961-3, United States Government Printing Office, Washington,
1996, p. 81-2, Editorial Note.
11.lbid, pp. 67-9, Memo Rusk to Kennedy, Washington, May 26,1961.
Subject: China and the United Nations. On p. 68 Rusk shows the
cynicism of the manoeuvre when he writes that: "We believe that the
U.K. could support this proposal, that the GRC could tolerate it, that it
could find wide support in the General Assembly, and that the
Chinese Communists would reject it".
12. Rusk is cited in Ibid, p. 30, Memo of Conversation, Washington,
March 14, 1961. Subject: US/UK Bilateral Talks: China and Chinese
Representation in the UN, pp. 28-33.
13.lbid, pp. 70-2, Editorial Note.
14.lbid, Memo of Conversation, Washington, July 28,1961. Subject:
Conference at White House on China Representation at United
Nations and Outer Mongolia-United Nations Membership Application,
pp.99-101.
15. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 308-9.
326
16.FRUS, NortheastAsia: Vol XXII, pp. 145-160 gives ample examples
of Kennedy's secret promise to Jiang to ensure that the Chinese were
not allowed into the United Nations. See also JFKL, CO- China Box
22, Folder: General CIA Cables 7/61-10/61, Cable from McGeorge
Bundy at the Presidenfs request to Ray Cline, pp. 1-2.
17.Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 310.
18. Rusk is cited in FRUS, Northeast Asia: Vol XXII, p. 55, Editorial Note,
pp. 54-5. The conversation with Kennedy is also referred to in Cohen,
Dean Rusk, pp. 164-5. This conversation is part of the evidence that
leads Warren Cohen to believe that Rusk was essentially a pragmatist
whose hard-line views were a reflection of Kennedy's instinctive
dislike of the Chinese.
19. Rusk is cited ibid, p. 55.
20. Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China
Policy: 1949-1979, (London & Westport, Conn, 1984), pp. 175 & 101.
A Gallup poll in September 1961 showed that 65 per cent opposed
Chinese entry into the United Nations against 18 per cent who
supported it.
21. Rusk is cited in FRUS, Northeast Asia: Vol XXII, p. 55.
22.James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-69:
A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", The China Quarterly, April-June
1972, p. 222.
23.Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-
1969, (New York & London, 1969), pp. 393-4; Howard Schaffer,
Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War, (Cambridge,
327
Massachusetts & London, England, 1993), pp. 76-7, 81 s 137-40.
Chapter two of Schaffer gives an excellent account of Bowles' political
philosophy.
24. Bowles cited in Schaffer, Chester Bowles, p. 123.
25.Bowles cited in Ibid, pp. 174-5. See also p. 121.
26.lbid, pp. 126 & 138-40. Yale University Library (YUL), Manuscript and
Archives, Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder: 542: Letter from Bowles to
Adlai Stevenson of July 23, 1961 where he outlines the attempts
within the Kennedy Administration to get rid of him. On p. 2 he writes
that: "Most of our mutual friends believe it originated with and was
masterminded by the same factions with whom we fought in the
Democratic Advisory Council" and on p.5 of the same document
Bowles refers to "the primary role of the Achesonians in the effort to
push me out".
27.lbid, p. 115; YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 159, Folder: 0659, Thomson
James C. Jr, 1953-8, all correspondence which shows the relationship
between the two and the encouragement given to the young Thomson
by the senior Bowles.
28. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL), OH (Oral History), Interviewer
Paige E. Mulhollan, interviewee J.C. Thomson Jr, Place: Kennedy
Institute of Politics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Date: July 22, 1971, p. 5. Thomson is cited on p. 11.
29. Thomson is cited in Ibid, p. 11.
30. YUL, Bowles Papers, Box 300, Folder 536, memo from Bowles to
Rusk, 17th March 1961, Subject: China and the United Nations, p. 5.
328
31. See for example, JFKL, Presidential Office Files, Box 28, Folder:
Chester Bowles 3/24/59-7/5/61, July 1, 1961, Subject: Some
Requirements of American Foreign Policy, p. 8.
32. Schaffer, Chester Bowles, pp. 189-92. Bowles is cited on p. 192.
33.lbid, pp. 189-92.
34. Bowles is cited in Bowles, Promises to Keep, p. 396.
35. See for example, Schaffer, Chester Bowles, pp. 197-201.
36. The State Department Officer is cited in an Original draft of a
Newsweek article that can be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 7,
Chester Bowles, Dept of State, General, 1963.
37. Schaffer, Chester Bowles, pp. 203-5.
38.lbid, p. 204.
39.lbid, pp. 228-9.
40. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 37.
41.lbid, p. 37. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 7, Chester Bowles, Dept of
State, General, 1963.
42. VUL, Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder: 542, Letter Bowles to
Stevenson, July 23,1961.
43. Press statement cited in Ibid p. 6.
44.JFKL, Oral History, Chester Bowles, p. 44; Thomson Jr, "On the
Making of US China Policy, 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics",
p.223.
45. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-69: A Study in
Bureaucratic Politics", China Quarterly, pp. 222-3.
46. Parsons cited in Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 443,
329
Folder: China 7, Memo Parsons to Harriman, Feb 21,1961, Subject:
Progress on China Policy, p. 5.
47. Rice's biographical details can be found in E.J. Kahn Jr, The China
Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them,
(New York, 1972), p. 310.
48.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 14, Far East, 1961-6 - Communist China
- SIP - 61159: US Policy Toward Communist China - 10/26/61.
49. Rice cited in Ibid, p. 4.
50. Rice cited in Ibid, p. 4-5.
51. Rice cited in Ibid, p. 10. See also p.6.
52. Ibid, pp. 12-3, The term "pliable" is used on p. 13. Rice believed that
the Japanese, if faced by mainland states under communist control
would feel the need to coexist with them no matter what the reaction
of the United States might be to that co-existence.
53. Ibid, p. 25.
54. Rice is cited in Ibid, p. 112.
55. Ibid, pp. 112-3.
56. Ibid, p. 113.
57. Ibid, p. 114.
58. Ibid, pp. 114-5.
59. Rice is cited in Ibid, p. 106. He is not explicit about what he means
and does not give any examples of Jiang's use of political warfare
against the United States.
60. Rice cited in Ibid, p. 118.
61.lbid, p. 61.
330
62. See for example Ibid, p. 77 & 117.
63. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study
in Bureaucratic Politics", p. 225; LC, Harriman Papers, Box 438,
Chester Bowles, Memo Thomson to Bowles, Dec 14, 1961, Subject:
Suggestions for Deputy Assistant Secretary in FE.
64. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy, 1961-1969: A Study
in Bureaucratic Politics", pp. 225-6.
65.lbid, p. 226.
66. VUL, Bowles Papers, Box 304, Folder 604, Memo Bowles to "Andy,
Jim (Thomson), and Sam", Date: January 15,1962, p. 1.
67. Thomson Jr, p. 227, "On the Making of US China Policy, 1961-1969:
A Study in Bureaucratic Politics"; JFKL, Presidential Office Files,
Countries, Box 113a, File: China Security, 1962-3, February 6,1962,
Memo Bowles to Kennedy, Subject: U.S. Initiatives Regarding the
China Mainland Food Crisis.
68. Bowles cited in Ibid, p. 1.
69. Bowles cited in Ibid, p. 1.
70.lbid.
71.lbid.
72. Bowles cited in Ibid, p.4.
73. For examples of Bowles and Thomson seeking support for their efforts
see JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6, Communist
China, Folder, Food for China, 1/62-2/62.
74. For an example of the Quakers' involvement in the issue see JFKL,
Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China,
331
Folder: Food for China, 1/62-2/62, Memorandum of Meeting in the
Office of Mr Carl Kaysen, Date January 10, 1962. The Quakers were
a well-respected religious organisation who tried to promote a
peaceful outcome to the Cold War.
75. FRUS, Vol XXII, Northeast Asia, Draft Memorandum from Rusk to
Kennedy, April 4, 1962, Subject: United States Policy on Shipments of
Medicines and Food Grains to Communist China, pp. 208-11.
76. Bowles cited in JFKL, Oral Histories, Chester Bowles, p. 34; FRUS,
Northeast Asia, Vol XXII, Editorial Note, p. 185 refers to Kennedy's
discussions with Bowles about the latter's mission to meet with U Nu.
77. Bowles, Promises to Keep, pp. 402-3.
78. LC, Harriman Papers, Box 443, Folder: China 7, Harriman to Rusk,
April13, 1962, Subject: United States Policy on Shipments of
Medicines and Food Grains to Communist China. FRUS, Northeast
Asia: Vol XXII, Memo Fm Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Johnson) to Rusk, April6, 1962, pp. 213-4.
79. Harriman cited in LC, Harriman Papers, Box 443, Folder: China 7,
Harriman to Rusk, April13, 1962, Subject: United States Policy on
Shipments of Medicines and Food Grains to Communist China.
80./bid. Three days later Bowles recorded his support for Harriman's
views see VUL, Bowles Papers, Box 301, Folder 537, Memo Bowles
to Rusk, April 16, 1962.
81.Harriman cited in FRUS, Northeast Asia, Vol XXII, p. 217 fn 4.
Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 317.
82.Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 317; For Bowles's view see JFKL,
332
Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China,
Folder: Food for China, 3/62-5/62, Memo Bowles to Kennedy, May 23
1962. The same Memo can also be found in YUL, Bowles Papers,
Box 297, Folder 498.
83. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 316-7; FRUS, Northeast Asia: Vol
XXII, pp. 231-3, Draft Paper Prepared in the State Department, May
28, 1962, Subject: Food Grains for Mainland China. This paper was
never discussed.
84.Peaslee cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6,
Communist China, Folder: Food for China, 6/62-7/62.
85. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 316-7.
86. Khrushchev cited in Immanuel HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (New
York, 1975), p. 812. Other details of the roots of the Sino-Soviet split
can be found on p. 809.
87.lbid, pp. 812-3.
88. Khrushchev cited in Ibid, p. 816.
89.Cohen, Dean Rusk, pp. 169-70.
90.HsO, The Rise of Modern China, pp. 819-20.
91.lbid, p. 816.
92. Thomson cited in Hitsman, To Move a Nation, p. 344; Thomson Jr,
MOnthe Making of US China Policy: 1961-69: A Study in Bureaucratic
Politics", p. 226; JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 15, Far East, 1961-6,
Communist China, General 1/62-3/62, Memo Thomson to Harriman,
January 2, 1962, Subject: Secretary's Policy Planning Meeting,
January 2, 1962: Discussion of the Sino-Soviet and U.S. Policy.
333
93. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-69: A Study in
Bureaucratic Politics", p. 227; Judith Coburn writing in Edward
Friedman & Mark Selden (Eds), America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on
Asian-American Relations, (New York, 1971), p. 86.
94.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 14, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China,
Sino-Soviet Conflict and US Policy, 4/30/62, 1 of 2, Memo Rostow to
Rusk, April 2, 1962, Subject: US Policy Re the Sino-Soviet Split.
95.lbid, p. 7.
96.lbid, pp. 10 & 15.
97.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 14, Far East, 1961-6, Communist China,
Folder: Sino-Soviet Conflict and US Foreign Policy, 4/30/62, 15 page
summary that it attached to a 77pp SIP draft paper entitled "The Sino-
Soviet Conflict and US Policy", p. 7.
98.lbid, pp. 8-9; Cohen, Dean Rusk, pp. 169-70.
99.Gordon Chang, "JFK, China and the Bomb", Journal of American
History, 1988, pp. 1287-1309, p. 1291.
100. Bundy is cited in LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Folder:
Chapters 10, 12-16, Chap 16, pp. 4-5.
101. Chang, uJFK, China and the Bomb", p. 1301.
102. FRUS, Northeast Asia: Vol XXII, Telegram Fm Embassy in Taipei
(Drumright) to Harriman in Dept of State, February 28, pp. 186-7;
Draft Message Fm Kennedy to Harriman, March 9, 1962,
Memorandum for the Record, March 31, 1962, Subject: White House
Meeting on GRC Plans, pp. 204-5; Telegram Fm CIA Station in
Saigon to Director of CIA McCone for distribution to President,
334
Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, June 7, 1962, pp. 241-4;
Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 310-5.
103. FRUS, Northeast Asia: Vol XXII, Memo to the Chief of CIA Station
in Taipei, Cline, March 31,1962, pp. 206-7.
104. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 318-9.
105. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 319.
106. Ibid, pp. 319-20.
107. Ibid, pp. 321-2,324 & 327.
108. Cohen, Dean Rusk, p. 170.
109. For Hilsman's view see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 338-9.
110. FRUS, Northeast Asia, Vol XXII, pp. XXXI & XXXIII.
335
CHAPTER FOUR: FOOTNOTES.
1. For the best account of the life of Harriman, see Rudy Abramson,
Spanning the Century: The Life ofW. Averell Harriman, 1891-1986,
(New York, 1992).
2. Ibid, p. 594.
3. John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union and The United States:
An Interpretive History, (New York, 1990), p. 101.
4. Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 409, NY Files, Post
Gubernatorial-China, 1955-1959.
5. Abramson, Spanning the Century, p. 601.
6. Ibid, p. 585.
7. Ibid, p. 611. This group also saw Vietnam as essentially a civil war
and had little time for the South Vietnamese leader Diem.
8. Ibid, pp. 592-3.
9. Ibid, p. 612.
10. Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in
the Administration of John F. Kennedy, (New York, 1967), p. 347.
11. McGeorge Bundy cited in FRUS (Foreign Relations of the United
States), 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia, (Washington,
1996), Editorial Note, p. 339.
12. John McCone cited in Ibid, p. 339.
13.lbid, p. 339.
14.lbid, pp. 339-40.
15.lbid, Editorial Note, p. 341.
16. Harriman cited in Ibid, p. 341.
336
17. Kennedy cited in Ibid, Editorial Note, pp. 370.
18.lbid, pp. 370-1.
19. De Martino cited in Ibid, pp. 370-1. For details of attempts by
Harriman to develop an understanding about a US-Soviet alliance
against the Chinese regarding Chinese nuclear development, see also
Gordon Chang, "JFK, China, and the Bomb, Journal of American
History, 1988, pp. 1291, 1301, 1304-5.
20. For details about the July 31, 1963 meeting of the NSC see, FRUS,
Northeast Asia, Vol XXII, Summary Record of the 516th of the
National Security Council, Washington, July 31,1963, pp. 371-4. For
the views of the CIA see, JFKL (John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library),
NSF (National Security Files), Box No 314, National Security Council
Meeting 1963, No: 516, 7/31/63, Folder:-10; Subject: CIA, SNIE 13-4-
63: Possibilities of Greater Militancy By the Chinese Communists. On
p. 2 the report concludes that the CCP "may become more
disagreeable, and there is a possibility that they will undertake
somewhat more assertive initiatives, in the hope of attaining limited
but visible gains at minimum risk", but that "over the past few years, in
spite of their warlike oratory, they have followed a generally cautious
policy".
21. FRUS, Northeast Asia: Vol XXII, Telegram From the Embassy in
Poland to the Department of State, Warsaw, August 7, 1963, pp. 378-
82. Cabot cited in footnote, No.1, p. 378.
22. Wang cited in Ibid, pp. 378-9.
23. Wang cited in Ibid, p. 382.
337
24.lbid, Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security
Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Bundy), Washington, November 5, 1963, pp. 404-5. The
Planning Group report is cited on p. 405.
25. Bromley Smith cited in Ibid, p. 405n4.
26.Abramson, Spanning the Century, p. 612.
27.lbid, p. 612.
28.JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5(6), Folder: 1/62-6/62 - Chronological
File: Letter Hilsman to JFK, 12/1/62.
29. LBJL (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library), Oral History Interview, James
Thomson, July 22, 1971. Thomson cited on p. 29.
30. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 347.
31.lbid, pp. 347-8.
32. Hilsman cited in Ibid, pp. 351-2.
33.lbid, pp. 340-4.
34. Hilsman cited in JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64,
Letter Hilsman to Marshall Green, July 5, 1963.
35. Green cited in JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64,
Personal Telegram from Marshall Green to Roger Hilsman, July 16,
1963.
36. JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64, Letters; Hilsman to
Green, August 1,1963 & Green to Hilsman, August 8,1963.
37.JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2125164, Paper Prepared in
the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Undated, Subject: Proposed
Changes in the Organization of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. A
338
covering Memo from Hilsman to William Crockett (Deputy Under
Secretary for Administration) dated October 8, 1963 indicates its
authorship. The same Paper can be found FRUS, Northeast Asia, Vol
XXII, pp. 397-9. Hilsman cited on pp. 397-8. In the covering Memo,
Hilsman makes the importance of the role envisaged for Marshall
Green: "As you know, the installation of Marshall Green as a Deputy
Assistant Secretary of FE provides they key activating factor in these
moves which I have been thinking about for many months".
38.JFKL, Hilsman Papers, Box 5, FE, 5/8/63-2/25/64, contains another
paper not produced in FRUS which puts forward the argument for an
Office of Regional Affairs.
39. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pp. 348-50; FRUS, Northeast Asia: Vol
XXII, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) to Secretary of State Rusk, Washington,
October 22, 1963 (Not Sent), pp. 403-4.
40. FRUS, Northeast Asia, Vol XXII, Introduction, p. VII.
41.LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Folder: Chaps 10,12-16.
William Bundy is cited on p. 19.
42.lbid, p. 19.
43.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman,
12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction; Memo:
Thomson to JCT (James Claude Thomson) Files, May 6, 1964,
Subject: Hilsman's China Speech of December 13, 1963, p. 1.
44.lbid, Thomson cited on p. 1.
45.lbid, p. 1.
339
46.lbid, p. 2.
47.lbid, p. 2; LBJL, Oral History Interview, Roger Hilsman, p. 36.
48. Kennedy cited in Stanley Bachrack, The Committee of One Million,
(New York, 1976), p. 208.
49. LBJL, OH, Roger Hilsman, p. 36.
50. LBJL, OH, James Thomson, p. 38.
51.Warren Cohen, Dean Rusk, (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980), pp. 171-3.
52.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman,
12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo
Thomson to JCT Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech
of December 13, p. 2-3.
53. Ibid, p. 3; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 353 suggested that a
contingency if the Johnson Administration disowned the speech would
be to tie it to the policy that Kennedy had intended to follow and the
Kennedy Administration in general.
54.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman,
12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo
Thomson to JCT Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech
of December 13, p. 3; Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 351, the others
present at this meeting were Joseph Neubert and Abram Manell who
were State Department FE Officers.
55.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman,
12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo
Thomson to JCT Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech
of December 13, p. 3.
340
56. Ibid, pp. 3-4.
57. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 355.
58. Ibid. Hilsman cited on p. 355.
59.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman,
12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo
Thomson to JCT Files, May 6, 1964, Subject: Hilsman's China Speech
of December 13, p. 4; LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 38-9; LBJL, OH,
Hilsman, p. 37.
60.James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9:
A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", The China Quarterly, April-June
1972, p. 231; LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 38-9.
61.LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Folder: Chaps 10,12-16, Chap
16, p. 13; Cohen, Dean Rusk, pp. 172-3 also emphasises that Rusk
would have understood fully the ramifications of the speech and that
he would have been broadly in agreement. Another useful and
interesting document is JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Folder:
Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63-12117/63, Memo Thomson to
Hilsman, December 11, 1963 which shows Thomson's genuine
concern about Rusk's likely reaction to the contents of the speech. He
writes that: "As this is a sensitive subject, you wanted him to know in
advance that you plan to appraise the nature of the Chinese
Communist leadership, power, and objectives; and that you define
and explain our policy of non-recognition and trade embargo while
emphasizing that we will always keep open the door to evidence of
more friendly Chinese Communist behavior. You quote President
341
Johnson's speech to Congress ... You might add that your speech has
been cleared by EUR, P, Harriman's Office (Sullivan), and Forrestal".
62. The text of the December speech can be found in the Congressional
Record where Senator George McGovern has placed it on p. 23859.
It can also be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Folder:-
Speeches, 1961-6, Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco,
Correspondence & Press, 12/13/63-12/17/63.
63. Hilsman makes this point explicitly in To Move a Nation, p. 351;
William Bundy also notes this shift, see LBJL, Papers of William
Bundy, Box 1, Folder: Chaps 10,12-16, Chap 16, p. 13.
64. Hilsman cited in Thomson Jr, Man the Making of US China Policy:
1961-1969", p. 230.
65. Hilsman cited in Congressional Record, p. 23859.
66. Hilsman cited in Ibid.
67. Hilsman cited in Ibid.
68.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches 1961-6, Roger Hilsman,
12/13/63, San Francisco Commonwealth Club, Press Reaction, Memo
Thomson to Hilsman, December 19, 1963, Subject: Distribution of San
Francisco Speech. The twelve Senators sent the speech were
Mansfield, Humphrey, Fulbright, Gore, Church, McGovern, Hart,
Clark, Kennedy, Pell, Engle and Kuchel.
69. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman,
12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo
Thomson to Barnett, Undated, Subject: Preliminary US Reaction to
Hilsman Speech and to French Recognition of Communist China, p. 1.
342
70. Reischauer cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches, 1961-
6, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence and Press, 12/26/63-
12/31/63, Note/Internal Letter, Reischauer to Thomson, December 16,
1963.
71.Thomson cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches, 1961-6,
12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence and Press, 12/26/63-
12/31/63, Note/Internal Letter, Thomson to Reischauer, December 31,
1963.
72.A. Doak Barnett cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches,
1961-6, R. Hilsman 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence &
Press, 12/18/63-12/25/63, Letter A. Doak Barnett to Thomson,
December 19, 1963.
73. Latourette and Pringsheim cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10,
Speeches 1961-6, R. Hilsman 12/13/63, San Francisco-
Correspondence & Press, 1/1/64-1n/64, Latourette to Thomson,
5/1/64, Pringsheim to Thomson, 4/1/64.
74.John Kenneth Galbraith cited in Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 356.
75.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 9, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman,
12/13/63, San Francisco, Notes on Genesis and Reaction, Memo
Thomson to Barnett, Undated, Subject: Preliminary US Reaction to
Hilsman Speech and to French Recognition of Communist China, p. 1.
76. Thomson cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 8, Folder:- Thomson-
Bowles, Correspondence, 11/63-2/64, Letter Thomson to Bowles,
December 13, 1963.
77. Thomson cited in Ibid.
343
78. McGovern cited in Congressional Record, p. 23859, a copy of which
can be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Speeches, 1961-6,
R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence and Press,
12/18/63-12/25/63.
79. Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 356.
80.Seymour Topping cited in New York Times, Thursday February 20,
1964, a copy of which can be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box
10, Speeches, 1961-6, R. Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco,
Correspondence & Press, 1116164-4/18/64.
81. Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China
Policy: 1949-1979, (London, England, 1984), p. 108.
82. LBJL, OH, Roger Hilsman, pp. 37-8. Jenkins cited on p. 38.
83. Hilsman cited in Ibid, p. 38.
84.lbid, p. 39.
85. Zhou En-Iai cited from an interview he gave to Reuters on October 13,
1963, which can also be found in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 8,
Folder:- Roger Hilsman, General, 1963-6, China Speech Material, p.
2.
86. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of US China Policy: 1961-1969", p. 232.
87. Thomson puts forward this thesis most fully in his article, "On the
Making of US China Policy: 1961-1969".
344
CHAPTER FIVE: FOOTNOTES:
1. The best introductory book on Lyndon Johnson is Doris Kearns
Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, (London, 1976).
2. This development is explored fully in Chapter six.
3. There are a number of books on Lyndon Johnson's policies and
attitude towards Vietnam. For example see Michael H. Hunt, Lyndon
Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968,
(New York, 1996).
4. Kearns explores this well in, Lyndon Johnson and the American
Dream, chapter Nine.
5. This aspect of Johnson's thinking are encapsulated well in Walter La
Feber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and
Abroad since 1750, (New York & London, 1989), pp. 579-81.
6. Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, pp. 174-8 & 260-
6.
7. For a blunt assessment of the sacking of Hilsman see, Lyndon Baines
Johnson Library, Oral History, James Thomson, p. 9. Hilsman in his
book, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the
Administration of John F. Kennedy, (New York, 1967), p. 535 claims
that he left the Administration of his own volition.
8. Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life ofW. Averell
Harriman, 1891-1986, (New York, 1992), p. 633.
9. Ibid, p. 635. Chapter 24 fully records Harriman's decline and his
doomed attempts to ingratiate himself with the new President.
10.William Bundy is cited in LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1,
345
Folder: Chaps 10,12-16, Chap 16, p. 15.
11. Bundy cited Ibid, p. 15.
12.Bundy cited Ibid, pp. 17-18.
13. Hunt, Lyndon Johnson's War, p. 90 demonstrates how Johnson
reacted to the incident.
14. Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's
China Policy: 1949-1979, (Westport, Connecticut & London, 1984), p.
110.
15. For a good assessment of Kennedy's policy towards Vietnam and his
reliance on counter-insurgency see, Marilyn Young, The Vietnam
Wars: 1945-1990, (New York, 1991), pp. 75-88.
16. La Feber, The American Age, p. 579.
17. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 114.
18.LBJL, Papers of William Bundy, Box 1, Chaps, 10, 12-16, Chap 16,
pp. 7, 9 & 11.
19.1bid, p. 7, 9 & 11.
20. Bundy cited in Ibid, p. 11.
21.Warren Cohen, Dean Rusk, (Totowa, New Jersey, 1980), p. 219;
Abramson, Spanning the Century, p. 532.
22. LBJL, OH, Dean Rusk, Interview three, Tape 1 of 2, p. 8.
23. Rusk cited in Ibid, p. 8.
24. Cohen, Dean Rusk, pp. 284-5.
25.John King Fairbank, The United States and China, (Cambridge, Mass,
1972), p. 387.
26. Thomson in LBJL, OH, Thomson, p. 48 recalls the conversation.
346
27.Cohen, Dean Rusk, p. 284.
28. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 116.
29.John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Box 7, Chester
Bowles, Folder, Thomson Thoughts on Bowles and State Department,
5/29/63, p. 1.
30. These Memos are to be found amongst the Thomson Papers at the
JFK library.
31. The Memo from Thomson to McGeorge Bundy of October 23, 1964
can be found in JFKL, NSC StafflMcGeorge Bundy, 1964-6, Chron
File, 9/64-11/64 and LBJL, National Security Files, Country File,
China, Box 238, Folder, China, Memos Vol II, 9/64-2165.
32.lbid.
33. Thomson cited Ibid, p. 3.
34.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 13, Far East, 1961-6, General Folder:
Thomson-Cooper Memoranda, 4/64-1/66, Memo for Mr (McGeorge)
Bundy, Subject: 2 Weeks in Asia, 23/11165, from Thomson, Cooper
and Ropa, pp. 8-9.
35. Komer cited in lBJl, NSF, Country File, China, Box 238, Folder:
China Memos Vol II, 9/64-2/65, Memo Komer to Bundy, 23/11164, p.
1.
36.lbid, p. 1.
37. Green cited in Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 467,
Folder: Hilsman, Roger, Memo Marshall Green to Harriman, 17/11/64.
38.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 16, Far East, 1961-1966, Communist
China, Folder: General, 1/65-4/65, Information Memo, Lindsey Grant
347
through Marshall Green to William Bundy, March 18, 1965, p. 1.
39. Grant cited Ibid, p. 1.
40. Grant cited Ibid, p. 4.
41. Grant cited Ibid, p. 3.
42. Grant cited Ibid, p. 3.
43. Grant cited Ibid, p. 3-4. (Emphasis in original).
44. This is covered in Kevin Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the
Search for a New US Policy in Asia, Unpublished MA Thesis,
(University of Warwick, 1993), pp. 99-100.
45. Stanley Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, (New York, 1976),
Chapter Ten.
46. Green cited LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 238, Folder: China,
Memos, Vol IV, 7/65-10/65, Memo Green to Cooper and Thomson,
July 9, 1965.
47. Library of Congress, Harriman Papers, Box 435, Folder: Robert
Barnett, Memo Barnett to Jacobsen and a copy sent to Harriman,
March 23, 1966.
48. Memo cited Ibid, p. 1. (Emphasis in original).
49. Memo cited Ibid, p. 2.
50. Memo cited Ibid, p. 2.
51.JFKL, Thomson Papers, NS StafflMcGeorge Bundy, 1964-1966,
Chron File, 7/65-8/65, Memo McGeorge Bundy, to Johnson, August
24,1965.
52.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 11, NS StafflMcGeorge Bundy, 1964-
1966,6/65, Chron File, Memo Thomson to Bundy, June 2,1965.
348
53. LBJL, Country File, China, Box 238, Folder: China, Memos, Vol IV,
7/65-10/65, Unused Memo Thomson to Johnson, Subject: Letter to
You from Dr Paul Dudley White Regarding Communist China.
54.JFKL, Thomson Papers, NS StafflMcGeorge Bundy, 1964-1966,
Chron File, 7/65-8/65, Memo McGeorge Bundy to Johnson, August
24,1965.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
57. State Department cited in LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 238,
Folder: China Memos, Vol IV, 7/65-10/65, Memo Berger & Schwartz
to Rusk, August 27, 1965.
58. Thomson cited in LBJL, OH, James Thomson, p. 42.
59. Thomson cited in Ibid, p. 42.
60. LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 240, Folder: China Memos Vol
VII, 9/66-11/66, Memo Alfred Jenkins to Walt Rostow, November 4,
1966.
61.JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 13, Far East, 1961-66, General, Folder:
Thomson-Cooper Memoranda, 4/64-1/66, Memo for Mr Bundy,
Subject: 2 Weeks in Asia, Date 23/11165, From Thomson, Cooper and
Ropa.
62. Thomson cited JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East, 1961-66,
Folder: General, 7/66-8/66 & Undated, Memo Thomson to Redmon,
Subject: China Talent, August 3, 1966, p. 1.
63.lbid, p. 1. See also LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 5, Folder: Jenkins,
Memos (Alfred), Memo Jenkins to Rostow, September 14, 1966,
349
Subject: Interagency China Country Committee.
64. LBJL, OH, Thomson, p. 56.
65. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 13, Far East, 1961-66, General Folder:
Thomson-Cooper, Memoranda, 4/64-1/66, Memo for McGeorge
Bundy from Thomson, December 7,1965.
350
CHAPTER SIX: FOOTNOTES:
1. Paul Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of
Modem China, (Oxford, 1985), p. 245.
2. This subject is looked at in greater depth in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
3. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
China, p. 260; Edwin O. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and
America, (New York, 1996), p. 319.
4. Charles Hucker, The Association for Asian Studies: An Interpretative
History: AAS Occasional Papers No.1, (Seattle & London, 1973).
5. Ibid, pp. 28-9, 82.
6. Ibid, p. 29.
7. An example of the growing American influence on the China Quarterly
see the names of the editorial board starting in 1960 and then later on.
8. Schwartz is cited in John N. Thomas, The Institution of Pacific
Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics, (Seattle & London,
1974), p. 123.
9. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
China, p. 266.
1O.lbid, p. 259.
11. Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White
House, (New York, 1983), p. 357.
12.lbid, pp. 357-9.
13.Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decisions to Enter the
Korean War, (Stanford, Calif, 1960).
14.Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-
351
American Confrontation, (New York, 1994), p. 2.
15.David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, (London, 1964).
16.Chen Jian, "Chinese Policy and the Korean War', pp. 189-205 in
Lester H. Brune (Ed). The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature
and Research, (Westport, Conn & London, 1996), pp. 191-3.
17.lbid, p. 191.
18.Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, Chap 3 especially pp. 44-6.
19.1bid, pp. 106-9.
20. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Vol II: The Roaring of
the Cataract, (Princeton. New Jersey, 1990).
21. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, Chap 1; See also Shu
Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean
War, 1950-1953, (Lawrence, Kansas, 1995).
22. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, Chap 5.
23. My research has shown that Allen Whiting did not usually move in
either the liberal or conservative circles and as his literature shows he
tended towards think tanks and government work.
24. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. viii.
25.Judith Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government: The Chrysantheum
on the Sword", pp. 67 - 107 in Edward Friedman & Mark Selden (eds),
America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on Asian-American Relations.
(New York. 1971). p. 95; Michael H. Hunt. Lyndon Johnson's War:
America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968, (New York,
1996), p. 104; Walter La Feber, The American Age: United States
Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad since 1750, (New York & London,
352
1989), pp. 579-580.
26. Chen Jian in Brune (Ed), The Korean War, pp. 196-9.
27. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, Chap 1.
28.lyndon Baines Johnson library, National Security Files, Country File-
China, Box 238, Folder: China, Memos Vol III, 4-65-6/65, Memo
Thomas Hughes (State Department, INR) to McGeorge Bundy, May
18,1965 & Memo Nagle (Chairman, FAR) to Members of the Foreign
Area Research Coordination Group (FAR), May 5, 1965, Subject:
Statement of the Position of the FAR China Subcommittee on External
Research Priorities.
29.lbid, Memo Nagle to members of FAR, p. 2.
3~.Ibid, p. 1.
31.lbid, p. 1.
32. Whiting cited in ibid, p. 1.
33. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. x.
34.lbid, pp. 1-2.
35.lbid, p. 2.
36.lBJl, NSF Files, Country File - China, Box 238, Folder: China,
Memos Vol III, 4/65-6/65, Memo Hughes to McGeorge Bundy, May
18,1965.
37.lBJL, NSF Files, Country File - China, Box 238, Folder: China,
Memos Vol III, 4/65-6/65, Document: "Statement of the Position of the
FAR China Subcommittee on External Research Priorities". Date:
April, 1965.
38.lbid.
353
39.lbid.
40. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, p. 267.
41.Hucker, The Association forAsian Studies, p. 77.
42.lbid, p. 78.
43. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 268 & 316-7.
44.lbid, p. 270; See also articles by James Peck, "The Roots of Rhetoric:
The Professional Ideology of America's China Watchers", pp. 40-66 &
Judith Coburn, "Asian Scholars and Government: The Chrysantheum
on the Sword" which are both located in Friedman & Selden (eds),
America's Asia; Far Eastern Economic Review, May 22, 1969 has a
long article on the disputes within the profession written by Dick
Wilson which is a good introduction to the areas of controversy.
Finally, the CCAS journal Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars had
regular features on the activities of the JCCC. See for example the
Summer-Autumn edition of 1971.
45. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol 5, No 1, (July 1973), p. 75.
46.lbid, p. 75; New York Times, James Reston, "New China Hands";
Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 211-213.
47.Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol5 No 1, (July 1973), p. 76 &
Vol 5 No 2, (October, 1973), pp. 62-3.
48. George Taylor cited in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, October
1973, Vol 5 No 2, p. 63.
354
49. Taylor cited in ibid, p. 63.
50. Bulletin ofConcemed Asian Scholars, Vo15, No 1, (July, 1973), pp. 74
& 76.
51.lbid, pp. 74-5.
52. Ibid, p. 75.
53. The SCAS charges are cited in ibid, p. 75.
54. SCAS cited in ibid, p. 75.
55. Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's
China Policy, 1949-1979, (Westport, Conn & London, 1984) focuses
on the issue of the influence of public opinion on America's China
policy.
56. CFR cited in A. T. Steele, The American People and China: A Volume
in the "Ine United States and China in World Affairs" series, CFR,
(New York, Toronto & London, 1966), p. XV. Also noted is a grant
from the Ford Foundation, which made the study possible and is
described as ·generous".
57. For details of the methodology adopted by Steele see ibid, pp. 2-3.
58. Steele cited ibid, p. 1.
59. Ibid, pp. 78-9.
60.lbid, p. 210.
61.lbid, p. 80.
62.lbid, p. 84.
63.lbid, p. 75.
64. Cited in ibid, p. 85.
65.lbid, p. 87.
355
66.lbid, p. 80.
67.lbid, p. 80.
68. Steele cited ibid, p. 80.
69.lbid, pp. 122-3.
70.lbid, pp. 129-130.
71.lbid, p. 2.
72. The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China, A Report
Prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, Survey Research
Center, University of Michigan, (New York, 1964).
73. Steele, The American People and China, pp. 244-5 & 247.
74. The government's view of The American Public's View of U.S. Policy
Toward China, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, can
be found in John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Thomson Papers, Box
16, Far East, 1961-1966 Communist China, Folder, "The American
Public's View of US Policy Toward China" - Council on Foreign
Relations, 12/15/64, Thomson concludes that the study "takes no
stand, expressed or implied, on American policy".
75. China Quarterly, 1964, No 22 pp. 207-8, has a good review of the
SRC study by Harold Kahn who finds its conclusions "at once
sobering and encouraging". The general ignorance of the US public is
mentioned on p. 208.
76.lbid, p. 208.
77.lbid, p. 208.
78.lbid, p. 208.
79. The Lou Harris poll of 1966 can be found in LBJL, WHCF, Country
356
Files, Box 22, Folder, CO-SO-2, PRC, S/17/66, Memo Hayes Redmon
to Bill Moyers.
80. Lou Harris cited in ibid. The quote is underlined in the original that
seems to accept an acknowledgement that this is a legitimate reading
of the statistics.
81. Stanley. D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, (New York,
1976), Chapter 10 charts the decline of the China Lobby in the 1960s.
82. The Washington Post, November 29, 1964 article is cited in Steele,
The American People and China, p. 239.
83. Report cited in Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol 47, (January 7,
1965), p. 1S.
84. Report cited in ibid, p. 1S.
8S. Report cited in ibid, p. 1S.
86. Report cited in ibid, p. 1S.
87.lbid, p. 1S; Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol 48, (April 8, 1965), p.
69.
88. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol 48, (April 8, 1965), p. 69.
89.lbid, p. 69.
90.FarEastern Economic Review, Vol49, (July 8, 1965), p. 8S..
91. For example many business leaders joined the National Committee on
US-China Relations whose work is covered in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
92. Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1984,
(New York, 1985), p. 212.
93.lbid, p. 213.
94. There have been a number of excellent accounts of the Cuban Missile
357
Crisis. For a good general overview see Thomas Paterson & Dennis
Merrill (eds), Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol II:
Since 1914, (Lexington, Mass & Toronto), Chap 10.
95. La Feber, The American Age, p. 568.
96.lbid, p. 572.
97.Thomas Reeves, A Question of Character: The Life of John F.
Kennedy, (New York & Ontario, 1991).
98.Hilsman's approach to Sino-American relations and his attempts to
model US policy towards the PRC on what he perceives to be
Kennedy's Soviet policy is covered in Chapter 4.
99.This theme is best summed up in Hilsman's December 1963 speech
when he stated that: "We believe ... that policies of strength and
firmness, accompanied by a constant readiness to negotiate -
policies long and effectively pursued with the Soviet Union -- will best
promote the changes which must take place on the China mainland".
JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 10, Folder, Speeches, 1961-1966, R.
Hilsman, 12/13/63, San Francisco, Correspondence and Press,
12/9163-12/17/63, Memo Neubert to Rice, December 13,1963.
100. Gabriel Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomyofa War, 1940-1975, (Toronto,
1986), pp. 111-4.
101. Ibid, Part One is the best overall introduction to the situation that
confronted the US in Vietnam.
102. La Feber, The American Age, pp. 563-5 & 577-81 explores these
choices briefly but identifies the salient points that led to the
escalations by the US.
358
103. Ibid, pp. 563-5 & 577-81.
104. Ibid, p. 579.
105. Ibid, p. 579; Michael Hunt, Lyndon Johnson's War, pp. 92-4 has a
good section on the Johns Hopkins speech.
106. la Feber, The American Age, p. 579; Marilyn Young, The Vietnam
Wars, 1945-1990, (New York, 1991), pp. 29-31.
107. la Feber, The American Age, pp. 579-80.
10B. There are a number of these conservative accounts of the Vietnam
War which stress that the US political leaders were unwilling to allow
the military to pursue the objective of total victory. The most famous
of these Guenter lewy, America in Vietnam, (New York, 197B).
109. Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, (london,
1976), captures this well in Chaps 9-12.
110. I found that there were dozens of boxes dealing with presidential
correspondence and decisions dealing with Vietnam.
111. la Feber, The American Age, pp. 586-9. The classic example of
this lack of credibility was the decision by the South Vietnamese
leader Nguyen Van Thieu to sabotage the peace talks in order to wait
out the Johnson Administration in the hope of getting better terms and
support from Nixon. For details of this see Young, The Vietnam Wars,
pp.233-4.
112. Immanuel HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (New York, 1975), p.
897.
113. The issue of the Chinese development of nuclear weapons and the
US reaction is covered in Chapters 4 and 5.
359
114. He Di is cited in Warren Cohen & Akira Iriye (Eds), The Great
Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960, (New York, 1990), p. 222.
115. Immanuel HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (New York & Oxford,
1995), p. 664. Chapter 26 is a good introductory overview of the early
years of CCP rule in China.
116. Ibid, p. 664.
117. Ibid,p.664.
118. Moise cited in Edwin E. Moise, The Present and the Past: Modem
China: A History, (london & New York, 1986), p. 151.
119. Ibid, p. 151; HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1995), pp. 655-8.
120. Moise, The Present and the Past, p. 151 & 155.
121. Ibid, p. 151; HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1995), p. 657.
122. Moise, The Present and the Past, p. 155; HsO, The Rise of Modem
China, (1995), p. 694.
123. HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1995), p. 694.
124. Ibid, pp. 694-5.
125. Akira lriye & Warren Cohen (Eds), The United States and Japan in
the Postwar World, (lexington, Kentucky, 1989), (Hosoya), p. 31.
126. I have never found individual assessments of Chinese leaders or
assessments of the potential changes that might arise should Mao be
replaced nor evidence of it being placed on an agenda for a meeting.
127. This is covered in Chapter 3 of the thesis.
128. A good example of this general reference to future Chinese
leaders is a speech given by Roger Hilsman in San Francisco in
November 1964 after he had left the State Department. In the
360
speech, Hilsman made a point of talking of a second echelon of
Chinese leaders who would be soon coming to power and whom he
was certain would see the world differently. Hilsman concluded by
stating that: "As time goes on these second echelon leaders will come
to power. As time goes on the Sino-Soviet dispute will also mature.
think it would be wise of the United States to continue to deal firmly
with aggression. But I think it would be equally wise of the United
States to lay the groundwork now that will permit flexibility later". The
text of the speech can be found in Library of Congress, Harriman
Papers, Box 467, Folder, Hilsman, Roger, Text of speech by Roger
Hilsman, November 1964.
129. HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1995), p. 695.
130. Ibid, p. 695.
131. Ibid, pp. 695-7.
132. Ibid, pp. 672-3.
133. Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Sino-American Reconciliation,
(Baltimore & London, 1978), p. 5 & 13.
134. Ibid, p. 21.
135. Ibid, p. 29. Barbara Tuchman's interesting assessment can be
found in her article, "If Mao had come to Washington: An Essay in
Alternanves", Foreign Affairs, (October 1972).
136. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, pp. 17-9.
137. Ibid, pp. 15-6.
138. Ibid, pp. 21-2; HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1995), pp. 660-1.
139. Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War, p. 21.
361
140. Ibid, p. 23; HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1995), p. 662.
141. HsO, The Rise of Modern China, (1975), p. 894.
142. Sutter, China-Watch, pp. 42-3.
143. Zhou En-Iai is cited in Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p.
117; Sutter, China-Watch, p. 67.
144. In fact, if anything, the message from Zhou in 1971 was even
tougher than their statement of 1955. On December 9, 1971 a
communication came from Zhou stating that: "In order to discuss, the
subject of the vacation of Chinese territories called Taiwan, a special
envoy of President Nixon's will be most welcome in Peking (Beijing)".
See Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, (New York, 1978), p. 350;
Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (London, 1979), pp. 700-1
& 703-4.
145. Sutter, China-Watch, p. viii; John Gittings, "The Great Power
Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy", in China Quarterly, No 39,
(July, 1969), pp. 41-54, p. 51; For details of the relevant section of the
Shanghai Communique see, HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1975),
pp. 905-6; Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 524.
146. HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1975), p. 794.
147. As India was to discover in October 1962.
148. Cohen & Iriye (Eds), The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960,
(He Di), pp. 231-2.
149. Ibid, pp. 231-2 & Warren Cohen pp. 8-9.
150. Ibid, pp. 240-1
151. Ibid, p. 242.
-,,)0£
152. Mao cited in Ibid, p. 242.
153. Chester Bowles, "The "China Problem" Reconsidered", in Foreign
Affairs, pp. 476-486, April 1960, Vol 38 No 3, p. 481: "The native
Formosans, the Nationalist Chinese and the world generally must be
convinced that our objective is not to create a military base for the
invasion of the mainland but to encourage the orderly growth of a
new, independent nation".
154. Cohen & Iriye (Eds), The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953-1960,
(He Di), pp. 236-7.
155. Ibid, p. 237.
156. HsO, The Rise of Modern China, (1975), p. 720; Han Su Yin,
Eldest Son: Zhou En-Iai and the Making of Modern China, 1898-1976,
(London, 1994), pp. 291-2.
157. Kolko, Vietnam, p. 403.
158. Ibid, p. 403.
159. HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (1975), p. 843; Gareth Porter, A
Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement,
(Bloomington & London, 1975), pp. 42-3.
160. Porter, A Peace Denied, pp. 42-3.
161. Moise, The Present and the Past, p.190.
162. Ibid, p. 190. Most recent reports have put the number of Chinese
military personnel in North Vietnam during the 1960s at about
320,000. (Figures from the H-Net discussion group H-Diplo, July
1999).
163. People's Daily, 29, March, 1966 cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers,
363
Box 17, Far East, 1961-1966, Communist China, Folder, General,
3/21/66-3/31/66.
164. Zhou cited in Han Su Yin, Eldest Son, p. 296.
165. Mao cited in Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, (1975), p. 726.
166. Rusk's position on Taiwan is covered in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
364
CHAPTER SEVEN: FOOTNOTES:
1. Paul Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of
Modem China, (Oxford, 1985), p. 248.
2. Ibid, p. 252.
3. Robert Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy, (New York,
1989), p. 79.
4. A. T. Steele, The American People and China: A Volume in the Series
"The United States and China in World Affairs", (New York, Toronto &
London, 1966). The importance of the book is dealt with in detail in
Chapter six of this thesis.
5. Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and
the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford, California, 1990), p. 274.
6. CFR 1966 handbook cited in Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and
Foreign Policy: America's China Policy. 1949-1979, (Westport, Conn
& London, 1984), p. 127.
7. Stanley Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, (New York, 1976),
p. 231; United States Policy Toward Asia: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd
Session, Vol I, Jan 25, 26, 27, & Feb 1,2,3,1966, & Vol II Feb 15 &
16, March 8, 9, 10 & 16, (US Government Printing Office, Washington,
1966).
8. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger, p. 79; U.S. Policy with Respect to
Mainland China: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session on U.S Policy
365
with Respect to Mainland China, March 8,10,16,18,21,28 & 30,
1966, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1966); Marilyn B.
Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990, (New York, 1991), p. 205.
9. J. William Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power, (New York, 1966), pp.
155-6 & 198.
10. U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 1.
11. Barnett cited in ibid, p. 4.
12.lbid, p. 4.
13. Barnett cited in ibid, p. 8.
14. Barnett cited in ibid, p. 12.
15.lbid, pp. 40 & 43.
16.Fulbright cited in Evans, John Fairbank and the American
Understanding of Modern China, p. 252.
17. Fairbank cited in ibid, p. 252.
18. U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings Before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 98.
19. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
China, p. 252.
20. Fairbank cited in U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China:
Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 132.
21. Eckstein cited in ibid, pp. 338-9.
22.lbid, pp. 70 & 134-43.
23.lbid, p. 336.
24. Eckstein cited in ibid, pp. 336-7.
366
25. Fairbank cited in ibid, pp. 122-3.
26.lbid, pp. 1 contains a list of the guest speakers, see also pp. 180, 270-
1, 375 & 549; Robert G. Sutter, The China Quandary: Domestic
Determinants of U.S. China Policy: 1972-1982, (Boulder, Colorado,
1983), p. 18 notes the similarity between the majority of speakers and
identifies key three demands that they were all making. Firstly, that
the US should recognise the PRC government. Secondly, that it
should allow trade in non-strategic items and thirdly that it should
allow the PRC into the UN.
27. U. S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 125.
28.Pell and Lindbeck are cited in ibid, p. 217.
29.lbid, pp. 626 & 629; Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 234;
JFKL (John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library), Thomson Papers, Box 17,
Far East, 1961-6, Communist China, Folder: General, 3/21/66-
3/31/66.
30. U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, p. 269.
31. Fulbright cited in ibid, p. 272.
32.lbid, pp. 484-9.
33. Rowe cited in ibid, p. 500.
34.lbid, pp. 522; 531-42.
35. Brigadier Samuel Griffith is cited in an article by Joseph Kraft in the
Washington Post, February 25, 1966. A copy of the article can be
located in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 16. Far East, 1961-6,
Communist China, 1/66-2/66.
367
36.Chester Cooper cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East,
1961-6, Communist China, "The Policy Maker and Mainland China",
Council on Foreign Relations, 6/10/66, p. 14.
37. U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China: Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, pp. 4 & 214.
38. Thomson is cited in U.S. Relations with the PRC, Hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, June
24, 25, 28, 29 & July 20, 1971, (U.S. Govt Printing Office,
Washington, 1972), p. 176.
39.lbid, p. 176.
40. Thomson is cited in ibid, p. 176.
41. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
China, p. 266.
42.lbid, p. 266.
43. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Oral History, James Thomson Jr, 22
July, 1971, p. 42; LBJL, National Security File, Name File, Box 8,
Folder, Thomson Memos, Memo Thomson to Moyers, March 15,
1966.
44. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, Box 239, Folder, China, Memos, Vol VI,
3/66-9/66, Memo Thomson to Valenti, March 1, 1966, Subject: Some
Propositions on China Strategy, p. 1.
45.lbid, pp. 1-2.
46.lbid, p. 2.
47.lbid, pp. 2-3.
48.lbid, pp. 2-4.
368
49.lbid, p. 4.
50. Thomson cited in LBJL, OH, Thomson, p. 43.
51. Valenti cited in LBJL, WHCF, Confidential File, Box 6, Folder, Co 1-3,
Asia, 1966, Eyes Only Memo Valenti to Rusk, March 1, 1966.
52. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Memos, Vol
VII, 9/66-11/66, Panel on China, the United Nations and United States
Policy, July 6, 1966.
53. Ibid.
54. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
China, pp. 260-1; John King Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty-Year
Memoir, (New York, 1982), p. 397.
55. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 260-1; Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 397.
56. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 260-1; Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 397.
57. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 260-1; Fairbank, Chinabound, p. 397.
58.LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 241, Folder, China, Memos, Vol
IX, 3/67-6/67, (1 of 2), Note for Rostow from Jenkins, May 23, 1967,
Subject, China and Asia Panels.
59. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder, China, Memos, Vol
VIII, 12/66-3/67, Memo Jenkins to Rostow, February 3, 1967. Subject.
Highlights of China Panel Meetings, February 1-2.
60.lbid, p. 2.
61.lbid, p. 4.
369
62.LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 241, Folder, China Memos, Vol
IX, 3/67-6/67, Memo Jenkins to Rostow, June 23, 1967, Subject,
China Panel.
63.lbid, p. 1.
64.lbid, p. 2.
65.lbid, p. 2.
66. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, pp. 264-5/
67.lbid, pp. 260-1.
68. The campaign was started by Thomson and the earliest mention of it
was found by me in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 13, Far East, 1961-
6, General, Folder, Thomson-Cooper, Memoranda, 4/64-1/66, Memo
for Bundy, January 7, 1966, Subject, The New Year in Asia, mentions
that a Memo exists dated January 6, 1966 making a recommendation
that Reischauer be appointed Ambassador at Large with special
responsibility for China policy. Further evidence of Thomson's
involvement can be found in LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 8, Folder,
Thomson Memos, Memo Thomson to McGeorge Bundy, February 4,
1966, Subject, Seventh Floor Assignment for Ambassador
Reischauer?
69. McGeorge Bundy cited in LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 8, Folder,
Thomson Memos, Memo McGeorge Bundy to William Bundy,
February 6, 1966. Moyers support for the appointment can be found
in LBJL, WHCF, Countries (CO), Box 21, Folder: Co China (EX),
Memo Moyers to LBJ, January 18, 1966.
370
70. Edwin. O. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, (New
York, 1996), pp. 296.
71.lbid, pp. 296 & 301.
72.lbid, p. 300.
73.lbid, p. 301.
74. Humphrey cited in JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 11, Speeches, 1961-
6, Hubert Humphrey, 6/8/66, West Point, New York.
75. Johnson cited in James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of u.S. China
Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", The China Quarterly,
April-June 1972, p. 241; see also LBJL, OH, Thomson, p. 44.
76. Johnson cited in James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China
Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics", The China Quarterly,
April-June 1972, p. 241.
77.Johnson cited in ibid, p. 241; see also Immanuel C.Y. HsO, The Rise
of Modem China, (New York, 1975), p. 896.
78. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 116.
79. Chang, Friends and Enemies, pp. 272-3.
80.lbid, pp. 272-3.
81.FarEastem Economic Review, Vol 57, No 3, July 20,1967; Nixon's
use of the Romanians to send a message to the PRC can be found in
Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (London, 1979), p. 181.
82.Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol 57, No 3, July 20,1967.
83.Zhou En-Iai cited in Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol 52, June 23,
1966, p. 584.
84.People's Daily, March 31,1966, p. 1. A copy of the article plus a
371
commentary on it can be found in LBJL, WHCF (Confidential File),
Box 7, Folder: CO-SO-China, Memo Thomson to Rostow, Moyers and
Valenti, April 2, 1966, Subject: Peking's Response to Indications of
U.S. Flexibility on China Policy.
85. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White
House, (New York, 1983), p. 496.
86. Chang, Friends and Enemies, p. 273; LBJL, NSF, Country Files,
China, Box 240, Folder: China, Memos Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, Note
Jenkins to Rostow, September 1, 1966, Subject: DOD Interest in
Chirep.
87.LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Memos Vol
VII, 9/66-11/66, Note Jenkins to Rostow, September 1, 1966, Subject:
DOD Interest in Chirep.
88. The US Chiefs of Mission in East Asia are cited in Akira Iriye &
Warren Cohen (eds), The United States and Japan in the Postwar
World, (Lexington, Kentucky, 1989), p. 55.
89.lbid, p. 55.
90.lbid, p. 55.
91. LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Cables, Vol
VII, 9/66-11/66, CIA -Intelligence Information Cable, September 19,
1966, Subject: Mao's Strategy, p. 15.
92.lbid, p. 19.
93. The origins of this study can be found in Chapter Five of this thesis.
94. LBJL, NSF, Country Files, China, Box 240, Folder, China, Memos Vol
VII, 9/66-11/66, Note Thomson to Rostow, August 4, 1966.
372
95.lbid.
96. Thomson cited in ibid.
97.lbid.
98. LBJL, NSF, Name File, Box 5, Folder, Jenkins, Memo Jenkins to
Rostow, September 14, 1966, Subject: Interagency China Country
Committee.
99.lbid.
100. Ibid, p. 3.
101. Ibid, p. 2.
102. LBJL, NSF, Country File, China, Box 240, Folder: China, Memos,
Vol VII, 9/66-11/66, Memo Jenkins to Rostow, November 4, 1966.
103. Iriye & Cohen (Ed), The United States and Japan in the Postwar
World, p. 56; Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, p. 118.
104. Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in
Bureaucratic Politics", China Quarterly, p. 242; Kusnitz, Public Opinion
and Foreign Policy, p. 117.
105. Thomson, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in
Bureaucratic Politics", China Quarterly, p. 242.
106. Wall Street Journal, November 14, 1967. Jenkins picked up the
article and sent a copy to Rostow which can be found in LBJL, NSF,
Country Files, China, Box 242, Folder: China Memos, Vol XI. 9/67-
12/67, Note Jenkins to Rostow, November 15, 1967, Subject: After
Mao.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
373
109. LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 55-6; Reischauer, My Life Between
Japan and America, pp. 296 & 301.
110. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, p. 317.
111. Ibid, pp. 296 & 301; LBJL, WHCF (Confidential File), Box 7,
Folder, CO 50-1, Formosa, Text of Cable from Ambassador
Reischauer (Tokyo, 1126), August 13, 1966.
112. Reischauer cited in LBJL, WHCF (Confidential File), Box 7, Folder,
CO 50-1, Formosa, Text of Cable from Ambassador Reischauer
(Tokyo, 1126), p. 6.
113. Reischauer cited in ibid, p. B.
114. LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 55-6.
115. Thomson cited in ibid, p. 56.
116. Ibid, p. 61.
117. Thomson cited in ibid, p. 61.
118. Ibid,pp.61-2.
119. Ibid, p. 62.
120. Ibid, pp 56-60.
121. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
China, p. 260; JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East, 1961-6,
Folder, Genera17/66-8/66 holds a series of documents on the
National Committee on US-China Relations and their work. This
includes their initial press releases and a list of founder members.
122. JFKL, Thomson Papers, Box 17, Far East, 1961-6, Folder,
GeneraI7166-BI66.
123. Ibid.
374
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modern
China, p. 260.
133. Ibid, p. 260; Steele's thesis is covered in Chapter Six of this thesis.
134. LBJL, Box 2, Meeting Notes File, Folder, February 2, 1968,
Meeting with China Experts.
135. Ibid, p. 1.
136. Ibid, p. 1.
137. Ibid, p. 2.
138. LBJ cited in ibid, p. 3.
139. Eckstein cited in ibid, pp. 3-4.
140. Ibid, pp. 4-5.
141. LBJL, Box 22, WHCF, Country Files Folder, CO 50-2, PRC, Memo
on China Policy, From National Committee on US-China Relations to
LBJ, February 12, 1968, The Memo notes that the Committee itself
takes no position but all the academics apart from Taylor hold the
position outlined in the Memo, pp. 1-2.
142. Ibid, p. 1.
375
143. Ibid, p. 3.
144. LBJL, Box 22, WHCF, Country Files Folder, CO 50-2, PRC, Letter
Taylor to Rostow, February 14, 1968.
145. LBJL, Box 22, WHCF, Country Files Folder, CO 50-2, PRC, Memo
Rostow to LBJ, February 22, 1968; LBJL, Box 3D,NSF, Memos to the
President, Folder, Vol 64, Feb 22-29, 1969 (2 of 2), Memo Rusk to
LBJ, February 22, 1968, Subject, Policy toward Communist China.
146. Rostow cited in LBJL, Box 22, WHCF, Country Files Folder, CO
50-2, PRC, Memo Rostowto LBJ, February 22,1968, p.1.
147. Rostow cited in ibid, p. 1.
148. Ibid, p. 3.
149. Ibid, p. 2.
150. LBJL, Box 3D,NSF, Memos to the President, Folder, Vol64,
February 22-29,1969 (2 of2), Memo Rusk to LBJ, February 22,1968,
Subject, Policy toward Communist China.
151. Rusk cited in ibid, p. 1.
152. Ibid, p. 3.
153. Rusk cited in ibid, p. 5.
154. Ibid, p. 5.
155. LBJL, OH, Thomson, pp. 40-2.
156. Thomson cited ibid, p. 40.
157. LBJL, Box 243, NSF Files, Folder, China Memos (cant), Vol XII,
12/67-6/68,Memo Rostow to LBJ, February 20, 1968. The issue was
heightened by a report in the Washington News on February 10, 1968
which reported the shooting down of the aircraft.
376
CHAPTER EIGHT: FOOTNOTES:
1. Herbert S. Parmet, Richard Nixon and his America, (London, Boston
& Toronto, 1990), Chaps 5-8; Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The
Education ofa Politician, 1913-1962, (London, 1987), Chaps 8-11.
2. Parmet, Richard Nixon and his America, p. 210.
3. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician, p. 249.
4. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York, 1978),
p.119.
5. Nixon cited in Parmet, Richard Nixon and his America, p. 313.
6. Nixon cited in Ibid, p. 315.
7. E. J. Kahn Jr, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers
and What Befell Them, (New York, 1972), pp. 247-8.
8. Nixon cited in Parmet, Richard Nixon and his America, p. 316.
9. Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and
the Soviet Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford, Calif, 1990), pp.109-110.
10.Nixon cited in Ibid, p. 112.
11. Nixon cited in Ibid, p. 112.
12.lbid, p. 112.
13. Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power: Nixon's and
Kissinger's Foreign Policy and its Effects, (London, 1973), pp. 181-2.
14. Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White
House, (New York, 1983); Marvin Kalb & Bernard Kalb, Kissinger,
(London, 1974), pp. 217-8.
15. George Dixon cited in Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 350 & Kalbs,
Kissinger, pp. 217-8.
377
16. Public Records Office, FO 371 148577.
17. Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 350.
18. For example, in October 1970 Nixon told Time magazine that: "If there
is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China. If I don't I
want my children to". Nixon cited in Hersh, The Price of Power, p.
365.
19.Thomas Reeves, A Question of Character: The Life of JFK, (New York
& Ontario, 1991), p. 211.
20.Nixon cited in Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 218.
21. Stanley 8achrack, The Committee of One Million, (New York, 1976),
p. 181. Nixon refers to the meeting in Richard Nixon, Six Crises.
(New York, 1962), pp. 408-9.
22.8achrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 181.
23.lbid, p. 181.
24.1. M. Oestler, Haruhiro Fukui & Hideo Sato, The Textile Wrangle:
Conflict in Japanese Relations, 1969-1971, (Ithaca & London, 1979),
p.166.
25. Lloyd Gardner (Ed), The Great Nixon Turnaround: America's New
Foreign Policy in the Post-Liberal Era, (New York, 1973), p. 23.
26. C. L. Sulzberger, The World and Richard Nixon, (New York, 1987), p.
157.
27. Edwin Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, (New York,
1986), p. 264.
28.lbid, p. 264.
29. William Safire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate
378
White House, (New York, 1975), p. 474.
3~. Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990, (New York, 1991),
p.267.
31. Yale University Library, Bowles Papers, Box 336, Folder 187, Letter
Bowles to Rusk, April 27, 1967, Subject: About Nixon's Recent Visit to
India.
32.Nixon cited in Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 218.
33. Nixon cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation:
American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, (Washington,
1985), p. 214; Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 350-1; Arnold Xiangze
Jiang, The United States and China, (Chicago & London, 1988), p.
160.
34. Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 351.
35. The best biography of Henry Kissinger is Walter Isaacson, Kissinger,
(New York, 1992).
36. Kalbs, Kissinger, pp. 53-5 & 218; Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 351-
2.
37.Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York, 1994), pp. 588-9.
38. Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 218; Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, (New York,
1978), p. 395.
39. Nelson Rockefeller cited in Henry Kissinger, The White House Years,
(London, 1979), p. 165.
40. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, p. 182.
41. The State Department Bulletin is entitled: "Ihe New China Policy" and
was published on March 13, 1972. The quotation taken from it can be
379
found in Gardner (Ed), The Great Nixon Turnaround, p. 106.
42. Nixon memo cited in Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 220; Vernon Walters, Silent
Missions, (New York, 1978), pp. 525-6; Garthoff, Detente and
Confrontation, p. 214.
43. Kevin Quigley, MA Thesis, "The Nixon Presidency and the Search for
a New U.S. Policy in Asia", Warwick University, November 1993, pp.
28-9.
44. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 22-3.
45.lbid, p. 112; Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 169-70.
46. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 113-4; Kissinger, The White House
Years, pp. 169-70 & 173.
47.Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 216.
48.lbid, p. 216.
49.lbid, p. 216.
50. Ibid, p. 216; Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 180.
51. Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 169; Kissinger, The White House Years, p.
170; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 218 & 255; Hersh, The
Price of Power, p. 352.
52. Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 222; Brandon, The Retreat of American Power, p.
70.
53.Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 118 & 132; Hersh, The Price of
Power, p. 356; Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 180-1.
54. Nixon cited in Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 134.
55. Immanuel HsO, The Rise of Modem China, (New York & Oxford,
1995), pp. 683-4.
380
56. Ibid, pp. 683-4; Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 357.
57. Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 357.
58. Ibid, p. 357.
59. HsO, The Rise of Modern China, p. 684; Kissinger, The White House
Years, p. 183.
60. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 87.
61. Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 182; Garthoff, Detente and
Confrontation, pp. 219-20.
62. Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 183; Kalbs, Kissinger, pp. 226-
7; Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 358.
63. Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 227.
64. Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American
Foreign Policy, (London, 1977), p. pp. 96-7; Hersh, The Price of
Power, p. 359.
65. Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 186.
66.Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 121; Hersh, The Price of Power, p.
359.
67. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 121-2; Kalbs, Kissinger, pp. 228-9;
Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 359; Kissinger, The White House
Years, p. 188.
68. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 123 & 204; Garthoff, Detente and
Confrontation, pp. 223-4; Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 686-
9; Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 360-1.
69. Stoessel cited in Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 223-4;
Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 360-1.
381
70.1 discuss the Nixon Doctrine and its significance in my unpublished
Masters. Kevin Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a
New US Policy in Asia, Chap 3.
71. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 186-7.
72.lbid, pp. 334-5.
73.lbid, p. 191.
74.lbid, p. 191.
75.lbid, p. 692; Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 283; Robert G. Sutter,
China-Watch: Sino-American Reconciliation, (Baltimore & London,
1978), p. 107.
76. HsO, The Rise of Modem China, Chap 28 gives a clear and precise
account of the Revolution and its affects on China. Jung Chang, Wild
Swans: Three Daughters of China, (London, 1991) is an extraordinary
account of the human suffering caused by it.
77. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, p. 240; Sutter, China-Watch,
p.65.
78. Sutter, China-Watch, p. 67.
79.lbid, p. 67; Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (New York, 1984), p.
637.
80. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, No 11, Winter 1998,
pp.155-75.
81.Jiang, The United States and China, p. 160.
82.lbid, p. 160; Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 111.
83. Cold War International History Project, No 11, Winter 1998, pp. 155-
75, Mao Zedong's Comments on an article by Commentator of
382
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Hongqi (Red Flag), January 1969.
The original document in Chinese can be located in Research
Materials on the Great Cultural Revolution: Vol II, (Beijing: National
Defense University, 1988), p. 517.
84. Cold War International History Project, No 11, Winter 1998, pp. 155-
75, Further Thoughts by Marshal Chen Yi on Sino-American
Relations. The original document in Chinese can be located in
Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, No 42, June 1992, pp. 86-7.
85.lbid.
86.Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New US Policy in
Asia, p. 31.
87. Karnow, Vietnam, p. 582.
88. Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New US Policy in
Asia, Chapter 2.
89.lbid, Chap 2.
90.lbid, pp. 14-7.
91.lbid, pp. 70-2.
92.lbid, pp. 70-2.
93.lbid, pp. 74-8.
94. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 413; Kissinger, The White House
Years, p. 749. In the speech given in Kansas on July 6,1971, Nixon
stated that: "What we see as we look ahead five years, ten years,
perhaps it is fifteen, but in any event, within our time, we see five great
economic superpowers: the United States, Western Europe, the
Soviet Union, mainland China, and, of course, Japan".
383
95.A. Doak Barnett & Edwin O. Reischauer (Eds with the assistance of
Lois Dougan Tretiak), The United States and China: The Next
Decade, (New York, Washington & London, 1970) contains the
transcripts from the conference.
96. Documents on the convocation can be found in National Archives II,
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, White House Central File,
Subject Files, [EX], Countries Category: CO 34-2, People's Republic
of China (Red China), 1969-1970.
97.lbid.
98.lbid. Barnett & Reischauer (eds with assistance from Tretiak), The
United States and China, p. XI claims the number who attended the
Convocation was 2,500.
99. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files, [EX],
Countries Category: CO 34-2, People's Republic of China (Red
China), 1969-1970, Letter, National Committee on US-China
Relations to Henry Kissinger, January 6, 1969.
100. This predominance is reflected in the contributions in Barnett &
Reischauer (Eds with assistance from Tretiak), The United States and
China.
101. Paul Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of
Modem China, (Oxford, 1985), p. 272.
102. Ibid, pp. 271-2.
103. Ibid, p. 272.
104. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol LXIV, No 16, April17, 1969,
pp. 134-5. There is a long analytical article on the convocation that
384
highlights the two Senators speeches by Dick Wilson.
105. Javits cited in Barnett & Reischauer (Eds with assistance from
Tretiak), The United States and China, p. 138.
106. Ibid, p. 139.
107. Edward Kennedy cited in Ibid, p. 146.
108. Kennedy cited in Ibid, p. 147.
109. Ibid, p. 148.
110. Kennedy cited in Ibid, pp. 148-9.
111. Kennedy cited in Ibid, p. 153.
112. Ibid, pp. 149-50.
113. Kennedy cited in Ibid, p. 151.
114. Ibid, p. 150.
115. Ibid, p. 152.
116. Kennedy cited in Ibid, p. 152.
117. A good account of the early years of the CCAS can be found in
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol 21, No 2-4, 1989, pp. 112-
35 by Douglas Allen. A specific reference to their attitude towards the
PRe can be found on p. 115.
118. Barnett & Reischauer (Eds with assistance from Tretiak), The
United States and China, p. 155.
119. Ibid, p.155.
120. Ibid, pp. 155-7.
121. Ibid, p. 157.
122. Kennedy cited in Ibid, p. 157.
123. Kennedy cited in Ibid, pp. 157-8.
385
124. Kennedy cited in Ibid, p. 159.
125. Kennedy cited in Ibid, p. 159.
126. Theodore Sorenson cited in Ibid, p. 224.
127. Examples of this line of thinking abound in the literature on Nixon's
opening to China. James Thomson Jr writing in the February 1969
edition of Atlantic Monthly provides a curious example. He writes that
a "Republican President, and preeminently this Republican President,
brings to the Chinese problem some very special assets ... Who, for
instance, can pin the label of "softness on Communism" on Richard M.
Nixon when he makes overtures to Peking? If little else is clear about
the new President, his anti-Communist credentials are impeccable.
The ironic fact is that any Republican would have greater domestic
room for manoeuvre on China policy than a Democrat, and that Mr.
Nixon will have more room than most Republicans".
128. Thomson cited in Barnett & Reischauer, The United States and
China, p. 221.
129. Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol LXIV, No 14, April3, 1969,
published the speech by Kennedy in its entirety (pp. 22-6) and its
editorial praised the speech and the mood of the convocation in
general.
130. George Taylor cited in Barnett & Reischauer, The United States
and China, p. 206.
131. U.S. Relations with the PRC, Hearings Before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, US Senate, 92nd Congress, June 24, 25, 28, 29 &
July 20, 1971, (Washington, 1972).
386
132. Ibid. Fulbright is cited on p. 182 & Whiting's view is outlined on p.
191.
133. Ibid, pp. 180-1.
134. Thomson is cited in Ibid, pp. 180-1.
135. Thomson is cited in Ibid, p. 225.
136. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files,
Countries Category [Gen], Box 5, CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970), Letter A.
Doak Barnett to Kissinger, December 12, 1968.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files,
Countries Category, [GenJ, Box 5, CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970), Letter
Barnett to Kissinger, December 18, 1968.
140. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files,
Countries Category, [Genl, Box 5, CO 1-3,Asia (1969-1970),
Document "The United States and Asia", pp. 2-3, 5,9-10.
141. Ibid, p. 9.
142. Ibid, pp. 16-7.
143. This subject is covered well in William Bordern, The Pacific
Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade
Recovery: 1945-1955, (Madison, Wisconsin, 1984).
144. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files,
Countries Category, [Gen], Box 5, CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970),
Document "The United States and Asia", pp. 4 & 16-17. The authors
say that they have covered the issue of Vietnam in another position
387
paper.
145. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files,
Box4, Countries Category, [EX], CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970),
Memorandum Kissinger to Nixon, Subject: Your Meeting with East
Asian Consultants, Thursday April24, 3.30P.M.
146. Ibid.
147. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files,
Box 4, Countries Category, [EX], CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970), Letter
Kissinger to Barnett, Pye, Reischauer, Rosovsky & Taylor, April18,
1969.
148. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files,
Box 4, Countries Category. [EX], CO 1-3, Asia (1969-1970), Letter
Barnett to Nixon, May 1, 1969.
149. Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 502.
150. NA II, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, WHCF, Subject Files,
[EX], CO 34-2, 1/8n1-31/9n1, Letter Clark MacGregor to John
Rousselot, August 24, 1971.
151. Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 363; Quigley, The Nixon Presidency
and the Search for a New US Policy in Asia, p. 90.
152. Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 696.
153. Ibid, pp. 698-9; Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 347-8.
154. Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 365; Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 234 reach
the same conclusion. They write that: "Given Nixon's determination to
start serious talks with the Chinese, it seems logical to assume that he
conveyed some hint of a possible American shift on the sensitive
388
Taiwan issue at this time".
155. Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 234.
156. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 349.
157. Ibid, p. 350; Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 364-5.
158. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 349; Hersh, The Price of Power, p.
365.
159. Jiang, The United States and China, p. 163; Kalbs, Kissinger, p.
235; Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 350-1; Hersh, The Price of
Power, pp. 366-7.
160. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 700-1.
161. Ibid, pp. 701-2.
162. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 398.
163. Ibid, p. 399; Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 712; Nixon, RN,
p.548.
164. Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 714.
165. Ibid, p. 717.
166. Ibid, p. 738-42.
167. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 411.
168. Ibid, p. 411.
169. Ibid, p. 414.
170. Ibid, p. 413; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp 232-3;
Kissinger, The White House Years, p. 748-53; Robert D. Schulzinger,
Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy, (New York, 1989), p. 91.
171. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 413.
172. Ibid, pp. 414-5.
389
173. Ibid, p. 415; Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 759-60.
174. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 775 & 782-3; Nixon, RN,
pp.555-6.
175. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 784-5; Jiang, The United
States and China, p. 165; Szulc, The Illusion of Peace. p. 502.
176. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 1049-50.
177. Nixon, RN, p. 562; Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, pp. 516-7.
178. HsO, The Rise of Modem China, p. 730.
179. Ibid, p. 730.
180. Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 1073-80.
181. Ibid, pp. 1075-80; Nixon cited in Hersh, The Price of Power, p.
497.
182. Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, p. 524.
183. Assessments of the US wording can be found on Hersh, The Price
of Power, p. 596; Jiang, The United States and China, p. 166; HsO,
The Rise of Modem China, pp. 729-30.
184. Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 497-9; H. R. Haldeman, The
Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, (New York, 1994),
pp.424-6.
185. Kalbs, Kissinger, p. 282.
186. Hersh, The Price of Power, pp. 500-2; HsO, The Rise of Modem
China, pp. 731-2; Quigley, The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a
New US Policy in Asia, p. 103.
187. HsO, The Rise of Modem China, pp. 731-2.
188. Walter Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 333.
390
189. Nixon cited in C. L. Sulzberger, The World and Richard Nixon, p.
186.
190. Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, pp. 1087-96; Roger
Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign
Policy, pp. 202-8; Immanuel HsO, The Rise of Modem China, pp. 731-
3.
191. HsO, The Rise of Modem China, p. 731; Robert G. Sutter, The
China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of US China Policy: 1972-
1982, (Boulder, Colorado, 1983), p. 20.
192. Sutter, The China Quandary, p. 20.
193. The moral void at the heart of Nixon's foreign policy is covered
thoroughly in Hersh, The Price of Power.
391
CONCLUSION: FOOTNOTES:
1. Leonard Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China
Policy, 1949-1979, (Westport, Conn & London, 1984).
2. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu; the Decisions to Enter the
Korean War, (New York, 1960).
3. Paul Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of
Modem China, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 338-9.
4. See for example, National Archives II, Nixon Presidential Materials
Project, White House Central File, Subject Files: Countries Category:
CO 34-2, People's Republic of China, 1/1n2 (2 of 3), Letter Kissinger
to Eckstein, September 6, 1972.
5. Ernest May & James Thomson Jr (eds), American-East Asian
Relations: A Survey, (Cambridge, Mass, 1972), p. 400.
6. This is one of the central arguments of my Masters Thesis. See Kevin
Quigley, MA Thesis, "The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a New
U.S. Policy in Asia", Warwick University, November 1993, Chap 7.
7. The role of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations) and their
influence on US Foreign Policy is considered in an article in the latest
edition of Diplomatic History (Summer 1999) by Akira Iriye. I have yet
to see the specific article but it has generated considerable debate on
the H-Net discussion group H-Diplo. H-Net is to be found on www.h-
net.msu.edu.
392
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS:
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
Bowles, Chester
Bundy, William P.
Cabot, John M.
Connell, William J.
Harriman, Averell W.
McCone, John A.
Rostow, Walt W.
Rusk, Dean
Taylor, Maxwe" D.
Thomson, James C.
Waldron, Robert
John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library
Bohlen, Charles
Bowles, Chester
Chiang Ching-kuo
Cooper, Chester
Dutton, Frederick
Fulbright, J. William
Harrison, Gilbart
Hodges, Luther
Mansfield, Mike
Parsons, Graham
393
Reischauer, Edwin O.
Thompson, llewellyn
ARCHIVAL SOURCES:
United Kingdom
Public Records Office:
F0371
United States
John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library
National Security Files
Countries, China
Regional Security, Southeast Asia
Meetings and Memoranda, Staff Memoranda
Meetings and Memoranda, National Security Action Memoranda
President's Office Files
Countries, China
White House Central Subject Files
Papers of Bernard Fall
Papers of Roger Hilsman
Papers of James Thomson
Papers of Arthur Schlesinger
Library of Congress
Papers of W. Averell Harriman
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library
National Security Files, Country Files
NSF, International Meetings and Travel File
394
NSF, Subject File
NSF, Agency File
NSF, Committee File, Committee on Nuclear Proliferation
NSF, Files of Alfred Jenkins
NSF, Name File
NSF, Intelligence File
NSF, National Security Action Memorandums
NSF, National Intelligence Estimates
NSF, Files of McGeorge Bundy
NSF, Files of Walt Rostow
NSF, National Security Council Histories
NSF, National Security Council Meetings
NSF, Memos to the President
Administrative Histories:
Agency for International Development
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
Department of State
United States Information Agency
White House Central Files, Civil Aviation
WHCF, Confidential File (CF)
WHCF, Countries (CO)
WHCF, Foreign Affairs (FO)
WHCF, International Organizations (IT)
Office Files of the White House Aides
Bellinger, Ceil
Cater, S. Douglass
Goodwin, Richard
Maguire, Charles
McPherson, Harry
Moyers, Bill
Panzer, Fred
Sparks, William
Cabinet Papers
Statements of Lyndon B. Johnson
Meeting Notes File
Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings
Senate Papers, 1949-1961
Vice-Presidential Papers, 1961-1963
Vice-Presidential Security Files
Papers of George W. Ball
Papers of William P. Bundy
Papers of Henry H. Fowler
Records From Government Agencies
Central Intelligence Agency
National Archives II
Nixon Presidential Materials Project
White House Central Files, Subject Files:
Countries Category: CO 34-2, People's Republic of China
Federal Government - - Organizations Category: FG 11, State
Department
395
396
Foreign Affairs Category: FO
International Organizations Category: IT
Trade Category: TA:
White House Special Files:
Dwight Chapin Files
Charles Colson Files
H. R. Haldeman Files
Egil Krogh Files
President's Personal Files
Special Staff Files
White House Central Files
Ron Ziegler Files
Yale University Library
Papers of Chester Bowles
PERODICALS:
Atlantic Monthly
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
China Quarterly
Diplomatic History
Far Eastern Economic Review
US GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS:
Asia, The Pacific, and The United States: Hearings before the Committee
on Foreign Relations, US Senate 90th Congress, First Session with
Former Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer, January 31, 1967,
(Washington, 1967).
397
East-West Trade: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,
U. S. Senate 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Part I, March 13, 16, 23, April
8, 9, 1964, (Washington, 1964).
Foreign Commerce Study [Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc}: Hearings
before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, (United
States Senate 86th Congress, 2nd Session, May 5 & 6, (Washington,
1960).
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol XIX, China,
(Washington, 1996).
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol XXII, Northeast
Asia, (Washington, 1996).
The Future United States Role in Asia and the Pacific: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House of
Representatives, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, February 29, March, 4, 7,
13, 14, 19, 20, April4, 1968, (Washington, 1968).
United States Foreign Policy: Asia: Studies Prepared at the Request of
the Committee on Foreign Relations (Conlon Associates), (Washington,
1960).
United States Policy With Respect to Mainland China: Hearings before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate 89th Congress,
Second Session on US Policy With Respect to Mainland China, March 8,
10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 30, 1966, (Washington, 1966).
United States Policy Toward Asia: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House
of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, January 25, 26, 27 &
398
February 1,2, 3, 1966, Part I, (Washington, 1966).
United States Policy Toward Asia: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
the Far East and the Pacific of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House
of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 1/, (Washington,
1966).
United States Relations with the People's Republic of China: Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate 92nd Congress,
June 24, 25, 28, 29 & July 20, 1971, (Washington, 1972).
BOOKS OF PRIMARY SOURCES:
Cold War International History Project Bulletins.
Thomas Etzold & John Lewis Gaddis (Eds), Containment: Documents on
American Policy and Strategy: 1945-1960, (New York, 1978).
H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House,
(New York, 1994).
Bruce Oudes (Ed), From: The President: Richard Nixon's Secret Files,
(London, 1989).
NONGOVERNMENTAL SOURCES:
The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China, A Report
Prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations, Survey Research Center,
University of Michigan, (New York, 1964).
MEMOIRS:
Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State
Department, (New York & London, 1987).
Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969,
(New York & London, 1971).
399
O. Edmund Clubb, The Witness and I, (New York & London, 1974).
John King Fairbank, Chinabound: A Fifty- Year Memoir, (New York, 1982).
H. R. Haldeman with Joseph DiMona, The Ends of Power, (New York,
1978).
Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the
Administration of John F. Kennedy, (New York, 1967).
Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China, (London, 1991).
Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (London, 1979).
Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (London, 1978).
Raymond Price, With Nixon, (New York, 1977).
Edwin O. Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, (New York,
1996).
William Satire, Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate
White House, (New York, 1975).
Vernon Walters, Silent Missions, (New York, 1978).
SECONDARY SOURCES:
Rudy Abramson, Spanning the Century: The Life ofW. Averell Hamman,
1891-1986, (New York, 1992).
Stephen Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913-1962,
(London, 1987).
Philip Armstrong, Andrew Glyn & John Harrison, Capitalism Since World
War II: The Making and Break-up of the Great Boom, (London, 1984).
Stanley D. Bachrack, The Committee of One Million, (New York, 1976).
Richard J. Barnet & Ronald E. MOiler, Global Reach: The Power of the
Multinational Corporations, (New York, 1974).
400
A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American
Policy, (New York, 1960).
A. Doak Barnett & Edwin o. Reischauer (Eds with the assistance of Lois
Dougan Tretiak), The United States and China: The Next Decade, (New
York, Washington & London, 1970).
Coral Bell, "Kissinger in Retrospect: The Diplomacy of Power-Concert",
International Affairs, Vol 53, No 2, April 1977, pp. 202-216.
Fred Bergsten, "The New Economic and US Foreign Policy", Foreign
Affairs, No 50, pp. 199-222.
Fred Block, The Origins of International Monetary Disorder: A Study of
United States International Monetary Policy From World War II to the
Present, (London, 1977).
William Bordern, The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic
Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery: 1945-1955, (Madison, Wisconsin,
1984).
Chester Bowles, "Ihe "China Problem" Reconsidered", Foreign Affairs,
April 1960, Vol38, No 3, pp. 476-486.
-------, The New Dimensions of Peace, (London, 1956).
Henry Brandon, The Retreat of American Power: Nixon's and Kissingers
Foreign Policy and its effects, (London, 1973).
Michael J. Brenner, "The Problem of Innovation and the Nixon-Kissinger
Foreign Policy", International Studies Quarterly, No 13, September 1973,
pp. 255-294.
Lester H. Brune, The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and
Research, (Westport, Conn & London, 1996).
40J
David P. Calleo, The Imperious Economy, (Cambridge, Mass & London,
1982).
Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China and the
Soviet Union, 1948-1972, (Stanford, California, 1990).
'--, ..JFK, China, and the Bomb", Journal of American History, 1988,
pp. 1287-1309.
Warren I.Cohen, America's Response to China: An Interpretative History
of Sino-American Relations, (New York, 1980).
---, Dean Rusk, (Totowa, NJ, 1980).
------ & Akiri Iriye (Eds), The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960,
(New York, 1990).
------- & Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Eds), Lyndon Johnson Confronts the
World: American Foreign Policy, 1963-1968, (Cambridge, England,
1994).
Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Vol II: The Roaring of the
Cataract, 1947-1950, (Princeton, NJ, 1990).
Gregory T. D'Auria, "Present at the Rejuvenation: The Association of
Dean Acheson and Richard Nixon", Presidential Studies Quarterly, Spring
1988, No 18(2).
I.M. Destler, Haruhiro Fukui & Hideo Sato, The Textile Wrangle: Conflict
in Japanese Relations, 1969-1971, (Ithaca, NY & London, 1979).
Peter Dickson, Kissinger and the Meaning of History, (Cambridge,
England, 1978).
William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, (Boulder,
Colorado, 1981).
402
Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution, (Cambridge, England,
1977).
---, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade:
Implications for US Policy, (New York, 1966).
Paul Evans, John Fairbank and the American Understanding of Modem
China, (Oxford, 1985).
John King Fairbank, Chinawatch, (Cambridge, Mass & London, 1987).
-------, The United States and China, (Cambridge, Mass, 1973).
Edward Friedman & Mark Selden (Eds), America's Asia: Dissenting
Essays on Asian-American Relations, (New York, 1971).
David Frost, I Gave Them a Sword: Behind the Scenes of the Nixon
Interviews, (New York, 1978).
J. William Fulbright. The Arrogance of Power, (New York, 1966).
John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union and The United States: An
Interpretative History, (New York, 1990).
Lloyd Gardner (Ed), The Great Nixon Turnaround: America's New
Foreign Policy in the Post-Liberal Era, (New York, 1973).
Raymond Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet
Relations from Nixon to Reagan, (Washington, 1985).
J. L. S. Girling, "Kissingerism: The Enduring Problems", International
Affairs, Vol 51, No 3, July 1975.
John Gittings, "Ihe Great Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy",
China Quarterly, No 39, July-Sept 1969, pp. 41-54 .
.__ , The World and China, 1922-1972, (London, 1974).
Allan E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: America's Search fora Negotiated
403
Settlement of the Vietnam War, (Stanford, California, 1978).
leonard Gordon & Sydney Chang, "John K. Fairbank and his Critics in
the Republic of China", Journal of Asian Studies, 1970, pp. 137-149.
P. Edward Haley, Congress and the Fall of South Vietnam and
Cambodia, (london and Toronto, 1982).
Han Su Yin, Eldest Son: Zhou En-Iai and the Making of Modem China,
1898-1976, (london, 1994).
Anthony Hartley, "American Foreign Policy in the Nixon Era", The Adelphi
Papers No 110, 1974-5, The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Thomas R. H. Havens, Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and
Japan: 1965-1975, (Princeton, NJ, 1987).
Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White
House, (New York, 1983).
Ole R. Holsti & James N. Rosenau, American Leadership in World
Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus, (london, 1984).
Immanuel C. Y. HsO, The Rise of Modern China, (New York & Oxford,
1975 2nd edition).
---, The Rise of Modern China, (New York & Oxford, 1990 4th
edition).
Charles O. Hucker, The Association for Asian Studies: An Interpretative
History: AAS Occasional Papers N01, (Seattle & london, 1973).
Michael H. Hunt, Lyndon Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in
Vietnam, 1945-1968, (New York, 1996).
Akira lriye & Warren I. Cohen (Eds), The United States and Japan in the
Postwar World, (lexington, Kentucky, 1989).
404
Walter Isaacson, Kissinger, (New York, 1992).
Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War. The Making of the Sino-
American Confrontation, (New York, 1994).
E. J. Kahn Jr, The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and
What Befell Them, (New York, 1972).
Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, (London, 1974).
Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (New York, 1983).
Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream,
(London, 1976).
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York, 1994).
Ross Y. Koen, The China Lobby in American Politics, (New York, 1974).
Gabriel Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomy of a War, 1940-1975, (London, 1986).
Leonard A. Kusnitz, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: America's China
Policy: 1949-1979, (Westport, Conn & London, 1984).
Arnold Xiangze Jiang, The United States and China, (Chicago, 1988).
Walter La Feber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1984, (New
York, 1985).
---, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and
Abroad since 1750, (New York & London, 1989).
Kenneth Scott Latourette, The American Record in the Far East, 1945-
1951, (New York, 1952).
Callum A. MacDonald, Korea: The War Before Vietnam, (London, 1986).
--, "Vietnam: History by the Losers", The Pacific Review, Vol 5 No 4,
1992.
Ernest May and James Thomson (Eds), American-East Asian Relations:
405
A Survey, (Cambridge, Mass, 1972).
Richard Melanson & David Mayers (Eds), Re-evaluating Eisenhower:
American Foreign Policy in the 1950s, (Chicago, 1987).
Edwin E. Moise, The Present and the Past: Modem China: A History,
(London & New York, 1986).
Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American
Foreign Policy, (London, 1977).
Edward Neilan & Charles R. Smith, The Future of the China Market:
Prospects for Sino-American Trade, (Stanford, Calif, 1974).
Charles E. Neu, The Troubled Encounter: The United States and Japan,
(Malabar, Florida, 1975).
Robert P. Newman, Owen Lattimore and the "Loss" of China, (Berkeley,
Los Angeles & Oxford, 1992).
Richard Nixon, Six Crises, (New York, 1962).
John S. Odell, US International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and
Ideas as Sources of Change, (Princeton, NJ, 1982).
Michel Oksenberg & Robert B. Oxnam (Eds), Dragon and Eagle: United
States-China Relations: Past and Present, (New York, 1978).
Herbert S. Parmet, Richard Nixon and his America, (Boston, Toronto &
London, 1990).
Thomas Patterson & Dennis Merrill (Eds), Major Problems in American
Foreign Relations, Vol II: Since 1914, (Lexington, Mass & Toronto, 1995).
Gareth Porter, A Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the
Paris Agreement, (Bloomington, Indiana, & London, 1975).
David Rees, Korea: The Limited War, (London, 1964).
406
Thomas Reeves, A Question of Character: The Life of John F. Kennedy,
(New York & Ontario, 1991).
Edwin Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam, (New York, 1968).
John G. Roberts, "The "Japan Crowd" and the Zaibatsu Restoration",
Japan Interpreter, No 12, Summer 1979.
Howard Schaffer, Chester Bowles: New Dealer in the Cold War,
(Cambridge, Mass & London, 1993).
Robert D. Schulzinger, Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy, (New York,
1989).
Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean
War, 1950-1953, (Lawrence, Kansas, 1995).
Leonard Silk, Nixonomics: How the Dismal Science of Free Enterprise
became the Black Arts of Controls, (New York, 1972).
William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of
Cambodia, (London, 1980).
Holly Sklar (Ed), Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite
Planning for World Management, (Boston, 1980).
Harvey Starr, Henry Kissinger: Perceptions of International Politics,
(Lexington, Kentucky, 1984).
A. T. Steele, The American People and China: A Volume in the Series
"The United States and China in World Affairs", (New York, Toronto &
London, 1966).
Paula Stern, Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American
Foreign Policy, (London, 1979).
C. L. Sulzberger, The World and Richard Nixon, (New York, 1987).
407
Robert G. Sutter, The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of US
China Policy: 1972-1982, (Boulder, Colorado, 1983).
---, China-Watch: Sino-American Reconciliation, (Baltimore &
London, 1978).
Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace, (New York, 1978).
John N. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and
American Politics, (Seattle & London, 1974).
James C. Thomson Jr, "On the Making of U.S. China Policy: A Study in
Bureaucratic Pofltics", The China Quarterly, April-June 1972.
Barbara Tuchman, "If Mao had come to Washington: An Essay in
Alternatives", Foreign Affairs, October 1972.
Raymond Vernon, The Economic and Political Consequences of
Multinational Enterprise, (Boston, 1972).
Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decisions to Enter the Korean
War, (New York, 1960).
----, "Sino-American Detente", The China Quarterly, June 1980, pp.
334-341.
Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United
States Experience, 1953-1967, (New York, 1968).
Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars: 1945-1990, (New York, 1991).
Donald Zag aria (Ed), Soviet Policy in East Asia, (New Haven, Conn &
London, 1982).
UNPUBLISHED THESIS:
Kevin Quigley, MA Thesis, "The Nixon Presidency and the Search for a
New U.S. Policy in Asia", (Warwick University, November 1993).
408
MISCELLANEOUS:
I have use of the information presented on the H-Net discussion list H·
Diplo. This can be found at www.h-net.msu.edu
409
ABBREVIA TIONS
AAS
ACLS
ADA
AOS
ARVN
BCAS
CAP
CIA
CCAS
CCP
CFR
CbiCom
CbiComs
CbiRep
DOD
FAR
FE
FEA
FDR
GRe
JPR
JAS
JCCC
JFK
LT
KMT
LBJ
MACV
MIT
Association of Asian Studies
American Council of Learned Societies
Americans for Democratic Action
American Oriental Society
Anny of the Republic of Vietnam
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
China Advisory Panel
Central Intelligence Agency
Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars
Chinese Communist Party
Council on Foreign Relations
Chinese Communist
Chinese Communists
China and the question of their representation in the United Nations
Department of Defense
Foreign Area Research Coordination Group
Far East
Far Eastern Association
Franklin Delano Roosevelt
Government of the Republic of China
Institute of Pacific Relations
Journal of Asian Studies
Joint Committee on Contemporary China
John Fitzgerald Kennedy
Lieutenant
Guomindang or Kuomintang
Lyndon Baines Johnson
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
410
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDEA National Defense Education Act
NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM National Security Study Memorandum
NSC National Security Council
OSS Office of Strategic Services
OWl Office of War Information
PRC People's Republic of China
ROC Republic of China
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organization
SRC Survey Research Center
SSRC Social Science Research Council
(It (o."~,.",, .. ,
University l f Los AngelesUCLA
UN United Nations
WSAG Washington Special Actions Group
World Trade AssociationWTA
